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(1) 
I. Executive Summary 
INTRODUCTION 
The China of today is vastly different from that of 30 years ago, 
when major economic reforms began, and even 10 years ago, when 
China acceded to the World Trade Organization. More people in to-
day’s China enjoy an improved quality of life, economic freedoms, 
and greater access to information via the Internet and other com-
munication technologies. But economic and technological progress 
has not led to commensurate gains in China’s human rights and 
rule of law record. 
In the areas of human rights and rule of law this year, China’s 
leaders have grown more assertive in their violation of rights, dis-
regarding the very laws and international standards that they 
claim to uphold and tightening their grip on Chinese society. Chi-
na’s leaders have done this while confidently touting their own 
human rights and rule of law record. This year, officials declared 
that China had reached a ‘‘major milestone’’ in its legal system and 
made ‘‘remarkable achievements’’ in carrying out its 2009–2010 
National Human Rights Action Plan, asserting that ‘‘civil and polit-
ical rights have been effectively protected.’’ China’s leaders no 
longer respond to criticism by simply denying that rights have been 
abused. Rather, they increasingly use the language of international 
law to defend their actions. According to China’s leaders, today’s 
China is strong and moving forward on human rights and rule of 
law. 
Official rhetoric notwithstanding, China’s human rights and rule 
of law record has not improved. Indeed, as this year’s Annual Re-
port indicates, it appears to be worsening in some areas. A trou-
bling trend is officials’ increased willingness to disregard the law 
when it suits them, particularly to silence dissent. Beginning in 
February 2011, Chinese police took the unusual step of ‘‘dis-
appearing’’ numerous lawyers and activists in one of the harshest 
crackdowns in recent memory. It was no surprise, then, that in 
sensitive issue areas such as China’s population planning policy, 
local government officials demonstrated little restraint in turning 
to illegal measures, including violence, to coerce compliance with a 
policy that itself violates international human rights standards. 
Lack of respect for the rule of law extended into the international 
arena, where China pursued domestic subsidies and industrial poli-
cies inconsistent with China’s commitments as a member of the 
World Trade Organization. 
The Chinese government’s misuse of the law to violate funda-
mental human rights continued. The Commission observed officials 
citing the ‘‘law’’ as a basis to crack down on peaceful protests; to 
prevent Buddhists, Catholics, Falun Gong practitioners, Muslims, 
Protestants, and Taoists from freely practicing their beliefs; to pre-
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vent Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic minorities from exer-
cising autonomy despite guarantees in Chinese law; to prevent 
workers from independently organizing; and to clamp down on civil 
society organizations. The Communist Party tightened its grip at 
all levels of society, stepping up monitoring of citizens and social 
groups and stifling attempts at independent political participation 
and advocacy for democracy. 
Along with negative developments, there have been some hopeful 
signs, notably at the grassroots level. The Commission observed the 
courage of citizens calling for justice, as when daring journalists 
and millions of Internet users outmaneuvered censors to raise 
questions about the government’s response to a high-speed rail 
crash, or when members of the Shouwang Church openly defied the 
government to hold outdoor worship services in Beijing. The Com-
mission also continued to observe well-intentioned officials and in-
dividuals seeking to bring about positive changes within the sys-
tem. Such actions testify to the Chinese people’s desire for a just 
society and their willingness to be productive partners in pursuit 
of that aim. 
Human rights and rule of law developments in China are impor-
tant to the rest of the world. The rights to freedom of expression, 
association, and religion are universal and transcend borders. 
These rights are provided for in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, two documents that China has publicly supported. 
When the Chinese government and Communist Party deny these 
rights, as when they censor the press and Internet and restrict ac-
cess to courts, citizens worldwide—not just in China—know less 
about issues such as poisoned food, unsafe products, natural and 
man-made disasters, and infectious disease, and have less recourse 
to hold officials accountable. Moreover, the Chinese government’s 
respect for human rights and rule of law domestically serves as an 
important barometer for China’s compliance and cooperation inter-
nationally, from trade agreements to issues of common global con-
cern. Finally, as recent years have shown, China’s increasing con-
fidence in and defense of its human rights record risk setting nega-
tive precedents for other countries and reshaping international 
human rights standards to allow for China’s abuses. China’s stri-
dent justification this past year of its imprisonment of the Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, and the refusal of some govern-
ments to send representatives to the Nobel ceremony, exemplify 
this trend. 
This is the Commission’s 10th Annual Report on China’s human 
rights and rule of law developments. As in the past, the Commis-
sion has assessed the Chinese government’s record on the basis of 
China’s own Constitution and laws and international human rights 
standards, relying on research based in large part on reports and 
articles published in China. As Commission research has shown 
this past year, Chinese officials continue to deny Chinese citizens 
their rights in order to preserve the Communist Party’s notion of 
political stability and harmony. China’s stability is in the United 
States’ best interest, but the Commission believes that stability 
will not result from repressing rights for perceived short-term gain, 
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but only by ensuring and protecting the rights of all Chinese citi-
zens. 
OVERVIEW 
Below is a discussion of the major trends that the Commission 
observed during the 2011 reporting year, covering the period from 
fall 2010 to fall 2011. 
DISREGARD FOR THE LAW 
The Commission observed Chinese officials disregarding the law 
to deny Chinese citizens the freedoms of speech, association, and 
religion, and the right to be free from arbitrary detention, as well 
as Chinese officials refusing to abide by international commit-
ments: 
• Disappearance of Human Rights Lawyers and Activ-
ists. In the first half of 2011, authorities reportedly ‘‘dis-
appeared’’ numerous lawyers and rights activists known for 
criticizing the Communist Party and for advocating on behalf 
of politically sensitive causes and groups. The ‘‘disappear-
ances,’’ in which persons went missing with little or no word 
of their whereabouts or the charges against them, violated the 
limited procedural protections provided under Chinese law and 
drew the criticism of the UN Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances and of the international commu-
nity. The missing included the well-known artist and public 
advocate Ai Weiwei, who was kept at a secret location for 81 
days before being released on bail on the condition that he not 
grant interviews or send Twitter messages. Following the 
crackdown, the Chinese government announced a draft revi-
sion to its Criminal Procedure Law that would legalize such 
disappearances. 
• Population Planning. Although Chinese law prohibits offi-
cials from infringing on the rights and interests of citizens 
when promoting compliance with population planning policies, 
the Commission noted reports of official campaigns, as well as 
numerous individual cases in which officials used violent meth-
ods to coerce citizens to undergo sterilizations or abortions or 
pay heavy fines for having ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children. In one such 
example, in October 2010, local family planning officials in 
Xiamen city, Fujian province, reportedly kidnapped a woman 
who was eight months pregnant with her second child and de-
tained her for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her with 
a substance that caused the fetus to be aborted. During this 
time, the woman’s husband reportedly was not permitted to 
see her. 
• Worker Rights. China’s Constitution and international 
human rights standards provide for freedom of association, but 
workers in China are still denied their fundamental right to or-
ganize independent unions, despite some potentially positive 
but limited developments this past year (see below). Instead, 
workers must rely on a Party-controlled union to represent 
them. Without genuine labor representation, Chinese workers 
continue to face poor working conditions and harassment when 
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they seek to advocate independently for their rights. Worker 
safety issues, especially among miners, and child labor re-
mained serious problems. 
• Extralegal Confinement of Released Activists, Peti-
tioners. Hu Jia, a human rights and environmental advocate, 
and Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal advocate who pub-
licized population planning abuses, were released from prison 
this year only to face, along with their families, onerous condi-
tions of detention and abuse with little or no basis in Chinese 
law. In Chen’s case, authorities kept him and his wife under 
extralegal house arrest and allegedly beat them after video 
footage of their conditions was smuggled out of the house and 
released on an overseas Web site. In addition, officials contin-
ued to hold Mongol rights advocate Hada after completion of 
his prison sentence in December 2010. The legal basis under 
Chinese law, if any, for his continued custody is unclear. Chi-
nese and international media also reported on the ongoing 
problem of ‘‘black jails,’’ which are extralegal detention facili-
ties used to house and abuse citizens who persistently petition 
the government about their grievances. 
• Commercial Rule of Law. China continued to implement 
policies that are inconsistent with its commitments as a mem-
ber of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and are incompat-
ible with the rule of law. Industrial policies limit market access 
for non-Chinese companies and in some cases violate the core 
WTO principle of national treatment; state-owned enterprises 
enjoy direct and indirect subsidies, including land and regu-
latory protection, which is contrary to China’s WTO commit-
ments. Favoring state-owned enterprises has implications for 
human rights, including the taking of land to subsidize produc-
tion and the use of the state secrets law to protect information 
in the state-owned sector. WTO cases this past year addressed 
the impact of China’s policies on its trading partners in indus-
tries ranging from tires to wind energy. These cases highlight 
Chinese support of its domestic industry, China’s use of quotas 
and subsidies, the lack of transparency, and the fear of retalia-
tion against foreign companies that speak up. China continued 
to control its currency, which many economists and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund consider to be undervalued. 
• Ethnic Minority Language and Culture. In Tibetan au-
tonomous areas of China, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and other mi-
nority areas, the government continued to promote policies 
threatening the viability of the language and culture of Tibet-
ans, Uyghurs, Mongols, and other groups, in contravention of 
China’s Constitution and law providing autonomy to ethnic mi-
norities. These policies included the imposition of Mandarin 
Chinese language in schools at the expense of other languages, 
the compulsory resettlement of large numbers of nomads, tight 
curbs over religious practice, and economic development 
projects that threatened livelihoods and sacred sites. 
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MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW AS A TOOL FOR REPRESSION 
The Commission also noted the continuance of Chinese officials 
abusing and strengthening laws as a tool for repression and to 
deny citizens the basic freedoms of speech, association, and reli-
gion, and the right to be free from arbitrary detention. 
• Criminal and Administrative Law. Official abuse of Chi-
nese criminal law and administrative provisions prohibiting 
‘‘subversion,’’ ‘‘splittism,’’ and ‘‘disrupting social order’’ re-
mained a significant concern this reporting year. Chinese offi-
cials used these provisions to imprison labor advocates, writ-
ers, Internet essayists, democracy advocates, and Tibetan and 
Uyghur writers and journalists who engaged in peaceful ex-
pression and assembly. These included labor lawyer and advo-
cate Zhao Dongmin, three Tibetans—Buddha (pen name), 
Jangtse, and Kalsang Jinpa—democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, 
Uyghur journalist Memetjan Abdulla, and numerous other ad-
vocates swept up in the domestic crackdown that followed pro-
tests in the Middle East and North Africa and the calls for 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in China. In August, China’s top legislature 
reviewed a draft amendment of the Criminal Procedure Law 
that would legalize the current practice of forcibly ‘‘dis-
appearing’’ rights advocates in violation of international stand-
ards. 
• Internet Regulation. The Chinese government sought to 
tighten its supervision of Internet activities, establishing in 
May 2011 a State Internet Information Office to ‘‘strengthen 
[the state’s] supervision of online content.’’ Reports indicated 
that officials also stepped up measures to monitor Internet use 
in public places. The total number of Web sites in China re-
portedly decreased dramatically as a result of greater state 
intervention. 
• Religious Regulation. The Chinese government continued 
to formally recognize only five religions and to require groups 
belonging to these religions to register with the government 
and submit to ongoing state control. Unregistered worshippers 
and those practicing unrecognized beliefs continued to face har-
assment. 
Æ Buddhists and Taoists. Authorities maintained a re-
strictive framework for controlling Buddhist and Taoist 
doctrines, practices, worship sites, and religious personnel. 
Æ Catholics. Authorities continued to harass and detain 
Catholics who worshipped outside state-controlled param-
eters. The state-controlled church forced some bishops to 
attend the ordination ceremonies of two bishops ordained 
without Holy See approval—the first such ordinations 
since late 2006—as well as a December 2010 state-con-
trolled church conference. 
Æ Falun Gong. Officials continued to carry out a cam-
paign—lasting more than a decade—of extensive, system-
atic, and in some cases violent efforts to pressure Falun 
Gong practitioners to renounce their beliefs. This year, of-
ficials were in the second year of a three-year campaign 
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that included greater funding and government measures to 
achieve these goals. 
Æ Protestants. Officials took into custody or confined to 
their homes hundreds of members of unregistered Protes-
tant congregations who assembled into large groups or 
across congregations. These included members of the 
Shouwang Church, which had not registered with the au-
thorities, after they attempted to hold large-scale outdoor 
services in Beijing. 
• Regulations in Ethnic Minority Regions. 
Æ Tibetans. Governments at prefecture levels or above 
issued or drafted a series of regulations to tighten state 
control over Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, 
monks, and nuns. 
Æ Uyghurs. Following demonstrations and riots in the 
Xinjiang region in 2009, authorities there maintained re-
pressive security policies that targeted peaceful dissent, 
human rights advocacy, and expressions of cultural and re-
ligious identity, especially among Uyghurs. 
TIGHTENING PARTY CONTROL OVER SOCIETY 
The Commission observed the Communist Party’s attempts to 
strengthen control over many aspects of society in ways that 
threatened basic human rights of freedom of expression, associa-
tion, and religion. Authorities created new institutions and stepped 
up monitoring of citizens and groups in the name of ‘‘comprehen-
sive management of public security’’ and ‘‘safeguarding social sta-
bility.’’ In some cities, Party monitoring was extended into commer-
cial buildings and local officials packaged ‘‘social management’’ 
tasks with government service delivery in expanded monitoring of 
neighborhoods. Party wariness of the formation of independent net-
works, whether among Chinese citizens or between Chinese citi-
zens and foreign groups, remained a prominent feature in many 
policies. 
• Democratic Governance and Political Participation. 
Top officials continued to insist that there would be no 
multiparty elections or separation of powers and that the goal 
of any political reform—whether it is of the political system or 
of the media—must be to strengthen, not weaken, the Party’s 
leadership. The use of the Internet by independent candidates 
running in local people’s congress elections emerged as a hope-
ful sign for grassroots attempts at democracy, but the Party 
discouraged such candidates, and local officials took repressive 
measures to stop them. The Party sought to monopolize village 
leadership positions. Authorities continued to have no toler-
ance for certain democracy advocates, for example restricting 
the freedom of movement of elections expert Yao Lifa. 
• Media and Internet. Party officials maintained heavy cen-
sorship of the Internet, media, and publishing, including lim-
iting coverage of public disasters and health emergencies, and 
silencing well-known journalists such as Chang Ping. Repres-
sion of foreign journalists peaked after they attempted to cover 
the calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests. 
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• Negotiations With the Dalai Lama. Regarding the status 
of negotiations between Chinese officials and the Dalai Lama 
or his representatives, no formal dialogue between the two 
sides took place this past year, the longest break since dialogue 
resumed in 2002. Officials continued their campaign to dis-
credit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader. For his part, the 
Dalai Lama renounced an official role in exiled Tibetan govern-
ance, a move that could alter the dialogue dynamics by making 
it more difficult for officials to characterize him as a ‘‘political’’ 
figure. 
PROGRESS CLAIMED; IMPACT UNCLEAR 
This past year, the Chinese government announced new meas-
ures related to human rights and the rule of law, but the actual 
impact was unclear or negative. 
• Civil Society. Beijing and Shanghai reportedly conducted 
limited reforms to potentially make it easier for certain types 
of civil society organizations to register with the government, 
but some experts argued that the moves could solidify the gov-
ernment’s already tight control over which types of civil society 
organizations are allowed to operate in China. 
• Death Penalty Reform. In order to limit application of the 
death penalty, for which statistics remain a state secret, au-
thorities amended the PRC Criminal Law to reduce the num-
ber of crimes punishable by death from 68 to 55. In practice 
authorities rarely, if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 
reclassified crimes. 
• Access to Justice. Officials promoted a new mediation law, 
effective in January 2011, as the preferred method of resolving 
disputes and maintaining social stability. While mediation may 
be effective in some cases, the courts’ emphasis on this form 
of dispute resolution raised questions about denying access to 
courts, increasing pressure on courts and parties to mediate 
cases, and weakening the rule of law. 
• Village Governance. Local authorities continued to imple-
ment pilot projects in villages to reduce corruption, maintain 
‘‘social stability,’’ improve budget transparency, and promote 
‘‘democratic’’ public participation, but the sustainability and 
impact of these projects are unclear. 
• Environment. Some central-level authorities continued to 
state their support for public participation and took steps to 
improve environmental information disclosure. An administra-
tive provision limiting the disclosure of basic pollution informa-
tion, however, appeared to remain in effect, and local environ-
mental authorities continued to be reluctant to disclose infor-
mation, especially in relation to polluting industries. In addi-
tion, central-level environmental officials issued a measure 
that states support for social organizations and encourages 
closer cooperation between government officials and environ-
mental groups, but also stipulates strengthening ‘‘guidance’’ of 
and ‘‘political thought’’ work for environmental groups. 
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POTENTIAL FOR PROGRESS 
In a few areas, the Commission observed developments that 
could bring about positive change in human rights and the rule of 
law in China depending on implementation and other factors. 
• Mental Health. After decades of preparation, officials re-
leased a draft national mental health law in June 2011 that 
could curb abuse of the diagnosis of mental illness to detain in 
psychiatric institutions persons who voice dissent. 
• Government Transparency. Officials continued to state 
their support for open government information initiatives, and 
the number of government agencies publicly disclosing general 
information about their budgets reportedly increased. However, 
a number of fundamental obstacles to transparency remained 
in place, including China’s state secrets laws, lack of a free 
press and independent judiciary, and policies requiring govern-
ment approvals of investments through a non-transparent 
process. 
• Worker Rights. Faced in part with the demands of a young-
er, more assertive workforce and pressure to maintain social 
stability, Chinese officials introduced limited steps that could 
improve conditions for workers. A law on social insurance took 
effect that deals with work-related injury insurance, and au-
thorities reportedly continued to consider a draft national wage 
regulation. It remains unclear whether such measures will 
help address unequal wealth distribution and streamline work-
er compensation procedures. 
• Citizen Participation on the Internet. Government ini-
tiatives to expand access to the Internet, including access 
among rural residents, have contributed to creating an online 
space that Chinese citizens have utilized to express concern 
over human rights and government policies. The government 
and Party, however, continued to heavily censor the Internet 
and to promote its use for economic development and propa-
ganda. 
• Anticorruption. The government continued limited anti- 
corruption measures, including steps to prevent corruption at 
the grassroots level, to curb judicial corruption, and to crim-
inalize bribery of foreign officials by Chinese companies oper-
ating overseas. Officials issued provisions calling for the pro-
motion of an ‘‘honest’’ Party and a ‘‘clean’’ government. Despite 
some new regulatory language, protections for whistleblowers 
remain inadequate. 
• Access to Justice. Chinese officials reportedly took some 
steps to expand legal aid and to promote administrative law re-
forms that seek to provide greater oversight of state agencies 
and government employees and to protect citizens’ interests. 
• Property Rights. Regulations covering expropriation of 
urban housing came into effect in January 2011. If fully imple-
mented, the regulations could offer greater protection for urban 
homeowners. Rural landowners, however, lack equivalent pro-
tection. 
• Criminal Procedure Reforms. In August, China’s top leg-
islature reviewed a draft amendment to the Criminal Proce-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
9 
dure Law, which includes revisions that aim to prohibit forced 
self-incrimination, bar the use of evidence obtained through 
torture, and permit Chinese criminal defense attorneys to meet 
criminal defendants in custody without being monitored. 
The Commission’s Executive Branch members have participated in 
and supported the work of the Commission. The content of this An-
nual Report, including its findings, views, and recommendations, 
does not necessarily reflect the views of individual Executive Branch 
members or the policies of the Administration. 
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SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A summary of specific findings follows below for each section of 
this Annual Report, covering each area that the Commission mon-
itors. In each area, the Commission has identified a set of issues 
that merit attention over the next year, and, in accordance with 
the Commission’s legislative mandate, submits for each a set of rec-
ommendations to the President and the Congress for legislative or 
executive action. 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese offi-
cials continued to maintain a broad range of restrictions on 
free expression that do not comply with international human 
rights standards, including Article 19 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While such stand-
ards permit states in limited circumstances to restrict expres-
sion to protect interests such as national security and public 
order, Chinese restrictions covered a much broader range of ac-
tivity, including expression critical of the Communist Party 
and peaceful dissent. Despite this, Chinese officials continue to 
point to Internet development in China as proof of freedom of 
expression and to argue that Chinese restrictions comply with 
international law, including in the case of imprisoned Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo. 
• This past year was marked by a major crackdown on Inter-
net and press freedom that exemplified the range of tools offi-
cials can use to restrict the free flow of information. The crack-
down began in mid-February following protests in the Middle 
East and North Africa and the appearance of online calls for 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in China. 
• While international and domestic observers continued to 
note the vibrancy of Internet and cell phone use in China, gov-
ernment and Party officials showed little sign of loosening po-
litical control. Top leaders, including President Hu Jintao, 
called for ‘‘strengthening’’ the Party’s guidance of online public 
opinion, as well as the Party’s leadership over the Internet. Of-
ficials established a central-level agency to tighten supervision 
of the Internet and issued regulations to increase monitoring 
of Internet use in public places. Censors continued to block the 
sharing of online information that officials deemed to be politi-
cally sensitive, including news of the Nobel Peace Prize award 
to imprisoned intellectual and reform advocate Liu Xiaobo, the 
calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests, and words such as ‘‘human rights’’ 
and ‘‘democracy.’’ At times, citizen expression on China’s 
microblogs overwhelmed censors, including following the 
Wenzhou high-speed train accident in July 2011. 
• Officials insisted that any reform of the media industry 
would result in ‘‘no change in the Party’s control over the 
media.’’ Officials continued to issue broad guidance, such as 
telling the media it was their ‘‘common responsibility’’ to pro-
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mote the 90th anniversary of the Party’s founding. Officials 
also continued to issue specific directives, such as how to cover 
the protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the 
award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Harassment of 
foreign journalists reached a new height this past year, includ-
ing beatings and threats of expulsion of journalists who at-
tempted to report on the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest strolls. 
• Officials continued to arbitrarily restrict expression by abus-
ing vague criminal law provisions and abusing broad regula-
tions and registration requirements applicable to journalists, 
publishers, news media, and the Internet. Citizens who criti-
cized the government were charged with national security 
crimes such as ‘‘subversion.’’ Official campaigns to train and 
supervise journalists conducted in the name of combating cor-
ruption continued to be heavily imbued with political indoc-
trination. Officials continued to use campaigns they described 
as intended to enforce the law to instead target ‘‘illegal’’ polit-
ical and religious publications. Such publications included ones 
that ‘‘defame the Party and state leaders’’ or ‘‘contain political 
rumors that create ideological confusion.’’ 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Raise concerns over and draw enhanced international atten-
tion to the Chinese government’s continued insistence that its 
restrictions on freedom of expression are consistent with inter-
national standards. Chinese officials assert that such measures 
are taken to protect national security or public order when 
available information indicates that many measures are aimed 
at silencing opposition to the Party or blocking the free flow of 
information on politically sensitive topics. Emphasize that the 
Chinese government’s position undermines international 
human rights standards for free expression, particularly those 
contained in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and Articles 19 and 29 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Emphasize to Chinese officials 
that Communist Party and government censorship of the Inter-
net and the press can lead to instability by eroding public faith 
in the media and government. 
Æ Engage in dialogue and exchanges with Chinese officials on 
the issue of how governments can best ensure that restrictions 
on freedom of expression are not abused and do not exceed the 
scope necessary to protect national security, minors, and public 
order. Emphasize the importance of procedural protections 
such as public participation in formulation of restrictions on 
free expression, transparency regarding implementation of 
such restrictions, and independent review of such restrictions. 
Reiterate Chinese officials’ own calls for greater transparency 
and public participation in lawmaking. Such discussions may 
be part of a broader discussion on how both the U.S. and Chi-
nese governments can work together to ensure the protection 
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of common interests on the Internet, including protecting mi-
nors, computer security, and privacy. 
Æ Acknowledge the Chinese government’s efforts to expand ac-
cess to the Internet and cell phones, especially in rural areas, 
while continuing to press officials to comply with international 
standards. Support the research and development of tech-
nologies that enable Chinese citizens to access and share polit-
ical and religious content that they are entitled to access and 
share under international human rights standards. Support 
practices and Chinese-language tools and training materials 
that enable Chinese citizens to access and share content in a 
way that ensures their security and privacy. Support the dis-
semination of online Chinese-language information on the 
Internet, especially popular Chinese social media sites, that 
discusses the rights and freedoms to which Chinese citizens 
are entitled under international standards. 
Æ Raise concerns regarding Chinese officials’ instrumental use 
of the law, including vague national security charges, as a tool 
to suppress citizens’ rights to freedom of expression, and ques-
tion whether such actions are in keeping with the spirit of the 
‘‘rule of law.’’ 
Æ Elevate concern over the increased harassment of foreign 
journalists, who this past year have been beaten and threat-
ened with expulsion for attempting to report on events of pub-
lic concern. Emphasize that such treatment is not in keeping 
with regulations issued for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic 
Games in which Chinese officials promised greater freedoms 
for foreign journalists, and is not in keeping with the treat-
ment Chinese journalists are afforded when reporting on 
events in the United States. 
Æ Call for the release of Liu Xiaobo and other political pris-
oners imprisoned for allegedly committing crimes of endan-
gering state security and other crimes but whose only offense 
was to peacefully express support for political reform or criti-
cism of government policies, including Tan Zuoren (sentenced 
in February 2010 to five years in prison after using the Inter-
net to organize an independent investigation into school col-
lapses in an earthquake). 
WORKER RIGHTS 
Findings 
• Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or 
in practice, full worker rights in accordance with international 
standards, including the right to organize into independent 
unions. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
the official union under the direction of the Communist Party, 
is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower 
level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU. 
• The Commission continues to note the lack of genuine labor 
representation in China. ACFTU officials continue to state that 
it is their goal to develop stronger representation for workers. 
In January 2011, for example, the ACFTU announced its plan 
to establish a system of electing worker representatives in 80 
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percent of unionized public enterprises and 70 percent of 
unionized non-public enterprises in 2011. In March 2011, 
Zhang Mingqi, the vice chairman of the ACFTU, acknowledged 
that an increase in worker actions was due to enterprises hav-
ing ‘‘neglected the legal rights and benefits of workers’’ for 
many years. Multiple localities in China also announced plans 
to establish collective wage consultation systems in coming 
years, including Qingdao, Changde, Rizhao, Qinhuangdao, and 
Shenzhen. 
• At the same time, advocates for worker rights in China con-
tinue to be subjected to harassment and abuse. In particular, 
officials appear to target advocates who have the ability to or-
ganize and mobilize large groups of workers. For example, in 
October 2010, a Xi’an court sentenced labor lawyer and advo-
cate Zhao Dongmin to three years in prison for organizing 
workers at state-owned enterprises. Authorities charged him 
with ‘‘mobilizing the masses to disrupt social order.’’ Authori-
ties continue to detain Yang Huanqing for organizing teachers 
in fall 2010 to petition against social insurance policies they al-
leged to be unfair. 
• As the Commission found in 2010, Chinese authorities con-
tinue to face the challenge of accommodating a younger, more 
educated, and rights-conscious workforce. In February 2011, 
the ACFTU released a set of policy recommendations intended 
to better address the demands of these young workers. Young-
er workers, born in the 1980s and 1990s, continue to be at the 
forefront of worker actions in China this year, including large- 
scale street protests in southern China in June 2011. These 
young workers also make up about 100 million of China’s 160 
million migrant workers, and compared to their parents, have 
higher expectations regarding wages and labor rights. China’s 
Minister of Agriculture Han Changfu has pointed out that 
many of these young workers have never laid down roots, are 
better educated, are the only child in the family, and are more 
likely to ‘‘demand, like their urban peers, equal employment, 
equal access to social services, and even the obtainment of 
equal political rights.’’ 
• With Chinese officials charged with preserving ‘‘social sta-
bility,’’ the extent to which they will allow workers to bargain 
for higher wages and genuine representation remains unclear. 
In part to address official concern over the unequal distribution 
of wealth across China and its potential effects on ‘‘social un-
rest,’’ the government reportedly is considering a national reg-
ulation on wages. Chinese media in the past year reported that 
the draft regulation includes provisions creating a ‘‘normal in-
crease mechanism’’ for wages, defining a set of standards to 
calculate overtime pay, and requiring the management of cer-
tain ‘‘monopolized industries’’ (longduan qiye) to disclose to the 
government and the public the salary levels of their senior em-
ployees. 
• The Commission continued to monitor the progress of 
Guangdong province’s draft Regulations on Democratic Man-
agement of Enterprises, which reportedly would extend to 
workers the right to ask for collective wage consultations and 
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allow worker members to sit on the enterprise’s board of direc-
tors and board of supervisors, represent worker interests in the 
boards’ meetings, and take part in the enterprise’s decision-
making processes. In September 2010, the Standing Committee 
of the Guangdong People’s Congress reportedly withdrew the 
draft from further consideration due to heavy opposition from 
industry. During this reporting year, a major Hong Kong 
media source reported that Guangdong authorities would ap-
prove the draft in January 2011. However, no such action has 
been observed. 
• Chinese workers, especially miners, continued to face per-
sistent occupational safety issues. In November 2010, the 
ACFTU released figures showing a 32 percent increase in occu-
pational illnesses in 2009, of which the vast majority involved 
lung disease. Officials took some efforts to close some mines 
and promote safety, and fatalities have been consistently re-
duced over the past few years, but uneven enforcement report-
edly continued to hinder such efforts. Collusion between mine 
operators and local officials reportedly remains widespread. 
• In January 2011, revisions to the Regulations on Work-Re-
lated Injury Insurance became effective. The changes include 
requiring officials to respond more quickly to worker injury 
claims, but the effectiveness of the changes is unclear. As the 
Commission reported last year, the claims process may last for 
more than a decade. The process is further complicated for mi-
grant workers who may already have left their jobs and moved 
to another location by the time clinical symptoms surface. 
• The extent of child labor in China is unclear in part because 
the government does not release data on child labor despite 
frequent requests by the U.S. Government, other countries’ 
governments, and international organizations. While a national 
legal framework exists to address the issue, systemic problems 
in enforcement have dulled the effects of these legal measures. 
Reports of child labor continued to surface this past year. As 
an example, in March 2011, Shenzhen authorities reportedly 
found 40 children working at an electronics factory. 
• The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed 
the PRC Social Insurance Law in October 2010, and it became 
effective on July 1, 2011. The law specifies that workers may 
transfer their insurance from one region to another and dis-
cusses five major types of insurance: Old-age pension, medical, 
unemployment, work-related injury, and maternity. No imple-
menting guidelines have been released and some critics have 
said the law is too broad to be implemented effectively. In ad-
dition, the extent to which the law will enable a greater num-
ber of migrant workers to obtain social insurance remains un-
clear. At the same time, migrant workers continued to face dis-
crimination in urban areas, and their children still faced dif-
ficulties accessing city schools. Employment discrimination 
more generally continued to be a serious problem, especially 
for workers without urban household registration status. 
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Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support projects promoting reform of Chinese labor laws and 
regulations to reflect internationally recognized labor prin-
ciples. Prioritize projects that not only focus on legislative 
drafting and regulatory development, but also analyze imple-
mentation and measure progress in terms of compliance with 
internationally recognized labor principles at the shop-floor 
level. 
Æ Support multi-year pilot projects that showcase the experi-
ence of collective bargaining in action for both Chinese workers 
and trade union officials; identify local trade union offices 
found to be more open to collective bargaining; and focus pilot 
projects in those locales. Where possible, prioritize programs 
that demonstrate the ability to conduct collective bargaining 
pilot projects even in factories that do not have an official 
union presence. Encourage the expansion of exchanges between 
Chinese labor rights advocates in non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), the bar, academia, the official trade union, and 
U.S. collective bargaining practitioners. Prioritize exchanges 
that emphasize face-to-face meetings with hands-on practi-
tioners and trainers. 
Æ Encourage research that identifies factors underlying incon-
sistency in enforcement of labor laws and regulations. This in-
cludes projects that prioritize the large-scale compilation and 
analysis of Chinese labor dispute litigation and arbitration 
cases and guidance documents issued by, and to, courts at the 
provincial level and below, leading ultimately to the publica-
tion and dissemination of Chinese language casebooks that 
may be used as a common reference resource by workers, arbi-
trators, judges, lawyers, employers, union officials, and law 
schools in China. 
Æ Support capacity-building programs to strengthen Chinese 
labor and legal aid organizations involved in defending the 
rights of workers. Encourage Chinese officials at local levels to 
develop, maintain, and deepen relationships with labor organi-
zations inside and outside of China and to invite these groups 
to increase the number of training programs in mainland 
China. Support programs that train workers in ways to iden-
tify problems at the factory-floor level, equipping them with 
skills and problem-solving training so they can relate their con-
cerns to employers effectively. 
Æ Where appropriate, share the United States’ ongoing experi-
ence and efforts in protecting worker rights—through legal, 
regulatory, or non-governmental means—with Chinese offi-
cials. Expand site visits and other exchanges for Chinese offi-
cials to observe and share ideas with U.S. labor rights groups, 
lawyers, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), and other 
regulatory agencies at all levels of U.S. Government that work 
on labor issues. 
Æ Support USDOL’s exchange with China’s Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) regarding setting 
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and enforcing minimum wage standards; strengthening social 
insurance; improving employment statistics; and promoting so-
cial dialogue and exchanges with China’s State Administration 
of Work Safety (SAWS) regarding improving workplace safety 
and health. Support the annual labor dialogue with China that 
USDOL started in 2010 and its plan for the establishment of 
a safety dialogue. Encourage discussion on the value of con-
structive interactions among labor NGOs, workers, employers, 
and government agencies. Encourage exchanges that empha-
size the importance of government transparency in developing 
stable labor relations and in ensuring full and fair enforcement 
of labor laws. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese 
government waged a broad-scale crackdown on human rights 
advocates, lawyers, bloggers, writers, and democracy activists. 
In early 2011, Chinese public security officials detained more 
than 200 advocates in a campaign that appeared related to of-
ficial sensitivity over recent protests in the Middle East and 
North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so-called 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protests within China. 
• Harassment and intimidation of human rights advocates and 
their families by Chinese government officials continued dur-
ing this reporting year. Public security authorities and unoffi-
cial personnel illegally monitored and subjected to periodic ille-
gal home confinement human rights defenders, petitioners, re-
ligious adherents, human rights lawyers, and their family 
members. Such mistreatment and abuse were evident particu-
larly in the leadup to sensitive dates and events, such as the 
Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony in December 2010 and the 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protests of early 2011. 
• Chinese officials continued to use various forms of extralegal 
detention against Chinese citizens, including human rights ad-
vocates, petitioners, and peaceful protesters. Those arbitrarily 
detained were often held in psychiatric hospitals or extralegal 
detention facilities and subjected to treatment inconsistent 
with international standards and protections found in China’s 
Constitution and the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. 
• Chinese criminal defense lawyers continue to confront obsta-
cles to practicing law without judicial interference or fear of 
prosecution. In cases that officials deemed ‘‘politically sen-
sitive,’’ criminal defense attorneys routinely faced harassment 
and abuse. Some suspects and defendants in sensitive cases 
were not able to have counsel of their own choosing and some 
were compelled to accept government-appointed defense coun-
sel. Abuses of Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law, which pre-
scribes criminal liability to lawyers who force or induce a wit-
ness to change his or her testimony or falsify evidence, con-
tinue to hinder effective criminal defense. 
• In February 2011, the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee reviewed and passed the eighth amendment to the 
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PRC Criminal Law, which reduced the number of crimes pun-
ishable by the death penalty to 55 crimes. The reduction sig-
naled the first time the Chinese government has reduced the 
number of crimes punishable by capital punishment since the 
PRC Criminal Law was enacted in 1979. International organi-
zations and the state-run media pointed out that courts rarely, 
if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 crimes no longer 
eligible for capital punishment. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Press the Chinese government to release immediately advo-
cates who are in prison or detention and to adhere to fair trial 
standards and ensure procedural protections for the approxi-
mately 40 human rights advocates in cases that have already 
gone to trial. 
Æ Support the establishment of exchanges between Chinese 
provincial law enforcement agencies and U.S. state law en-
forcement agencies to study policing, evidence collection, in-
mate rights, and other criminal justice reforms currently un-
derway in China. 
Æ Press the Chinese government to adopt the recommendation 
of the United Nations (UN) Committee against Torture to in-
vestigate and disclose the existence of ‘‘black jails’’ and other 
secret detention facilities as a first step toward abolishing such 
forms of extralegal detention. Ask the Chinese government to 
extend an invitation to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention to visit China. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to commit publicly to a spe-
cific timetable for its ratification of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, which the Chinese government 
signed in 1998 but has not yet ratified. Press the Chinese gov-
ernment to implement the principles asserted in its 2009–2010 
National Human Rights Action Plan, and request that the Chi-
nese government implement additional plans to advance 
human rights and the rule of law. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to amend the PRC Criminal 
Procedure Law to reflect the enhanced rights and protections 
for lawyers and detained suspects contained in the 2008 revi-
sion of the PRC Lawyers Law. Encourage Chinese officials to 
commit to a specific timetable for revision and implementation 
of the revised PRC Criminal Procedure Law. 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Findings 
• The Chinese government continued in the past reporting 
year to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. China’s 
Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief but limits 
protections for religious practice to ‘‘normal religious activi-
ties,’’ a term applied in a manner that falls short of inter-
national human rights protections for freedom of religion. The 
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government continued to recognize only five religions—Bud-
dhism, Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism, and Taoism—and 
required groups belonging to these religions to register with 
the government. Registered groups received some legal protec-
tion for their religious activities but remained subject to ongo-
ing state controls. Members of both unregistered and reg-
istered groups deemed to run afoul of state-set parameters for 
religion faced risk of harassment, detention, and other abuses. 
Some unregistered groups had space to practice their religions, 
but this limited tolerance did not amount to official recognition 
of these groups’ rights. Authorities also shut down the activi-
ties of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on other 
religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong. 
• The government continued to use law to control religious 
practice in China rather than protect the religious freedom of 
all Chinese citizens, accelerating efforts in the past reporting 
year to revise or pass new legal measures. Planned legal meas-
ures, like others passed in recent years, build on provisions 
contained in the 2005 Regulations on Religious Affairs (RRA). 
Recent legal measures have added more clarity to ambiguous 
provisions in the RRA but also have articulated more detailed 
levels of control. 
• Authorities continued to control Buddhist institutions and 
practices and take steps to curb ‘‘unauthorized’’ Buddhist tem-
ples. As of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 
Tibetan autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted 
regulatory measures that increase substantially state infringe-
ment on freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries 
and nunneries. 
• Authorities continued to deny Catholics the freedom to recog-
nize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to the 
practice of their faith, including selecting Chinese bishops. Au-
thorities continued to harass, detain, and place under surveil-
lance some unregistered priests and bishops, as well as forced 
some bishops to attend what the Holy See considers illegit-
imate state-controlled church events against their will. 
• Local governments across China continued to prohibit Mus-
lims from engaging in religious outreach and preaching activi-
ties independent of state-set parameters. In the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, officials integrated curbs over 
Islam into security campaigns and monitored mosques, placed 
restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Ramadan, con-
tinued campaigns to prevent Muslim men from wearing beards 
and women from wearing veils, and targeted ‘‘illegal’’ religious 
materials in censorship campaigns. 
• Cases of harassment and detention of Protestants since late 
2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities have intensified to-
ward Protestants who organize into large groups or across con-
gregations, or who have contact with foreign individuals or or-
ganizations. This past year, the government also called for 
‘‘guiding’’ members of unregistered Protestant groups to wor-
ship at registered sites. 
• Authorities maintained controls over Taoist activities and 
took steps to curb ‘‘feudal superstitious activities.’’ 
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• Authorities are currently in the second year of a three-year 
campaign to increase efforts to pressure Falun Gong practi-
tioners to renounce their belief in and practice of Falun Gong. 
This campaign is part of a broader campaign—lasting more 
than a decade—that reportedly has been extensive, systematic, 
and in some cases violent. Local authorities in Guangzhou city, 
Guangdong province, took measures to restrict the freedom of 
Falun Gong practitioners during the November 2010 Asian 
Games in Guangzhou, including detaining Falun Gong practi-
tioners on suspicion of ‘‘cult’’-related activity. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to guarantee to all citizens 
freedom of religion in accordance with Article 18 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and to remove the govern-
ment’s framework for recognizing only select religious commu-
nities for limited state protections. Stress to Chinese authori-
ties that freedom of religion includes the right to practice a re-
ligion, as well as the right to hold religious beliefs, and that 
China’s limited protections for ‘‘normal religious activities’’ do 
not meet protections for freedom of religion as defined by inter-
national human rights standards. Call on officials to integrate 
steps to protect freedom of religion into initiatives to improve 
human rights in China. Stress to the Chinese government that 
the right to freedom of religion includes: The right of Bud-
dhists to carry out activities in temples independent of state 
controls over religion, and the right of Tibetan Buddhists to ex-
press openly their respect or devotion to Tibetan Buddhist 
teachers, including the Dalai Lama; the right of Catholics to 
recognize the authority of the Holy See in matters relating to 
the practice of their faith, including to make bishop appoint-
ments; the right of Falun Gong practitioners to freely practice 
Falun Gong inside China; the right of Muslims to engage in re-
ligious outreach and preaching activities independent of state- 
set parameters and not face curbs on their internationally pro-
tected right to freedom of religion in the name of upholding 
‘‘stability’’; the right of Protestants to worship free from state 
controls over doctrine and to worship in unregistered house 
churches, free from harassment, detention, and other abuses; 
and the right of Taoists to interpret their faith free from state 
efforts to ban practices deemed as ‘‘feudal superstitions.’’ 
Æ Call for the release of Chinese citizens confined, detained, or 
imprisoned in retaliation for pursuing their right to freedom of 
religion (including the right to hold and exercise spiritual be-
liefs). Such prisoners include: Sonam Lhatso (Tibetan Buddhist 
nun sentenced in 2009 to 10 years’ imprisonment after she and 
other nuns staged a protest calling for Tibetan independence 
and the Dalai Lama’s long life and return to Tibet); Su Zhimin 
(an unregistered Catholic bishop who disappeared after being 
taken into police custody in 1996); Wang Zhiwen (Falun Gong 
practitioner serving a 16-year sentence for organizing peaceful 
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protests by Falun Gong practitioners in 1999); Nurtay Memet 
(Muslim man sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for a ‘‘su-
perstition’’-related activity connected to his religion); Fan 
Yafeng (a legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, and house 
church leader kept under home confinement since November 
2010 in connection with his advocacy for unregistered Protes-
tant communities and coinciding with a broader crackdown on 
rights advocates), as well as other prisoners mentioned in this 
report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 
Æ Call for officials to eliminate criminal and administrative 
penalties that target religion and spiritual movements and 
have been used to punish Chinese citizens for exercising their 
right to freedom of religion. Specifically, call for officials to 
eliminate Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law (which crim-
inalizes using a ‘‘cult’’ to undermine implementation of state 
laws) and Article 27 of the PRC Public Security Administration 
Punishment Law (which stipulates detention or fines for orga-
nizing or inciting others to engage in ‘‘cult’’ activities and for 
using cults or the ‘‘guise of religion’’ to disturb social order or 
to harm others’ health). 
Æ Support initiatives to provide technical assistance to the 
Chinese government in drafting legal provisions that protect, 
rather than restrain, freedom of religion for all Chinese citi-
zens. Promote exchanges to bring experts on religious freedom 
to China and support training classes for Chinese officials on 
international human rights standards for the protection of 
freedom of religion. Promote dialogue on religious freedom, in-
cluding information on protecting the rights of the range of re-
ligious communities and organizations, including faith-based 
groups that carry out social welfare activities. 
Æ Support non-governmental organizations that collect infor-
mation on conditions for religious freedom in China and that 
inform Chinese citizens of how to defend their right to freedom 
of religion against Chinese government abuses. Support organi-
zations that help religious practitioners to appeal prisoners’ 
sentences and orders to serve reeducation through labor stem-
ming from citizens’ exercise of freedom of religion; to challenge 
government seizure of property; and to challenge job discrimi-
nation based on religion. 
ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS 
Findings 
• In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities in China contin-
ued to face unique challenges in upholding their rights, as de-
fined in both Chinese and international law. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic minorities within a state ‘‘shall not be 
denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language.’’ The PRC Re-
gional Ethnic Autonomy Law stipulates some protections for 
minority rights and provides for a system of regional autonomy 
in designated areas. Limits in the substance and implementa-
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tion of state laws and policies, however, prevented minorities 
from fully enjoying their rights in line with international 
standards and from exercising meaningful autonomy in prac-
tice. 
• The government continued to recognize 55 groups as minor-
ity ‘‘nationalities’’ or ‘‘ethnicities’’ (shaoshu minzu) and exerted 
tightest control over groups deemed to challenge state author-
ity, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous 
areas, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See separate 
findings and recommendations on Xinjiang and Tibet within 
this section.] Government authorities continued to punish eth-
nic Mongols perceived to challenge state power or who at-
tempted to promote their rights. In the past year, authorities 
detained, sentenced to prison, or appeared to hold in extralegal 
detention a number of Mongols who aimed to protect their 
rights or preserve Mongol culture. Those detained included 
Mongols who held demonstrations in May 2011 to protest gov-
ernment policy toward grasslands use and curbs on Mongol 
culture. 
• Government steps to address ethnic minorities’ grievances 
remained limited in the past year. The State Ethnic Affairs 
Commission reported in December 2010 on exploring and ‘‘per-
fecting’’ ‘‘new mechanisms and forms’’ for improving the state’s 
regional ethnic autonomy system, but also affirmed the basic 
parameters of the state’s minority policies. The Chinese gov-
ernment’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 
pledged support for some aspects of ethnic minority rights, but 
appeared to have limited impact, especially in the areas of civil 
and political rights. 
• The Chinese government continued to implement top-down 
development policies that have undercut the promotion of re-
gional autonomy and limited the rights of ethnic minorities to 
maintain their unique cultures, languages, and livelihoods, 
while bringing a degree of economic improvements to minority 
areas. The government bolstered longstanding grasslands poli-
cies that have imposed grazing bans and required some herd-
ers to resettle from grasslands and abandon pastoral liveli-
hoods, a development that affects Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, 
and other minority groups in China. Mongols protested grass-
lands policies during a series of demonstrations in May. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support rule of law programs and exchange programs that 
raise awareness among Chinese leaders of different models for 
governance that protect ethnic minorities’ rights and allow 
them to exercise meaningful autonomy over their affairs, in 
line with both domestic Chinese law and international human 
rights standards. Following the expiration of the 2009–2010 
National Human Rights Action Plan, call on Chinese authori-
ties to continue to include attention to minority rights in sub-
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sequent human rights initiatives and issue concrete plans for 
implementation and assessment in line with international 
standards. 
Æ Support programs that promote models for economic devel-
opment in China that include participatory decisionmaking 
from ethnic minority communities. Call on the Chinese govern-
ment to examine the efficacy of existing grasslands policies in 
ameliorating environmental degradation and to take steps to 
ensure that the rights of herders are protected in the process 
of promoting environmental policies. 
Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address 
human rights conditions for ethnic minorities in China to en-
able them to continue their research and develop programs to 
help ethnic minorities increase their capacity to protect their 
rights. Encourage such organizations to develop training pro-
grams on promoting economic development that includes 
participatory decisionmaking from ethnic minority commu-
nities; programs to protect ethnic minority languages, cultures, 
and livelihoods; and programs that document conditions and 
research rights abuses in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Re-
gion. Encourage broader human rights and rule of law pro-
grams that operate in China to develop projects that address 
issues affecting ethnic minorities in China. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained, 
imprisoned, or otherwise held in custody for advocating for the 
rights of ethnic minority citizens, including Mongol rights ad-
vocate Hada (who remains in custody despite the expiration of 
his 15-year sentence in December 2010), his wife Xinna and 
son Uiles (detained in advance of Hada’s scheduled release and 
later formally arrested), and other prisoners mentioned in this 
report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database. 
POPULATION PLANNING 
Findings 
• Chinese government officials continued to implement popu-
lation planning policies that interfere with and control the re-
productive lives of its citizens, especially women, employing 
various methods including fines, withholding of state benefits 
and permits, forced sterilization, forced abortion, and arbitrary 
detention to punish policy violations. 
• The Commission observed in 2011 the continued practice by 
local governments of specifically targeting migrant workers for 
coercive implementation of family planning policies. 
• The PRC Population and Family Planning Law is not con-
sistent with the standards set by the 1995 Beijing Declaration 
and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo International 
Conference on Population and Development. Controls imposed 
on Chinese women and their families and additional abuses en-
gendered by the system, from forced abortion to discriminatory 
policies against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children, also violate standards in 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
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Cultural Rights. China is a state party to these treaties and 
is bound to uphold their terms. 
• The Chinese government does not consistently implement 
provisions in the PRC Population and Family Planning Law 
(PFPL) that prohibit and provide punishment for abuses in the 
implementation of population planning policies. Article 4 of the 
PFPL states that officials shall ‘‘enforce the law in a civil man-
ner, and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and 
interests of citizens.’’ Under Article 39, an official is subject to 
criminal or administrative punishment if, in the implementa-
tion of population planning policies, the official ‘‘infringes on a 
citizen’s personal rights, property rights, or other legitimate 
rights and interests’’ or ‘‘abuses his power, neglects his duty, 
or engages in malpractices for personal gain . . . .’’ 
• September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of the begin-
ning of China’s current family planning efforts, and following 
this anniversary, the Commission observed increased public 
discussion of the prospects for family planning policy reform. 
Top Communist Party and government leaders continue to 
publicly defend the policy and rule out its cancellation in the 
near-term. 
• The Chinese government’s population planning policies con-
tinue to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, in-
cluding a severely imbalanced sex ratio—the highest in the 
world—an aging population, and a decline in the working age 
population. 
• Authorities released Chen Guangcheng, a self-trained legal 
advocate who publicized population planning abuses, from pris-
on after he had completed his full sentence on September 9, 
2010. Following his release, however, authorities have kept 
Chen and his family under ‘‘soft detention,’’ or home confine-
ment, and continued to subject them to abuse and restrictive 
control. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge Chinese government officials to cease coercive methods 
of enforcing family planning policies. Urge the Chinese govern-
ment to dismantle coercive population controls and provide 
greater reproductive freedom and privacy for women. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to reevaluate the PRC Popu-
lation and Family Planning Law and bring it into conformance 
with international standards set forth in the 1995 Beijing Dec-
laration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the Cairo Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development, as well 
as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
Æ Urge China’s central and local governments to enforce vigor-
ously provisions under Chinese law that provide for punish-
ments of officials and other individuals who violate the rights 
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of citizens when implementing population planning policies. 
Urge the Chinese government to establish penalties, including 
specific criminal and financial penalties, for officials and indi-
viduals found to commit abuses such as coercive abortion and 
coercive sterilization—practices that continue in China despite 
provisions under existing laws and regulations intended to pro-
hibit them. Urge the Chinese government to delink material 
and financial incentives for officials from their performance in 
implementing family planning policies and thereby reduce or 
remove the impetus for unlawful practices. 
Æ Support the development of programs and international co-
operation on legal aid and training programs that help citizens 
pursue compensation under the PRC State Compensation Law 
and that help citizens pursue other remedies against the state 
for injury suffered as a result of official abuse related to Chi-
na’s population planning policies. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to release Chen 
Guangcheng and his family from extralegal detention and to 
permit them to enjoy the freedoms of movement, expression, 
and association, as provided under Chinese law and inter-
national standards to which the Chinese government has com-
mitted. 
FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s reporting year, the Chinese govern-
ment continued to relax some household registration (hukou) 
restrictions consistent with earlier efforts. The system, first im-
plemented in the 1950s, continues to limit the right of Chinese 
citizens to establish formally their permanent place of resi-
dence. 
• The Chinese government implemented several pilot hukou 
reform projects in several municipalities, aimed to bring all 
residents who already hold a local hukou under a unified reg-
istration system. The ramifications of the latest hukou reforms 
remain unclear. The Chinese media have praised the latest re-
forms as an important step toward true equality between 
urban and rural Chinese citizens. However, potential problems 
include the possibility of forced relocation of rural residents, in-
adequate compensation, and rural residents’ ability to adjust to 
urban life after relocation. 
• The Chinese government continued to impose restrictions on 
Chinese citizens’ right to travel in a manner that is incon-
sistent with international human rights standards. During the 
past year, authorities increasingly used various legal pretexts 
to prevent rights defenders, advocates, and critics from leaving 
China. Officials often cited the PRC Law on the Control of the 
Exit and Entry of Citizens as justification for preventing rights 
defenders from traveling. 
• The Chinese government continued to place restrictions on 
liberty of movement to punish and control political dissidents 
and human rights advocates. Restrictions on liberty of move-
ment within China were especially harsh during this reporting 
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period. Authorities employed a spectrum of measures including 
stationing police to monitor the homes of rights defenders, tak-
ing rights defenders to remote areas, inviting them to meetings 
to ‘‘drink tea’’ with security personnel, and imprisonment. 
• Chinese authorities used forceful efforts to intimidate and 
control human rights advocates and their family members dur-
ing this reporting period. The Chinese government appears to 
have intensified efforts to crack down on human rights advo-
cates after the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to prominent 
Chinese writer and democracy activist Liu Xiaobo and an 
anonymous online call for ‘‘Jasmine Revolution’’ protests within 
China. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support programs, organizations, and exchanges with Chi-
nese policymakers and academic institutions engaged in re-
search and outreach to migrant workers that provide legal as-
sistance to migrant workers, and encourage policy debates on 
the hukou system. 
Æ Call on U.S. academic and public policy institutions and ex-
perts to consult with the Commission on avenues for outreach 
to Chinese academic and public policy figures engaged in policy 
debates on reform of the hukou system. 
Æ Stress to Chinese government officials that the Chinese gov-
ernment’s non-compliance with international standards regard-
ing freedom of movement inside China negatively impacts con-
fidence outside China in the Chinese government’s commit-
ment to international standards more generally. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC Law on 
the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so that the mean-
ing and parameter of ‘‘harmful to state security,’’ and ‘‘cause a 
major loss to national interests’’ under Article 8(5) are more 
clear. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to revise the PRC Law on 
the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens so that those who 
are detained can appeal the decision or seek other remedies. 
Æ Raise specifically Chinese government authorities’ restriction 
on liberty of movement of rights defenders, advocates, and crit-
ics including writer Liu Xia, wife of Nobel Peace Prize Lau-
reate Liu Xiaobo, and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng 
and his family. 
STATUS OF WOMEN 
Findings 
• Chinese officials continue to promote existing laws that aim 
to protect women’s rights, including the amended PRC Law on 
the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests and the 
amended PRC Marriage Law; however, ambiguity and lack of 
clearly outlined responsibilities in China’s national-level legis-
lation, in addition to selective implementation and selective en-
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forcement of this legislation across localities, limit progress on 
concrete protections of women’s rights. 
• In its domestic laws and policy initiatives and through its 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Chinese gov-
ernment has committed to ensuring female representation in 
government. However, female representation at all levels of 
government appears to have made little significant progress in 
the 2011 reporting year. 
• The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed 
the revised PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees in 
October 2010, revising the language stating that there should 
be ‘‘an appropriate number of women’’ in village committees to 
language that states village committees ‘‘should have female 
members.’’ The revised law also includes a stipulation that 
women should hold one-third of positions in village representa-
tive assemblies. The impact these revisions will have on female 
representation at the village level in the future is unclear, but 
some domestic observers have hailed them as a positive step. 
An increase in women’s decisionmaking power at the village 
level may lead to greater protection of women’s property rights 
in rural areas. 
• China has committed under CEDAW to take ‘‘all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
field of employment.’’ Women continue to experience wide-
spread discrimination in areas including recruitment, wages, 
and retirement despite the fact that the Chinese government 
has committed under Article 7 of the International Covenant 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 11 of 
CEDAW to ensuring gender equality in employment. While 
China’s existing laws such as the PRC Labor Law, amended 
PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests 
(LPWRI), and PRC Employment Promotion Law prohibit gen-
der discrimination, they lack clear definitions and enforcement 
mechanisms, which weakens their effectiveness. 
• The amended LPWRI and amended PRC Marriage Law pro-
hibit domestic violence, and individuals charged with the crime 
of domestic violence are punishable under the PRC Criminal 
Law. These national legal provisions leave many who encoun-
ter domestic violence unprotected, however, as they do not de-
fine domestic violence or outline specific responsibilities of gov-
ernment departments in prevention, punishment, and treat-
ment. Officials reportedly completed draft national-level legis-
lation that clarifies the definition and distribution of govern-
ment responsibilities. Domestic violence reportedly remains 
pervasive, affecting nearly one-third of families in China. Chi-
na’s amended LPWRI also prohibits sexual harassment and 
provides an avenue of recourse for victims. The LPWRI does 
not, however, provide a clear definition of sexual harassment 
or specific standards and procedures for prevention and pun-
ishment, presenting challenges for victims in protecting their 
rights. Sexual harassment reportedly remains prevalent in 
China. 
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• Statistics and analysis from studies published in 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 regarding China’s skewed sex ratio suggest that sex- 
selective abortion remains widespread, especially in rural 
areas, despite the government’s legislative efforts to deter the 
practice. Some observers, including Chinese state-run media, 
have linked China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio with an in-
crease in forced prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms 
of human trafficking. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support programs in China that increase women’s leader-
ship training through U.S.-China exchanges and international 
conferences. Support legal programs that promote women’s 
land rights, especially in rural areas, and urge that steps be 
taken to ensure that village rules and regulations are in ac-
cordance with national-level laws and policies and to ensure 
adequate protection of women’s rights and interests. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to strengthen enforcement 
mechanisms for implementation of provisions in the PRC 
Labor Law, the amended PRC Law on the Protection of Wom-
en’s Rights and Interests (LPWRI), and the PRC Employment 
Promotion Law that prohibit gender discrimination. Urge Chi-
nese officials to address specifically gender discrimination in 
recruitment, wages, and retirement. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to enact comprehensive na-
tional-level legislation that clearly defines domestic violence, 
assigns responsibilities to government and civil society organi-
zations in addressing it, and outlines punishments for offend-
ers. Inquire whether officials will release such legislation for 
public comment and, if so, how long the public comment period 
will be and to whom it will be made available. Urge the Chi-
nese government to further revise the LPWRI or enact new 
comprehensive national-level legislation to provide a clear defi-
nition of sexual harassment and specific standards and proce-
dures for prevention and punishment. Support training pro-
grams that increase awareness of domestic violence and sexual 




• China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination 
for the trafficking of men, women, and children. The majority 
of human trafficking cases are domestic and involve trafficking 
for sexual exploitation, forced labor, and forced marriage. 
• The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) in December 2009. To 
date, the Chinese government has revised some, but not all, of 
its legislation to conform to the Palermo Protocol. For example, 
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the Chinese government issued an amendment to the PRC 
Criminal Law, which included revisions that broaden the scope 
of prosecutable offenses for forced labor and increase penalties, 
but do not clearly define forced labor. The Chinese govern-
ment’s legal definition of trafficking does not conform to inter-
national standards. 
• Using the definition of human trafficking under Chinese 
law—which conflates human smuggling, child abduction, and 
illegal adoption with human trafficking—the Supreme People’s 
Court reportedly convicted 3,138 defendants in trafficking 
cases in 2010, up from 2,413 in 2009. Of these, courts report-
edly handed down 2,216 prison sentences of five years or more. 
In addition, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate reportedly 
convicted 4,422 individuals on trafficking-related crimes in 
2010. In cooperation with non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations, Chinese authorities took steps to 
improve protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking 
but continued to focus efforts on women and children. 
• The Chinese government does not offer legal alternatives to 
deportation for identified foreign victims of trafficking, and 
continues to deport North Korean refugees under the classifica-
tion of ‘‘economic migrants,’’ regardless of whether or not they 
are victims of trafficking. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to abide by its commitments 
under the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; continue 
to revise the government’s definition of trafficking; and enact 
comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation to align with inter-
national standards. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide more services for 
trafficking victims. Support expanding training programs for 
law enforcement personnel and shelter managers that help 
raise awareness and improve processes for identifying, pro-
tecting, and assisting trafficking victims. Support legal assist-
ance programs that advocate on behalf of both foreign and Chi-
nese trafficking victims. 
Æ Object to the continued deportation of North Korean traf-
ficking victims as ‘‘economic migrants.’’ Urge the Chinese gov-
ernment to abide by its international obligations with regard 
to North Korean trafficking victims and provide legal alter-
natives to repatriation. 
NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA 
Findings 
• During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, central and 
local authorities continued policies of classifying all North Ko-
reans in China as ‘‘illegal’’ economic migrants and repatriating 
North Korean refugees in China, amid rising concerns over hu-
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manitarian crises and political instability in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2011, the Chinese gov-
ernment reportedly increased the presence of public security 
officials in northeastern China and erected new barricades 
along the Chinese-North Korean border. 
• The Chinese government continued to deny the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to the Chinese- 
North Korean border and to North Korean refugees in north-
east China. The inability of the UNHCR to access North Kore-
ans seeking asylum in China makes it difficult for the UNHCR 
and human rights organizations to obtain accurate information 
on the number of North Korean refugees, the reasons behind 
the North Korean defections, and the concerns of North Korean 
refugees over forced repatriation. 
• Chinese security authorities reportedly cooperated with 
North Korean police officials to repatriate North Korean refu-
gees in reported ‘‘manhunts’’ throughout China, including re-
mote areas within Yunnan province and the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region. Chinese law enforcement agencies have 
deployed hundreds of officials to locate and forcibly repatriate 
North Korean refugees. 
• North Korean women in China continue to be trafficked into 
forced marriage and commercial sexual exploitation. The Chi-
nese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Korean 
women contravenes the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (Protocol), 
as well as Article 7 of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (Palermo Protocol). The government’s failure to take 
adequate measures to prevent North Korean women from 
being trafficked and to protect North Korean victims of traf-
ficking contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the Pa-
lermo Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). 
• Chinese local authorities near the border with the DPRK 
continued to deny household registration (hukou) to the chil-
dren of North Korean women married to Chinese citizens. 
Without household registration, these children live in a state-
less limbo and cannot access education and other social bene-
fits. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support the efforts of the UNHCR to gain unfettered access 
to North Korean refugees in China, beginning with children 
born to a North Korean parent in China, and encourage the 
Chinese government to work with the UNHCR in enacting and 
implementing national asylum legislation that conforms with 
China’s obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol 
and to immediately cease detaining and repatriating North Ko-
reans in China. 
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Æ Urge central and local Chinese government officials to abide 
by their obligations under the Palermo Protocol (Article 9) and 
CEDAW (Article 6) to prosecute human traffickers in north-
eastern China and along the border with the DPRK. 
Æ Urge Chinese officials to grant residency status and related 
social benefits to North Korean women married to Chinese citi-
zens and grant the same to their children. In particular, urge 
local Chinese officials to allow these children to receive an edu-
cation in accordance with the PRC Nationality Law (Article 4) 
and the PRC Compulsory Education Law (Article 5). Urge the 
Chinese government to allow greater numbers of North Korean 
defectors to have safe haven and secure transit until they 
reach third countries. 
PUBLIC HEALTH 
Findings 
• The Chinese government’s domestic legislation explicitly for-
bids discriminatory practices in employment, and as a State 
Party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Chinese government has committed to 
eliminate discrimination in employment and education against 
persons with disability or infectious diseases. Discrimination 
against people living with medical conditions such as infectious 
diseases and mental illness remains commonplace, and those 
who experience discrimination face challenges in seeking legal 
recourse. 
• Chinese non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and indi-
vidual advocates continue to play a positive role in raising 
awareness about health concerns; however, Chinese officials 
continue to harass some public health advocates and monitor 
and control the activities of NGOs through restrictions on reg-
istration and funding. 
• The burden that cases of mental illness place on the coun-
try’s under-resourced mental healthcare system is significant. 
Officials reportedly continue to abuse their power over psy-
chiatric institutions and medical professionals by using them 
as ‘‘tools for detaining people deemed a threat to social sta-
bility.’’ In June 2011, the Chinese government released for 
public comment the draft Mental Health Law, which generated 
vibrant discussion among individuals and organizations across 
civil society sectors. Officials announced plans to enact the 
Mental Health Law by the end of 2011. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to stop repression of public 
health advocates and provide more support to U.S. organiza-
tions that address public health issues in China. 
Æ Urge Chinese officials to focus attention on effective imple-
mentation of the PRC Employment Promotion Law and related 
regulations that prohibit discrimination in hiring and in the 
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workplace against persons living with HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis B 
virus, and other illnesses. Support programs that raise rights 
awareness among individuals living with infectious disease, 
disability, or mental illness. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to address concerns that indi-
viduals and NGOs raised during the public comment period for 
the draft Mental Health Law. Urge Chinese officials to accom-
plish their stated goal of enacting the Mental Health Law by 
the end of 2011. Urge officials to then ensure implementation 
of the law across localities. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
Findings 
• China’s environmental problems remain serious. This year’s 
report highlights heavy metal and growing rural pollution 
problems. Citizens continued to express their environmental 
grievances and sometimes protested in the streets, including at 
a protest against a chemical plant in Dalian city, Liaoning 
province, involving over 10,000 citizens who ‘‘took a walk’’ in 
front of government and Communist Party buildings. In some 
cases, officials suppressed demands for a cleaner environment. 
Local authorities detained, harassed, or threatened people in-
cluding parents of children affected by lead poisoning in sev-
eral provinces who raised grievances or sought redress; citizens 
demonstrating or complaining about landfill operations in 
Fujian province; citizens protesting operations of a waste incin-
erator in Jiangsu province; and citizens protesting expanded 
mining operations in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
and Tibetan autonomous areas. 
• Corruption, noncompliance with and uneven implementation 
and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations, and 
the lack of legal recourse, remain significant challenges for 
China in managing its environmental problems. Sometimes en-
vironmental protection authorities do not take enforcement ac-
tions as required by law, and at times courts refuse to accept 
lawsuits because of concerns over ‘‘social stability.’’ Environ-
mental protection was among the areas to have the highest 
levels of bribery and corruption in the first six months of 2010. 
• Central and some local Chinese environmental protection of-
ficials have taken steps to improve information disclosure. Yet, 
efforts to implement disclosure measures remain under-
developed. Some citizens have been proactive in requesting in-
formation; however, several challenges to accessing information 
remain, including administrative provisions that limit the 
scope of information that environmental authorities can dis-
close. The most difficult type of information to obtain in some 
cases is that related to polluting enterprises, which has poten-
tial implications for citizen health. Chinese citizens and ex-
perts have expressed concern over the speed and lack of trans-
parency of developing hydroelectric and nuclear power projects. 
The nuclear power plant disaster in Japan in March 2011 ap-
peared to embolden Chinese citizens and experts to speak out 
about safety concerns, and prompted Chinese officials to con-
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duct a safety review and consider new legislation that could 
improve the transparency of China’s nuclear industry. 
• Environmental protection remains a sector in which public 
participation is somewhat encouraged, yet officials also con-
tinue to seek to ‘‘guide’’ or manage participation. A new na-
tional-level official guiding opinion requires environmental 
groups to report on their international cooperative projects 
with foreign non-governmental entities for ‘‘examination and 
approval.’’ The opinion also calls for the further strengthening 
of relations and cooperation between the government and so-
cial organizations, as well as greater political indoctrination of 
environmental groups by relevant authorities. 
• Top Chinese authorities reportedly consider China to be vul-
nerable to the impacts of climate change and have taken steps 
to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Chinese leaders plan 
to voluntarily reduce carbon dioxide intensity (i.e., emissions 
per unit of GDP) by 17 percent by 2015. While non-govern-
mental organizations continue some activities to address cli-
mate change, public participation in climate change policy 
processes is minimal. Chinese leaders stated they would im-
prove data reliability and transparency in relation to energy 
and climate change; however, Chinese leaders face significant 
challenges in these areas. Official Chinese measures to address 
climate change, as well as their implementation, could place 
the rights of citizens at risk without sufficient procedural and 
safety protections. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call upon the Chinese government to cease punishing citi-
zens for their grassroots environmental activism or for utilizing 
official and institutionalized channels to voice their environ-
mental grievances or to protect their rights. Support efforts by 
Chinese and U.S. groups working in China to expand aware-
ness of citizens’ environmental rights and to promote the pro-
tection of those rights. Projects might include supporting U.S.- 
China discussions about complaint resolution mechanisms and 
strengthening U.S.-China cooperation regarding researching 
and addressing environmental health problems. Include envi-
ronmental law issues in the bilateral human rights and legal 
expert dialogues. 
Æ Support multilateral exchanges regarding environmental en-
forcement and compliance tools, including environmental in-
surance, market mechanisms, criminal prosecution of serious 
environmental infringements, and public interest litigation 
mechanisms. Encourage Chinese leaders to strengthen environ-
mental impact assessment processes and citizen participation 
in those processes. Engage Chinese officials and others who 
seek to devise a realistic and fair compensation system for peo-
ple harmed by pollution in China that could aid enforcement 
efforts. 
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Æ Support continued expansion of environmental information 
disclosure in China. Share U.S. Government experiences with 
the Toxics Release Inventory Program and other U.S. programs 
that seek to provide more environmental transparency. Sup-
port programs that educate Chinese citizens about China’s sys-
tem of open government information. Encourage Chinese offi-
cials to make government and expert research reports regard-
ing climate change and its impacts in China public and easily 
accessible. In addition, continue U.S. Government engagement 
with relevant ministries, academic institutions, experts, and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing China’s 
capacity to measure, report, publicize, and verify emissions re-
duction strategies and techniques reliably. 
Æ Encourage the development of environmental NGOs in 
China, including incorporating joint non-governmental partici-
pation in bilateral projects. Support efforts to raise the tech-
nical and operational capacity of Chinese environmental 
NGOs. 
Æ Engage local Chinese leaders in their efforts to reconcile de-
velopment and environmental protection goals. Call upon U.S. 
cities with sister-city relationships in China to incorporate en-
vironmental rights awareness, environmental protection, and 
climate change components into their sister-city programs. 
When making arrangements for travel to China, request meet-
ings with officials from central and local levels of the Chinese 
government to discuss environmental governance and best 
practices. Invite Chinese local-level leaders, including those 
from counties, townships, and villages, to the United States to 




• During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the number of 
civil society organizations (CSOs)—including organizational 
forms that most nearly correspond to the Western concept of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—participating in legal 
and policymaking activities in areas that are not politically 
sensitive continued to increase gradually. At the same time, or-
ganizations and individuals who worked on politically sensitive 
issues continued to face challenges. 
• NGOs continued to face challenges fulfilling complicated and 
cumbersome registration requirements. In order to operate le-
gally, an organization is required to obtain a sponsorship 
agreement from a public administration department in a rel-
evant ‘‘trade, scientific or other professional area’’ at the appro-
priate level of government before registering with the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs (MCA). Sponsorship agreements are sometimes 
difficult to obtain because local sponsors are at times reluctant 
to take on the burdens of supervisory responsibilities. NGOs 
that do not fulfill these ‘‘dual management’’ requirements are 
not protected under the law and are prohibited from receiving 
outside donations. Some NGOs opt to register as commercial 
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entities, in part to circumvent the burdens of fulfilling dual 
management requirements, though such actions could also sub-
ject them to targeted or selective oversight from the govern-
ment as well as higher tax rates. 
• The Commission observed in this reporting year that ‘‘pri-
vate’’ foundations (fei gongmu jijin hui), which are not per-
mitted to solicit donations through public fundraising activi-
ties, reportedly continued to face operational hardships. ‘‘Pri-
vate’’ foundations may apply to become ‘‘public’’ foundations 
(gongmu jijin hui), which are permitted to solicit donations 
through public fundraising activities, only if they can find gov-
ernment department sponsors and meet other required criteria. 
The Chinese government reportedly is considering revisions to 
the 2004 PRC Regulations on the Management of Foundations 
and is drafting the PRC Charities Law. Nevertheless, because 
draft language does not appear to have been widely circulated, 
it remains unclear what the proposed revisions and the new 
law will entail or how proposed regulatory changes will create 
room for private foundations to operate and grow. 
• Some Chinese citizens who sought to establish and operate 
NGOs that focus on issues officials deem to be sensitive faced 
intimidation, harassment, and punishment from government 
authorities. During this reporting year, for example, Chinese 
authorities continued to repeatedly harass and interfere with 
the operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, a 
Beijing-based public health advocacy organization founded in 
1994 by Wan Yanhai, a public health researcher. Authorities 
reportedly visited Aizhixing’s office where they confiscated doc-
uments, warned Wan—who had left China for the United 
States in May 2010 over concerns for his personal safety—not 
to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Norway honoring 
Liu Xiaobo, and shut down the organization’s Web site for post-
ing a letter that officials found objectionable. 
• Some localities are following efforts in Shenzhen to simplify 
the registration process for certain types of service-oriented 
NGOs, and two other localities are among those considering 
changes to current regulations. Authorities in Beijing, for ex-
ample, may extend to the entire city a current pilot project in 
one district that ‘‘opens up’’ the registration process for four 
types of social organizations, including the types of organiza-
tions that provide ‘‘social benefits’’ (shehui fuli) and ‘‘social 
services’’ (shehui fuwu). Officials in Shanghai city reportedly 
signed a ‘‘cooperative agreement’’ with the Ministry of Civil Af-
fairs to ‘‘create new models for the development of social orga-
nizations.’’ The extent to which these reform efforts will create 
space for civil society organizations to grow remains unclear, 
as civil society advocates remain under tight scrutiny, and 
some were subjected to harassment, detention, and other 
abuses. Moreover, some experts on Chinese civil society both in 
China and abroad have cautioned that the latest reform ef-
forts, while helpful to many grassroots organizations providing 
various kinds of social services, could also solidify the govern-
ment’s ability to control such groups by forcing them to follow 
‘‘government leadership’’ as a condition to operate. 
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• During this reporting year, Chinese officials have continued 
to emphasize efforts to ‘‘guide’’ developments in civil society. 
Zhou Yongkang, the Secretary of the Communist Party Central 
Committee Political and Legal Affairs Commission, said that 
‘‘in fostering comprehensive social organizations, we must work 
hard to integrate various types of social organizations into a 
social organization system led by the Party Committee and the 
government . . . in the management of social organizations, 
we must establish a system of separate development and sepa-
rate management to promote the healthy and orderly develop-
ment of social organizations . . . in the management of foreign 
non-governmental organizations working in China, we must es-
tablish a joint management mechanism to protect legitimate 
exchanges and cooperation and strengthen management ac-
cording to the law.’’ 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Ask Chinese officials for updates on recent reforms at the 
local level relating to registration of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) and other aspects of civil affairs. Encourage 
these officials to broaden the reform efforts that relax con-
straints on NGOs and to make them applicable to other parts 
of the country through national legislation and regulatory de-
velopment. 
Æ Ask the Chinese government to refrain from applying un-
even or selective enforcement of regulations to intimidate 
groups that they consider to be handling sensitive work. Re-
quest the Chinese government to revisit the recently issued 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange circular concerning 
overseas donations to Chinese organizations. Emphasize that 
NGOs, both domestic and international, are outlets for citizens 
to channel their grievances and find redress, and in turn con-
tribute to the maintenance of a stable society. Conversely, 
point out that stricter controls over civil society organizations 
could remove a potentially useful social ‘‘safety valve,’’ thereby 
increasing the sources of instability. During discussions with 
Chinese officials, mention the Tsinghua University report 
which found that even as the government increased spending 
on public security and tightened its control over civil society, 
social conflicts are happening with greater regularity. 
Æ Take measures to facilitate the participation of Chinese citi-
zens who work in the NGO sector in relevant international 
conferences and forums, and support training opportunities in 
the United States to build their leadership capacity in non-
profit management, public policy advocacy, strategic planning, 
and media relations. 
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INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Findings 
• The Communist Party exercises control over political affairs, 
government, and society through networks of Party committees 
or branches that exist at all levels in government, legislative, 
and judicial agencies, as well as in businesses, major social 
groups (including unions), the military, and most residential 
communities. During the 2011 reporting year, Communist 
Party leaders reiterated Party dominance and accelerated ef-
forts to build or revitalize Party organizations, especially focus-
ing on Party branches in commercial buildings, urban neigh-
borhoods, academic institutions, and law firms. 
• China’s political institutions do not comply with the stand-
ards defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which Chinese leaders have signed 
and declared an intention to ratify. Nor do China’s political in-
stitutions comply with the standards outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. While central-level Chinese 
leaders continued to issue measures meant to improve the effi-
ciency of bureaucratic governance and to bolster trust in the 
Party, news reports did not indicate any major forthcoming po-
litical reforms. Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the need for 
political reforms; however, some of his remarks were censored 
in the Chinese domestic news. Other top leaders appeared to 
criticize ideological pluralism and to emphasize the impos-
sibility of implementing ‘‘Western-style’’ democracy with its 
separation of powers and competing political parties. 
• During this reporting year, Chinese authorities expanded so-
cial controls under the banner of strengthening ‘‘comprehensive 
management of public security’’ and ‘‘safeguarding social sta-
bility.’’ Officials engaged in a largely preemptive crackdown af-
fecting hundreds of people, apparently disregarding their con-
stitutional right to freedom of assembly and preventing them 
from gathering peacefully in so-called ‘‘Jasmine Revolution’’ 
rallies, with the purpose of advocating for democratic reforms, 
among other issues. In addition, authorities continued to de-
tain, sentence, and demonstrate little tolerance for those indi-
viduals involved in political parties not sanctioned by the Com-
munist Party. For example, authorities handed down a harsh 
sentence to Liu Xianbin for his democracy advocacy activities 
and arrested Li Tie for posting writings advocating for democ-
racy on the Internet. 
• Direct elections for local people’s congress representatives 
are held only at the county level. Authorities appeared to dis-
courage ‘‘independent candidates’’ who utilized online resources 
to campaign in the latest round of local people’s congress elec-
tions, and news stories reported harassment of ‘‘independent 
candidates’’ and their families. At least 100 ‘‘independent can-
didates’’ announced via microblog their intention to run. 
• Chinese leaders continued to voice support for village auton-
omy with the Party as the leading core. While village com-
mittee elections have spread across most of China, they con-
tinue to be plagued by official interference and corruption. 
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Major revisions to the law governing village committee elec-
tions are likely to alter the balance of authority in village-gov-
erning organizations, partially because the law mandates es-
tablishment of a new ‘‘supervisory committee’’ or equivalent in 
every village. The revisions also clarify election and recall pro-
cedures. The supervisory committees may help to reduce vil-
lage corruption, but they may also act to ‘‘maintain social sta-
bility’’ by stifling critical voices. Central-level officials contin-
ued a survey of outstanding governance problems at the grass-
roots level, and authorities in numerous localities reported that 
they instituted a variety of ‘‘democratic management’’ projects 
to improve relations between village leaders and rural resi-
dents, to reduce corruption, to improve information disclosure, 
and to promote ‘‘democratic’’ public participation. The Commis-
sion has not observed news media reports containing details on 
the implementation and sustainability of these pilot projects. 
• Authorities continued to express support for government in-
formation disclosure and expanding the transparency of Party 
affairs. In addition, the State Council released the Opinion Re-
garding Strengthening Construction of a Government That 
Rules by Law in November 2010, which emphasizes enhancing 
government information disclosure, with a focus on budgets, al-
location of public resources, approval and implementation of 
major construction projects, and nonprofit social causes. Bei-
jing municipality issued a measure that reportedly will, for the 
first time, include Party leaders within the ‘‘scope of account-
ability.’’ 
• The Chinese government and Communist Party reportedly 
sought to improve governance accountability, and at the same 
time improve ‘‘social management.’’ The government reportedly 
took limited steps to combat corruption, which remains a sig-
nificant problem. In the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment issued China’s first white paper on corruption as well 
as other measures to subject officials to financial audits, en-
courage reporting of corruption, and protect whistleblowers. 
Chinese government authorities revised official evaluation 
models that could lead to greater accountability, relieving pres-
sure on officials to falsify data in order to be promoted. Au-
thorities issued a major economic and social development plan 
for the next five years (the 12th Five-Year Plan), which notes 
that authorities will ‘‘establish a community management and 
service platform,’’ linking service provision and social manage-
ment. 
• Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to po-
litical decisionmaking processes; however, they are increas-
ingly able to use various channels to express opinions regard-
ing proposed policies and regulatory instruments. New meas-
ures stipulate that ‘‘major’’ policy decisionmaking processes 
should include public participation, expert argumentation, risk 
assessment, legal review, and group discussions. The measures 
also stipulate that authorities should track how their decisions 
are being implemented. 
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Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to release people detained 
or imprisoned for exercising their right to call for political re-
form within China—including democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, 
who was sentenced to 10 years in prison in March 2011 for ‘‘in-
citing subversion of state power’’; the people detained for men-
tioning the protests in the Middle East and North Africa or 
calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in personal communications or in 
Internet postings; and other prisoners of conscience mentioned 
in this report and in the Commission’s Political Prisoner Data-
base. 
Æ Support research programs for U.S. citizens to study polit-
ical and social developments at the grassroots level in China 
and expand the number of U.S. consulates throughout the 
country. 
Æ Support programs that aim to reduce corruption in local peo-
ple’s congress and village committee elections, including expan-
sion of domestic election monitoring systems, training of Chi-
nese domestic election monitors, and joint U.S.-Chinese elec-
tion monitoring activities. 
Æ Support continued substantive exchanges between Members 
of the U.S. Congress and members of the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Con-
ference, especially in relation to Congressional oversight proc-
esses and budgetary matters. 
Æ Support projects of U.S. or Chinese organizations that seek 
to work with local Chinese governments in their efforts to im-
prove transparency and accountability, especially efforts to ex-
pand and improve China’s government information disclosure 
initiatives. Such projects might include training in the U.S. 
Freedom of Information system for Chinese officials, joint ef-
forts to better publicize the Open Government Information 
(OGI) Regulations at local levels, and citizen and group train-
ing about how to submit OGI requests. 
Æ Support projects that assist local governments, academics, 
and the nonprofit sector in expanding transparent public hear-
ings and other channels for citizens to incorporate their input 
in the policymaking process. Such projects might include an ex-
change program component, whereby Chinese local government 
officials and non-governmental organization representatives 
would travel together to the United States to attend town hall 
or public meetings that address significant issues. Such 
projects might also include pilot projects in China in which citi-
zens’ suggestions to authorities about draft laws, regulations, 
or policies are made available to the public. 
COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 
Findings 
• Industrial policy continues to play an important role in the 
Chinese economy, guiding important sectors such as auto-
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motive, software, and ‘‘cultural industry.’’ These industrial poli-
cies are comprehensive frameworks for development in key sec-
tors of the Chinese economy, providing for subsidies and other 
benefits, plans for restructuring the state-owned companies in 
the relevant sector, and export goals. The use of industrial 
policies, especially in key sectors, was supplemented by China’s 
12th Five-Year Plan, which sets out certain ‘‘strategic emerg-
ing industries’’ for support, including energy conservation, 
new-generation information technology (IT), biotechnology, 
high-end equipment manufacturing, new energies, new mate-
rials, and new-energy vehicles. Further, the Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology and other government depart-
ments have issued sector-specific plans. 
• China’s state-owned sector enjoys preferential treatment, 
crowding out private companies in certain key sectors. This can 
act as a barrier to legal development and the rule of law, as 
the state controls the companies, the courts, the legislatures, 
and administrative departments. China’s industrial policies en-
courage the transfer of technology to the state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs), and their consolidation into ‘‘domestic cham-
pions.’’ SOEs also enjoy various direct and indirect subsidies. 
• Chinese legislation is vague as to whether information con-
cerning the SOEs falls under China’s rules on commercial se-
crets or the PRC State Secrets Law. This was highlighted in 
the case of Xue Feng, a U.S. citizen who was arrested in China 
for helping his U.S.-based employer purchase a commercial 
database in China. The database was not classified as a state 
secret at the time of the transaction. Xue was sentenced to 
eight years’ imprisonment in China for violating China’s state 
secrets law, and his sentence was upheld on appeal in Feb-
ruary 2011. 
• China has been a party to several World Trade Organization 
(WTO) cases since acceding to the WTO in December 2001, and 
there were six active disputes against China in 2010. The WTO 
found against China in a case it brought challenging the 
United States’ imposition of tariffs on certain auto and truck 
tires under the transitional product-specific safeguard provi-
sion in China’s Protocol of Accession. The United States 
brought a case against China concerning its provision of sub-
sidies to the domestic wind energy industry, which is pending. 
China appealed a WTO decision that China’s restraints of ex-
ports of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese, sil-
icon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and zinc are not 
consistent with China’s obligations under the WTO. 
• The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be a subject of 
concern to policymakers inside and outside China. 
• Chinese government departments closely regulate foreign in-
vestment in China and use the approval process to ensure that 
foreign investment is in keeping with government policy. Dur-
ing the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities 
issued a revised draft of the Foreign Investment Guidance 
Catalogue, which lists industries in which foreign investment 
is encouraged, restricted, or forbidden. The revised catalogue 
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includes provisions listing as ‘‘encouraged’’ the strategic emerg-
ing industries covered in the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
• Chinese outbound investment has grown, with much of the 
growth concentrated in investments in energy and minerals 
needed for Chinese manufacturing. Outbound investment is 
regulated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). The 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion issued new measures regulating offshore financial activi-
ties by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Outbound invest-
ments are financed by loans from China’s state-owned banks, 
outbound investment funds, and use of renminbi reserves. 
• Two of the three Chinese government departments in charge 
of implementing the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML) issued new 
AML regulations during the 2011 reporting year. The State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce passed three sets 
of regulations on monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance, 
and abuse of administrative power, and the NDRC issued two 
sets of regulations on price monopoly. The five sets of regula-
tions became effective on February 1, 2011. 
• MOFCOM, which handles AML merger reviews, has held up 
approval of mergers of non-Chinese entities outside China dur-
ing this reporting year, including Nokia’s purchase of certain 
of Motorola’s network assets, and the merger of two Russian 
potash companies. There have been no reports of MOFCOM 
not approving, or giving only conditional approval to, mergers 
between Chinese companies; however, the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission has been encour-
aging the consolidation of the SOEs in China, a process which 
some industrial policies, such as that for the auto industry, 
mandate. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Develop and support a project surveying the role of China’s 
industrial policies in the Chinese economy from the perspective 
of WTO requirements, including how the development of these 
policies, and the role they play in directing China’s economy, 
impact the development of transparency, rule of law, and Chi-
na’s compliance with its international legal commitments. 
Æ Request through the Open Government Information office at 
the Ministry of Commerce, or through bilateral dialogues be-
tween the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission and their Chinese counterparts, details on merger 
applications reviewed since the PRC Antimonopoly Law came 
into effect, including the number of applications involving non- 
Chinese companies, the number of applications involving state- 
owned enterprises, and the results of each of the merger re-
views. 
Æ Through bilateral dialogues between (1) the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative and U.S. Department of Commerce and (2) China’s 
Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform 
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Commission, and State-Owned Assets Supervision and Admin-
istration Commission, obtain details on the amount of Chinese 
investment (other than in financial instruments) in the United 
States, the criteria Chinese authorities use in making approval 
decisions concerning such investment, and how such invest-
ment is financed. 
Æ Arrange for Chinese authorities to clarify the approval pro-
cedure applicable to foreign investment in China, including 
how the security review procedure relates to the regular review 
procedure applicable to all foreign investment in China under 
the auspices of legal exchanges such as the U.S. Legal Ex-
change under the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Findings 
• Chinese citizens’ ability to redress perceived wrongs contin-
ued to face significant challenges during the Commission’s 
2011 reporting year. Authorities continued to promote a ‘‘har-
monious’’ socialist society with Chinese characteristics. Key 
policies and regulations during the past year reflect the Party’s 
ongoing concern with ‘‘maintaining social stability.’’ 
• The courts encouraged the use of mediation over trials as 
means to resolve disputes in civil cases. Critics point out that 
mediation could lead to curtailed access to courts for Chinese 
citizens. In addition, it remains unclear whether the new PRC 
People’s Mediation Law can adequately resolve disputes with-
out coercion, and whether it can provide for effective enforce-
ment of mediated agreements. 
• Citizen petitioners seeking to address their grievances con-
tinued to face official reprisals, harassment, violence, and de-
tention, especially by local governments due to incentive struc-
tures linked to citizen petitioning. 
• Officials at various levels of government continued to dis-
courage, intimidate, and detain human rights lawyers and de-
fenders who take on issues, cases, and clients that officials 
deem to be ‘‘sensitive.’’ Officials employed a spectrum of meas-
ures including stationing police to monitor the homes of rights 
defenders, forcing rights defenders to travel to unknown areas 
or to attend meetings to ‘‘drink tea’’ with security personnel, 
and imprisonment. 
• The Supreme People’s Court announced in May 2011 that it 
would issue uniform guidelines for some types of cases. The 
guiding cases are meant to provide uniformity in decision-
making for the public security apparatus, procuratoracy, and 
the courts. One of the key questions that remains unanswered 
is the degree to which the guiding cases are binding on lower 
courts. 
• The Chinese government continued to promote administra-
tive law reforms that seek to provide greater oversight of state 
agencies and government employees and to protect citizen in-
terests if they are faithfully implemented and executed. The 
amended PRC Administrative Supervision Law became effec-
tive in June 2011. Its key provisions provide some protection 
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for whistleblowers. The amended PRC State Compensation 
Law became effective in December 2010. Its key provisions ex-
pand the scope of the law by allowing negligence as a cause of 
action against the government under some circumstances. In 
addition, the amended law eliminates certain procedural loop-
holes making it easier to establish a valid claim. 
• Chinese citizens remained reluctant to bring cases against 
government officials utilizing administrative law provisions. 
Cases brought against the government based on administrative 
law provisions reportedly accounted on average for very low 
percentages of local courts’ total workloads. 
• The government increased funding for the legal aid system 
during the 2011 reporting year. Nevertheless, China faces a 
systemic shortage of defense lawyers. In underdeveloped re-
gions, some criminal defendants may have no access to legal 
representation. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support the U.S. State Department’s International Visitor’s 
Leadership Program and other bilateral exchange programs 
that bring Chinese human rights lawyers, advocates, and 
scholars to the United States for study and dialogue. Support 
similar programs in the non-governmental organization and 
academic sectors that partner with China’s human rights law-
yers and nonprofit legal organizations. 
Æ Continue to monitor the policy of mediation as the Chinese 
government’s preferred way to resolve disputes. Achieve a clear 
understanding of the implications on Chinese citizens’ access to 
justice and the Chinese government’s compliance with inter-
national standards. 
Æ Continue to monitor the anticipated issuance of the guiding 
cases by the Supreme People’s Court for the public security ap-
paratus, procuratoracy, and the courts. Pay particular atten-
tion to their effect, if any, on lower level courts. 
Æ Express concern to Chinese authorities over treatment of pe-
titioners and encourage Chinese leaders to examine the incen-
tive structures at the local level that lead to abuse of peti-
tioners who seek to express their grievances. 
Æ Object to the continued harassment of human rights lawyers 
and advocates. Call for the release of lawyers and activists who 
have been subject to unlawful home confinement, ‘‘disappear-
ance,’’ or harassment by officials for their activities to defend 
and promote the rights of Chinese citizens. 
Æ Support exchange, education, and training in legal aid ex-
pertise with Chinese defense lawyers and law schools. 
PROPERTY 
Findings 
• Over the past year, there have been numerous cases of ex-
propriation and abuses by local governments and property de-
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velopers, including forced evictions. Forced evictions are con-
trary to the General Comments to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which China has rati-
fied. Some property owners who refuse to leave their homes 
have been beaten, harassed, or illegally detained. China’s eco-
nomic development has led to increased need for land, and in-
come from land sales has been an important source of revenue 
for local governments. 
• In January 2011, the Regulations on Expropriation and 
Compensation for Housing on State-Owned Land came into ef-
fect. The regulations define ‘‘public interest’’ in the context of 
land takings and set out some procedural protection for urban 
land rights owners. Though the 2007 PRC Property Law and 
the 2004 PRC Law on Administration of Urban Real Property 
both provide that local government should only expropriate 
land in the ‘‘public interest,’’ neither include a definition of the 
term. While the new regulations provide greater clarity and 
better protection, their effectiveness will depend on implemen-
tation. 
• The Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for 
Housing on State-Owned Land apply only to urban land, leav-
ing China’s rural residents with a lower level of protection. 
Rural land is owned by collectives, and farmers legally can 
enter into 30-year contracts with their collectives for use of col-
lectively owned land. However, there is little protection for 
farmers, and there have been recommendations that protection 
from expropriation be extended to rural residents. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge the Chinese government in meetings and correspond-
ence to prepare and pass legislation concerning expropriations 
that provides protection for rural land dwellers comparable to 
that enjoyed by urban dwellers under the Regulations on Ex-
propriation and Compensation for Housing on State-Owned 
Land. 
Æ Arrange and support a program of technical assistance for 
Chinese government departments responsible for land manage-
ment concerning U.S. procedures and standards for taking 
property by eminent domain. Such assistance would highlight 
the meaning under U.S. law of takings in the ‘‘public interest,’’ 
and could be organized by U.S. municipal governments work-
ing with their sister cities in China. 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to put in place comprehensive 
legislation to clarify rural land titles and to provide legal as-
sistance to rural land dwellers to help them protect their rights 
to collectively owned land. Working through U.S.-China dia-
logues, such as the Legal Exchange under the Joint Commis-
sion on Commerce and Trade, engage in technical exchanges 
with China concerning pro bono programs at law firms, or pro-
vision of other legal services for the poor in the United States. 




• Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-
mous Region (XUAR) remained poor in the Commission’s 2011 
reporting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the re-
gion in July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security 
policies that targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, 
and independent expressions of cultural and religious identity, 
especially among Uyghurs, as threats to the region’s stability. 
Authorities bolstered security in the region in summer 2011, 
following incidents they described as terrorist attacks and in 
advance of an expanded trade expo. 
• The Chinese government continued to obscure information 
about people tried in connection to the July 2009 demonstra-
tions and riots, while overseas media reported on cases of peo-
ple imprisoned for peaceful speech and assembly during that 
time. The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes 
of endangering state security—a category of criminal offenses 
that authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism 
and dissent—decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 figures but 
remained higher than in years before 2009. 
• Implementation of a series of central government-led devel-
opment initiatives, first announced at a May 2010 meeting 
known as the Xinjiang Work Forum, spurred an intensification 
of longstanding policies—including Mandarin-language school-
ing, herder resettlement, and urban development projects— 
that have undermined the rights of Uyghurs and other non- 
Han groups to maintain their cultures, languages, and liveli-
hoods. 
• Authorities in the XUAR enforced tight controls over reli-
gion, especially Islam, and maintained restrictions on religious 
practice that are harsher than curbs articulated in national 
regulations. Officials integrated curbs over Islam into security 
campaigns and monitored mosques, placed restrictions on the 
observance of the holiday of Ramadan, continued campaigns to 
prevent Muslim men from wearing beards and women from 
wearing veils, and targeted ‘‘illegal’’ religious materials in cen-
sorship campaigns. 
• Discriminatory job hiring practices against Uyghurs and 
other non-Han groups continued in both the government and 
private sectors. Authorities also continued to send rural non- 
Han men and women to jobs elsewhere in China, through pro-
grams reportedly marked, in some cases, by coercion to partici-
pate and exploitative working conditions. Education authorities 
in the XUAR continued to require students to pick cotton and 
engage in other forms of labor in work-study programs that ex-
ceeded permitted parameters for student labor under Chinese 
law and international standards for worker rights. 
• National and XUAR government officials continued to imple-
ment projects that have undermined Uyghurs’ ability to protect 
their cultural heritage. Authorities continued steps to demolish 
and ‘‘reconstruct’’ the Old City section of Kashgar and relocate 
residents, a five-year project launched in 2009 that has drawn 
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opposition from Uyghur residents and other observers for re-
quiring the resettlement of residents and for undermining cul-
tural heritage protection. The Chinese government also contin-
ued to politicize the protection of Uyghurs’ intangible cultural 
heritage, nominating a Uyghur social and artistic gathering for 
increased state and international protection, but defining this 
form of intangible heritage narrowly to exclude variations that 
contain religious elements and social activism. 
• Information remained limited on the status of asylum seek-
ers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia in December 
2009, before the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum seekers’ 
refugee status. In May 2011, Chinese security officials, in co-
operation with authorities in Kazakhstan, forcibly returned a 
Uyghur man—initially recognized as a refugee, though the 
UNHCR later revoked this status—from Kazakhstan to China. 
In August, authorities in Thailand turned over a Uyghur man 
to Chinese authorities—who are presumed to have returned 
him to China—while authorities in Pakistan and Malaysia 
forcibly returned Uyghurs to China in the same month. The 
forced returns are among several documented cases of forced 
deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of 
‘‘refoulement’’ and torture that Uyghur refugees, asylum seek-
ers, and migrants have faced in neighboring countries under 
the sway of China’s influence and its disregard for inter-
national law. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Support legislation that expands U.S. Government resources 
for raising awareness of human rights conditions in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), for protecting 
Uyghur culture, and for increasing avenues for Uyghurs to pro-
tect their human rights. 
Æ Raise concern about human rights conditions in the XUAR 
to Chinese officials and condemn the use of security campaigns 
to suppress human rights. Call on the Chinese government to 
release people imprisoned for advocating for their rights or for 
their personal connection to rights advocates, including: 
Gheyret Niyaz (sentenced in 2010 to 15 years in prison for 
‘‘leaking state secrets’’ after giving interviews to foreign 
media); Nurmemet Yasin (sentenced in 2005 to 10 years in 
prison for allegedly ‘‘inciting racial hatred or discrimination’’ or 
‘‘inciting separatism’’ after writing a short story); Alim and 
Ablikim Abdureyim (adult children of activist Rebiya Kadeer, 
sentenced in 2006 and 2007 to 7 and 9 years in prison, respec-
tively, for alleged economic and ‘‘separatist’’ crimes), as well as 
other prisoners mentioned in this report and in the Commis-
sion’s Political Prisoner Database. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide details about 
each person detained, charged, tried, or sentenced in connec-
tion to demonstrations and riots in the XUAR in July 2009, in-
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cluding each person’s name, the charges (if any) against each 
person, the name and location of the prosecuting office (i.e., 
procuratorate), the court handling each case, and the name of 
each facility where a person is detained or imprisoned. Call on 
the Chinese government to encourage people who have been 
wrongfully detained to file for compensation. Call on the Chi-
nese government to ensure people suspected of crimes in con-
nection to events in July 2009 are able to hire a lawyer and 
exercise their right to employ legal defense in accordance with 
Articles 33 and 96 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and to 
ensure suspects can employ legal defense of their own choos-
ing. Call on the Chinese government to announce the judg-
ments in all trials connected to events in July 2009, as re-
quired under Article 163 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law. 
Call on the government to allow independent experts to con-
duct independent examinations into the demonstrations and 
riots and to allow them access to the trials connected to these 
events. 
Æ Support non-governmental organizations that address 
human rights issues in the XUAR to enable them to continue 
to gather information on conditions in the region and develop 
programs to help Uyghurs increase their capacity to preserve 
their rights and protect their culture, language, and heritage. 
Provide support for media outlets devoted to broadcasting news 
to the XUAR and gathering news from the region to expand 
their capacity to report on the region and provide uncensored 
information to XUAR residents. Provide support for libraries 
that hold Uyghur-language collections to increase their capac-
ity to collect and preserve books and journals from the XUAR. 
Support organizations that can research and take steps to safe-
guard tangible and intangible cultural heritage in the XUAR. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to support development 
policies in the XUAR that promote the broad protection of 
XUAR residents’ rights and allow the XUAR government to ex-
ercise its powers of regional autonomy in making development 
decisions. Call on central and XUAR authorities to ensure eq-
uitable development that promotes not only economic growth 
but also respects the broad civil and political rights of XUAR 
residents and engages these communities in participatory deci-
sionmaking. Ensure development projects take into account the 
particular needs and input of non-Han ethnic groups, who have 
faced unique challenges protecting their rights in the face of 
top-down development policies and who have not been full 
beneficiaries of economic growth in the region. Call on authori-
ties to ensure that residents have input into resettlement ini-
tiatives and receive adequate compensation. Call on authorities 
to take measures to safeguard the rights of herders to preserve 
their cultures and livelihoods. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to ensure government and 
private employers abide by legal provisions barring discrimina-
tion based on ethnicity and cease job recruiting practices that 
reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese. Call on authori-
ties to monitor compliance with local directives promoting job 
opportunities for non-Han groups, who continue to face dis-
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crimination in the job market. Support organizations that can 
provide technical assistance in monitoring compliance with 
labor laws and in bringing suits challenging discriminatory 
practices, as provided for under Article 62 of the PRC Employ-
ment Promotion Law. Call on Chinese authorities to inves-
tigate reports of coercion and exploitative working conditions 
within labor transfer programs that send rural non-Han men 
and women to jobs in the interior of China. Call on Chinese au-
thorities to investigate work-study programs within the XUAR 
and ensure they do not exceed permitted parameters for stu-
dent labor under Chinese law and international standards for 
worker rights. 
Æ Call on the Chinese government to provide information on 
the whereabouts and current legal status of Uyghur asylum 
seekers forcibly returned from Cambodia in December 2009 
and Uyghurs forcibly returned to China from Kazakhstan, 
Thailand, Pakistan, and Malaysia in 2011. Raise the issue of 
Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers with Chinese officials and 
with officials from international refugee agencies and from 
transit or destination countries for Uyghur refugees. Call on 
Chinese officials and officials from transit or destination coun-
tries to respect the asylum seeker and refugee designations of 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the refugee and 
citizenship designations of other countries. Call on transit and 
destination countries for Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and 
migrants to abide by requirements in the 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and the Convention against 
Torture on ‘‘refoulement.’’ 
TIBET 
Findings 
• Expanding Chinese government and Communist Party use of 
legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan cul-
ture—especially on religion and language—are resulting in 
consequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of 
their culture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts 
with increases in government-provided statistical measures on 
economic development and social services, such as education. 
Tibetans who peacefully express disapproval of government 
and Party policy on Tibetan affairs are at increased risk of 
punishment as the central and local governments expand the 
use of legal measures to safeguard ‘‘social stability’’ by crim-
inalizing such expression. 
• No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama’s rep-
resentatives and Chinese government and Party officials dur-
ing the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. The environment for 
dialogue deteriorated as the government pressed forward with 
implementation of legal measures and policies that many Ti-
betans—including the Dalai Lama—believe threaten the Ti-
betan culture, language, religion, heritage, and environment. 
In 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role of 
a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is com-
monly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile. The 
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change has the potential to alter dialogue dynamics by elimi-
nating the basis for the Party and government to characterize 
the Dalai Lama as a ‘‘political’’ figure. 
• The government and Party continued the campaign to dis-
credit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader and expanded gov-
ernment and Party control over Tibetan Buddhism to impose 
what officials describe as the ‘‘normal order’’ of the religion. As 
of August 2011, the central government and 9 of 10 Tibetan 
autonomous prefectural governments issued or drafted regu-
latory measures that increase substantially state infringement 
of freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and 
nunneries. The measures impose closer monitoring and super-
vision of each monastery’s Democratic Management Com-
mittee—a monastic group legally obligated to ensure that 
monks, nuns, and teachers obey government laws, regulations, 
and policies. The measures expand significantly township-level 
government authority over monasteries and nunneries and pro-
vide a monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role to village- 
level committees. 
• Government security and judicial officials used China’s legal 
system as a means to detain and imprison Tibetan writers, art-
ists, intellectuals, and cultural advocates who turned to veiled 
language to lament the status of Tibetan culture or criticize 
government policies toward the Tibetan people and culture. 
Examples during the 2011 reporting year included writer-pub-
lishers, a conference organizer, a singer, and persons who 
downloaded ‘‘prohibited’’ songs. The government seeks to pre-
vent such Tibetans from influencing other Tibetans by pun-
ishing peaceful expression as a ‘‘crime’’ and using imprison-
ment to remove them from society. 
• Events this past year highlighted the importance Tibetans 
attribute to the status and preservation of the Tibetan lan-
guage and the increased threat that some Tibetans believe will 
result from ‘‘reform’’ of the ‘‘bilingual education’’ system. Ti-
betan students in one province led protests against plans to re-
duce the status and level of use of Tibetan language during the 
period 2010 to 2020. A Party official characterized ‘‘unity of 
spoken and written language’’ as essential for ‘‘a unified coun-
try’’ and implied that protesting students put national unity at 
risk. Retired Tibetan educators submitted to authorities a peti-
tion analyzing what they deemed to be violations of China’s 
Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that result in 
the infringement of ethnic minorities’ rights. 
• Rural Tibetans protested against what they consider to be 
adverse effects of government and Party economic development 
policies—especially mining—that prioritize government objec-
tives above respecting or protecting the Tibetan culture and 
environment. The value of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
mineral resources is approximately double the 2001 to 2010 
subsidies the central government provided to the TAR, based 
on official reports. The TAR government has completed the 
compulsory settlement or resettlement of nearly two-thirds of 
the TAR rural population. Officials provided updates on con-
struction of the railway network that will crisscross the Ti-
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betan plateau: one link will traverse quake-struck Yushu, 
which the government renamed and will make into a ‘‘city’’ 
with a substantial population, economy, and well-developed in-
frastructure. Tibetans in Yushu protested after authorities ei-
ther sold or expropriated their property without providing ade-
quate compensation. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Urge the Chinese government to engage in substantive dia-
logue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives on protecting 
the Tibetan culture, language, religion, and heritage within the 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Tibetan autonomous 
prefectures and counties in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and 
Yunnan provinces. The Dalai Lama’s withdrawal from exiled 
Tibetan administrative affairs has the potential to alter dia-
logue dynamics by eliminating the basis for the government 
and Party to characterize him as a ‘‘political’’ figure. As ten-
sions rise in Tibetan areas, a Chinese government decision to 
engage in dialogue can result in a durable and mutually bene-
ficial outcome for the Chinese government and Tibetans and 
improve the outlook for local and regional security in coming 
decades. 
Æ Convey to the Chinese government the urgent importance of 
refraining from expanding the use of legal measures to infringe 
upon and repress Tibetan Buddhists’ right to the freedom of re-
ligion. Point out to Chinese officials that the anti-Dalai Lama 
campaign, aggressive programs of ‘‘patriotic education,’’ and re-
cent prefectural-level legal measures seeking to control Tibetan 
Buddhist monastic affairs could promote social discord, not ‘‘so-
cial stability.’’ Urge the government to respect the right of Ti-
betan Buddhists to identify and educate religious teachers in 
a manner consistent with Tibetan preferences and traditions. 
Æ Request that the Chinese government follow up on a 2010 
statement by the Chairman of the TAR government that 
Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen Lama whom the Dalai 
Lama recognized in 1995, is living in the TAR as an ‘‘ordinary 
citizen’’ along with his family. Urge the government to invite 
a representative of an international organization to meet with 
Gedun Choekyi Nyima so that Gedun Choekyi Nyima can ex-
press to the representative his wishes with respect to privacy; 
photograph the international representative and Gedun 
Choekyi Nyima together; and publish Gedun Choekyi Nyima’s 
statement and the photograph. 
Æ Convey to the Chinese government the importance of re-
specting and protecting the Tibetan culture and language. 
Urge Chinese officials to promote a vibrant Tibetan culture by 
honoring China’s Constitution’s reference to the freedoms of 
speech, association, assembly, and religion, and refraining from 
using the security establishment, courts, and law to infringe 
upon and repress Tibetans’ exercise of such rights. Urge offi-
cials to respect Tibetan wishes to maintain the role of both the 
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Tibetan and Chinese languages in teaching modern subjects 
and not to consign Tibetan language to inferior status by dis-
continuing its use in teaching modern subjects. 
Æ Encourage the Chinese government to take fully into ac-
count the views and preferences of Tibetans when the govern-
ment plans infrastructure, natural resource development, and 
resettlement projects in the Tibetan areas of China. Encourage 
the Chinese government to engage appropriate experts in as-
sessing the impact of such projects and in advising the govern-
ment on the implementation and progress of such projects. Re-
quest the Chinese government to compensate fully, fairly, and 
promptly all Tibetans who suffer the loss of property or prop-
erty rights as a result of the April 2010 Yushu earthquake and 
the government’s decision to redevelop Yushu as a new ‘‘city.’’ 
Æ Increase support for U.S. non-governmental organizations to 
develop programs that can assist Tibetans to increase their ca-
pacity to peacefully protect and develop their culture, lan-
guage, and heritage; that can help to improve education, eco-
nomic, health, and environmental conservation conditions of 
ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas of China; and that cre-
ate sustainable benefits for Tibetans without encouraging an 
influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. 
Æ Continue to convey to the Chinese government the impor-
tance of distinguishing between peaceful Tibetan protesters 
and rioters; condemn the use of security campaigns to suppress 
human rights; and request the Chinese government to provide 
complete details about Tibetans detained, charged, or sen-
tenced for protest-related crimes. Continue to raise in meetings 
and correspondence with Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans 
who are imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of 
human rights. Representative examples include: Former Ti-
betan monk Jigme Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year 
sentence for printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later 
shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison); monk Choeying 
Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets); 
Bangri Chogtrul (regarded by Tibetan Buddhists as a reincar-
nated lama, serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from life 
imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’); and nomad Ronggyal 
Adrag (sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for shouting polit-
ical slogans at a public festival). 
DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG AND MACAU 
Findings 
• Though the Hong Kong Basic Law states that the ‘‘ultimate 
aim’’ is the selection of the chief executive and the election of 
all members of the Legislative Council (Legco) by universal 
suffrage, reforms passed in 2011 fell short of these aims. The 
reforms cover the election of Legco members and the selection 
of the chief executive in Hong Kong’s 2012 elections. Under the 
reforms, the number of members of the selection committee 
that chooses the chief executive will be increased from 800 to 
1,200, and the number of Legco members will be increased 
from 60 to 70, with 5 of the additional 10 members elected di-
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rectly and the other 5 elected under a newly created territory- 
wide District Council functional constituency. According to a 
report in an independent Hong Kong newspaper, the mainland 
Chinese government has been ‘‘coordinating’’ election strategies 
behind the scenes. 
• The Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law 
provide that Hong Kong shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. 
In the past year Hong Kong’s immigration authorities refused 
to grant visas to two exiled leaders of the Tiananmen protests, 
Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of Hong 
Kong democracy activist Szeto Wah in January 2011. Hong 
Kong controls its own immigration policies under the Basic 
Law, and at least one Hong Kong commentator viewed the im-
migration department’s refusal to issue visas as Hong Kong de-
ferring to the wishes of the mainland authorities. 
• Corruption in Macau is a major and growing problem, with 
Macau’s ranking on the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index dropping from 43rd in 2009 to 46th in 2010. 
The growth of gambling in Macau, fueled by money from main-
land Chinese gamblers and the growth of U.S.-owned casinos, 
has been accompanied by widespread corruption, organized 
crime, and money laundering. 
Recommendations 
Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration officials are 
encouraged to: 
Æ Continue to make every effort to visit Hong Kong when trav-
eling to mainland China. U.S. Government delegations’ meet-
ings in Hong Kong should include meetings with members of 
the Hong Kong Legislative Council, officials with the Hong 
Kong government administration, and members of the judici-
ary. Such meetings show U.S. support for a high degree of au-
tonomy in Hong Kong under the system of ‘‘one country, two 
systems’’ and for rule of law. 
Æ In meetings with Chinese government officials, urge them to 
allow the people of Hong Kong to enjoy the high degree of au-
tonomy articulated in the Basic Law and the Sino-U.K. Joint 
Declaration, especially in matters concerning elections and im-
migration, and to allow the introduction of universal suffrage 
with ‘‘one man, one vote,’’ if this is the wish of the people of 
Hong Kong. 
Æ Arrange for regulatory experts from states with gaming in-
dustries, such as Nevada, to provide technical training and as-
sistance to Macau authorities on how to control criminal activ-
ity, and ensure that U.S. casino owners and operators in 
Macau are adhering to the highest standards for the gaming 
industry. 
The Commission adopted this report by a vote of 13 to 0.† 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
52 
POLITICAL PRISONER DATABASE 
Recommendations 
When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a polit-
ical or religious prisoner, or preparing for official travel to China, 
Members of Congress and Administration officials are encouraged 
to: 
Æ Check the Political Prisoner Database (PPD) (http:// 
ppd.cecc.gov) for reliable, up-to-date information on a prisoner 
or groups of prisoners. Consult a prisoner’s database record for 
more detailed information about the prisoner’s case, including 
his or her alleged crime; specific human rights that officials 
have violated; stage in the legal process; and location of deten-
tion or imprisonment, if known. 
Æ Advise official and private delegations traveling to China to 
present Chinese officials with lists of political and religious 
prisoners compiled from database records. 
Æ Urge U.S. state and local officials and private citizens in-
volved in sister-state and sister-city relationships with China 
to explore the database and to advocate for the release of polit-
ical and religious prisoners in China. 
A POWERFUL RESOURCE FOR ADVOCACY 
The Commission’s 2011 Annual Report provides information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners1 in the context of 
specific human rights and rule of law abuses. Many of the abuses 
result from the Communist Party’s and government’s application of 
policies and laws. The Commission relies on the Political Prisoner 
Database (PPD), a publicly available online database maintained 
by the Commission, for its own advocacy and research work, in-
cluding the preparation of the Annual Report, and routinely uses 
the database to prepare summaries of information about political 
and religious prisoners for Members of Congress and Administra-
tion officials. The Commission invites the public to read about 
issue-specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this An-
nual Report and to access and make use of the upgraded PPD at 
http://ppd.cecc.gov. (Information on how to use the PPD is avail-
able at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index.php.) 
PPD use has increased substantially following the July 2010 
PPD upgrade. The PPD received approximately 90,900 online re-
quests for prisoner information during the 12-month period ending 
August 31, 2011, an increase of approximately 164 percent over the 
34,400 requests during the 12-month period ending in August 
2010. During the 12-month period ending in August 2011, the 
United States was the country of origin of the largest share of re-
quests for information (approximately 46 percent), followed by 
China (24 percent), Germany (8 percent), France (3.5 percent), and 
Great Britain (3.2 percent). Approximately 13 percent of the re-
quests originated from U.S. Government (.gov) Internet domains, 
13 percent from worldwide commercial (.com) domains, 13 percent 
from worldwide network (.net) domains, 1.5 percent from U.S. edu-
cation (.edu) domains, and 0.8 percent from worldwide nonprofit or-
ganization (.org) domains. Approximately 16 percent of the re-
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quests for information were from numerical Internet addresses that 
do not provide information about the name of the registrant or the 
type of domain. 
POLITICAL PRISONERS 
The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information that 
is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work to 
maintain and update political prisoner records based on the staff 
member’s area of expertise. The staff seek to provide objective anal-
ysis of information about individual prisoners and about events and 
trends that drive political and religious imprisonment in China. 
As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained information on 
6,623 cases of political or religious imprisonment in China. Of 
those, 1,451 are cases of political or religious prisoners currently 
known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, and 5,172 are 
cases of prisoners who are known or believed to have been re-
leased, or executed, who died while imprisoned or soon after re-
lease, or who escaped. The Commission notes that there are consid-
erably more than 1,451 cases of current political and religious im-
prisonment in China. The Commission staff works on an ongoing 
basis to add cases of political and religious imprisonment to the 
PPD. 
The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 
former Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious prisoners 
in China with the Commission to help establish the database. The 
Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The Commission also relies 
on its own staff research for prisoner information, as well as on in-
formation provided by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and oppos-
ing political and religious imprisonment, and other public sources 
of information. 
MORE POWERFUL DATABASE TECHNOLOGY 
The PPD has served since its launch in November 2004 as a 
unique and powerful resource for the U.S. Congress and Adminis-
tration, other governments, NGOs, educational institutions, and in-
dividuals who research political and religious imprisonment in 
China or who advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The July 2010 
PPD upgrade significantly leveraged the capacity of the Commis-
sion’s information and technology resources to support such re-
search, reporting, and advocacy. 
The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power to 
cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment in 
China. The most important feature of the PPD is that it is struc-
tured as a genuine database and uses a powerful query engine. 
Each prisoner’s record describes the type of human rights violation 
by Chinese authorities that led to his or her detention. These types 
include violations of the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of reli-
gion, freedom of association, and free expression, including the 
freedom to advocate for peaceful social or political change and to 
criticize government policy or government officials. 
The design of the PPD allows anyone with access to the Internet 
to query the database and download prisoner data without pro-
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viding personal information to the Commission and without the 
PPD downloading any software or Web cookies to a user’s com-
puter. Users have the option to create a user account, which allows 
them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not require 
a user to provide any personal information to set up such an ac-
count. The PPD does not download software or a Web cookie to a 
user’s computer as the result of setting up such an account. Saved 
queries are not stored on a user’s computer. A user-specified ID 
(which can be a nickname) and password are the only information 
required to set up a user account. 
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II. Human Rights 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Introduction 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chinese officials 
maintained a broad range of restrictions on free expression that do 
not comply with international human rights standards. While such 
standards permit states in limited circumstances to restrict expres-
sion to protect interests such as national security and public order, 
Chinese restrictions covered a much broader range of activity, in-
cluding peaceful expression critical of the Communist Party. Chi-
nese officials showed little sign of loosening political control over 
the Internet and cell phones. They called for strengthening the 
Party’s guidance of online opinion and censored politically sensitive 
information, including searches for ‘‘human rights’’ or ‘‘democracy.’’ 
At times, citizen expression on China’s popular microblogs over-
whelmed censors, including following a high-speed train accident in 
July. A top official said there would be ‘‘no change in the Party’s 
control over the media,’’ amidst censorship of events such as the 
Nobel Peace Prize award to imprisoned Chinese intellectual and re-
form advocate Liu Xiaobo and intensified harassment of foreign 
journalists. Officials continued to abuse vague criminal charges, in-
cluding subversion, to target peaceful speech critical of the Party. 
Officials maintained broad regulations and registration require-
ments applicable to journalists, publishers, news media, and the 
Internet. 
International Standards for Free Expression 
Many Chinese restrictions on free expression do not comply with 
international human rights standards. Article 19 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Arti-
cles 19 and 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights per-
mit officials to restrict expression so long as it is (1) for the purpose 
of respecting the rights or reputations of others or protecting na-
tional security, public order, public health or morals, or the general 
welfare; (2) set forth in law; and (3) necessary and the least restric-
tive means to achieve the purported aim.1 Regarding the purpose 
requirement, the UN Human Rights Council has said restrictions 
on ‘‘discussion of government policies and political debate,’’ ‘‘peace-
ful demonstrations or political activities, including for peace and 
democracy,’’ and ‘‘expression of dissent,’’ are inconsistent with Arti-
cle 19 of the ICCPR.2 As outlined in this section, Chinese officials 
continued to restrict expression on the Internet and in the media 
for impermissible purposes, such as to stifle peaceful criticism of 
the Communist Party. As to restrictions clearly set forth in law, 
Chinese officials this past year abused vaguely worded criminal 
law provisions and resorted to extralegal measures to arbitrarily 
restrict free expression. As to the narrowness requirement, as docu-
mented in this section, Chinese restrictions continued to be overly 
broad and disproportionate to protecting the stated interest. In 
May 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression noted 
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that restrictions on expression should be applied by an independent 
body and include the possibility of remedy against abuse.3 As noted 
in this section, in China there remained no independent checks on 
government abuse. 
Official Response to Overseas Protests and Calls for Domestic 
‘‘Jasmine’’ Protests 
This past year was marked by a crackdown on free expression in 
China in early 2011 that followed protests in the Middle East and North 
Africa and the appearance of online calls for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests domesti-
cally. Protests in the Middle East began in Tunisia in December 2010 
and soon spread to Egypt, Libya, and other countries in the region. In 
February 2011, the ‘‘Jasmine’’ calls began circulating online in China.4 
They called for weekly non-violent protest strolls in select cities to de-
mand an end to corruption and to promote issues such as judicial inde-
pendence, free expression, and political reform.5 
MEDIA AND INTERNET CENSORSHIP 
Officials reportedly censored Chinese media coverage of the Middle 
East and North Africa protests. According to leaked censorship instruc-
tions, officials allegedly ordered Chinese media to use only stories issued 
by the central government news agency, Xinhua, and banned reporting 
on demands for democracy in the Middle East or drawing comparisons 
to China’s political system.6 Western media observed Chinese media re-
lying heavily on Xinhua stories and observed one-sided coverage empha-
sizing the dangers of democracy for countries not ready for it.7 At the 
time, online censors reportedly blocked searches of the words ‘‘Egypt,’’ 
‘‘Libya,’’ ‘‘Jasmine,’’ and ‘‘democracy.’’ 8 The duration and effectiveness of 
the censorship was unclear. Foreign media attempting to report on the 
‘‘Jasmine’’ protests encountered intense harassment. [See Foreign Jour-
nalists below for more information.] 
HARASSMENT, DETENTIONS OF CHINESE CITIZENS 
Starting in mid-February 2011, Chinese authorities also targeted 
large numbers of writers, artists, Internet bloggers, lawyers, and reform 
advocates. Many were outspoken critics of the government; some tried to 
share information about the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest calls, while the connec-
tion of others, if any, to the calls was unclear.9 Officials detained numer-
ous citizens on national security and public disturbance charges.10 [For 
information on these and other individual cases in the crackdown, see 
Internet and Other Electronic Media, and Abuse of Criminal Laws To 
Punish Free Expression in this section.] The UN Working Group on En-
forced or Involuntary Disappearances and other international groups 
noted reports of numerous Chinese citizens having gone missing or dis-
appearing into official custody with little or no information about their 
charges or whereabouts.11 [For more information on the apparent dis-
regard of criminal procedural protections in connection with the dis-
appearances, see Enforced Disappearances in Section II—Criminal Jus-
tice.] 
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Internet and Other Electronic Media 
BLOCKING AND FILTERING POLITICAL CONTENT 
In China, officials are not transparent about the content that is 
blocked or why it is blocked,12 and they continue to arbitrarily 
block content for purposes impermissible under international 
standards. Chinese authorities expressed anger over the awarding 
of the Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned prominent intellectual and 
reform advocate Liu Xiaobo in October 2010, for example, and 
blocked online searches for ‘‘Nobel Peace Prize’’ or ‘‘Liu Xiaobo’’ and 
text messages containing Liu’s name.13 In January 2011, authori-
ties reportedly banned hundreds of words, including ‘‘democracy’’ 
and ‘‘human rights’’ from cell phone text messages.14 Politically 
sensitive Web sites continued to be blocked, including a popular Ti-
betan culture site, an anticorruption site, and a public health advo-
cacy Web site.15 Officials also continued to block information in a 
disproportionate manner that did not appear necessary to achieve 
a legitimate aim. For example, access to overseas sites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube remained completely blocked.16 In 
late May 2011, officials reportedly imposed broad blocks on Inter-
net and cell phone access in the northern part of the Inner Mon-
golia Autonomous Region following a series of mostly peaceful pro-
tests sparked by the death of a herder.17 
Officials continued to detain and harass Chinese citizens who 
sought to share politically sensitive content online. In each case, 
the activity appeared to pose little threat to national security or 
public order, or the punishment appeared disproportionate to the 
alleged offense. For example, rights defender Cheng Jianping (who 
uses the pseudonym Wang Yi) sent a satirical Twitter message urg-
ing anti-Japanese protesters to converge on the Japanese pavilion 
at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.18 The Xinxiang City Reeduca-
tion Through Labor (RTL) Committee in Henan province ordered 
her to serve one year of RTL in November 2010.19 In April 2011, 
authorities in Chongqing municipality ordered a citizen to serve 
RTL for posting scatological humor in a critique of the policies of 
Chongqing’s Party Secretary Bo Xilai.20 In November 2010, Shang-
hai police interrogated the writer Xia Shang after he offered to buy 
flowers for victims of a Shanghai fire in an Internet post.21 Offi-
cials treated citizens who sought to share information about the 
calls for domestic ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests, which appeared to be a non- 
violent call for political reform, as threats to the state. The de-
tained included Hua Chunhui, an insurance company manager and 
activist who reportedly sent Twitter messages about the ‘‘Jasmine’’ 
protest calls and was charged with endangering state security.22 In 
April 2011, officials in Jiangsu province ordered Hua to serve 18 
months of RTL.23 In February, police in Harbin city, Heilongjiang 
province, detained Internet blogger Liang Haiyi on suspicion of the 
crime of ‘‘subversion of state power.’’ Police accused her of posting 
information about the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests on the popular QQ 
microblogging site.24 
The types of content prohibited online in China are not clearly 
defined in law, and thus conflict with international standards. Chi-
nese Internet regulations contain vague and broad prohibitions on 
content that, for example, ‘‘harms the honor or interests of the na-
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tion,’’ ‘‘spreads rumors,’’ or ‘‘disrupts national policies on reli-
gion.’’ 25 Chinese law does not define these concepts.26 In China, 
the government places the burden on Internet service and content 
providers to monitor and remove content based on these vague 
standards and to maintain records of such activity and report it to 
the government.27 In February 2011, a manager at Renren, a major 
social media company similar to Facebook, said that the company 
censored sensitive content using a staff of 500 and a keyword fil-
tering system, and that the ‘‘CEO would have to have a coffee with 
the government’’ for any misstep.28 The Party’s influence over the 
technology sector was evident in June, when more than 60 rep-
resentatives from top Chinese Internet companies, including Sina 
and Baidu, gathered in Shanghai to commemorate the Party’s 90th 
anniversary.29 Also in June, Sina announced plans to launch an 
English microblog site in the United States, which could have the 
effect of exporting Chinese censorship to overseas markets.30 The 
U.S.-based company Google, which has operations in China and 
which in early 2010 challenged Chinese censorship requirements, 
reportedly continued to face problems in China. In March 2011, 
Google reported that the Chinese government appeared to be inter-
fering with its email service in China and making it look like a 
technical problem.31 The government denied the charge.32 In June, 
Google reported that an attack on hundreds of personal Gmail ac-
counts, including those of Chinese political activists, senior U.S. of-
ficials, and journalists, had originated from China.33 The Party’s of-
ficial newspaper rejected the allegation.34 
PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON THE INTERNET 
In addition to blocking certain types of content, officials in China 
control the Internet by determining who gains access to the me-
dium through numerous licensing requirements (i.e., prior re-
straints). All Web sites hosted in China are required either to be 
licensed by or registered with the government, and sites providing 
news content or audio and video services require an additional li-
cense or registration.35 In a 2011 report, the UN Special 
Rapporteur for Free Expression said that licensing requirements 
‘‘cannot be justified in the case of the Internet, as it can accommo-
date an unlimited number of points of entry and an essentially un-
limited number of users.’’ 36 In October 2010, Chinese media re-
ported that as of the end of September 2010 Chinese Internet com-
panies had inspected nearly 1.8 million Web sites and shut down 
3,000 for failing to register.37 In July 2011, the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) reported a 41 percent decrease in the 
number of Web sites in China in 2010 to 1.91 million sites.38 The 
report’s editor cited government campaigns targeting ‘‘obscene’’ 
sites and the economic downturn as reasons for the decrease, and 
said in recent years few sites had been closed ‘‘purely to control 
speech.’’ 39 Other observers in China, however, attributed the de-
crease to the chilling effect of expanding government control.40 The 
CASS study also claimed that the United States was using new 
media, including the Voice of America, to threaten China’s ‘‘ideolog-
ical safety.’’ 41 
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EXPANDING OVERALL ACCESS, WHILE MAINTAINING CONTROL 
The government has pledged to expand access to the Internet 
and cell phones.42 Official statistics indicate that by the end of 
2010, there were 457 million Internet users in China, including a 
growing number in rural areas, and by April 2011, 900 million mo-
bile phone accounts.43 Officials have sought to expand the Internet 
to promote economic development and government propaganda.44 
Still, international observers and Western media continue to note 
the difficulties officials have in controlling this emerging and vi-
brant space for expression, including expression of criticism of the 
government and discussion of some politically sensitive topics.45 In 
July 2011, for example, users on China’s two most popular Twitter- 
type microblogs posted some 26 million messages after a high- 
speed train crash near Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province.46 Officials 
reportedly censored some messages, but a large number of mes-
sages either were allowed through or appeared too quickly for cen-
sors to react.47 
Official statements and actions continue to emphasize control 
rather than freedom on the Internet. The importance of maintain-
ing official control was reinforced in May 2011, when officials es-
tablished a State Internet Information Office to ‘‘supervise and 
urge relevant departments to strengthen their supervision of online 
content, and to be responsible for approvals for online news serv-
ices and other related services as well as day-to-day oversight.’’ 48 
In China, the Communist Party exercises tight control over govern-
ment agencies that manage the media and Internet.49 This rela-
tionship gives the Party discretion to use government restrictions 
not just for the purpose of regulating pornography, intellectual 
property violations, and protecting minors—permissible purposes 
under international standards—but also to serve the Party’s inter-
ests. In February 2011, President Hu Jintao called for ‘‘strength-
ening the mechanisms for guiding online public opinion.’’ 50 The 
practice of authorities paying Chinese citizens to post comments fa-
vorable to the government and Party on the Internet reportedly 
continued.51 In February, Communist Party Politburo Standing 
Committee member Zhou Yongkang said authorities should ‘‘coa-
lesce a comprehensive’’ structure for managing the Internet ‘‘under 
the Party committee’s unified leadership.’’ 52 In Beijing, authorities 
reportedly issued regulations requiring bars, hotels, and other pub-
lic places to purchase and install costly software to monitor the 
identities of people using wireless services at those locations.53 
Abuse of Criminal Law To Punish Free Expression 
Officials continued to use the criminal charges of ‘‘subversion’’ 
and ‘‘inciting subversion’’ (Article 105 of the PRC Criminal Law) 
this past year, in part in connection with the crackdown that fol-
lowed protests in the Middle East and North Africa and the calls 
for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests domestically.54 According to the non-govern-
mental organization (NGO) Chinese Human Rights Defenders, out 
of a total of 48 individuals detained since mid-February 2011, offi-
cials had charged at least 17 with ‘‘subversion’’ or ‘‘inciting subver-
sion.’’ 55 Ran Yunfei, a prolific writer, blogger, and activist, was ar-
rested in March for ‘‘inciting subversion.’’ 56 Authorities released 
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him in August but placed him under ‘‘residential restriction’’ for six 
months, restricting his movements and ability to write and 
speak.57 In March, police in Ningbo city, Zhejiang province, de-
tained prominent blogger Guo Weidong on suspicion of ‘‘inciting 
subversion of state power’’ after alleging he had forwarded informa-
tion online about the protests.58 
Officials also charged numerous persons with ‘‘creating disturb-
ances,’’ a crime under Article 293 of the PRC Criminal Law.59 Offi-
cials detained the human rights activist Wei Qiang on the charge 
of ‘‘creating a disturbance’’ in March 2011, before releasing him on 
bail to await trial in April.60 In February, Wei was at the site of 
one of the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest strolls in Beijing and reported on the 
scene using his Twitter account. Amid the broader crackdown, au-
thorities in March 2011 also detained the Beijing-based rights ad-
vocate Wang Lihong on the charge of creating a disturbance, but 
in connection with activities stemming from almost a year ear-
lier.61 They alleged that Wang had used the Internet to organize 
protests outside a court in support of three bloggers accused of def-
amation for helping a woman call on officials to reinvestigate her 
daughter’s death.62 In September, after a trial reportedly marked 
by procedural irregularities,63 a Beijing court sentenced Wang to 
nine months in prison for creating a disturbance.64 
In the case of the well-known artist Ai Weiwei, officials charged 
him with economic crimes, alleging that his company had evaded 
‘‘a huge amount of tax.’’ 65 Ai had become an outspoken critic of 
government policies and had been keeping track of the lawyers, 
bloggers, and activists swept up in the crackdown, when officials 
detained him in April.66 Authorities had refused to notify his fam-
ily of the charges against him or his whereabouts and kept him at 
a secret location, purportedly under ‘‘residential surveillance.’’ 67 
During his 81 days in custody, Ai was reportedly kept in a cell 
without windows and was accompanied by two guards.68 Authori-
ties released Ai on bail in June on the condition that he not give 
interviews or use Twitter.69 In August, Ai resumed his Twitter 
messages and told a Western newspaper, ‘‘I can’t be alive and not 
express my feelings.’’ 70 
The actual threat these citizens posed to state security and pub-
lic order or whether the underlying crime was the actual motiva-
tion for official action is unclear, as details regarding many of these 
cases remain limited. Available information suggests that officials 
targeted the citizens to stifle political expression and dissent. Many 
of the citizens targeted had track records of criticizing the govern-
ment and Communist Party and advocating for democracy and 
human rights.71 As the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
and Chinese Human Rights Defenders have noted in recent years, 
the vagueness of Chinese crimes of endangering state security, in-
cluding subversion, lends itself to official abuse of freedom of 
speech, and Chinese courts make little assessment of whether the 
speech in question poses a threat to state security.72 There were 
other cases of alleged subversion or splittism this past year. In Oc-
tober 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei province, arrested the 
prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of subversion; Li had written nu-
merous essays in support of democracy.73 In November, Beijing au-
thorities detained activist Bai Dongping on inciting subversion 
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charges after he posted online a photo of the 1989 Tiananmen pro-
tests.74 In December, three Tibetan writers, Kalsang Jinpa, 
Jangtse Donkho, and Buddha were sentenced to prison terms of 
three to four years for inciting splittism after articles they had 
written about the 2008 Tibetan protests appeared in a magazine.75 
In March 2011, authorities in Suining city, Sichuan province, sen-
tenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin to 10 years in prison for 
seeking to incite subversion by writing essays advocating for, 
among other things, democracy, and posting them on Web sites 
outside of China.76 
Authorities Defend Liu Xiaobo Case on Grounds of International 
Law 
After imprisoned prominent intellectual and reform advocate Liu 
Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, Chinese au-
thorities sought to defend their handling of his case as consistent with 
international law. After the award was announced, China’s central gov-
ernment news agency, Xinhua, issued an analysis of the case based on 
the findings of a Chinese criminal law scholar, Gao Mingxuan.77 The 
analysis noted that international treaties and nearly every country’s 
laws criminalize some speech, and that Liu’s speech had sought to incite 
the overthrow of the Chinese government.78 Xinhua failed to note that 
the essays and activities cited as evidence against Liu, who was sen-
tenced to 11 years in prison, did not advocate violence and instead 
called for nonviolence and gradual political reform.79 A May 2011 opin-
ion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that 
Chinese authorities’ handling of Liu’s case violated both his right to fair 
trial and his right to political free speech as provided under inter-
national law.80 Chinese officials responded to the Nobel announcement 
by detaining citizens who distributed leaflets and posted online mes-
sages in support of Liu.81 
Extralegal Harassment 
Chinese officials continued to physically harm, restrict the travel 
of, and otherwise extralegally harass citizens to punish and stifle 
expression. Under illegal home confinement after his release, self- 
trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his wife Yuan 
Weijing recorded video of themselves describing the round-the-clock 
surveillance and harassment they faced.82 After the video was 
smuggled out and posted online in February 2011, security officials 
reportedly beat Chen and Yuan on two occasions.83 After the Nobel 
announcement in October 2010, authorities confined Liu Xia, the 
wife of Liu Xiaobo, to her home in Beijing and cut off her commu-
nications to the outside world.84 A May 2011 opinion of the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded that Liu Xia’s 
house arrest violates international standards.85 After his release 
from prison in December, China Democracy Party co-founder Qin 
Yongmin was harassed by police in Wuhan city, Hubei province, 
who accused him of speaking to reporters.86 Officials refused to 
allow the noted writer Liao Yiwu to attend the March 2011 PEN 
World Writers Festival in New York and a literary festival in Aus-
tralia in May.87 In July, Liao escaped China at the Vietnam bor-
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der. He fled to Berlin in anticipation of the publication of a memoir 
on the four years he spent in a Chinese prison for writing a poem 
on the 1989 Tiananmen protests.88 The Buddhist leader Wu 
Zeheng reportedly has been beaten, harassed, and prevented from 
participating in a Buddhist celebration by authorities in 
Guangdong province following his release from prison in February 
2010.89 Wu previously served 11 years for alleged economic crimes, 
although reports connect that imprisonment to his issuance of let-
ters to China’s leadership calling for reforms and an end to corrup-
tion.90 
Freedom of the Press 
Chinese government and Communist Party control over the press 
continued to violate international standards. International experts 
identify media serving ‘‘as government mouthpieces instead of as 
independent bodies operating in the public interest’’ as a major 
challenge to free expression.91 In China, officials expect the media 
to serve as the Party and government’s mouthpiece. In a November 
2010 speech on political reform, Liu Binjie, director of the govern-
ment agency responsible for regulating the press, the General Ad-
ministration on Press and Publication, said any reform must be 
‘‘beneficial to strengthening and improving the Party’s leadership 
over press and publishing work. . . . From beginning to end we 
must insist on . . . no change to the nature of press and publishing 
serving as mouthpiece of the Party and the people, no change in 
the Party’s control over the media.’’ 92 In January 2011, a spokes-
person for the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television 
(SARFT) said officials had ruled out any moves to commercialize 
radio and television stations. ‘‘Radio and television stations are the 
Party’s important news media and battleground for propagandizing 
ideology and culture . . . and propaganda must remain its focus,’’ 
he said.93 In November 2010, the Party’s official journal, Seeking 
Truth, cited the experience of the former Soviet Union to argue 
against any liberalization of China’s press.94 
Authorities have allowed reporters some room to exercise ‘‘public 
supervision’’ duties over local officials and local matters, but in re-
cent years have sought to rein in this space. In the summer of 
2010, for example, the Central Propaganda Department reportedly 
barred more commercially oriented ‘‘metropolitan’’ (dushi) news-
papers from publishing ‘‘negative’’ stories about incidents in other 
geographic areas within China or carrying stories published by 
newspapers based in other areas, a practice known as ‘‘outside area 
supervision.’’ 95 Rhetorically, officials continue to claim that the 
rights of legally recognized journalists should be protected, al-
though the content of such rights remains unclear.96 Emboldened 
by official claims that journalists deserve protection, Chinese jour-
nalists protested a series of incidents during the summer of 2010 
in which local officials and commercial interests had targeted a 
number of journalists, including threatening them with charges of 
criminal defamation.97 Despite such protests, a deputy editor at 
Caijing, a Chinese financial magazine known for its investigative 
reporting, noted the ‘‘core problem: our police and judiciary are not 
independent and there is widespread collusion between officials 
and enterprises.’’ 98 In July, the Party issued an order censoring 
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news coverage of a high-speed train accident in Wenzhou city, 
Zhejiang province, forcing newspapers to discard pages containing 
coverage of the incident.99 The order came after Chinese citizens 
flooded the Internet with messages questioning officials’ response 
and openness following the crash.100 A number of Chinese journal-
ists expressed outrage at the propaganda order on their blogs, and 
at least one news weekly appeared to ignore the order.101 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH PARTY DIRECTIVES 
This past year, officials continued to publicly issue broad direc-
tives on what China’s domestic media should report, reminding 
journalists of their duty to ‘‘correctly’’ (zhengque) guide public opin-
ion. On Journalists’ Day in China in November 2010, Li 
Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee, said that ‘‘a 
correct public opinion orientation benefits the Party and the peo-
ple.’’ 102 He called on the news media to ‘‘propagandize the Party’s 
positions.’’ 103 To prepare for the 90th anniversary of the founding 
of the Chinese Communist Party in July 2011, Central Propaganda 
Department director Liu Yunshan said in April that covering the 
anniversary was the ‘‘common responsibility of media organizations 
at various levels.’’ 104 He called on evening and metropolitan news-
papers to ‘‘use vivid stories and inspiring topics to illustrate the 
glorious history of our Party’s struggle’’ and urged online media to 
‘‘help the large numbers of netizens understand the Party’s great 
historical course by publishing special postings, background links, 
and online interviews.’’ 105 In May 2011, an official at SARFT con-
firmed that television stations had been verbally ordered not to air 
detective and time travel shows during the anniversary period.106 
The Party, through its Central Propaganda Department, lower 
level propaganda departments, and other government agencies, 
also issues more specific directives to the media on what they can 
and cannot report on. These directives are considered state secrets, 
but their contents continue to be leaked to the public and reported 
on by foreign and Hong Kong media and non-governmental organi-
zations. In an April 2011 Washington Post story, unnamed Chinese 
editors and journalists confirmed the substance of a series of direc-
tives issued in March that appeared to reflect official nervousness 
over the North Africa and Middle East protests.107 In January 
2011, the International Federation of Journalists released a report 
documenting more than 80 censorship orders in 2010.108 The or-
ders reportedly blocked information on ‘‘public health, disasters, 
corruption and civil unrest.’’ 109 A virtual news blackout, including 
the blacking out of Western stations broadcast in China, followed 
the Nobel Peace Prize announcement in October 2010.110 The only 
news stories were from state-run media outlets such as Xinhua and 
Global Times, which reported on Chinese displeasure with the 
award.111 In January 2011, the Central Propaganda Department 
reportedly ordered media not to use the phrase ‘‘civil society’’ in 
their reports.112 
PUNISHMENT OF JOURNALISTS 
Journalists and news media who issued news reports that au-
thorities did not approve of continued to face punishment. In De-
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cember 2010, a reporter at Southern Weekend said that the paper 
had been ordered to cease publication of an annual media 
award.113 In January 2011, the outspoken journalist Chang Ping, 
who worked for the Southern Daily Group, reported that he had 
been dismissed from his job under pressure from authorities.114 
That same month, Time Weekly placed one of its editors, Peng 
Xiaoyun, on what appeared to be involuntary leave after the paper 
ran a story mentioning prominent activists and several signers of 
Charter 08.115 Titled the ‘‘100 Most Influential People of Our Time’’ 
and published in mid-December, the list included Zhao Lianhai, the 
advocate for victims of tainted milk.116 After the story’s publica-
tion, copies reportedly were recalled and Peng and another editor 
were required to write self-criticisms.117 In March 2011, Peng re-
ported that she had been dismissed.118 The publishers of another 
Guangzhou-based publication, South Wind Window, reportedly de-
moted its president and suspended another journalist after officials 
criticized a story they deemed ‘‘anti-government and anti-Com-
munist Party.’’ 119 Following the Wenzhou train crash, China’s cen-
tral television network suspended Wang Qinglei after the host of 
a program he produced questioned the Railway Ministry’s response 
to the incident, and removed another program after it criticized the 
ministry’s spokesman.120 
POLITICAL CONTROL OF MEDIA THROUGH REGULATION OF EDITORS 
AND JOURNALISTS 
All news media are subject to an extensive licensing system and 
continual government oversight. In order to legally report the 
news, domestic newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as well as 
individual journalists, must obtain a license or accreditation from 
the government.121 Radio and television broadcast journalists must 
pass a government-sponsored exam that tests them on basic knowl-
edge of Marxist views of news and Communist Party principles.122 
In the 2010 Annual Report, the Commission reported that govern-
ment officials were planning to require all journalists to pass a 
similar exam, but it is unclear whether this exam has been imple-
mented.123 Ongoing training initiatives for journalists continued to 
be heavily imbued with political indoctrination. In November, tele-
conferences with journalists across China were held in connection 
with a new campaign to ‘‘Stop False Reporting, Strengthen Social 
Responsibility, and Strengthen Construction of News Profession 
Ethics.’’ 124 The campaign sought to ‘‘guide editors and journalists 
to grasp the basics of Marxist views of news . . . in order to 
strengthen the feeling of glory and mission in doing the Party’s 
news work well.’’ 125 According to an April 2011 article on the 
China Journalists Association Web site on 14 newspaper units that 
carried out ‘‘self-education,’’ journalists at one Beijing newspaper 
were reminded that ‘‘news media are the mouthpiece of the Party 
and people . . . and not simply a commercial activity.’’ 126 
International experts have criticized a general licensing require-
ment for journalists.127 In a 2010 joint declaration on challenges to 
free expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression and his international counterparts identified as 
challenges ‘‘registration requirements for print media’’ and govern-
ment rules against ‘‘publishing false news.’’ 128 Chinese officials 
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continue to exercise their discretion to shut down unlicensed 
media. In March 2011, China’s main press regulator, the General 
Administration on Press and Publication, announced a 100-day 
campaign to, among other objectives, shut down ‘‘illegal’’ reporting 
offices.129 
FOREIGN JOURNALISTS 
This past year the Commission observed a spike in the intensity 
and level of harassment against foreign journalists as they at-
tempted to report on events considered sensitive by Chinese offi-
cials. In February 2011, foreign journalists who traveled to Linyi 
city, Shandong province, to report on the home confinement of self- 
trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng encountered violent 
groups of men who roughed them up, threatened them with bricks, 
and destroyed equipment.130 The journalists contacted local police 
but received no assistance.131 In late February and early March 
2011, Chinese authorities harassed foreign journalists attempting 
to cover the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest strolls at sites in Beijing and other 
parts of China.132 On February 27, reporters covering the 
Wangfujing site in Beijing met rough treatment from officials, and 
one journalist was reportedly beaten and later sought treatment at 
a hospital.133 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi denied that 
any foreign journalists had been beaten, and foreign ministry 
spokesperson Jiang Yu said the journalists had disrupted ‘‘normal 
order’’ and violated unspecified rules.134 Harassment continued in 
the days that followed, with officials asking a journalist to sign a 
pledge promising never to report on the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests and of-
ficials threatening to expel journalists or revoke their press creden-
tials.135 In April, plainclothes police detained, and in at least one 
case roughed up, foreign reporters attempting to cover an outdoor 
Christian religious gathering.136 In May 2011, the professional as-
sociation of international journalists in China, the Foreign Cor-
respondents’ Club of China, said 94 percent of survey respondents 
believed reporting conditions in China had deteriorated, with 70 
percent saying they faced interference, violence, or other harass-
ment during the past year, and 40 percent saying their sources had 
encountered official harassment.137 
RESTRICTIONS ON ‘‘ILLEGAL’’ PUBLISHING AND POLITICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS 
The Chinese government continued to engage in campaigns to 
root out unlicensed publications and publications containing what 
officials deemed to be ‘‘illegal’’ political and religious content. In 
China, no one may publish, print, copy, or distribute a publication 
without government approval, and publishers must submit to ongo-
ing government supervision.138 To obtain government approval, a 
publisher must meet minimum capital requirements, obtain a gov-
ernment-approved sponsor, and accord with the state’s own plans 
for the publishing industry.139 Once approved, publishers must 
submit written reports of their publishing activities to the govern-
ment and seek advance approval to publish on matters that involve 
‘‘state security’’ or ‘‘social stability.’’ 140 In March 2011, the State 
Council amended the Regulations of the Administration of Publica-
tions, leaving these general requirements intact and adding new 
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provisions requiring those who distribute publications over the 
Internet or information networks to obtain a license and requiring 
specialized personnel to take a state exam to show compliance with 
state-imposed qualifications.141 
Those who ‘‘illegally’’ engage in business activities, including 
publishing without a license, remain subject to criminal penalties 
under Article 225 of the PRC Criminal Law, and officials continue 
to use this charge to target political speech.142 In August 2010, au-
thorities in Shaanxi province detained author and journalist Xie 
Chaoping on this charge after he published a book on the relocation 
of citizens affected by a hydroelectric dam.143 Prosecutors refused 
to approve Xie’s arrest for insufficient evidence.144 In December 
2010, authorities took Mongol writer Erden-uul into custody in ap-
parent connection to a new book he authored that reportedly ad-
dressed Inner Mongolian independence from China, saying the 
writer had engaged in ‘‘illegal publishing.’’ 145 The Chinese govern-
ment reported in September 2010 that Mongol rights advocate 
Sodmongol was being tried in connection to ‘‘counterfeiting book 
registration numbers and illegally publishing and selling books.’’ 146 
In April 2010 authorities detained Sodmongol while he was en 
route to attend the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.147 
Government agencies police content based on vague and sweep-
ing prohibitions on content deemed by officials to ‘‘destroy ethnic 
unity, or infringe upon ethnic customs and habits,’’ ‘‘propagate evil 
cults or superstition,’’ or ‘‘harm the honor or interests of the na-
tion.’’ 148 Provincial and local authorities continued to target ‘‘ille-
gal’’ political and religious publications. In March 2011, a Chinese 
news report said authorities in Heilongjiang province would ‘‘strict-
ly confiscate political illegal publications and publications that de-
fame the Party and state leaders, along with illegal publications 
that incite ethnic division.’’ 149 It also said authorities would em-
phasize blocking and confiscating ‘‘illegal political publications’’ 
that ‘‘hostile foreign forces cook up,’’ or that ‘‘domestic lawless per-
sons illegally print or copy to disseminate political rumors,’’ or that 
‘‘create ideological confusion.’’ 150 In April, authorities in Jiangxi 
province seized some 632 publications that constituted ‘‘illegal reli-
gious propaganda.’’ 151 Also in April, authorities in Guang’an city, 
Sichuan province, reportedly destroyed some 30 items that were ‘‘il-
legal political publications, [related to the] Falun Gong cult organi-
zation, and illegal religious propaganda,’’ as well as 1,141 ‘‘illegal 
newspapers and journals.’’ 152 




Workers in China still are not guaranteed, either by law or in 
practice, full worker rights in accordance with international stand-
ards, including the right to organize into independent unions. Ad-
vocates for worker rights in China continued to be subjected to har-
assment and abuse. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU), the official union under the direction of the Communist 
Party, is the only legal trade union organization in China. All lower 
level unions must be affiliated with the ACFTU. 
During the 2011 reporting year, Chinese authorities have faced 
the dual challenges of accommodating a younger, more educated, 
and rights-conscious workforce and addressing changes in economic 
development patterns (including inland growth, fewer workers mi-
grating to coastal areas, rising wages, and labor shortages in some 
locales). Due in part to shifting labor, economic, and demographic 
conditions, official and unofficial reports have indicated that work-
ers appeared to have gained increased leverage in the relationship 
between labor and capital. In recent years, Chinese workers have 
become more assertive in securing their rights, higher wages, more 
genuine representation, and better protection under China’s labor 
laws. In some cases during this reporting year, workers continued 
to channel their grievances through, and to seek guidance, advice, 
and legal aid from, labor lawyers and advocates. At the same time, 
authorities have harassed, detained, and sent to prison labor advo-
cates who attempted to organize workers for ‘‘disrupting social 
order.’’ Some local officials reportedly beat and kicked striking 
workers and labor petitioners, and reports of attacks on migrant 
workers seeking back pay continued to surface. 
With Chinese officials charged with preserving ‘‘social stability,’’ 
the extent to which they will allow workers to bargain for higher 
wages and genuine representation remains unclear. Principles and 
different aspects of collective bargaining rights have been men-
tioned in multiple drafts of local and national regulations during 
this reporting year, including the draft Regulation on Wages—pro-
posed in part to address official concern over the unequal distribu-
tion of wealth across China and its potential effects on ‘‘social un-
rest’’—as well as trials and measures for collective wage negotia-
tions in different localities. Some critics, however, have questioned 
the lack of specifics in some of these proposals and, thus, their 
eventual effectiveness. 
Rights Consciousness, Worker Actions, and ‘‘Social Stability’’ 
During this reporting year, Chinese officials have continued to 
assess the characteristics of the new generation of migrant workers 
as well as their significance on the shifting labor landscape, public 
safety, and ‘‘social stability.’’ 1 Chinese government statistics sug-
gest that these young workers constitute 61.6 percent of all mi-
grant workers.2 In February 2011, the ACFTU released a study 
identifying the characteristics unique to current young migrant 
workers. The document also provided several policy recommenda-
tions for ‘‘resolving the problems facing the new generation of mi-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
68 
grant workers in realizing their rights and interests.’’ 3 The report 
notes that over half of young migrant workers are unmarried and 
that 74.1 percent of them had ‘‘studied in school’’ prior to leaving 
home. By contrast, only 35.4 percent of the ‘‘traditional migrants,’’ 
those born before 1980, had studied in school.4 These young mi-
grant workers also are mostly concentrated in secondary and ter-
tiary industries and are overwhelmingly employed by private enter-
prises (84.3 percent) as opposed to state-owned enterprises (12.5 
percent).5 On average, they receive lower wages (167.27 yuan 
(US$26) lower than ‘‘traditional migrants’’); are more likely to sign 
labor contracts that lack specific provisions detailing minimum pay 
in line with local regulations; have less employment stability; face 
‘‘relatively more hidden dangers’’ in terms of workplace safety; and 
are less likely to join labor unions (44.6 percent of young migrant 
workers are union members, versus 56 percent of ‘‘traditional mi-
grants’’).6 
The ACFTU report provides several recommendations on ways in 
which the government may more effectively accommodate younger 
workers’ unique life experiences and characteristics. Some of the 
suggestions include strengthening efforts to tackle wage disparities, 
advance social insurance programs, provide technical training to in-
crease young migrant workers’ competitiveness and ability to ad-
just to changing circumstances, encourage localities to explore 
methods to reform the household registration system, and organize 
young migrant workers into unions and facilitate channels for them 
to address their grievances.7 These suggestions appear to reflect 
the Chinese government’s initial ideas to grapple with the afore-
mentioned generational changes, a generation of migrant workers 
who, as one senior Chinese official observed, have never put down 
roots, are better educated, are only children, and are more likely 
to demand equal access to employment and social services—and 
even equal political rights—in the cities.8 
Official and unofficial reports indicate that, for the most part, the 
young migrant workers described above have been at the forefront 
of recent worker actions.9 Worker actions have been common in 
China in recent years, and that continues to be the case during the 
2011 reporting year. China Strikes, a Web site dedicated to 
‘‘track[ing] strikes, protests and other collective actions taken by 
Chinese workers to defend their rights and interests,’’ recorded at 
least 32 such actions by workers from October 2010 to May 2011.10 
As with the spate of worker actions that took place in the spring 
and summer of 2010 that garnered international attention, workers 
during this reporting year took action to recover back wages, pro-
test the non-payment of wages, call for higher pay, and, for some 
older workers, demand due compensation in the cases of restruc-
turing at certain enterprises. Social inequality and the lack of rule 
of law reportedly played a role in driving low-paid migrant workers 
to participate in a series of riots and protests in southern China 
in June 2011.11 In April 2011, workers reportedly blocked the front 
gate of a liquor factory protesting the compensation terms during 
restructuring.12 In the same month, more than 1,000 truck drivers 
in Shanghai municipality, reacting to rising fuel costs, protested for 
higher pay. In March 2011, about 80 sanitation workers in 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, took part in work stoppages 
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to protest non-payment of wages, claiming that management owed 
each worker from 3,000 to 4,000 yuan (US$464 to US$618) for 
overtime and other allowances.13 In November 2010, an ‘‘entire 
street’’ in Foshan city, Guangdong province, was reportedly ‘‘filled 
with workers,’’ perhaps up to 7,000, as management at Foxconn, a 
Taiwanese-owned company that produces electronics, allegedly 
forced workers to sign contracts with terms that many workers 
found unsatisfactory.14 Starting in October 2010, about 70 workers 
at a Japanese-owned factory took part in strikes to demand that 
the company comply with China’s labor laws, including the right to 
sign contracts and to be compensated with overtime payments.15 
Chinese authorities during this reporting year continued to har-
ass, detain, and imprison labor advocates and lawyers whom offi-
cials deemed to be threats to ‘‘social stability.’’ For example, au-
thorities ordered Yang Huanqing, a teacher in Jingzhou city, Hubei 
province, to serve one year of reeducation through labor in March 
2011 for ‘‘disrupting work unit order’’ when he supposedly orga-
nized 22 and 33 dismissed teachers in October and November 2010, 
respectively, to petition in Beijing. Yang reportedly led the teachers 
to petition against social insurance policies they alleged were un-
fair.16 
In another case that reflects authorities’ concern with labor advo-
cates’ and lawyers’ ability to organize and mobilize large groups of 
workers, the Xincheng District People’s Court in Xi’an city, 
Shaanxi province, sentenced labor lawyer and advocate Zhao 
Dongmin to three years’ imprisonment on October 2010 for ‘‘gath-
ering a crowd to disrupt social order.’’ 17 Zhao had allegedly orga-
nized workers at state-owned enterprises in Xi’an in April 2009 to 
establish the Shaanxi Union Rights Defense Representative Con-
gress, an organization that, according to China Labor News Trans-
lations, a Web site dedicated to analyzing developments in China 
labor relations, was ‘‘critical of the Chinese [state-run] trade 
union’s failure to represent the interests of state sector employees 
in restructured and/or privatized enterprises.’’ 18 Prior to Zhao’s ar-
rest, Shaanxi authorities had warned that Zhao and others had: 
seriously disrupted the normal workings of Party and gov-
ernment organs and have become a huge potential danger 
to social stability. They have made use of problems in soci-
ety, including using old and frail enterprise retirees as 
cannon fodder to pressure the government. They have 
stirred up extreme delusions and fanned the flames in an 
extremely outrageous manner. If resolute measures are 
not adopted, they will grow into a threatening force and 
are very likely to wreak even greater havoc to social sta-
bility.19 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The Chinese government prevents workers in China from exer-
cising their constitutional right to freedom of association.20 Trade 
union activity in China is organized under the All-China Federa-
tion of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a quasi-governmental organization 
under the direction of the Communist Party.21 Leading trade union 
officials hold concurrent high-ranking positions in the Party. The 
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ACFTU Constitution and the Trade Union Law of 1992 both high-
light the dual nature of the ACFTU to protect the legal rights and 
interests of workers while supporting the leadership of the Party 
and the broader goals and interests of the Chinese government.22 
The ACFTU monopolizes many worker rights issues in China, such 
as shop-floor organizing and formalistic collective contract negotia-
tions, but it does not consistently or uniformly advance the rights 
of workers.23 
At the shop-floor level, the ACFTU’s unions remain weak and 
marginalized. While the ACFTU and its affiliated unions at lower 
administrative levels sometimes may play an important role in leg-
islative and regulatory development, this role is not matched with 
power at the enterprise level. Generally speaking, firm-level union 
branches are weak, non-democratic, and subordinate to manage-
ment.24 Despite an increase in legislation and administrative regu-
lations that grants the ACFTU more power at the firm level to re-
solve disputes, the structural weaknesses of the trade union 
branches make improvements in trade union autonomy and worker 
advocacy difficult and slow.25 
COLLECTIVE CONTRACTING 
Collective contracts and some process of collective consultation 
and negotiation have been part of Chinese labor relations since the 
1990s, when state enterprise reform deepened and labor conflict 
began to increase rapidly, especially in the private sector. The 
ACFTU has championed collective contracts and collective negotia-
tions as important foundations for trade union work at the enter-
prise level. In recent years, the collective contract system has re-
ceived more Chinese government and Communist Party support as 
part of an attempt to institutionalize a tripartite system of labor 
relations at the local level between the government, the ACFTU, 
and the employer associations.26 Moreover, some Chinese officials 
have stated in public that collective consultation—and, in the proc-
ess, fostering more genuine representation for workers—could be 
an effective way to defuse labor disputes and develop ‘‘harmonious 
labor relations.’’ 27 
In January 2011, the ACFTU published a set of ‘‘work objectives’’ 
for the new year, stating the organization’s goal to ‘‘set up trade 
union organizations according to law to unionize the vast majority 
of workers[.]’’ 28 More specifically, some of the benchmarks that the 
ACFTU document provided include the boosting of national union-
ization rates at ‘‘businesses with corporate capacity to 65 [per-
cent],’’ and an increase in ‘‘the number of union memberships to 
make up more than 80 [percent] by the end of 2011’’ and ‘‘over 90 
[percent] by the end of 2013.’’ 29 Even as the ACFTU supplied 
quantifiable benchmarks, however, it is not clear how these goals 
will be implemented in practice. It remains to be seen whether 
such goals will facilitate the approval of local and national regula-
tions with specific implementation and follow-through directives 
and measures, as well as the necessary reforms to make unions 
more representative of workers’ interests.30 
During this past year, the Commission continued to follow devel-
opments concerning the Guangdong province draft Regulations on 
Democratic Management of Enterprises (Regulations). As the Com-
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mission reported last year,31 the draft Regulations would extend to 
workers the right to ask for collective wage consultations 32 and 
allow worker members to sit on the enterprise’s board of directors 
and board of supervisors,33 represent worker interests in the 
boards’ meetings,34 and take part in the enterprise’s decision-
making processes.35 In September 2010, reportedly under heavy 
lobbying by members of the Hong Kong industrial community, 
many of whom operate factories in southern China and are con-
cerned with rising production costs, the Guangdong People’s Con-
gress Standing Committee decided to suspend further deliberation 
of the draft Regulations.36 In January 2011, a source in the Hong 
Kong industrial community who had met with officials in 
Guangdong province reported to the South China Morning Post 
that the Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress would ‘‘very like-
ly’’ approve the draft Regulations later that month.37 Other unoffi-
cial sources, however, suggest that the approval process of the draft 
Regulations seemed to have stalled indefinitely.38 
Other localities in China also announced plans to establish col-
lective wage consultation systems in the coming years. In Qingdao 
city, Shandong province, for example, the Qingdao City Health Bu-
reau announced in March 2011 goals to establish a system of 
‘‘equal collective wage consultation’’ for all contract workers within 
three years.39 In a city with more than 40,000 medical workers, the 
health bureau’s plan reportedly will only cover contracted workers, 
who number around 5,000.40 At medical organizations where 
unions do not yet exist, a government document suggests that 
workers may choose their own representatives.41 This past year, 
other cities that reported plans for collective wage consultation ini-
tiatives included Changde city, Hunan province; 42 Rizhao city, 
Shandong province; 43 Qinhuangdao city, Hebei province; 44 and 
Guanghaiwei city, Zhejiang province.45 The Shenzhen Municipal 
Trade Union reportedly plans to sign collective wage contracts at 
550 enterprises in the next year.46 
The extent to which the ACFTU’s stated goals, if materialized, 
and other local experiments with collective consultation will ex-
pand the space for greater and more genuine worker representation 
remains unclear. At present, the collective contract and consulta-
tion system remains weak and formalistic in many cases because 
enterprise-level trade union leaders are not positioned to serve the 
interests of their workers. Many collective contracts reportedly 
solely reflect the basic legal standards in the locality and often are 
the result of concerted government or Party work to encourage the 
enterprise to enter into formalistic contracts rather than the result 
of genuine bargaining between management and the enterprise 
trade union.47 Finally, none of the aforementioned actions taken by 
different localities and the ACFTU have changed the fact that free-
dom of association does not exist in China. 
Migrant Workers 
Migrants are generally characterized as rural residents who have 
left their place of residence to seek non-agricultural jobs in Chinese 
cities, sometimes in the same province and sometimes far from 
home. Official Chinese government statistics break down the total 
number of migrants into those who spent less than half the year 
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as migrants, i.e., those who spent less than six months during the 
year away from their place of legal residence (61 million in 2010), 
and those who spent more than half the year as migrants (160 mil-
lion in 2010).48 The government estimates that over the next three 
decades, about 300 million people are expected to relocate to urban 
areas.49 As a marginalized urban group, migrant workers are often 
abused, exploited, or placed in unsafe work conditions by employers 
who take advantage of their insecure social position and lower lev-
els of education.50 Persistent discrimination reportedly continues to 
adversely affect the social, civil, and political rights of migrant 
workers.51 
In 2011, migrant workers continued to face serious challenges in 
the workplace, such as wage arrears and non-payment of wages.52 
They also lacked access to reliable social insurance, specifically 
payments covering occupational injuries and diseases.53 Many lo-
calities have expanded efforts to provide migrants with social in-
surance coverage. Figures from the Chinese Ministry of Human Re-
sources and Social Security indicated that, by mid-2011, 838 coun-
ties in 27 provinces and autonomous regions, as well as the four 
directly administered municipalities, had launched what the State 
Council has called the ‘‘new-type rural social old-age insurance pi-
lots,’’ covering 24 percent of the population in these areas.54 A 2009 
State Council document also provided details on ways to make so-
cial insurance accounts transferable as migrants move around the 
country.55 There still appear to be significant problems in terms of 
participation (for both employers and employees), coverage, and 
portability between rural and urban areas.56 Migrant workers gen-
erally are able to withdraw funds only from their individual ac-
counts, losing the larger percentage of their pensions that is paid 
by their employers. With migrant workers facing uncertainty about 
whether they will return to the same locale from one year to the 
next to look for new work, and with the portability of pension ac-
counts highly restricted, some have chosen to withdraw their pen-
sions.57 
Law on Social Insurance 
The National People’s Congress approved the PRC Law on Social 
Insurance in October 2010, and it went into effect on July 1, 
2011.58 The law states that the Chinese government will estab-
lish 59 a system of basic old-age insurance,60 medical insurance,61 
work-related injury insurance,62 unemployment insurance,63 and 
maternity insurance.64 It specifies the respective responsibilities of 
employees and employers to fund contributions for different insur-
ance programs. Under the law, both the employee and the em-
ployer, for example, are required to contribute toward the basic in-
surance funds for old-age pensions, medical care, and unemploy-
ment benefits.65 For work-related injury and maternity insurance, 
however, only the employer is responsible for the contributions.66 
The law also requires employers to register employees with social 
insurance agencies within 30 days of hire,67 delineates the legal 
penalties for an employer who fails to contribute the required funds 
within the specified time limit,68 and grants social insurance agen-
cies the right to seek help from government administrative units— 
at the county level or above—to request the transfer of funds equal 
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to the amount of missed payments from the appropriate banking 
and financial institutions.69 
One of the law’s stated aims is to make social insurance coverage 
‘‘sustainable,’’ 70 and the law specifies that workers may transfer 
their accounts as they move from one region to another. It explic-
itly states that ‘‘rural residents entering cities to work may partici-
pate in social insurance.’’ 71 In the cases of old-age and medical in-
surance, the law seeks to enable their portability by stating that, 
for an individual who travels from one region to another for work, 
his or her basic old-age and medical insurance records ‘‘will trans-
fer along with the individual,’’ and the calculation of his or her con-
tributions will be ‘‘cumulative.’’ 72 Once the individual reaches re-
tirement age, basic old-age insurance benefits will be calculated by 
taking into account work performed in all localities, but payments 
will be made in a ‘‘unified’’ way (i.e., no distinction between work 
done in rural and urban areas).73 The law, however, states only 
that ‘‘national coordination’’ of old-age insurance pools and ‘‘provin-
cial coordination’’ of the other four insurance pools will be ‘‘gradu-
ally implemented,’’ leaving the ‘‘specific time frame [and] steps’’ for 
the State Council to decide.74 Moreover, one foreign law firm point-
ed out that since the law does not provide ‘‘national united social 
insurance contribution rates . . . employers would still need to 
refer to the local regulations for contribution rates of the social in-
surance schemes.’’ 75 At this point, the law’s effectiveness and abil-
ity to standardize and expand China’s social safety net remain un-
clear and implementation regulations have yet to be issued.76 
Wages 
By the end of 2010, 30 provinces had reportedly raised minimum 
wage levels by an average of 22.8 percent.77 Some localities contin-
ued to establish higher levels of increases thereafter.78 On March 
1, 2011, Guangdong province announced a four-tier minimum wage 
level chart, categorizing minimum wage levels by region within the 
province.79 Authorities assigned Guangzhou city, the provincial 
capital, a level of 1,300 yuan (US$200) per month. Dongguan city, 
where many foreign-invested factories are located, fell into the sec-
ond category, with a new minimum wage level of 1,100 yuan 
(US$170) per month. In Shenzhen, effective April 1, 2011, the gov-
ernment raised the minimum wage level by 20 percent, to 1,320 
yuan (US$204) per month, the highest in China.80 Other localities, 
such as Shanghai municipality and Shandong province, also estab-
lished further increases.81 Reports indicate that some cities pro-
ceeded to raise minimum wages because they struggled to attract 
workers.82 Despite rising minimum wage levels, however, reports 
also indicate that inflationary pressure continued: Inflation stood 
at 5.4 percent in March 2011 83 and 5.5 percent in May 2011, with 
food prices rising by 11.7 percent.84 
The PRC 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for work-
ers and requires local governments to set wage standards for each 
region.85 The PRC Labor Contract Law improves formal monitoring 
requirements by tasking local labor bureaus to monitor labor prac-
tices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.86 The 
law also imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates below 
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minimum wage.87 In addition, the law guarantees minimum hourly 
wages for part-time workers.88 
Illegal labor practices, however, continue to undermine minimum 
wage guarantees. Wage arrears remain a serious problem, espe-
cially for migrant workers.89 Subcontracting practices within indus-
try reportedly also exacerbate the problem of wage arrearages. 
When investors and developers default on their payments to con-
struction companies, workers at the end of the chain of labor sub-
contractors may lack the means to recover wages from the original 
defaulters. Some subcontractors neglect their own duties to pay la-
borers and leave workers without any direct avenue to demand 
their salaries.90 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Secu-
rity, in conjunction with other government agencies—including the 
Ministry of Public Security and the State-Owned Assets Super-
vision and Administration Commission—reportedly formed a 
‘‘united investigative group’’ and examined wage arrears problems 
in provincial-level areas such as Tianjin, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Guangxi, Qinghai, and 
Xinjiang.91 
DRAFT REGULATION ON WAGES 
In part to address official concern over the unequal distribution 
of wealth across China and its potential effects on ‘‘social unrest,’’ 
Chinese media sources indicated that the Chinese government re-
portedly has assembled a ‘‘basic framework’’ for a national regula-
tion on wages.92 The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Se-
curity (MOHRSS) began formulating the regulation in 2007, and of-
ficials reportedly started soliciting comments and suggestions for a 
completed draft in early 2009.93 Some media reports indicated that 
the regulation would be approved sometime in 2010, though one 
MOHRSS official later said that was never the case.94 It appears 
that deliberations surrounding the pending regulation likely will 
continue throughout 2011.95 
Based on media reporting, the draft contains 10 sections, includ-
ing provisions that delineate the ‘‘parameters for collective con-
tracts, collective consultations, and minimum wages.’’ 96 In addi-
tion, the draft reportedly lays out standards to determine minimum 
wage level increases, and mandates certain enterprises to ‘‘periodi-
cally and publicly release average wage levels, increases, and bo-
nuses’’; 97 requires that overtime compensation, time off given on 
days with extreme temperatures, as well as various kinds of state 
subsidies may not be factored into the calculation of wage levels; 98 
calls upon provinces to consider local consumer price indexes in set-
ting minimum wage levels; 99 and establishes a ‘‘normal increase 
mechanism’’ to ‘‘create a system’’ of collective wage consultations 
and ‘‘open a scientifically logical space for wage increases.’’ 100 
Labor experts cited in Chinese media reports also commented 
that the draft lacks clarity on certain points. For example, it re-
portedly does not delineate whether or not employers will be re-
quired to answer workers’ demands for collective wage negotia-
tions, nor does it lay out the consequences for failing to do so.101 
One labor expert also supported the idea to ‘‘link wage increases 
to the growth of enterprises,’’ which apparently was introduced in 
an earlier version of the draft.102 
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Reportedly, the draft regulation attempts to bridge the wealth 
gap with additional provisions such as requiring the disclosure to 
both the government and the public of plans to adjust salary levels 
and benefits within what one state-run publication called ‘‘monopo-
lized industries.’’ 103 These so-called ‘‘monopolized industries’’ 
(longduan qiye) refer to state-owned enterprises in industries such 
as electricity, telecommunications, insurance, and finance.104 An-
other provision reportedly also would require these enterprises to 
seek approval from three different government departments before 
issuing bonuses or raises.105 One media report suggested that these 
provisions have contributed to the delay in the regulation’s ap-
proval.106 One academic cited in the same report stated that the 
draft’s proposed ‘‘interference with or even control of wages 
through administrative methods are not compatible with the trends 
of market economics.’’ 107 
PRESSURE TO EXAMINE WAGE POLICIES 
In 2011, three developments continued to exert pressure on Chi-
nese officials at all levels to examine their policies on wages: Labor 
shortages in certain areas, growing income inequality, and the cen-
tral government’s acknowledgement of the need to rebalance Chi-
na’s economy. During this reporting year, the Commission mon-
itored reports of labor shortages surfacing in China’s manufac-
turing centers, particularly in the south and coastal areas.108 As 
early as 2006, the PRC State Council Development Research Cen-
ter found that 75 percent of the 2,749 villages surveyed in China 
‘‘no longer have young laborers to move’’ outward,109 and other re-
ports also suggest that more migrant workers are opting to pursue 
opportunities in their home provinces.110 Such developments re-
portedly have contributed to the upward pressure on wage levels 
and, combined with other factors, have made some factory owners 
consider moving their operations further inland or to Southeast 
Asian countries in order to keep production costs competitive.111 At 
the same time, it has been pointed out that ‘‘improved productivity 
can pay for more than half of these wage increases, while the other 
half can be passed in the form of higher customer prices.’’ 112 More-
over, despite moderate increases, wages actually have fallen for 22 
straight years in proportion to China’s gross domestic product.113 
The unequal distribution of wealth received much attention in re-
cent years. The National People’s Congress and the Chinese Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference featured this issue promi-
nently during their March 2010 meetings.114 In 2011, the Chinese 
media continued to report on the growing gap between the rich and 
the poor.115 The current ‘‘income ratio among China’s eastern, cen-
tral, and western regions’’ is roughly 1.52:1:0.68.116 Moreover, the 
distribution has grown more unequal over time, with rural areas 
lagging far behind the urban regions.117 According to a November 
2010 Chinese report, the ratio of ‘‘urban to rural income’’ was 2.9:1 
in 2001, 3.22:1 in 2005, and 3.31:1 in 2008.118 The difference be-
tween the top and bottom 10 percent of China’s income earners has 
increased from a multiple of 7.3 in 1988 to 23 in 2009.119 
Chinese officials have appeared more willing to openly acknowl-
edge that a higher consumption rate within China is an important 
part of the government’s efforts to rebalance the country’s economic 
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development. The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on Na-
tional Economic and Social Development, for example, noted that 
Chinese officials ‘‘must be soberly aware of the fact that the prob-
lems of lack of balance, lack of coordination, and lack of sustain-
ability in China’s development remain prominent’’ and that the im-
balance in the ‘‘investment and consumption relationship’’ poses a 
challenge to the country’s future growth.120 More pointedly, Pre-
mier Wen Jiabao has also described China’s current growth model 
as ‘‘unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and unsustainable.’’ 121 
Although some experts have said that reforms can be done in the 
short term via ‘‘administrative fiat,’’ such as ‘‘mandatory wage 
hikes,’’ any rebalancing efforts will be difficult, as ‘‘state-backed 
and private corporate sectors are likely to protest reforms that 
threaten their margins, as will these sectors’ support bases associ-
ated with their interests, such as the commerce ministry and the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.’’ 122 
Occupational Safety and Work Conditions 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENTS 
The PRC Law on Safe Production, which took effect in 2002, de-
lineates a set of guidelines to prevent workplace accidents and to 
keep ‘‘their occurrence at a lower level, ensuring the safety of peo-
ple’s lives and property and promoting the development of the econ-
omy.’’ 123 Specifically, the law charges principal leading members of 
production and business units to educate workers on safety issues 
and formulate rules of operation; 124 protects workers’ right to have 
knowledge of, speak up about, and address work safety issues; 125 
sets forth trade unions’ rights to pursue workers’ complaints over 
safety issues; 126 tasks local governments at the county level or 
above to inspect and handle violations and potential dangers in a 
timely manner; 127 and lays out the consequences for non-compli-
ance.128 
Workers in China, however, continued to face persistent occupa-
tional safety issues, especially those working in the mining indus-
try. On November 9, 2010, Zhang Mingqi, the Vice Chairman of the 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, spoke to reporters at the 
National Mining Industry Health and Safety Experience Exchange 
Conference and stated that China had 18,128 reported cases of oc-
cupational-related illnesses in 2009, which represented a 32 per-
cent increase from the previous year.129 Of the 2009 cases, 
14,495—about 80 percent—involved the lung disease pneumo-
coniosis.130 The People’s Daily has reported that a total of 57,000 
Chinese coal miners suffer from pneumoconiosis annually, and 
more than 6,000 of them die from the disease each year.131 Report-
edly, ‘‘pneumoconiosis is now responsible for nearly three times as 
many deaths each year as mine accidents.’’ 132 
Miners are limited in their ability to promote safer working con-
ditions in part due to legal obstacles to independent organizing. 
Collusion between mine operators and local government officials re-
portedly remains widespread.133 Chinese authorities reportedly 
closed 1,600 small coal mines with ‘‘outdated facilities’’ during the 
first 10 months of 2010.134 The State Administration of Work Safe-
ty issued a directive in September 2010 requiring mine managers 
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to spend time in the shafts with workers in an effort to focus their 
attention on safety issues; the directive also laid out specific fines 
for managers who refused to do so.135 The China Daily, however, 
reported that some managers skirted the new requirements by 
handpicking ‘‘people to be promoted to ‘assistants to managers’ and 
to accompany the miners’’ in their place.136 
WORKING CONDITIONS 
Workplace abuses and poor working conditions remained a per-
sistent problem this reporting year. Allegations of unsafe working 
environments, for example, continued to surface at factories oper-
ated by Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned company that manufactures 
electronic products. In July, a worker died after falling from his 
dormitory at one of Foxconn’s factory complexes in southern 
China.137 The Commission reported last year that more than 10 
employees committed suicide in 2010, reportedly as a result of the 
harsh working conditions at the company’s production plants.138 
Workers often cited low wages, forced overtime, military-style man-
agement, and social isolation as some of the major problems that 
they face.139 Reports also indicated that some workers are also ex-
posed to chemicals known to be harmful.140 In May 2011, a blast 
at Foxconn’s factory in Chengdu city killed 3 people and injured 16 
others; the families of the factory’s workers complained at the time 
that Foxconn management ‘‘turned down’’ their demand for ‘‘a list 
of dead and injured.’’ 141 Poor conditions and other workplace 
abuses also surfaced at other factories, including ‘‘routine excessive 
overtime’’ that averaged 120 hours per month, use of harmful 
chemicals, poor ventilation, arbitrary calculation of wages, and mis-
treatment by management.142 The Commission also observed one 
recently published report detailing a past case involving Chinese 
prisoners who, in addition to doing hard labor during the day, were 
‘‘forced to play online games’’ at night ‘‘to build up credits that pris-
on guards would then trade for real money.’’ 143 
WORKERS COMPENSATION 
One major problem facing injured workers or their family mem-
bers seeking to receive timely compensation is China’s ‘‘complicated 
and incredibly time consuming’’ work-related injury compensation 
procedure.144 Some cases reportedly can last for decades.145 It is 
difficult to determine the total number of cases in part because 
many cases never are reported due to the complicated nature of the 
compensation process.146 Moreover, Chinese courts and doctors do 
not routinely recognize some occupational diseases. While trau-
matic work injuries and deaths have been widely recognized and 
reported, experts on workers compensation litigation in China re-
port failure to diagnose diseases like silicosis and failure to recog-
nize that the condition may be caused by exposure to chemicals at 
work.147 As a result, the extent of work-related diseases like sili-
cosis remains difficult to measure and report on and, therefore, in 
many cases goes largely unrecognized.148 
In January 2011, the State Council’s revisions to the Regulations 
on Work-Related Injury Insurance (Work Injury Regulations) be-
came effective.149 The revisions made 24 changes to the old Regula-
tions, clarifying the definitions of what constituted ‘‘occupational 
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injuries’’; 150 adding law firms and accounting firms, among others, 
to the list of contributors to the occupational injury insurance 
fund; 151 and stating that in applications where ‘‘the facts are clear’’ 
and ‘‘rights and obligations are apparent,’’ the social insurance ad-
ministrative department shall render a decision within 15 days of 
accepting the applications.152 
In addition to the aforementioned Work Injury Regulations, the 
PRC Law on Social Insurance, which went into effect in July 2011, 
also addressed the topic of work-related injury insurance.153 It 
clarifies that the ‘‘employing unit,’’ not the worker, is responsible 
for contributing to the work-related injury insurance fund.154 The 
law states that the contribution rates will be determined by the 
‘‘risk level’’ of each industry, as well as the number of workplace 
injury cases that occur in that industry, and leaves the task of set-
ting the specific rate figures to the State Council.155 Though the 
law’s language maintains that workers are entitled to receive work- 
related injury insurance benefits if their injuries or illnesses are 
certified as work related and that certification of such injuries 
should be ‘‘straight-forward [and] convenient,’’ it does not provide 
a specific time requirement for the certification process.156 The law 
does, however, detail the types of expenses that may be paid with 
money from the insurance fund. These may include, for example, 
a worker’s medical treatment and rehabilitation fees as well as food 
and travel allowances if the worker obtains treatment outside of 
the area where the injury took place.157 
At this point, it is not clear to what extent the revisions to the 
Work Injury Regulations or the new PRC Law on Social Insurance 
will streamline the complicated and time-consuming compensation 
processes for injured workers. Central government directives have, 
in previous years, encouraged local governments to pressure be-
reaved families into signing compensation agreements and to condi-
tion out-of-court compensation settlements on forfeiture by be-
reaved families of their rights to seek further compensation 
through the court system.158 Moreover, there have been reports of 
local officials preempting class actions by prohibiting contact 
among members of bereaved families in order to forestall coordina-
tion.159 
Child Labor 
Child labor remained a problem in China during this reporting 
year.160 As a member of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), China has ratified the two core conventions on the elimi-
nation of child labor.161 The PRC Labor Law and related legislation 
prohibit the employment of minors under 16 years old.162 Both na-
tional and local legal provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate 
fines for employing children.163 Under the PRC Criminal Law, em-
ployers and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years 
for forcing children to work under conditions of extreme danger.164 
Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have dulled the effects 
of these legal measures. The extent of child labor in China is un-
clear in part because the government does not release data on child 
labor despite frequent requests by the U.S. Government, other for-
eign governments, and international organizations. One recent re-
port by a global risks advisory firm, however, suggests that China 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
79 
is rated as ‘‘amongst those with the most widespread abuses of 
child workers’’ and estimates that there are ‘‘between 10 to 20 mil-
lion underage workers.’’ 165 
Child laborers reportedly work in low-skill service sectors as well 
as small workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe 
manufacturing enterprises.166 Many underage laborers reportedly 
are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15 years old, a phe-
nomenon exacerbated by problems in the education system and 
labor shortages of adult workers.167 In March 2011, a Hong Kong 
newspaper reported that authorities in Longgang district, 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, rescued 40 children who were 
found working at a factory that manufactured electronics.168 The 
children were reportedly between the ages of 12 and 14, holders of 
‘‘fake identity cards’’ that apparently demonstrated that they were 
of legal working age, and had worked there for at least three 
months for about five yuan (US$0.77) an hour.169 In another case 
reflective of the child labor problem, Apple acknowledged in Feb-
ruary 2011 that, in 2010, it had discovered 91 children under 16 
years old working in 10 ‘‘Chinese factories owned by its suppliers’’; 
in contrast, in 2009, the company discovered only 11 such cases.170 
In the case of one factory that reportedly hired 42 of the children, 
Apple learned that the ‘‘vocational school involved in hiring the un-
derage workers had falsified student IDs and threatened retalia-
tion against students who revealed their ages during [Apple’s] au-
dits.’’ 171 
The Chinese government, which has condemned the use of child 
labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat it,172 per-
mits ‘‘work-study’’ programs and activities that in practical terms 
perpetuate the practice of child labor and are tantamount to official 
endorsement of it.173 National provisions prohibiting child labor 
provide that ‘‘education practice labor’’ and vocational skills train-
ing labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational 
institutes do not constitute use of child labor when such activities 
do not adversely affect the safety and health of the students.174 
The PRC Education Law supports schools that establish work- 
study and other programs, provided that the programs do not nega-
tively affect normal studies.175 These provisions contravene China’s 
obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting child 
labor.176 In 2006, the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Applica-
tions of Conventions and Recommendations ‘‘expresse[d] . . . con-
cern at the situation of children under 18 years performing forced 
labor not only in the framework of re-educational and reformative 
measures, but also in regular work programs at school.’’ 177 




During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s failure to uphold legal protections for criminal suspects 
and defendants, promote transparency of the judicial process, and 
implement legal reforms highlighted ongoing problems within the 
criminal justice system. Chinese public security officials continue to 
contravene international standards by detaining, interrogating, and 
investigating criminal suspects without adequate due process pro-
tections. Closed trial proceedings and unfair trial procedures con-
tinue to contravene Chinese and international legal protections and 
demonstrate the lack of an independent judiciary. 
During the year, the Chinese government signaled its resolve to 
protect what it deemed to be ‘‘social stability’’ through targeted 
crackdowns on rights advocates and continued reliance on an array 
of arbitrary and extrajudicial detention measures. In early 2011, 
Chinese public security officials implemented a harsh crackdown 
on government critics and rights advocates, including lawyers, 
bloggers, writers, and democracy activists. In the months that fol-
lowed, Chinese authorities employed a range of illegal and arbi-
trary detention measures—including home confinement and en-
forced disappearances—to ‘‘maintain stability’’ and silence rights 
advocates. International human rights groups have called the 2011 
crackdown one of the most severe in years. 
Abuse of Police Powers: Suppression of Dissent 
During this past year, the Commission observed reports of Chi-
nese law enforcement personnel engaged in a range of abuses tar-
geting human rights advocates, lawyers, writers, and their fami-
lies.1 These abuses included harassment, assault, detention, 
kidnappings, and illegal surveillance.2 Reported incidents of abuse 
increased during periods of heightened official sensitivity. Begin-
ning in February 2011, public security officials and plainclothes se-
curity personnel detained, harassed, ‘‘disappeared,’’ and placed 
under illegal surveillance prominent rights defenders. The cam-
paign appeared related to official concern over protests in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa and to an anonymous online call for so- 
called ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests within China.3 By April 18, the non-gov-
ernmental organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported 
that public security officials had criminally detained 39 rights ad-
vocates and that more than 20 individuals remained ‘‘dis-
appeared.’’ 4 For example, Chinese police detained Beijing-based 
lawyer Tang Jitian on February 16 after he attended a meeting to 
discuss the ongoing ‘‘soft detention’’ of the self-trained legal advo-
cate Chen Guangcheng.5 Beijing police summoned and detained 
human rights lawyer and university lecturer Teng Biao on Feb-
ruary 19 before searching his residence and confiscating property, 
including two computers, politically themed books, and documen-
taries.6 In February, the Guardian reported that five domestic se-
curity protection officers allegedly beat human rights lawyer Liu 
Shihui after he attempted to attend a planned protest in 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province.7 The Commission also noted 
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increased police abuses against rights defenders and advocates sur-
rounding other politically sensitive events, such as the Nobel Peace 
Prize Ceremony in December 2010 and the annual meetings of the 
National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consult-
ative Conference in March 2011.8 Such arbitrary restrictions on 
personal liberty, freedom of expression, and freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and association contravene the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, as well as China’s Constitution and domestic laws.9 
Pretrial Detention and Prisons: Torture and Abuse in Custody 
Although the Chinese government formally outlawed torture in 
1996 with amendments to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and 
the PRC Criminal Law,10 torture and abuse by law enforcement of-
ficers remain widespread. In November 2008, the UN Committee 
against Torture (UNCAT) stated it ‘‘remains deeply concerned 
about the continued allegations . . . of routine and widespread use 
of torture and ill-treatment of suspects in police custody, especially 
to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal pro-
ceedings.’’ 11 Although China objected to the UNCAT report’s find-
ings in its November 2009 followup report, in October 2010, 
UNCAT submitted a letter to the Chinese government requesting 
clarification on issues including the legal safeguards to prevent tor-
ture, the harassment of lawyers and rights defenders, and the lack 
of statistical information related to torture.12 
During this reporting year, the Commission observed multiple re-
ports in which public security officials allegedly employed various 
torture measures, including beatings, electric shock, cigarette burn-
ings, and sleep deprivation.13 In January 2011, the Guardian re-
ported on the December 2010 death of local police chief Xie Zhigang 
in Benxi city, Liaoning province, who reportedly died from a heart 
attack within a day of his detention. Xie’s wife disputed the police 
account and claimed Xie died as a result of torture, stating, ‘‘There 
were bruises all over [Xie’s] body, and deep scars on his wrist and 
ankles. Five of his ribs were broken.’’ 14 In March 2011, human 
rights lawyer Zhang Kai released a video of Qian Chengyu, a wit-
ness to the murder of village leader and petitioner Qian Yunhui. 
In the February 2011 video, Qian Chengyu described how public 
security officials beat him for five hours and deprived him of sleep 
for thirty hours and explained that the injuries prevented him from 
standing for a month.15 
In response to a spate of high-profile suspicious deaths and in-
creased public scrutiny since 2009, Chinese law enforcement agen-
cies reportedly have ordered an overhaul of prisons and detention 
centers. In 2009 and 2011, Chinese agencies released various 
guidelines intended to improve oversight responsibilities and en-
hance supervision of detainees in detention centers.16 In early 
2011, the Ministry of Public Security reportedly delivered a draft 
revision of the Detention Regulations, the first revision since the 
Detention Regulations were enacted in 1990.17 In February 2011, 
Xinhua reported that in a nationwide campaign to improve over-
sight of detention centers, prosecutors found 2,207 detention center 
‘‘bullies’’ and prosecuted 123 suspected crimes.18 In a March 2011 
China News Weekly interview, Sun Qian, Deputy Procurator-Gen-
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eral of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, said that abnormal 
deaths in recent years had ‘‘exposed problems in prison administra-
tion law enforcement’’ and had resulted in reportedly ‘‘thorough’’ of-
ficial investigations into prisons and detention centers.19 
Arrest and Trial Procedure Issues 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
The right to legal counsel in criminal trials is not a guaranteed 
legal right for all defendants in China, even though the PRC Crimi-
nal Procedure Law (CPL) and the PRC Lawyers Law provide guide-
lines for legal representation in criminal trials.20 Chinese law 
grants all criminal defendants the right to hire an attorney, but 
only guarantees legal defense if the defendant is a minor, faces a 
possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or mute. Although the 
Chinese government has increased funding for legal assistance in 
recent years, most criminal defendants approach the legal system 
without access to legal assistance. [For more information on devel-
opments in China’s legal aid system, see Section III—Access to Jus-
tice.] This remains counter to provisions under Article 14(3)(d) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which 
grant the right to defend oneself in person or through legal assist-
ance.21 
Chinese criminal defendants face two primary obstacles—re-
ferred to on occasion as the ‘‘two lows’’ (liang di)—in securing 
criminal defense counsel: The low rate of active representation by 
lawyers in criminal cases and the low quality of criminal defense.22 
Most Chinese defendants confront the criminal process without the 
assistance of an attorney.23 According to a February 2011 Beijing 
Review article, a professor at China University of Political Science 
and Law noted that 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in 
China are unable to hire a lawyer.24 In addition, the higher propor-
tion of risks associated with criminal defense work—as compared 
with those of civil and commercial work—continues to impact the 
quality of criminal representation.25 In recent years, lawyers have 
been illegally detained, criminally punished, beaten, summoned, 
and disbarred for performing their legal responsibilities.26 
Chinese lawyers also remain vulnerable to prosecution under Ar-
ticle 306 of the PRC Criminal Law (commonly referred to as the 
‘‘lawyer-perjury’’ statute), a legal provision on evidence fabrication 
that specifically targets criminal defense attorneys.27 While harass-
ment of lawyers takes many forms in China, from prosecution for 
corruption to threats and physical violence, a disproportionately 
high number of such cases involve charges of evidence fabrica-
tion.28 Many evidence fabrication cases are brought under Article 
306, which makes it a crime for defense attorneys or other defense 
agents to ‘‘destroy or forge evidence, help any parties destroy or 
forge evidence, or coerce or entice witnesses into changing their 
testimony in defiance of the facts or giving false testimony.’’ 29 Be-
cause of the risks presented by Article 306, most defense attorneys 
reportedly engage in passive defense: they focus on finding flaws 
and weaknesses in the prosecutors’ evidence rather than actively 
collecting evidence or conducting their own investigations.30 Chi-
nese criminal defense lawyers acknowledge that the threat of Arti-
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cle 306 of the PRC Criminal Law—also commonly referred to as 
‘‘Big Stick 306’’—gives prosecutors ‘‘unlimited power’’ to intimidate 
lawyers and derail criminal defense work.31 
Specific cases involving Article 306 of the PRC Criminal Law 
continued to be featured prominently in national Chinese news and 
in ongoing debates over Article 306. In June 2011, for instance, 
leading Chinese scholars and lawyers criticized the high profile 
case against four criminal defense lawyers—Yang Zaixin, Yang 
Zhonghan, Luo Sifang, and Liang Wucheng—in Beihai city, 
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.32 The four criminal defense 
attorneys were representing criminal suspect Pei Jinde, accused in 
a murder trial, when the testimonies of three defense witnesses 
challenged the prosecution’s case.33 Authorities later detained the 
four attorneys on suspicion of committing ‘‘witness tampering’’ 
under Article 306 and arrested the defense witnesses, who were in-
dicted on perjury charges. On June 28, 2011, public security offi-
cials formally arrested rights lawyer Yang Zaixin on suspicion of 
violating Article 306.34 The three remaining criminal defense law-
yers were reportedly released on bail pending trial on suspicion of 
similar charges.35 In July 2011, China University of Political 
Science and Law Professor Chen Guangzhong told Oriental Outlook 
Magazine that the formal arrest of Yang Zaixin was ‘‘wrongful’’ and 
that, based on disclosed information, the four lawyers were ful-
filling their professional obligations.36 In July 2011, the Global 
Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, reported 
that more than 30 unidentified persons attacked lawyers from Bei-
jing municipality and Shandong and Yunnan provinces who had 
travelled to Beihai to represent lawyer Yang Zaixin.37 According to 
the Global Times article, the assailants reportedly demanded the 
lawyers not represent client Yang and that they leave imme-
diately.38 
Chinese legal scholars this past year continued to urge revision 
of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law, which is reportedly on the 
National People’s Congress agenda, to address the problem of Arti-
cle 306 and other longstanding issues related to criminal defense 
counsel. Such longstanding issues include the commonly referred to 
‘‘three difficulties’’ (san nan) of criminal defense: Gaining access to 
detained clients, reviewing the prosecutors’ case files, and col-
lecting evidence.39 Although authorities amended the 2008 PRC 
Lawyers Law to address these issues, inconsistencies between the 
PRC Lawyers Law and the 1997 PRC Criminal Procedure Law re-
main. In January 2011, several criminal defense lawyers, inter-
viewed by the Legal Weekly, expressed growing frustrations over 
limitations within criminal defense work. In addition to the widely 
discussed ‘‘three difficulties,’’ prominent Beijing criminal defense 
lawyer Xu Lantang raised ‘‘ten difficulties’’—including the difficulty 
of getting witnesses to appear in court, the difficulty of getting a 
hearing for trial on appeal, and the difficulty of participating in the 
death penalty review process.40 According to the article, criminal 
defense lawyers’ primary obstacle is having innocence claims ac-
cepted by people’s courts.41 A January 2011 Legal Daily article said 
that the challenges to successfully representing criminal defend-
ants have led to a decline in the rate of legal representation of 
criminal defendants in China.42 
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FAIRNESS OF CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Chinese lawyers and criminal defendants continue to face numer-
ous obstacles in ensuring the application of the right to a fair trial. 
Although judicial independence is enshrined in the 1997 PRC 
Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese judges regularly receive political 
guidance on pending cases, including instructions on how to rule, 
from both the government and the Communist Party.43 Closed 
trials, undue political influence, and a lack of transparency in judi-
cial decisionmaking remain commonplace within the justice system. 
For criminal suspects that reach the trial stage, the likelihood of 
a guilty verdict is great. According to 2010 official statistics from 
the Supreme People’s Court, the conviction rate for criminal cases 
was 98.12 percent.44 Chinese officials routinely sentence defend-
ants in trials that fall far short of fair trial standards set forth in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.45 
During this reporting year, the Commission has observed several 
notable cases in which Chinese judicial authorities failed to provide 
transparency and uphold defendants’ fair trial rights in accordance 
with domestic and international law. In March 2011, for instance, 
the Suining Intermediate People’s Court in Sichuan province sen-
tenced democracy advocate Liu Xianbin, a signatory to Charter 08 
(a treatise advocating political reform and human rights), to 10 
years’ imprisonment for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 46 Au-
thorities reportedly denied Liu access to a lawyer for months, 
which appeared to contravene protections in the PRC Lawyers 
Law.47 [For more information about Liu Xianbin, see Section III— 
Institutions of Democratic Governance.] In August 2011, the 
Chaoyang District People’s Court in Beijing city tried rights advo-
cate Wang Lihong for ‘‘creating a disturbance’’ in connection with 
her role in organizing a protest outside of a Fujian province court-
house on April 16, 2010.48 It was not until March 2011, nearly 12 
months after the protest, that Chinese authorities criminally de-
tained Wang.49 At Wang’s own trial in August, Wang’s criminal de-
fense lawyer, Han Yicun, maintained that the trial was ‘‘unfair,’’ 
since the judge interrupted Wang’s final statement and did not per-
mit defense attorney Han to finish his defense statement.50 In ad-
dition, the criminal defense attorneys were unable to photocopy 
court documents or present arguments before the indictment.51 In 
September, the court sentenced Wang to nine months in prison for 
‘‘creating a disturbance.’’ 52 Additionally, in the past year, the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention released Opinion No. 15/ 
2011, which found that the December 2009 criminal case against 
prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo ‘‘was organized in [a] way which 
constitutes a breach of fairness.’’ 53 
In June 2010, two regulations took effect that prohibit convic-
tions based on illegally obtained evidence.54 According to a Novem-
ber 2010 Oriental Outlook Weekly article, however, fewer than 20 
percent of lawyers surveyed had used the regulations, and many al-
leged that the regulations lacked enforceability.55 In January 2011, 
a Procuratorial Daily article addressed the reasons behind enforce-
ment obstacles and why the implemented guidelines lack force.56 
The article noted that the evidence regulations ‘‘possess their own 
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inherent flaws,’’ ‘‘easily result in different interpretations,’’ and suf-
fer from the prejudices of judicial officials.57 
Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders 
Amid a broad crackdown against human rights advocates that 
began in February 2011, authorities in Beijing municipality and 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, detained at least five promi-
nent human rights lawyers in late February or early March 2011, 
including Teng Biao, Tang Jitian, Jiang Tianyong, and Tang Jin-
gling.58 Chinese officials detained other human rights lawyers, 
such as Li Fangping and Li Xiongbing, for briefer periods in April 
and May 2011.59 In at least some instances, authorities required 
those released to sign ‘‘letters of guarantee.’’ 60 According to one 
unnamed human rights lawyer, the ‘‘letters’’ required that those re-
leased guarantee not to commit certain acts, including criticizing 
the Communist Party, participating in training by overseas organi-
zations, and communicating with overseas organizations.61 As a re-
sult, released human rights lawyers declined to speak to the media 
about their detentions.62 
The following are examples from the past year of official mis-
treatment of Chinese human rights lawyers and defenders. 
• In February 2011, security officials in Shandong province re-
portedly beat self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and 
his wife Yuan Weijing. The reported beatings followed the cou-
ple’s covert recording of video footage in which they described 
the official surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and abuse 
their family has endured since Chen’s release from prison after 
serving his full sentence on September 9, 2010.63 
• In April 2011, Beijing-based human rights lawyer Jin 
Guanghong disappeared amid a number of apparently politi-
cally motivated disappearances.64 After a Beijing psychiatric 
hospital reportedly released Jin 10 days later, he was in an 
‘‘extremely weak physical and mental state.’’ 65 Jin alleged he 
was beaten and vaguely recalled receiving injections while tied 
to a bed.66 He was unable to fully recall the circumstances sur-
rounding his detention.67 In recent years, Jin had defended a 
member of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement in 
Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, and had participated on 
the legal defense team in a high-profile 2010 criminal defama-
tion case in Fujian province.68 [For more information on condi-
tions for Falun Gong practitioners, see Section II—Freedom of 
Religion—Falun Gong.] 
• In April 2011, public security officials in Beijing detained 
housing rights advocate and former lawyer Ni Yulan on sus-
picion of ‘‘creating a disturbance.’’ 69 The criminal detention of 
Ni and the disappearance of her husband followed months of 
police harassment, which included surveillance and disruptions 
in their electricity, water, and Internet services.70 Ni is con-
fined to a wheelchair reportedly due to chronic medical condi-
tions and alleged official torture suffered over the past dec-
ade.71 
In 2011, Chinese authorities have continued to pressure human 
rights lawyers who take on sensitive cases by denying annual pro-
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fessional license renewals during the ‘‘annual inspection and as-
sessment process’’ (niandu jiancha kaohe), which justice depart-
ments throughout the country completed in July 2011.72 Lawyers 
that participate in politically ‘‘sensitive’’ cases—including those in-
volving workers’ rights, religious freedom, and political reform— 
frequently fail to have their professional licenses renewed during 
the annual assessment.73 As of mid-July 2011, justice departments 
failed to renew the professional licenses of at least four human 
rights lawyers, including Liu Xiaoyuan, Cheng Hai, Li Jinglin, and 
Li Baiguang.74 In July 2011, a Caijing article reported that some 
lawyers viewed the annual assessment system as a ‘‘tool to sup-
press disobedient lawyers.’’ 75 The article claimed that prominent 
rights lawyer Liu Xiaoyuan failed to pass the 2011 ‘‘annual inspec-
tion and assessment process’’ as a result of offending officials.76 In 
a subsequent posting on his personal blog, however, Liu denied of-
fending any individuals prior to failing to have his professional li-
cense renewed.77 
The whereabouts and condition of prominent human rights law-
yer Gao Zhisheng, who angered Chinese authorities by exposing 
human rights abuses and representing marginalized citizens and 
religious practitioners, remain unknown. Weeks after reportedly re-
appearing publicly in late March 2010, Gao ‘‘disappeared’’ again in 
mid-April 2010.78 In January 2011, the Associated Press released 
information from an April 2010 interview with Gao in which he 
confirmed being tortured extensively during detention.79 In Feb-
ruary 2011, Freedom Now, a U.S.-based non-governmental organi-
zation that represents individual prisoners of conscience, publicly 
released a November 2010 statement from the UN Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention in which the UN agency demanded the Chi-
nese government ‘‘proceed to an immediate release of [Gao] and 
provide for reparation of the harm caused as a result of his situa-
tion.’’ 80 
Arbitrary Detention 
Arbitrary detention in China takes many forms and continues to 
be widely used by Chinese authorities to quell local petitioners, 
government critics, and rights advocates. Among the forms of arbi-
trary extralegal and illegal detention are: 
• ‘‘enforced disappearances’’; 
• ‘‘soft detention’’ (ruanjin), a range of extralegal controls 
under which individuals may be subjected to home confine-
ment, surveillance, restricted movement, and limitations on 
contact with others; 
• reeducation through labor, an administrative detention of up 
to four years for minor offenses; 
• ‘‘black jail’’ (hei jianyu) detentions; and 
• forcible detention in psychiatric hospitals for non-medical 
reasons. 
‘‘Shuanggui,’’ another form of extralegal detention, is used by the 
Communist Party for investigation of Party members, most often in 
cases of suspected corruption. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (UNWGAD) defines the deprivation of personal liberty to 
be ‘‘arbitrary’’ if it meets one of the following criteria: (1) There is 
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no clear legal basis for the deprivation of liberty; (2) an individual 
is deprived of his liberty for having exercised rights guaranteed 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); or 
(3) there is grave non-compliance with fair trial standards set forth 
in the UDHR and other international human rights instruments.81 
In addition, many forms of arbitrary detention also appear to con-
travene protections within China’s Constitution and domestic 
laws.82 In this past year, for example, UNWGAD issued two opin-
ions declaring that the Chinese government’s imprisonment of 
prominent intellectual Liu Xiaobo and house arrest of his wife Liu 
Xia contravene the UDHR and amount to arbitrary detentions. The 
opinions call on Chinese officials to immediately release Liu 
Xiaobo, immediately end Liu Xia’s house arrest, and provide rep-
arations to both persons.83 
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 
During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed nu-
merous reported cases of Chinese citizens who went ‘‘missing’’ or 
‘‘disappeared’’ into official custody with little or no information 
about their whereabouts or potential charges against them. In an 
April 8, 2011, press release, the UN Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances (UNWGEID) expressed ‘‘serious 
concern at the recent wave of enforced disappearances that alleg-
edly took place in China over the last few months,’’ adding that it 
had received ‘‘multiple reports of a number of persons having 
[been] subject to enforced disappearance . . . .’’ 84 Article 2 of the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from En-
forced Disappearance defines ‘‘enforced disappearance’’ as follows: 
‘‘the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation 
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons 
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or 
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared per-
son, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.’’ 85 
In late May, Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported that at 
least 22 prominent Chinese rights advocates—including well- 
known artist and public advocate Ai Weiwei, petitioner Zhou Li, 
and writer Gu Chuan—had been subjected to enforced disappear-
ances, some for as long as 70 days.86 In June, UNWGEID issued 
a press release expressing ‘‘serious concern’’ over all persons sub-
jected to enforced disappearance in China, including the 300 Ti-
betan monks whom security personnel allegedly removed from 
Kirti Monastery, Aba county, Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture, Sichuan province, on April 21, 2011.87 
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Draft Amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure Law 
In August 2011, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) reviewed a draft amendment to the PRC Criminal Procedure 
Law (CPL), which includes 99 amendments to the current CPL.88 Chi-
nese state-run media has reported that any revised draft amendment 
approved by the NPCSC will likely be deliberated upon and passed by 
the plenary session of the National People’s Congress in March 2012.89 
According to state-run media reports, legal scholars have said the 
CPL draft revisions ‘‘will help improve the protection of criminal sus-
pects’ human rights’’ 90 and have said the draft amendment complies 
with international standards.91 The CPL draft amendment includes re-
visions that would aim to prohibit forced self-incrimination,92 and bar 
collecting evidence obtained through torture.93 The draft amendment ex-
plicitly states that Chinese criminal defense attorneys are not to be 
monitored when meeting criminal defendants in custody.94 
International organizations and news media outlets have raised con-
cerns that specific amendment revisions, however, would legalize the 
current practice of forcibly ‘‘disappearing’’ rights advocates in violation 
of international standards.95 The revisions allow Chinese police, in cases 
involving national security, terrorism, or major instances of bribery, to 
keep criminal suspects under residential surveillance at a fixed location 
outside of their homes, with approval from an upper level procuratorate 
or security organ, for up to six months, if keeping them at their homes 
would likely ‘‘hinder an investigation.’’ 96 The revisions also would per-
mit Chinese police to withhold information about this form of ‘‘house ar-
rest’’ in the case of suspected state security or terrorism cases, if they 
believed that notifying relatives, as normally required, could ‘‘hinder the 
investigation.’’ 97 Under the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, a state commits a crime of 
enforced disappearance when its agents arrest, detain, abduct, or other-
wise deprive a person of liberty and then deny holding the person or 
conceal the fate or whereabouts of the person.98 Chinese lawyers and 
media organizations have also criticized these provisions for having the 
potential to undermine human rights protections.99 In September 2011, 
for instance, an editorial in the official newspaper China Daily acknowl-
edged potential loopholes: ‘‘For one thing, the crime of endangering state 
security is a vague and sprawling conception. Without proper definition 
and limitations, it is highly vulnerable to abuse. The impossibility of no-
tification and the possibility of impeding investigations are even harder 
to define and clarify.’’ 100 
‘‘SOFT DETENTION’’ AND CONTROL 
During this reporting year, the Commission noted various re-
ports of law enforcement authorities continuing to use ‘‘soft deten-
tion’’ (ruanjin) to control and intimidate Chinese citizens.101 Those 
under ‘‘soft detention’’ may be subject to various forms of harass-
ment, including home confinement, surveillance, restricted move-
ment, and limited contact with others.102 The ‘‘soft detention’’ that 
numerous human rights defenders, advocates, and their family 
members are subjected to has no basis in Chinese law and con-
stitutes arbitrary detention under international human rights 
standards. 
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In the period surrounding the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony 
in late 2010, Chinese authorities used ‘‘soft detention’’ measures on 
more than 100 prominent human rights advocates and associates 
of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize award recipient Liu Xiaobo.103 The Com-
mission also noted that in 2011, authorities placed many rights de-
fenders under ‘‘soft detention’’ after releasing them from official 
custody. The following are some notable ‘‘soft detention’’ cases from 
the past year: 
• From October 2010 to December 2010, state security officials 
in Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, and Beijing municipality held 
Ding Zilin, a representative of the Tiananmen Mothers (an ad-
vocacy organization of 1989 Tiananmen protest victims’ rel-
atives), and her husband Jiang Peikun under ‘‘soft detention’’ 
for a period of 74 days. The couple was unable to access all 
forms of communication and unable to contact relatives, 
friends, and fellow rights advocates.104 
• In February 2011, a publicly released homemade video of 
legal advocate Chen Guangcheng showed Chen and his family 
under ‘‘soft detention’’ in Dongshigu village, Linyi city, 
Shandong province.105 Chen and his family have been under 
‘‘soft detention’’ since September 2010, when he completed a 
51-month sentence for disturbing public order and destroying 
public property.106 
• In April 2011, public security officers reportedly placed Jin 
Tianming, a Protestant pastor, and 500 members of the 
Shouwang Church in Beijing under ‘‘soft detention’’ after sev-
eral outdoor worship services organized by the Shouwang 
Church.107 
REEDUCATION THROUGH LABOR (RTL) 
Public security officers continued to use the reeducation through 
labor (RTL) system to silence critics and to circumvent the criminal 
procedure process. RTL is an administrative measure that allows 
Chinese law enforcement officials to order Chinese citizens, without 
legal proceedings or due process, to serve a period of administrative 
detention of up to three years, with the possibility of up to one year 
extension.108 While the Bureau of Reeducation Through Labor Ad-
ministration maintains that the RTL system has been established 
‘‘to maintain public order, to prevent and reduce crime, and to pro-
vide compulsory educational reform to minor offenders,’’ 109 au-
thorities frequently use RTL to punish, among others, dissidents, 
drug addicts, petitioners, Falun Gong adherents, and religious 
practitioners who belong to religious groups not approved by the 
government.110 
During this reporting year, the Commission observed numerous 
accounts of RTL orders violating the legal rights of Chinese citi-
zens, specifically their right to a fair trial and right to be protected 
from arbitrary detention. In November 2010, an RTL committee in 
Henan province ordered rights defender Cheng Jianping (who uses 
the pseudonym Wang Yi) to serve one year of RTL. Authorities al-
leged that Cheng ‘‘disturbed social order’’ when, in October 2010, 
she re-tweeted a Twitter message from her fiance´ regarding anti- 
Japanese protests following a fishing incident between China and 
Japan in disputed waters.111 The tweet was reportedly satirical in 
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tone and urged demonstrators to protest at the Japanese pavilion 
at the Shanghai 2010 World Expo.112 In March 2011, Chinese au-
thorities ordered rights advocate Yang Qiuyu to serve two years of 
RTL for ‘‘creating a disturbance.’’ 113 The RTL order claimed that 
Yang had ‘‘incited’’ petitioners to go to Tiananmen Square, 
Wangfujing Street, and other locations in Beijing to cause ‘‘trou-
ble.’’ 114 In July 2011, Shanghai authorities released Shanghai peti-
tioner Mao Hengfeng after she served 18 months of RTL for ‘‘dis-
turbing the social order.’’ 115 According to her husband Wu Xuewei, 
Mao was subjected to physical and mental torture while serving 
her RTL order.116 After her release, Wu said that Mao, who arrived 
home in a wheelchair, was unable to speak and did ‘‘not have the 
strength to walk.’’ 117 Mao was initially released on medical parole 
in February 2011, but officials detained Mao again two days later 
for unspecified ‘‘illegal activities.’’ 118 
Human rights advocates and legal experts in China have been 
calling for an end to RTL for decades. In August 2010, on the eve 
of the 53rd anniversary of the establishment of China’s RTL sys-
tem, a number of Chinese scholars, lawyers, and advocates publicly 
released a ‘‘civil rights advocacy letter’’ calling on the government 
to immediately abolish the ‘‘Decision of the State Council Regard-
ing the Question of Reeducation Through Labor’’ and other admin-
istrative regulations that form the legal basis for RTL.119 The let-
ter stated that current RTL provisions that permit detention with-
out a judicial trial are unconstitutional and violate Chinese domes-
tic laws and regulations, including the PRC Legislation Law and 
the PRC Administrative Punishment Law.120 In February 2011, 
the advocates reportedly planned to send the signed letter, with 
over 1,000 signatures, to the National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee.121 
‘‘BLACK JAILS’’: SECRET DETENTION FACILITIES 
Chinese authorities continued to use ‘‘black jails’’ (hei jianyu)— 
secret detention sites established by local officials—to detain and 
punish petitioners who travel to Beijing and provincial capitals to 
voice complaints and seek redress for injustices.122 Those detained 
are denied access to legal counsel and often denied contact with 
family members or associates.123 A December 2010 Human Rights 
Watch report detailed conditions for prisoners in ‘‘black jails’’: 
‘‘Once detained, petitioners are subjected to abuses including phys-
ical and sexual violence, food and sleep deprivation, denial of med-
ical care, and intimidation.’’ 124 [For more information about Chi-
na’s petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system, see Section 
III—Access to Justice.] 
In recent years, the Commission has observed reports by inter-
national and domestic Chinese media organizations on ‘‘black jails,’’ 
as well as on the network of personnel that intercept and abuse pe-
titioners.125 In one prominent example of domestic reporting, in 
September 2010, the Southern Metropolitan Daily reported on a 
private security company, Anyuanding, which was accused of as-
sisting local governments in abducting and detaining petitioners in 
‘‘black jails.’’ 126 The New York Times reported in late September 
2010 that the ‘‘system of interceptors and black jails has flourished 
in recent years,’’ as Chinese petitioners have sought official redress 
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in the face of illegal land grabs, official misconduct, and other in-
justices.127 In April 2011, the Southern Metropolitan Daily re-
ported on the experiences of Sun Yinxia and two individuals forc-
ibly detained in a ‘‘black jail’’ in Sihong county, Jiangsu province, 
after refusing to sign an agreement allowing the local government 
to demolish their houses without adequate compensation.128 Village 
and township leaders reportedly watched as unidentified guards 
forcibly detained the ‘‘nail household’’ 129 residents, who reportedly 
were later ‘‘beaten,’’ ‘‘sexually harassed,’’ and tortured during their 
12 days of detention.130 According to the article, local residents 
said that local officials had detained nearly 200 people in the 
‘‘black jail’’ since it opened in 2006.131 In August 2011, Chinese 
media reported on a ‘‘black jail’’ in Changping district, Beijing mu-
nicipality, after a petitioner surnamed Zhou revealed information 
about her four-day detention.132 According to the Beijing News, 
several ‘‘black jail’’ ‘‘retrievers’’ forcibly detained Zhou after she vis-
ited a local government office in Beijing.133 The ‘‘black jail’’ per-
sonnel reportedly held Zhou and more than 50 detainees in tight 
quarters without beds, depriving the detainees of their mobile 
phones and beating some who resisted the detention center man-
agement. Zhou said that the detainees, from several provinces, had 
been forcibly detained or lured into detention.134 
SHUANGGUI: EXTRALEGAL INVESTIGATORY DETENTION OF COMMUNIST 
PARTY MEMBERS 
During this reporting year, the Commission continued to observe 
Chinese media reporting on the Communist Party’s use of 
shuanggui (often translated as ‘‘double regulation’’ or ‘‘double des-
ignation’’), a form of extralegal detention that involves summoning 
Party members under investigation to appear at a designated place 
at a designated time.135 Notable cases of high-ranking officials 
placed under shuanggui included: Liu Xiquan, a deputy head of 
Beijing’s Chaoyang district; 136 Zhang Wanqing, Shandong Provin-
cial People’s Government Secretary-General; 137 and Zhang Rui, a 
deputy director at the Department of Exchequer in the Ministry of 
Finance.138 Shuanggui investigations often precede formal Party 
disciplinary sanctions or the transfer of suspects to law enforce-
ment agencies if there has been a violation of the criminal law.139 
The investigations at undisclosed locations usually last several 
months, and officials may extend the investigations for over a 
year.140 Those under investigation are ‘‘generally held incommuni-
cado and denied some of the protections to which criminal suspects 
are entitled at least in principle.’’ 141 
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Legal Scholar Questions Anti-Crime Campaign’s Excesses 
This past year, authorities in Chongqing municipality, Sichuan prov-
ince, continued a massive, public ‘‘anti-crime’’ sweep (known in Chinese 
as ‘‘striking organized crime and uprooting evil’’ [dahei chu’e]) of crimi-
nal syndicates and corrupt officials that netted thousands of arrests and 
raised various concerns about judicial independence and procedural 
rights.142 In an April 2011 public letter, circulated widely, Beijing-based 
human rights advocate and university professor He Weifang compared 
the ‘‘movement-style’’ campaign to the turbulent period of the Cultural 
Revolution.143 Of the campaign, He writes, ‘‘the Cultural Revolution is 
being replayed, and the ideal of rule of law is right now being lost.’’ 144 
He publicly questioned the lack of independent adjudicative and pros-
ecutorial powers and criticized the public security agencies’ emphasis on 
order above all.145 
Medical Parole 
During this reporting year, Chinese authorities denied medical 
parole and adequate medical treatment to prisoners, particularly 
human rights advocates. The U.S. State Department observed in 
its report on China’s human rights situation for 2010 that 
‘‘[a]dequate, timely medical care for prisoners remained a serious 
problem, despite official assurances that prisoners have the right 
to prompt medical treatment.’’ 146 In January 2011, Zeng Jinyan, a 
rights advocate and the wife of human rights defender Hu Jia, ap-
plied for medical parole on behalf of Hu, who suffers from hepatitis 
and cholelithiasis.147 As was the case with previous requests, au-
thorities denied the appeal for medical parole, despite Hu’s deterio-
rating condition.148 The Commission noted at least one case where 
untimely medical parole release had likely contributed to a decline 
in a prisoner’s medical condition. In December 2010, rights advo-
cate Zhang Jianhong, who wrote under the pen name Li Hong, died 
after being released on medical parole on June 5, 2010.149 Authori-
ties had repeatedly denied Zhang medical parole, which resulted in 
an apparent worsening of his condition.150 
In addition, authorities appeared to use medical parole as a 
measure to silence rights advocates and defenders. In December 
2010, authorities released rights advocate Zhao Lianhai, the head 
of an advocacy group for parents of children sickened by melamine- 
tainted milk, on medical parole.151 Some supporters, however, 
feared that Zhao’s release was intended to keep him silent.152 In 
April 2010, Zhao reportedly broke this public silence to comment 
on the broad crackdown on rights advocates and to detail the in-
tense pressure he and his family were living under.153 Police re-
portedly then threatened to rescind Zhao’s medical parole if he con-
tinued to comment on the treatment of human rights advocates.154 
In February 2011, Shanghai authorities terminated the medical pa-
role release of Shanghai petitioner Mao Hengfeng, two days after 
her release from a reeducation through labor (RTL) center.155 Al-
though authorities cited ‘‘illegal activities inconsistent with [the 
stipulations of] medical parole’’ as the rationale, they reportedly did 
not specify the alleged ‘‘illegal activities.’’ 156 Mao reportedly suf-
fered torture and ill treatment throughout her RTL detention.157 
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Capital Punishment 
During this reporting year, the Chinese government maintained 
its policy of not releasing details on the thousands of prisoners re-
portedly executed annually and continued to keep information on 
the death penalty a state secret. Chinese officials also maintained 
the stated goal of limiting the number of executions. In March 
2011, for instance, Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Wang 
Shengjun emphasized the state policy of ‘‘strictly controlling and 
carefully applying the death penalty’’ and urged ‘‘improving the 
death penalty review process’’ in his report to the annual session 
of the National People’s Congress.158 In May 2011, the SPC stated 
in its annual 2010 work report that courts should suspend death 
sentences for two years, if the criminal circumstances do not re-
quire an ‘‘immediate execution.’’ 159 On February 25, 2011, the Na-
tional People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed the 
eighth amendment to the PRC Criminal Law, which reduced the 
number of crimes punishable by the death penalty from 68 to 55.160 
As the revision was the first time the Chinese legislature reduced 
the number of crimes subject to capital punishment since enacting 
the PRC Criminal Law in 1979, the country’s official media her-
alded the reform as a step ‘‘to restructure its penalty system and 
better protect human rights.’’ 161 In an August 2010 Southern 
Weekend article on the then proposed amendment, a member of 
the National People’s Congress Legal Committee pointed out that 
authorities rarely, if ever, applied the death penalty for the 13 
crimes under consideration for reclassification as non-capital of-
fenses.162 
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
Introduction 
The Chinese government continued in the Commission’s 2011 re-
porting year to restrict Chinese citizens’ freedom of religion. Chi-
na’s Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief but limits 
protections for religious practice to ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ 1 a 
term applied in a manner that falls short of international human 
rights protections for freedom of religion.2 The government contin-
ued to recognize only five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Islam, 
Protestantism, and Taoism—and required groups belonging to 
these religions to register with the government. Registered groups 
received some legal protection for their religious activities but re-
mained subject to ongoing state controls. Members of both unregis-
tered groups and registered groups deemed to run afoul of state- 
set parameters for religion faced risk of harassment, detention, and 
other abuses. Some unregistered groups had space to practice their 
religions, but this limited tolerance did not amount to official rec-
ognition of these groups’ rights. Authorities also shut down the ac-
tivities of some unregistered groups and maintained bans on other 
religious or spiritual communities, including Falun Gong. 
Despite the Chinese government’s stated commitment to pro-
moting internationally recognized human rights, it has not com-
mitted to promoting religious freedom in line with international 
human rights standards. The Chinese government’s 2009–2010 Na-
tional Human Rights Action Plan, which was ‘‘framed . . . in pur-
suit of . . . the essentials of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’’ 
affirmed the government’s existing framework of control over reli-
gion.3 A September 2010 State Council Information Office white 
paper, which described China’s human rights progress in the pre-
vious year, addressed a range of civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights, but made no reference to religion.4 The State 
Administration for Religious Affairs’ goals for 2011 called for fur-
ther institutionalizing existing controls and mobilizing religious 
communities to promote doctrine that advances state-defined no-
tions of ‘‘social harmony.’’ 5 
The government continued to use law to control religious practice 
in China rather than protect the religious freedom of all Chinese 
citizens, accelerating efforts in the past year to revise or pass new 
legal measures. The State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA) issued measures for the management of Tibetan Buddhist 
monasteries in September 2010, effective in November 2010, that 
stipulate more extensive controls over these religious venues.6 [See 
Section V—Tibet for more information.] In January 2011, SARA 
announced it would issue new legal measures (banfa) and provi-
sions (guiding) during the year on managing the ‘‘collective reli-
gious activities’’ of foreigners in China; on certifying teacher quali-
fications; on granting degrees at religious schools; and on managing 
religion-related foreign affairs.7 It also described plans to begin 
drafting measures for the management of religious schools and of 
Muslims’ pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj).8 The planned measures, like 
others passed in recent years, build on provisions in the Regula-
tions on Religious Affairs (RRA), which took effect in March 2005.9 
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Recent legal measures have added more clarity to ambiguous provi-
sions in the RRA but also have articulated more detailed levels of 
control. In addition, while such legal measures, along with the 
RRA, have provided limited protections for the activities of reg-
istered religious communities—such as establishing venues for wor-
ship and holding property—they exclude unregistered groups from 
these benefits, leaving their activities and possessions vulnerable to 
official abuses.10 
Buddhism (Non-Tibetan) 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party maintained a restrictive framework 
for controlling the doctrine, practices, worship sites, and religious 
personnel of Buddhists in non-Tibetan areas.11 [For more informa-
tion on conditions for Tibetan Buddhists, see Section V—Tibet.] 
State-controlled ‘‘patriotic religious organizations’’ 12 monitor and 
control the doctrine, practices, property, and personnel of each of 
China’s five recognized religions, and the Buddhist Association of 
China (BAC) continued to monitor, control, and restrict the reli-
gious activities of Buddhists. 
CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
This past reporting year, the government and Party continued to 
control Buddhist doctrine and practices to conform them to govern-
ment and Party goals. Local governments and Buddhist associa-
tions throughout China continued to call for government and Party 
controls over Buddhists.13 For example, the Shanxi Provincial Bud-
dhist Association reportedly called on Buddhists to recognize Com-
munist Party doctrine, implement the Party’s basic policy on reli-
gion, and demonstrate allegiance to China and to socialism, among 
other goals.14 China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA) called for authorities to ‘‘lead’’ Buddhists to hold Buddhist 
scripture reading events based on the government-dictated theme 
of ‘‘purity and harmony,’’ 15 and local authorities and Buddhist as-
sociations held events that echoed this theme.16 Local governments 
continued to restrict Buddhist practices by calling for the removal 
of practices that authorities deemed to be ‘‘superstitious’’ or ‘‘feu-
dal.’’ 17 Chinese law does not provide clear definitions for these 
terms,18 giving authorities the flexibility to arbitrarily restrict the 
religious practices of Buddhists. 
CONTROLS OVER BUDDHIST SITES OF WORSHIP AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSONNEL 
The government and Party continued to impose political goals on 
the management of Buddhist sites of worship and personnel. Gov-
ernment sources continued to call for the construction of ‘‘harmo-
nious temples, mosques, and churches,’’ 19 and during a March 
2011 interview with the central government news agency Xinhua, 
BAC head Master Chuanyin said a December 2010 event that fo-
cused on this theme ‘‘aroused the positive nature of making con-
tributions to economic and social development’’ for Buddhists.20 
The Regulations on Religious Affairs conditions the construction of 
sites of worship on government oversight,21 and local authorities 
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throughout China continued to call for restrictions on what au-
thorities often refer to as the ‘‘indiscriminate construction of tem-
ples and excessive construction of open-air religious statues.’’ 22 In 
addition, local Buddhist associations throughout China continued 
to exercise control over the appointment of Buddhist monks and 
nuns.23 For example, the Mount Putuo Buddhist Association, in 
Zhoushan prefecture, Zhejiang province, convened a meeting in late 
2010 in which an official from the Jiangsu Provincial Ethnic and 
Religious Affairs Committee ‘‘required’’ the Mount Putuo Buddhist 
Association to confirm and put on file the qualifications of Buddhist 
monks and nuns according to guidance from SARA.24 
Catholicism 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party continued to interfere in the reli-
gious activities of China’s estimated 4 to 12 million Catholics.25 
The state-controlled church continued to deny Catholics in China 
the freedom to accept the authority of the Holy See to select 
bishops, and authorities continued to detain and harass some 
Catholics who practiced their faith outside of state-approved pa-
rameters. In addition, authorities forced some bishops to attend a 
December 2010 national conference of state-controlled church lead-
ership, as well as the ordination ceremonies of two bishops or-
dained without Holy See approval. 
INTERFERENCE WITH RELIGIOUS PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES 
The government and Party continued to implement a restrictive 
framework of control over the selection and activities of Catholic 
religious personnel. Since the 1950s, the government and Party 
have denied Catholics in China the freedom to accept the authority 
of the Holy See to select bishops, and the state-controlled church 
asserts that it has the authority to approve the ordination of 
bishops in China.26 Officials have cited the principles of ‘‘independ-
ence’’ for Catholics in China and the ‘‘autonomous’’ selection and 
ordination of bishops as a basis for rejecting the authority of for-
eign entities (including the Holy See) over the state-controlled 
church,27 and China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs 
continued to call for the promotion of these principles in 2011.28 In 
some cases, the state-controlled church has allowed discreet Holy 
See approval of bishops who have also received state-controlled 
church approval, and this practice continued during this reporting 
year.29 Nevertheless, on November 20, 2010, state-controlled 
church authorities ordained Guo Jincai of Chengde diocese,30 Hebei 
province, the first ordination of a Catholic bishop in China without 
Holy See approval since November 2006. Authorities reportedly 
forced some bishops to attend the ordination, including Li Liangui 
of the Cangzhou diocese, Hebei.31 In July 2011, authorities in 
Shantou city, Guangdong province, took bishops Liang Jiansen, 
Liao Hongqing, Su Yongda, and Gan Junqiu into custody 32 and re-
portedly forced them to attend the ordination ceremony of Huang 
Bingzhang, another bishop ordained without Holy See approval.33 
The government continued to interfere in the affairs of some un-
registered bishops and their congregations this past year. For ex-
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ample, authorities in Gonghui town, Zhangbei county, Zhangjiakou 
city, Hebei province, reportedly restricted access to the town after 
the March 9, 2011, death of unregistered bishop Hao Jinli 34 in 
order to prevent large numbers of Catholics from traveling there to 
pay their respects to the bishop.35 
Authorities also continued efforts to incorporate political themes 
into Catholic doctrine and education. In November 2010, the Hebei 
Provincial Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureau appointed one of its 
own officials, Tang Zhaojun, to join the leadership of the Hebei 
Seminary and teach classes on ideology and politics.36 Students at 
the seminary demonstrated soon thereafter,37 and the seminary ap-
pointed new leadership in January 2011.38 Honorary chairman Liu 
Bainian 39 of both the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA)—which 
manages the state-controlled church on behalf of the government 
and Party 40—and the Bishops Conference of the Catholic Church 
in China (BCCCC)—which approves the selection of bishops in 
China 41—said in a March 2011 interview that ‘‘[w]hat the church 
needs is talent who love the country and love religion: politically, 
they should respect the Constitution, respect the law, and fervently 
love the socialist motherland.’’ 42 
HARASSMENT AND DETENTION 
The government and Party continued to harass and detain un-
registered Catholics who practiced their faith outside of state-ap-
proved parameters. At least 40 unregistered Chinese bishops are in 
detention, home confinement, or surveillance; are in hiding; or have 
disappeared under suspicious circumstances.43 Some have been 
missing for years, such as unregistered (or ‘‘underground’’) bishops 
Su Zhimin and Shi Enxiang, whom public security officials took 
into custody in 1996 and 2001, respectively.44 Authorities targeted 
other Catholics more recently. For example, on April 8, 2011, public 
security officials in Beijing municipality reportedly took into cus-
tody Beijing-based unregistered priest Chen Hailong in connection 
with his religious activities.45 Authorities reportedly took him to a 
guest house in Yanqing county, Beijing, and then took him to an 
unknown location on April 9.46 Authorities reportedly questioned 
Chen about the location of unregistered bishop Zhao Kexun and 
then released Chen on July 23, 2011.47 
BISHOPS FORCED TO ATTEND NATIONAL CATHOLIC CONFERENCE 
From December 7 to 9, 2010, the state-controlled Catholic church 
convened the eighth National Conference of Chinese Catholic Rep-
resentatives (NCCCR) in Beijing to choose new state-controlled 
church leaders. Throughout the NCCCR, government and Party 
leaders emphasized that Catholics in China should practice their 
religion in conformity with government and Party policies. For ex-
ample, Jia Qinglin—a member of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central Committee 48— 
described to CPA and BCCCC representatives the Party’s efforts to 
prevent Catholics in China from practicing their faith independent 
of Party policies: ‘‘Religious work is an important component of the 
work of the Party and the country . . . . [The Party Central Com-
mittee] continuously consolidates and develops a patriotic united 
front between the Party and the religious community.’’ 49 
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During the time surrounding the NCCCR, the government de-
nied some bishops the choice to abstain from religious activities 
that contravene the Holy See’s policies. Both the Holy See and 
some delegates at the NCCCR reportedly alleged that authorities 
forced some bishops to take part in the NCCCR,50 following reports 
that authorities instructed local United Front Work Departments 
and Ethnic and Religious Affairs Bureaus throughout China to en-
sure that enough delegates attend.51 For example, on December 6, 
2010, public security officials in Hengshui city, Hebei province, re-
portedly used force to remove registered bishop Feng Xinmao from 
the Jing county cathedral in Hengshui to take him to the 
NCCCR.52 Shortly before the NCCCR, public security authorities 
attempted to force bishop Li Liangui to participate, but they could 
not locate him,53 and they reportedly told members of his diocese, 
the Cangzhou diocese, that they would attempt to find him.54 After 
Li returned to his diocese on December 17, 2010, authorities re-
portedly took him to attend a political study session and ordered 
him to write a letter of apology for his absence.55 As of January 
20, 2011, he reportedly was back at the Cangzhou diocese.56 
Falun Gong 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Communist 
Party and Chinese government continued to carry out a cam-
paign—lasting more than a decade 57—of extensive, systematic, and 
in some cases violent efforts to pressure Falun Gong practitioners 
to renounce their belief in and practice of Falun Gong. The govern-
ment and Party refer to this process as ‘‘transformation through re-
education,’’ or simply ‘‘transformation,’’ and they are currently in 
the second year of a three-year, national campaign to increase ef-
forts to ‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong practitioners. In addition, authori-
ties in Guangzhou city, Guangdong province, targeted Falun Gong 
practitioners during the November 2010 Asian Games, held in 
Guangzhou. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement based on Chinese 
meditative exercises called qigong and the teachings of its founder, 
Li Hongzhi.58 It is difficult to ascertain the number of practitioners 
in China today, because the movement has been forced under-
ground, but official Chinese sources and Falun Gong sources esti-
mate that tens of millions of Chinese citizens practiced Falun Gong 
in the 1990s.59 The Commission tracks information on Falun Gong 
practitioners detained in connection to their practice of Falun Gong 
based on public information, which is incomplete, and reports that 
information in its Political Prisoner Database (PPD). As of Sep-
tember 20, 2011, the PPD contained records of 486 Falun Gong 
practitioners currently detained, serving prison sentences, or serv-
ing reeducation through labor (RTL) terms.60 Of the 376 serving 
prison sentences and for whom sentence information is available, 
the average sentence was approximately 7 years and 7 months.61 
HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND ‘‘TRANSFORMATION’’ 
This past reporting year, government authorities and the 6–10 
Office—an extralegal, Party-run security apparatus created in June 
1999 to implement the ban against Falun Gong 62—continued to 
take measures to ‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong practitioners in China,63 
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primarily through prisons, RTL centers, and specialized facilities 
known as ‘‘transformation through reeducation centers.’’ 64 For ex-
ample, in September 2010, public security officials detained 11 
Falun Gong practitioners 65 in Laishui county, Baoding munici-
pality, Hebei province, under orders from a 6–10 Office in Baoding 
and reportedly forced them to participate in ‘‘transformation’’ at a 
‘‘transformation through reeducation center.’’ 66 
The government and Party also continued to harass and detain 
people who attempted to assist Falun Gong practitioners, such as 
family members and lawyers. For example, on February 24, 2011, 
public security officials in Shijiazhuang city, Hebei province, took 
into custody Hu Mingliang after he sought legal redress against the 
Hebei Women’s RTL Center.67 Public security officials there report-
edly had sexually assaulted his daughter Hu Miaomiao, a Falun 
Gong practitioner.68 The Commission has not observed reports that 
provide further information on Hu Mingliang’s whereabouts. On 
February 16, 2011, public security officials in Xuanwu district, Bei-
jing municipality, detained human rights lawyer Tang Jitian,69 
whose lawyer’s license had been revoked by the Beijing Municipal 
Justice Bureau in 2010 in connection with his representation of a 
Falun Gong practitioner in 2009.70 Authorities reportedly placed 
Tang under a state described as ‘‘house arrest’’ in March 2011, as 
of which time he reportedly was suffering from tuberculosis.71 [For 
more information on the detention and disappearance of human 
rights lawyers, see Section II—Criminal Justice.] 
PARTY SPEARHEADS CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE EFFORTS TO 
‘‘TRANSFORM’’ FALUN GONG PRACTITIONERS 
The government and Party are in the second year of a three-year, 
national campaign to increase efforts to ‘‘transform’’ Falun Gong 
practitioners. Documents from local governments, Party organiza-
tions, and other sources describe a ‘‘2010–2012 Transformation- 
Through-Reeducation Assault and Consolidation Overall Battle 
Work Plan,’’ a campaign that calls on governments, Party organiza-
tions, businesses, and individuals to increase efforts to ‘‘transform’’ 
Falun Gong practitioners,72 including allocating more funding to 
‘‘transformation’’ work.73 The campaign is divided into three stages, 
with themes that include the following: 74 
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SELECTED THEMES OF THE ‘‘2010–2012 TRANSFORMATION-THROUGH- 
REEDUCATION ASSAULT AND CONSOLIDATION OVERALL BATTLE WORK PLAN’’ 
Stage Selected Themes 
Stage 1: 2010 • Establishing targets for the campaign 
• Signing ‘‘responsibility agreements’’ to implement 
‘‘transformation through reeducation’’ 
Stage 2: 2011 • Training a professional cadre corps and a civil, vol-
unteer ‘‘help and education’’ corps to participate in 
‘‘transformation’’ work 
• ‘‘Deeply launching the work of a transformation- 
through-reeducation assault and consolidation’’ 
Stage 3: 2012 • Developing a long-term mechanism for work to ‘‘re-
turn to society’’ Falun Gong practitioners who have 
renounced their belief in and practice of Falun Gong 
• Drawing lessons from the experience of the cam-
paign and ‘‘establish[ing] and perfect[ing] long-last-
ing mechanisms for transformation through reedu-
cation work’’ 
• Proposing new ‘‘transformation through reeduca-
tion’’ duties 
The documents indicate that the Party has taken the lead role 
in initiating and overseeing the campaign. Some cite the October 
2007 17th Party Congress as a basis for the campaign,75 and one 
states specifically that the 17th Party Congress ‘‘put forward a 
new, higher requirement’’ in ‘‘the work of dealing with cults, in-
cluding transformation through reeducation.’’ 76 Some note that 6– 
10 Office authorities at the central, provincial, municipal, and 
county levels have required local government authorities to partici-
pate in the campaign,77 and one describes ‘‘transformation’’ work as 
‘‘led by the Party committees, with the cooperation of relevant [gov-
ernment] departments . . . .’’ 78 That document also refers to 
‘‘transformation’’ work as a ‘‘test of [the] Party’s ability to gov-
ern.’’ 79 
The documents also call for the establishment of mechanisms to 
place greater responsibility for ‘‘transformation’’ work on actors at 
the local level, such as governments, Party organizations, busi-
nesses, and individuals. For example, one document calls on 6–10 
Office authorities to sign ‘‘responsibility agreements’’ with various 
businesses and to assess the ‘‘transformation’’ work of those busi-
nesses on a regular basis.80 In some cases, local governments have 
established specific, numerical targets. For example, the General 
Office of the Ruichang Municipal People’s Government established 
the following targets: To reduce by 50 percent the number of people 
who had not been ‘‘transformed’’ by the end of 2009, and to keep 
the proportion of ‘‘recidivists’’ and ‘‘unstable people’’ within 10 per-
cent of ‘‘transformed’’ Falun Gong practitioners.81 
The mechanisms to place greater responsibility at the local level 
include personalized and, in some cases, invasive measures that 
reach into the workplaces and homes of Falun Gong practitioners. 
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For example, one document calls on authorities to ‘‘mobilize and or-
ganize basic-level Party organizations and mass organizations, 
form responsibility help and education small groups, and enter the 
villages and homes [of Falun Gong practitioners] to conduct an 
educational assault.’’ 82 One document calls on local authorities to 
require local businesses to establish ‘‘transformation-through-re-
education assault work small groups’’ and develop an individual 
plan to ‘‘transform’’ each employee who has not been ‘‘trans-
formed.’’ 83 Three of the documents call on authorities to establish 
databases of information on Falun Gong practitioners.84 
ASIAN GAMES 
Under the theme of ‘‘oppose cults, promote harmony, welcome the 
Asian Games,’’ 85 authorities used the 2010 Asian Games as a jus-
tification to increase security measures targeted at Falun Gong 
practitioners (the Asian Games were held in Guangzhou city, 
Guangdong province, from November 12 to 27, 2010). For example, 
on August 18, 2010, public security officials in Haizhu district, 
Guangzhou, criminally detained lawyer and Falun Gong practi-
tioner Zhu Yubiao on suspicion of ‘‘using a cult to undermine the 
implementation of the law,’’ 86 a crime under Article 300 of the 
PRC Criminal Law 87 and a charge commonly used against Falun 
Gong practitioners. The charges reportedly were related to Falun 
Gong materials that authorities found in Zhu’s home during a 
sweep of Falun Gong practitioners and supporters ahead of the 
Asian Games.88 Zhu was last reported to be held at the Haizhu 
District Public Security Bureau Detention Center.89 In addition, a 
November 10, 2010, directive from the Guangzhou Municipal Peo-
ple’s Government instructed local authorities to ‘‘prevent cult orga-
nizations and law breakers, including ‘Falun Gong,’ from using 
wireless communications to initiate activities of interference and 
destruction.’’ 90 
Islam 
Chinese authorities maintained tight controls over the affairs of 
Muslim communities. The state-controlled Islamic Association of 
China (IAC) continued to regulate the confirmation of religious 
leaders, content of sermons, and overseas pilgrimages to accord 
with the Chinese government and Communist Party objectives. In 
2011, the IAC marked the 10th anniversary of the establishment 
of a steering committee to interpret scripture and compile sermons 
in line with state goals. In an April 2011 speech on the anniver-
sary, Wang Zuo’an, Director of the State Administration for Reli-
gious Affairs (SARA), praised the scripture interpretation work for 
raising the ‘‘political caliber’’ of religious leaders and for promoting 
‘‘positive positions within Islam that suit social progress.’’ He also 
described the work as beneficial for ‘‘rallying the Muslim masses 
even more tightly around the Party and government’’ and called for 
future work to ‘‘even better conform to the needs of our country’s 
social development.’’ 91 In its work plan for 2011, SARA said it 
would ‘‘help’’ the IAC in its scripture interpretation work and 
change of leadership.92 
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SARA announced plans in 2011 to draft legal measures on ‘‘the 
management of Hajj work,’’ 93 building on existing requirements in 
the national Regulations on Religious Affairs and other documents 
that regulate pilgrimages.94 The government requires all pilgrim-
ages to take place under the auspices of the IAC.95 Participants are 
subject to ‘‘patriotic education’’ prior to departure and to restric-
tions on activities within Mecca in a stated effort to guard against 
contact with ‘‘East Turkistan forces’’ (groups, according to the Chi-
nese government, that seek Xinjiang’s independence) and other 
‘‘enemy forces.’’ 96 An official from SARA reported in October 2010 
that authorities had strengthened ‘‘education and guidance’’ toward 
Muslims and ‘‘investigated, prosecuted, and curbed’’ the activities 
of ‘‘illegal organizations’’ as part of efforts to stop pilgrimages orga-
nized independently of state control.97 
Local governments maintained bans on Islamic religious activi-
ties outside of state-sanctioned parameters. Authorities in multiple 
localities continued to call for banning ‘‘dawa preaching activi-
ties’’—a term apparently used by officials to refer to religious out-
reach to fellow Muslims, including by foreign groups—and to stop 
religious ‘‘infiltration.’’ 98 Authorities in a neighborhood in 
Shizuishan municipality, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, for ex-
ample, reported in September 2010 on an ‘‘implementation plan’’ to 
address ‘‘dawa’’ activities and on ‘‘educating and leading’’ cadres 
and religious believers to distance themselves from and stop 
‘‘dawa’’ activities and organizations.99 In Taojiang county, Yiyang 
municipality, Hunan province, local Islamic association officials re-
ported taking steps to stop ‘‘infiltration’’ by outside missionaries, 
whose sermons were deemed to ‘‘violate’’ the Quran and state pol-
icy, and they reported carrying out ‘‘ideological work’’ toward local 
Muslims after ordering ‘‘dawa preachers’’ to leave the province.100 
In Changde municipality, Hunan province, authorities called for 
‘‘vigorously performing anti-infiltration stability work’’ following ‘‘il-
legal proselytizing and infiltration activities’’ by ‘‘backbone mem-
bers’’ of ‘‘Muslim extremist ‘dawa preaching groups’ ’’ and foreign 
Christian missionaries and reported ‘‘appropriately handling’’ three 
‘‘infiltration’’ incidents connected to ‘‘dawa’’ groups.101 In Huangpu 
district, Guangzhou municipality, Guangdong province, authorities 
singled out for scrutiny the activities of ‘‘Muslims, Tibetan Bud-
dhists, and members of non-mainstream sects’’ who came to the lo-
cality, as part of steps to guard against ‘‘foreign infiltration.’’ 102 
ISLAM IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION 
See Section IV—Xinjiang for information on conditions in the 
Muslim-majority Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
Protestantism 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party continued to implement a restric-
tive framework for control of the doctrine and practices of China’s 
estimated 20 million or more registered Protestants,103 who wor-
ship in state-sanctioned churches. Unregistered Protestants wor-
ship outside state-sanctioned churches; reliable data on the number 
of unregistered Protestants is difficult to obtain, and estimates 
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vary widely. Many sources estimate that there are between 50 and 
70 million unregistered Protestants,104 while other estimates range 
from approximately 45 million to over 100 million.105 The govern-
ment and Party continued to harass, detain, and imprison some 
members of both the registered and unregistered communities who 
ran afoul of government or Party policy. In addition, cases of har-
assment and detention since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ 
sensitivities intensified toward Protestants who assemble into large 
groups or across congregations, or who have contact with foreign 
individuals or organizations. 
GOVERNMENT AND PARTY SEEK TO CONTROL PROTESTANT DOCTRINE 
AND PRACTICES 
This past year, the government, Party, and state-controlled 
Protestant church continued to dictate the terms by which Protes-
tants in China must interpret doctrine and theology. China’s Con-
stitution guarantees ‘‘freedom of religious belief,’’ 106 but the gov-
ernment and Party continued to promote ‘‘theological reconstruc-
tion,’’ the process by which the state-controlled church attempts to 
eliminate elements of the Christian faith that do not conform to 
Party goals and ideology.107 The Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
(TSPM) and the China Christian Council (CCC) are the official or-
ganizations that manage registered Protestants on behalf of the 
government and Party,108 and TSPM Secretary General Xu 
Xiaohong linked Protestant doctrine to political goals when he re-
portedly said in September 2010 that ‘‘[t]here are many Bible 
teachings that are complementary to the government policy of so-
cial harmony. These ethics, if carried out, are a great help to soci-
ety and, in a way, help consolidate the regime.’’ 109 Officials also 
continued to link theological reconstruction to economic develop-
ment 110 and describe it as a ‘‘requirement’’ for the ‘‘mutual adapta-
tion’’ of Protestantism and socialism.111 
HARASSMENT, DETENTION, AND INTERFERENCE WITH PLACES OF 
WORSHIP 
The government and Party continued to harass, detain, imprison, 
and interfere with the religious activities of some Protestants who 
worship outside of state-approved parameters. In particular, cases 
since late 2010 suggest that authorities’ sensitivities intensified to-
ward members of unregistered Protestant congregations (‘‘house 
churches’’) who assembled into large groups or across congrega-
tions, or who had contact with foreign individuals or organizations. 
The Commission has not observed official statements that acknowl-
edge a concerted effort to target house church congregations during 
this period, but a January 2011 document from China’s State Ad-
ministration for Religious Affairs (SARA) that outlines SARA’s poli-
cies in 2011 called on authorities to ‘‘guide’’ Protestants who ‘‘par-
ticipate in activities at unauthorized gathering places’’ (house 
churches) to worship in state-controlled churches.112 In addition, 
two April 2011 editorials from the Global Times warned unregis-
tered Protestant congregations not to overstep state-approved pa-
rameters in their religious activities.113 The Global Times operates 
under the People’s Daily,114 the official news media of the Com-
munist Party. During this period, authorities throughout China 
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stopped house church gatherings; took participants into custody; 
placed unregistered Protestants under ‘‘soft detention’’ (ruanjin), a 
form of unlawful home confinement; and blocked access to sites of 
worship. Such measures violate provisions in international law that 
protect religious practice and peaceful assembly, such as Articles 
18 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 115 and 
Articles 18 and 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights.116 China’s Regulations on Religious Affairs excludes 
unregistered religious groups from the limited state protections 
that it offers,117 leaving members of house church congregations at 
risk of harassment, detention, and imprisonment by authorities. 
Selected cases follow: 118 
• Beginning on April 9, 2011, public security authorities in 
Beijing repeatedly took into custody and placed under ‘‘soft de-
tention’’ members and leaders of the unregistered Beijing 
Shouwang Church as they attempted to worship outdoors in 
Beijing.119 Shouwang reportedly has approximately 1,000 
members, one of the largest unregistered congregations in Bei-
jing.120 Shouwang began to organize outdoor worship gath-
erings every Sunday from April 10 onward after authorities re-
portedly pressured its landlords to deny it access to indoor 
sites where it had previously met or planned to meet.121 In one 
instance, officials reportedly took into custody over 160 church 
members.122 In total, officials reportedly placed approximately 
500 church members and leaders under ‘‘soft detention,’’ 123 in-
cluding pastors Jin Tianming, Yuan Ling, Zhang Xiaofeng, and 
Li Xiaobai, and lay leaders Sun Yi, You Guanhui, and Liu 
Guan.124 As of April 29, all seven remained confined to their 
homes.125 
• On May 10, 2011, public security officials in Zhengzhou city, 
Henan province, interrupted a Bible study gathering of mem-
bers of the Chinese House Church Alliance (CHCA)—which as-
sociates with unregistered Protestant congregations in multiple 
provinces—and took into custody 49 people.126 The 49 included 
3 persons who were previously detained in April after having 
contact with CHCA leaders,127 as well as Korean pastor Jin 
Yongzhe (pinyin name), and Jin’s wife Li Sha.128 All but Jin 
and Li were released by the following day; 129 Jin and Li were 
released on May 15.130 Since late 2010, authorities in various 
locations have harassed and detained CHCA leadership, in-
cluding president Zhang Mingxuan 131 and vice president Shi 
Enhao.132 On June 21, public security officials in Suqian city, 
Jiangsu province, reportedly detained Shi on suspicion of 
‘‘using superstition to undermine the implementation of the 
law,’’ 133 and authorities later ordered him to serve two years 
of reeducation through labor.134 
• In December 2010, authorities harassed, detained, or pre-
vented from leaving the country approximately 200 Protestants 
who received invitations to attend the Third Lausanne Con-
gress on World Evangelization, held in South Africa,135 despite 
the fact that a January 2011 SARA report lists ‘‘proactively 
launching foreign religious exchanges’’ as an achievement of 
SARA in 2010.136 Authorities reportedly warned members of 
unregistered church communities not to attend because their 
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attendance would ‘‘endanger state security,’’ 137 an explanation 
that, according to Fan Yafeng, anecdotal evidence suggests has 
been broadly applied to rights defenders and other citizens.138 
Fan is a prominent legal scholar, religious freedom advocate, 
and house church leader.139 [See Section II—Freedom of Resi-
dence and Movement for more information.] 
• Between October and December 2010, authorities in Beijing 
took Fan Yafeng into custody at least six times in connection 
with his legal advocacy for unregistered Protestant commu-
nities 140 and his contact with foreign media.141 Since Novem-
ber 1, 2010, public security officials have prevented him from 
leaving his home.142 
Other members of unregistered Protestant communities remain 
in detention or in prison for practicing their religion. For example, 
Uyghur Protestant Alimjan Yimit remains in the Xinjiang No. 3 
Prison in Urumqi city, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,143 
after the Kashgar Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to 15 
years in prison in 2009 for ‘‘leaking state secrets.’’ 144 He previously 
told a U.S. citizen about an interview between himself and local 
authorities about his own preaching activities; the interview’s con-
tents were later classified as a state secret.145 
In a May 2011 letter submitted to the National People’s Congress 
(NPC),146 22 house church leaders and members called on the NPC 
to investigate and resolve the Beijing Shouwang Church’s conflict 
with authorities, examine the constitutionality of the Regulations 
on Religious Affairs, and pass a law that protects freedom of reli-
gious belief.147 Drawing on Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the letter argued that freedom of religion in-
cludes assembly, association, expression, education, and 
evangelization.148 
Authorities also continued to interfere in the religious practices 
and worship sites of registered Protestants. For example, in Decem-
ber 2010, public security officials in Bengbu city, Anhui province, 
pressured three congregations—two unregistered and one reg-
istered—to cancel a Christmas service that all three had planned 
to hold together.149 On November 19, 2010, the registered 
Chengnan Church, in Tinghu district, Yancheng city, Jiangsu prov-
ince, was demolished 150 after government officials and real estate 
developers had unsuccessfully sought to purchase the church’s 
property to build commercial residential buildings.151 
Taoism 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment and Communist Party continued to exercise control over 
Taoist 152 religious activities in much the same way that they do 
for other religious communities in China, restricting doctrine, per-
sonnel, activities, and sites of worship. 
CONTROLS OVER DOCTRINE 
The state-controlled Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) continued 
to dictate the terms by which Taoists must interpret doctrine and 
continued to call on Taoists to accept government and Party goals. 
For example, a November 23, 2010, CTA announcement seeking 
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students for a Taoist scripture reading class required candidates to 
‘‘fervently love the socialist motherland [and] uphold the leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party.’’ 153 Authorities continued to link 
Taoist doctrine to patriotism and economic development,154 and in 
March 2011, China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs 
(SARA) urged the CTA to hold an international event on Taoism 
because it would be significant in ‘‘increasing the influence of Tao-
ism, spreading traditional Chinese culture, increasing the country’s 
soft power, and the great revival of the Chinese nation.’’ 155 
CONTROLS OVER PERSONNEL, ACTIVITIES, AND SITES OF WORSHIP 
The government requires Taoist groups and religious personnel 
to register with the CTA to legally perform ritual services and hold 
Taoist ceremonies.156 Local governments continued to restrict Tao-
ist practices by calling for the removal of practices that authorities 
deem to be ‘‘superstitious’’ or ‘‘feudal.’’ 157 China’s Regulations on 
Religious Affairs conditions the construction of sites of worship on 
government oversight,158 and local governments continued to call 
on officials to monitor and control the ‘‘indiscriminate’’ construction 
of Taoist temples and statues.159 Central and local authorities also 
used the November 2010 Asian Games as a justification for impos-
ing political goals on Taoist practices.160 For example, SARA Vice 
Director Jiang Jianyong told participants at a November 2010 Tao-
ist cultural festival in Huizhou city, Guangdong province, that the 
festival would be ‘‘advantageous for ‘constructing harmonious reli-
gion and serving the Asian Games.’ ’’ 161 
Other Religious Communities 
The Chinese government did not recognize additional religious 
groups in the past year or remove its framework of recognizing 
only selected religious communities. In January 2011, the State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) implemented a tech-
nical revision to implementing rules that regulate the activities of 
foreigners in China.162 The revised rules retain broad restrictions 
on foreigners’ religious activities in China and interaction with Chi-
nese citizens, barring them from leading religious activities with 
Chinese citizens in attendance, ‘‘cultivating followers from among 
Chinese citizens,’’ distributing ‘‘religious propaganda materials,’’ 
and carrying out ‘‘other missionary activities.’’ 163 Leaders of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reported in August 
2010 on holding meetings with a high-level Chinese official and 
said church leaders ‘‘established a relationship’’ that they ‘‘expect 
will lead to regularizing the activities of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints in China.’’ 164 No new developments appeared 
to take place in this area in the past reporting year. SARA has en-
gaged in talks with officials from the Orthodox Church in recent 
years,165 but the Orthodox Church continues to lack national-level 
recognition. A limited number of localities in China recognize the 
Orthodox church within local legislation.166 
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ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS 
Introduction 
In the past reporting year, ethnic minorities in China continued 
to face unique challenges in upholding their rights, as defined in 
both Chinese and international law. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights stipulates that ethnic, religious, and lin-
guistic minorities within a state ‘‘shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use 
their own language.’’ 1 China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law stip-
ulates some protections for minority rights and provides for a sys-
tem of regional autonomy in designated areas.2 Limits in the sub-
stance and implementation of state laws and policies, however, pre-
vented minorities from fully enjoying their rights in line with inter-
national standards and from exercising meaningful autonomy in 
practice. The government continued to recognize 55 groups as mi-
nority ‘‘nationalities’’ or ‘‘ethnicities’’ (shaoshu minzu 3) and exerted 
tightest control over groups deemed to challenge state authority, 
especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Tibet 
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas, and the 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. [See Section IV—Xinjiang and 
Section V—Tibet for more information on these areas. See text 
below for information on broader government policies toward ethnic 
minorities and on conditions in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region.] 
State Minority Policy 
Government steps to address ethnic minorities’ grievances re-
mained limited in the 2011 reporting year. The State Ethnic Af-
fairs Commission (SEAC) reported in December 2010 on exploring 
and ‘‘perfecting’’ ‘‘new mechanisms and forms’’ for improving the re-
gional ethnic autonomy system, but throughout the year SEAC also 
affirmed the basic parameters of the state’s minority policies.4 In 
a June 2011 report, SEAC called for ‘‘persisting on the correct path 
of [using] Chinese characteristics [zhongguo tese] to solve ethnic 
problems.’’ 5 In August, SEAC issued a five-year plan on the con-
struction of an ‘‘ethnic legal system,’’ outlining measures to pro-
mote continued legislation and research related to ethnic issues.6 
The plan perpetuates the state’s existing legal framework for eth-
nic minorities, though it also calls for research on ethnic minority- 
related legislation in other countries and on protections for ethnic 
minorities in international human rights conventions.7 The Chi-
nese government’s 2009–2010 National Human Rights Action Plan 
(HRAP) outlined measures to promote legislation on regional au-
tonomy and on some aspects of ethnic minority rights,8 but the 
HRAP appeared to have limited impact in spurring improvements, 
especially for civil and political rights.9 The Chinese government 
continued to implement top-down development policies that have 
undercut the promotion of regional autonomy and limited the 
rights of ethnic minorities to maintain their unique cultures, lan-
guages, and livelihoods, while bringing a degree of economic im-
provement to minority areas.10 During the past reporting year au-
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thorities promoted a second 10-year phase of the Great Western 
Development Project, which has accelerated development efforts in 
a number of provinces and regions with large populations of non- 
Han ethnic groups.11 The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan 
on National Economic and Social Development called for expanding 
aid for development efforts in ethnic minority areas.12 
Grasslands Policy and Protests in Inner Mongolia 
The government bolstered longstanding grasslands policies that 
have imposed grazing bans and required some herders to resettle 
from grasslands and to abandon pastoral livelihoods, a develop-
ment that affects Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, and other minority 
groups in China.13 At a State Council meeting in April 2011, au-
thorities called for ‘‘more forceful policy measures’’ for ‘‘speeding up 
development of pastoral areas, ensuring the state’s ecological secu-
rity, and promoting ethnic unity and border stability,’’ along with 
‘‘a more vigorous employment policy’’ for ‘‘encouraging herders to 
change [modes of] production and occupations.’’ 14 In August, the 
government publicized a State Council opinion issued in June on 
the development of grasslands.15 The opinion reinforces grazing 
bans, calls for resettling nomadic pastoralists by 2015, and pro-
motes herders’ change of occupation.16 Scholars have questioned 
the efficacy of state grasslands policies in meeting the declared goal 
of ameliorating grasslands degradation,17 while communities af-
fected have reported forced resettlement, inadequate compensation, 
minimal recourse for grievances, and poor living conditions, along 
with challenges in upholding traditional pastoral livelihoods and 
preserving their cultures.18 
Mongols in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) held 
a series of protests in May 2011, after mining workers in Xilingol 
League, IMAR, killed a Mongol herder protesting mining oper-
ations on grasslands and, in a separate incident, a mining worker 
killed a resident protesting other mining operations.19 Demonstra-
tors called for authorities to address the case of the murdered herd-
er and protested government policy toward grasslands use and 
curbs on Mongol culture.20 Authorities reportedly took some pro-
testers into detention, as well as others believed to be connected to 
the protests.21 In the aftermath, security in the region reportedly 
remained tight, with curbs on the Internet and other communica-
tion tools.22 Authorities and official media acknowledged some of 
the protesters’ concerns but did not address broader grievances 
over official curbs on Mongol culture, and cast blame on groups 
with alleged ‘‘ulterior motives’’ for organizing the protests.23 In 
June, the Xilingol Intermediate People’s Court sentenced two peo-
ple to death for the murders in May.24 Mongols in the IMAR also 
held other protests connected to grasslands use and mining later 
in the summer.25 
Political Prisoners 
In addition to detentions associated with the May protests in the 
IMAR, officials punished other ethnic Mongols who aimed to pro-
tect their rights or preserve Mongol culture. New developments oc-
curred in the following cases: 
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• Hada. The 15-year prison sentence of Mongol rights advo-
cate Hada expired on December 10, 2010, but authorities have 
continued to hold him in custody.26 Hada’s prison sentence 
stemmed from charges of ‘‘splittism’’ and ‘‘espionage’’ after he 
organized a peaceful protest for Mongol rights in Hohhot, the 
IMAR capital, in 1995.27 Before Hada’s scheduled release, au-
thorities also detained Hada’s wife and son, Xinna and Uiles— 
later formally arresting them both 28—and placed under home 
confinement people who had planned to mark Hada’s home-
coming, including rights advocate Govruud Huuchinhuu, whose 
whereabouts later became unknown.29 
• Batzangaa. On January 15, 2011, the Dongsheng District 
People’s Court, Ordos municipality, IMAR, tried Batzangaa, 
the head of a traditional Mongolian medicine school, on 
charges connected to ‘‘diverting a special fund’’ and sentenced 
him on January 27, 2011, to three years’ imprisonment with a 
four-year reprieve.30 Batzangaa had come under official scru-
tiny earlier because of his school’s activities promoting coopera-
tion between Mongols and Tibetans and because of a land dis-
pute with local authorities.31 Chinese security officials initially 
detained Batzangaa and his family in October 2009 outside the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees office in Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, where Batzangaa had applied for asylum.32 
• Erden-uul (pen name Unaga). In December 2010, authori-
ties took Mongol writer Erden-uul into custody in apparent 
connection to a book he authored that reportedly addressed 
Inner Mongolian independence from China. Authorities de-
scribed the book’s publication as ‘‘illegal publishing’’ and ‘‘ille-
gal operation of a business.’’ The most recent report on his sta-
tus from mid-January 2011 indicated that he remained in de-
tention.33 
• Sodmongol. Following the April 2010 detention of Mongol 
rights advocate Sodmongol while he was in Beijing, en route to 
the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in New York, 
the Chinese government reported in September 2010 that he 
was being tried in connection to ‘‘counterfeiting book registra-
tion numbers and illegally publishing and selling books.’’ 34 
[See Section II—Freedom of Expression for more information 
about government controls over the publishing industry.] 




China’s population planning policies in both their nature and im-
plementation violate international standards. During the Commis-
sion’s 2011 reporting year, central and local authorities continued 
to implement population planning policies in a manner that inter-
feres with and controls the reproductive lives of Chinese citizens, 
especially women. Population planning policies limit most women 
in urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting slightly more 
than half of Chinese women—located in many rural areas—to bear 
a second child if their first child is female.1 The Commission notes 
continued debate in the Chinese media about possible reform of 
these policies, but has not observed government action to introduce 
national reform measures. 
Local officials continue to monitor the reproductive cycles of Chi-
nese women in order to prevent unauthorized births. The Chinese 
government requires married couples to obtain a birth permit be-
fore they can lawfully bear a child and forces them to employ con-
traceptive methods at other times. Although Chinese law prohibits 
officials from infringing upon the rights and interests of citizens 
while promoting compliance with population planning policies, re-
ports during this reporting year indicate that abuses continue. 
Mandatory abortion, which is often referred to as a ‘‘remedial 
measure’’ (bujiu cuoshi) in government reports, is endorsed explic-
itly as an official policy instrument in the regulations of at least 
18 of China’s 31 provincial-level jurisdictions.2 This past year, the 
Commission found that local officials continued to coerce women 
with unauthorized pregnancies to undergo abortions in both urban 
and rural areas across China. 
International Standards 
China’s population planning policies in both their nature and im-
plementation constitute human rights violations according to inter-
national standards. The 1995 Beijing Declaration and the 1994 
Programme of Action of the Cairo International Conference on Pop-
ulation and Development provide for the freedom to make repro-
ductive decisions.3 The PRC Population and Family Planning Law 
and provincial implementing guidelines, however, limit couples’ 
freedom of reproductive choice by stipulating if, when, and how 
often they may bear children.4 Other domestic policies coerce com-
pliance with population planning targets through heavy fines.5 
Controls imposed on Chinese women and their families and addi-
tional abuses engendered by the system, from forced abortion to 
discriminatory policies against ‘‘out-of-plan’’ children, violate stand-
ards in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women,6 the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.8 China is a state party to these treaties and is 
bound to uphold their terms. 
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Coercive Implementation 
Chinese law prohibits certain types of official behavior in the im-
plementation of population planning policies. For example, Article 
4 of the PRC Population and Family Planning Law (PFPL) states 
that officials ‘‘shall perform their administrative duties strictly in 
accordance with the law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, 
and they may not infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests 
of citizens.’’ 9 Article 39 states that an official is subject to criminal 
or administrative punishment if he ‘‘infringes on a citizen’s per-
sonal rights, property rights, or other legitimate rights and inter-
ests’’ or ‘‘abuses his power, neglects his duty, or engages in mal-
practices for personal gain’’ in the implementation of population 
planning policies.10 Despite these provisions, the Commission has 
noted continued abuses in the 2011 reporting year, as illustrated 
by the examples of official campaigns and individual cases of abuse 
below. 
OFFICIAL CAMPAIGNS 
During the 2011 reporting year, authorities in some areas imple-
mented population planning enforcement campaigns—in some 
cases dubbed ‘‘spring family planning service activities’’ (chunji 
jisheng fuwu xingdong)—that employed coercive measures to pre-
vent or terminate ‘‘out-of-plan’’ pregnancies.11 For example, in 
March 2011, the Yangchun city government in Guangdong province 
reported that one such campaign had commenced and that the 
‘‘focal points’’ of the campaign were the sterilization of mothers 
with two daughters and the implementation of ‘‘remedial meas-
ures’’ for out-of-plan pregnancies.12 Yangchun family planning offi-
cials were directed to adopt ‘‘man-on-man military tactics,’’ ‘‘launch 
meticulous ideological work,’’ and ‘‘storm the fortifications of ‘nail 
households’ (dingzi hu) 13 and ‘flight households’ (waitao hu) 14 in 
a targeted manner.’’ 15 
The Commission noted that this year, in official speeches and 
government reports from a wide range of localities, authorities also 
used the phrase ‘‘spare no efforts’’ (quanli yifu) to signify intensi-
fied enforcement measures and less restraint on officials who over-
see coercive population planning implementation measures. Be-
tween November 2010 and June 2011, county and township govern-
ments in at least eight provincial-level jurisdictions (Shandong,16 
Anhui,17 Gansu,18 Guangdong,19 Hunan,20 Guangxi,21 Hubei,22 and 
Jiangxi 23) urged officials to ‘‘spare no efforts’’ in implementing fam-
ily planning campaigns including, in some cases, the ‘‘two inspec-
tions and four procedures’’ (liangjian sishu)—or intrauterine device 
(IUD) inspections and pregnancy inspections (the two inspections), 
IUD implants, first-trimester abortions, mid- to late-term abor-
tions, and sterilization (the four procedures).24 
Reports surfaced in May 2011 regarding official implementation 
of population planning policies which resulted in the illegal abduc-
tion and sale of children by local officials. From 2000 to 2005 in 
Hunan province,25 family planning officials reportedly took at least 
16 children—allegedly born in violation of population planning poli-
cies—from their families and sold them to local orphanages.26 In 
many of the reported cases, officials took the children because their 
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families could not pay the steep fines levied against them for vio-
lating population planning regulations.27 
INDIVIDUAL CASES OF VIOLENT COERCION 
Numerous reports emerged this past year illustrating family 
planning officials’ use from 2009 to 2011 of violence to coerce steri-
lizations, abortions, or payment of fines. The following are rep-
resentative cases that occurred in eight different provinces. 
• Hunan. In February 2009, local family planning officials re-
portedly kidnapped Liu Dan, 39 weeks pregnant with her first 
child, and forced her to undergo an abortion because she had 
not yet reached the age at which she could be legally married 
to the child’s father. Liu and the child reportedly died during 
the procedure.28 
• Anhui. In July 2010, local family planning officials report-
edly kidnapped 23-year-old Li Hongmei and forced her to un-
dergo a sterilization procedure. She later filed a lawsuit, which 
the local county people’s court did not accept on the grounds 
that the case was ‘‘unclear.’’ 29 
• Yunnan. In September 2010, officials reportedly destroyed a 
man’s home, harassed his family, and reportedly beat his 67- 
year-old mother because the man did not return home to pay 
family planning fines and undergo a mandatory sterilization 
procedure.30 
• Shandong. In September 2010, local family planning offi-
cials reportedly forced a woman surnamed Xie to undergo an 
abortion when she was six months pregnant because her hus-
band had been three months younger than the legal marriage 
age at the time the child was conceived.31 
• Fujian. In October 2010, local family planning officials re-
portedly kidnapped a woman who was eight months pregnant 
and detained her for 40 hours. They then forcibly injected her 
with a substance which aborted the fetus. During this time, 
the woman’s husband was reportedly not permitted to see 
her.32 
• Henan. In November 2010, local family planning officials re-
portedly kidnapped a man in order to force him to pay the re-
mainder of a fine for having a second child. The same day, the 
village head notified his family that he was in the hospital. 
When the family went to see him, they reportedly found him 
dead under unknown circumstances.33 
• Guizhou. In May 2011, local family planning officials re-
portedly beat Zhang Xuequn and her husband and forced her 
to undergo surgical implantation of an intrauterine device, de-
spite the fact that she showed them her valid marriage license 
and birth permits and that she was technically accountable to 
the government in her home province of Zhejiang.34 
• Jiangxi. In May 2011, local officials reportedly beat Zhang 
Julan and forced her to undergo tubal ligation surgery after 
she and 10 other villagers went to the town government to dis-
cuss officials’ illegal requisition of land. Zhang remained in the 
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hospital for at least one month following the procedure due to 
injuries she sustained while in official custody.35 
Punishments and Rewards 
Chinese authorities continued to use various methods of punish-
ment and reward to manage citizens’ compliance with population 
planning policies. For example, in accordance with national pol-
icy,36 local governments continued to direct officials to levy fines, 
termed ‘‘social compensation fees’’ (shehui fuyang fei), against cou-
ples who give birth to an unauthorized child.37 These fines force 
many couples to choose between undergoing an unwanted abortion 
and incurring financial hardship.38 Often with court approval, fam-
ily planning officials are permitted to take ‘‘forcible’’ action against 
families who are unwilling or unable to pay the fines.39 These 
‘‘forcible’’ actions are in violation of the PRC Population and Family 
Planning Law and include the confiscation of family belongings and 
the destruction of violators’ homes.40 
In some cases officials not only levy fines against violators but 
also threaten or impose other punitive measures, including job loss, 
demotion, denial of promotion, expulsion from the Communist 
Party, destruction of personal property, arbitrary detention, and, in 
some cases, violence.41 Some children may go without household 
registration (hukou) in China because they are born ‘‘out-of-plan’’ 
and their parents do not pay the necessary fines.42 According to 
sources cited in a December 2010 Chinese Human Rights Defend-
ers report, family planning officials in some cases also reportedly 
withhold a hukou from an otherwise eligible child whose mother re-
fuses to undergo sterilization or IUD insertion after the child’s 
birth.43 Lack of a valid hukou raises barriers to access to social 
benefits typically linked to the hukou, including government-sub-
sidized healthcare and public education.44 [For additional discus-
sion of China’s hukou system, see Section II—Freedom of Residence 
and Movement.] 
Some local governments offer rewards to informants who report 
population planning violations. Local government reports during 
the 2011 reporting year mentioned rewards for informants in 
amounts ranging from 100 yuan (US$15) to 6,000 yuan (US$926) 
per case for verified information on violations by either citizens or 
officials, including concealment of out-of-plan births, false reports 
of medical procedures, and falsified family planning documents.45 
Conversely, authorities in one neighborhood in Chifeng city, Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region, offered a reward of up to 20,000 
yuan (US$3,085) for information regarding non-medically necessary 
prenatal sex determination examinations or performance of a sex- 
selective abortion.46 
Local governments similarly incentivized family planning offi-
cials to ensure strict implementation of population planning poli-
cies. For example, in March 2011, the Maojing township govern-
ment in Qingyang city, Gansu province, issued a report on the ‘‘out-
standing results’’ of the government’s ‘‘rectification activities.’’ 47 
The report calls for officials to ‘‘spare no efforts’’ (quanli yifu) in im-
plementing population policies and notes that village cadres face a 
penalty of 1,500 yuan (US$230) for each woman with two daugh-
ters whom they fail to sterilize. Conversely, they are promised a re-
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ward of 500 yuan (US$77) for each tubal ligation that they see 
through to completion.48 A March 2011 directive from the 
Yangchun city government in Guangdong province indicated a goal 
of fostering ‘‘friendly one-upmanship’’ and ‘‘keen competition’’ 
among family planning cadres, calling for daily progress reports 
and participation in ‘‘information sharing meetings’’ in which they 
are publicly praised or criticized based on their reports.49 [See Offi-
cial Campaigns above.] 
Targeting Migrant Workers 
As in prior years, the Commission observed during its 2011 re-
porting year a number of reports indicating that some local govern-
ments continue to target migrant workers specifically for imple-
mentation, in some cases coercively, of family planning policies. For 
example, in April 2011, the Sucheng township government in 
Zuoquan county, Jinzhong municipality, Shanxi province, called for 
a one-month ‘‘superior services, superior management’’ campaign 
targeting migrant worker women ‘‘who had given birth, were preg-
nant, or may become pregnant again.’’ As part of the ‘‘superior 
management’’ efforts, Sucheng officials were directed to ‘‘adopt re-
medial measures’’—a term often used to refer to mandatory abor-
tion—for out-of-plan pregnancies and ‘‘levy social compensation fees 
in accordance with the law’’ for out-of-plan births.50 In November 
2010, the Tangshan city government in Hebei province reprinted a 
China Population Report article on the ‘‘Six Rights and Six Obliga-
tions of the Migrant Population.’’ Obligations 5 and 6 directed that 
migrant workers whose contraceptive measures ‘‘fail’’ should 
‘‘promptly adopt remedial measures’’ and that migrant workers 
who violate family planning laws and regulations should pay the 
appropriate ‘‘social compensation fees.’’ 51 The Commission also 
noted directives from local governments in several provinces, in-
cluding Jiangsu,52 Guangdong,53 Shandong,54 and Zhejiang,55 in-
structing local officials to take advantage of the spring festival 
timeframe—a period when many migrant workers return home to 
be with family—to target the migrant population for family plan-
ning policy implementation and services. [For additional informa-
tion on official treatment of migrant workers, see Section II—Free-
dom of Residence and Movement and Section II—Worker Rights.] 
Prospects for Policy Reform 
September 2010 marked the 30th anniversary of the beginning 
of China’s current family planning policies,56 and following this an-
niversary, the Commission observed increased public discussion of 
the prospects for family planning policy reform.57 According to a 
March 2011 Xinhua report, officials in five provinces will introduce 
relaxed population planning trial measures in 2011, allowing a sec-
ond child for some couples in which both persons are only chil-
dren.58 The same ‘‘loosened’’ measures are already in effect in 
major municipalities including Shanghai,59 Beijing,60 and 
Tianjin.61 While census data released in 2011 may have also 
sparked new debate among Chinese leaders regarding family plan-
ning policies,62 top Communist Party and government leaders con-
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tinue to publicly defend the policy and rule out its cancellation in 
the near term.63 
Demographic Consequences 
The Chinese government’s population planning policies continue 
to exacerbate the country’s demographic challenges, including an 
aging population, diminishing workforce, and skewed sex ratio. Af-
fected in recent decades by government restrictions on the number 
of births per couple, China’s total fertility rate has dropped from 
6.1 births per woman in 1949 64 to an estimated 1.5 births per 
woman in 2011,65 resulting in the rapid growth of China’s aging 
population and decline in the working-age population. In the 2011 
reporting year, officials continued to express concern about China’s 
aging population and its present and anticipated strain on the 
country’s social services.66 Several reports also have emerged pro-
jecting that the recent decline in China’s working-age population 
may result in significant labor shortages by as soon as 2013.67 [For 
additional information on China’s projected labor shortage, see Sec-
tion II—Worker Rights.] 
In response to government-imposed birth limits and in keeping 
with a traditional cultural bias for sons, Chinese parents continue 
the practice of sex-selective abortion,68 contributing to a severely 
skewed sex ratio—the highest sex ratio in the world.69 In August 
2011, Chinese state media noted that China’s sex ratio at birth ‘‘is 
increasing,’’ citing the remarks of a senior Chinese health official 
at a press conference.70 Some social and political scientists argue 
that large numbers of ‘‘surplus males’’ could create social conditions 
that the Chinese government may choose to address by expanding 
military enlistment.71 Reports in the 2011 reporting year have also 
suggested a possible linkage between China’s large number of ‘‘sur-
plus males’’ and an increase in the trafficking of women and chil-
dren for forced marriage or commercial sexual exploitation.72 In 
August 2011, the State Council issued the PRC Outline for the De-
velopment of Children (2011–2020), which urged officials to ‘‘step 
up efforts against the use of ultrasound and other [forms of tech-
nology] to engage in non-medically necessary sex determination 
and sex-selective abortion.’’ 73 
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Case Update: Chen Guangcheng 
Public security officials continue to hold prominent rights advocate 
Chen Guangcheng and his family under ‘‘soft detention,’’ or home con-
finement, following his release from prison on September 9, 2010, after 
serving his full sentence.74 Authorities reportedly beat Chen 
Guangcheng and his wife Yuan Weijing in their home on February 8 75 
and February 18, 2011.76 The beatings are believed to be in connection 
with the couple’s recording of video footage, released on ChinaAid’s Web 
site on February 9, in which Chen and Yuan spoke of the official abuse 
and restrictive control the family has faced since Chen’s release.77 Offi-
cials reportedly did not permit Chen and Yuan to seek medical care for 
their injuries sustained in the beatings.78 Foreign journalists and a 
‘‘netizen’’ who attempted to visit Chen’s village following the release of 
this video reported encountering ‘‘groups of violent, plainclothes 
thugs.’’ 79 Police also reportedly detained several lawyers and rights de-
fenders in Beijing in February after they met to discuss Chen’s case.80 
Chen is a self-trained legal advocate who drew international news 
media attention to population planning abuses, particularly forced abor-
tions and forced sterilizations, in Linyi city, Shandong province, in 
2005.81 The Yinan County People’s Court tried and sentenced Chen in 
August 2006 to four years and three months in prison for ‘‘intentional 
destruction of property’’ and ‘‘organizing a group of people to disturb 
traffic order.’’ 82 Chen’s trial, retrial, and treatment in prison prompted 
repeated criticism for criminal procedure violations and infringement of 
the rights of Chen and his family.83 Chen reportedly remains under 
‘‘soft detention’’ with his family, and his six-year-old daughter reportedly 
has not been permitted to leave the house to attend school.84 
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FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE AND MOVEMENT 
Freedom of Residence 
The Chinese government continued to enforce the household reg-
istration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s.1 Hukou 
regulations place limitations on the right of Chinese citizens to for-
mally establish their permanent place of residence. Initially used 
to control migration of the rural population to China’s cities, the 
hukou system today has developed into ‘‘one of the most important 
mechanisms determining entitlement to public welfare, urban serv-
ices and, more broadly, full citizenship.’’ 2 The hukou regulations 
classify Chinese citizens as either rural or urban hukou holders, 
and local governments restrict access to some social services based 
on the classification. The implementation of these regulations dis-
criminates against rural hukou holders who migrate to urban areas 
by imposing significant constraints on rural hukou holders’ ability 
to obtain healthcare benefits, education, and other social services 
in urban locations where they reside but lack legal residency sta-
tus. The hukou regulations appear to contravene the freedoms 
guaranteed in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Articles 12 and 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which include ‘‘the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose [one’s] residence.’’ 3 
During this reporting period, many local governments have con-
tinued to relax certain hukou restrictions, consistent with earlier 
reform efforts. While details vary by location, the key provisions of 
these reforms allow some rural residents to transfer their hukou 
status from rural to urban status based on certain criteria, which 
usually include income, education, and specialized skill sets. For 
example, the coastal province of Guangdong implemented a point- 
based system that allowed some rural hukou holders to become 
urban hukou holders. However, only a relatively small number of 
migrant workers, 60,000 4 out of 23 million 5 according to data 
available in October 2010, had been affected by the reform. 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, authorities imple-
mented new experimental hukou reform policies. Unlike earlier 
hukou reforms that have allowed some rural residents to obtain 
urban hukou based on criteria such as income and education, the 
latest reforms seek to include all residents who already hold a local 
hukou irrespective of other criteria such as income and education. 
For example, Chengdu municipality initiated hukou reforms that 
allowed all local hukou holders to register under a unified registra-
tion system for purposes of concentrated community relocation, 
marriage and population control, employment taxes, creditworthi-
ness, and social benefits.6 The implications of the latest hukou re-
forms are unclear. 
It has become increasingly apparent that one of the driving 
forces behind the latest hukou reforms is the need for more land 
for urbanization. According to Global Times, which operates under 
the official People’s Daily, ‘‘the ultimate goal of reform, is to engi-
neer a smooth and advanced urbanization process’’—meaning more 
rural land must be made available for economic and industrial de-
velopment.7 At the same time, authorities have provided some safe-
guards for rural residents against potential adverse consequences 
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resulting from the reforms. For example, a key feature of the latest 
hukou reform allows local rural hukou holders to temporarily re-
tain their contracted land.8 According to official government state-
ments, the land retention provision is meant to ease the rural-to- 
urban transition: ‘‘It is clear that the current hukou reform does 
not call for rural residents to give up their land and rural property. 
As soon as they settle down into urban areas, their land and prop-
erties will need to be dealt with sooner or later.’’ 9 The long-term 
implications for rural residents, especially after the land seizure, 
remain unclear. 
Under the rubric of hukou reform, there appears to be increasing 
tension between some local governments and rural residents. The 
tension results from the clash between some rural residents’ desire 
to remain on rural land and some local authorities’ inclination to 
convert rural land to urban land.10 The conversion allows the local 
government to sell some of the rural land rights to developers after 
relocating rural residents to urban areas. According to one Chinese 
source, ‘‘officials are eager to move farmers off the land, because 
land sales make up about half of local government revenue and, in 
some areas, as much as 80 percent. The governments earn huge 
profits by compensating farmers very little . . . . [T]his scheme has 
become a new source of land supply for many local governments.’’ 11 
[For a discussion of the requisition and conversion of rural land, 
see Section III—Property—Urban Land and Collectively Owned— 
or Rural—Land.] 
In connection with the latest hukou and land reforms, corruption 
at the local level and mistreatment of rural residents emerged as 
prominent issues during this reporting period. Some local govern-
ments forcibly seized rural land and relocated rural residents to 
urban areas, often at a compensation level that is deemed unfair 
based on market values.12 For example, in one case, authorities 
withheld 70 percent of the money owed to rural residents after the 
residents moved into apartments.13 In another example, the local 
government removed 11,000 villagers from rural lands located out-
side of Wuxi city, Jiangxi province, and sold the underlying land 
to developers for 30 times the amount it paid in compensation to 
the rural residents.14 
The current hukou reforms face many challenges. In addition to 
local-level corruption and abuse, it is unclear how rural residents 
will adapt after relocation to urban areas, or to what extent their 
host municipalities can bear the cost of providing social benefits 
equivalent to those available to the existing urban residents. In ad-
dition, the issue of how to deal with rural residents who insist on 
staying on rural land remains a key concern to the Commission. 
Freedom of Movement 
The majority of Chinese citizens enjoy increasing freedom of 
movement to travel within China and internationally. However, au-
thorities restrict freedom of movement to penalize citizens who ex-
press views that authorities deem objectionable. During this report-
ing period, the Chinese government placed restrictions on freedom 
of movement that are inconsistent with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights.15 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00124 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
119 
Chinese authorities increasingly prevented rights defenders, ad-
vocates, and critics from leaving China under the color of law. Offi-
cials often cited the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry 
of Citizens as justification for preventing rights defenders from 
traveling (see examples below). To the extent the authorities pro-
vided an explanation for the prohibition on travel, they frequently 
cited Article 8(5) of the Law, which prohibits the departure from 
China of ‘‘persons whose exit from the country . . . in the opinion 
of the competent department of the State Council, [would] be harm-
ful to state security or cause a major loss to national interests.’’ 16 
However, the meaning and scope of ‘‘harmful to state security’’ and 
‘‘cause a major loss to national interests’’ are undefined. In addi-
tion, there appear to be no effective remedial provisions for appeal-
ing a decision preventing one’s freedom to travel. 
The Commission particularly notes official efforts to block some 
human rights advocates’ ability to travel internationally, especially 
during the period close to the Nobel Prize award ceremony. To the 
extent the authorities gave any justification at all, they predomi-
nantly cited the activists’ travel as harmful to ‘‘national security.’’ 
Examples include the following: 
• Authorities prevented Nobel Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo’s 
lawyer, Mo Shaoping, and his colleague, He Weifang, from 
traveling to London to attend a legal conference hosted by the 
International Bar Association on November 9, 2010; 17 pre-
vented economist Mao Yushi from traveling to Singapore on 
December 1, citing concerns for ‘‘national security’’; 18 pre-
vented artist Ai Weiwei from boarding a flight to Seoul on De-
cember 2, also citing concerns for ‘‘national security’’ at the 
boarding gate; 19 prevented human rights lawyer Jiang 
Tianyong from boarding flights to the United States on October 
30, 2010, again citing concerns for ‘‘national security’’; 20 and 
prevented professor and religious scholar He Guanghu from 
boarding a plane to Singapore to attend a conference on No-
vember 20, 2010, explaining that his trip ‘‘would pose a threat 
to national security.’’ 21 Authorities also turned down retired 
professor Sun Wenguang’s passport application after he openly 
stated his desire to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony.22 
• Chinese authorities prevented poet, writer, and musician 
Liao Yiwu from traveling to the United States in March to pro-
mote his books,23 from attending the PEN World Voices Fes-
tival of International Literature in New York City in April,24 
and from attending a literary festival in Australia in May.25 
Liao had been imprisoned for four years for reciting his poem 
‘‘Massacre’’ about the Tiananmen protests.26 In July 2011, with 
help from his friends, Liao fled to Germany through Vietnam 
and Poland so that he could ‘‘speak freely and publish free-
ly.’’ 27 
HOME CONFINEMENT, SURVEILLANCE, AND HARASSMENT OF CHINESE 
CITIZENS 
The Chinese government placed restrictions on liberty of move-
ment to punish and control political dissidents and human rights 
advocates in contravention of international legal standards 28 and 
Article 37 of China’s Constitution, which prohibits unlawful deten-
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tion, and deprivation or restriction of personal freedom of citizens 
by unlawful means. 
As in previous years, authorities continued to employ a range of 
measures to restrict liberty of movement, including stationing po-
lice to monitor the homes of rights defenders,29 forcing rights de-
fenders to take so-called ‘‘vacations’’ to remote areas 30 or to ‘‘drink 
tea’’ with security personnel,31 removing them to unknown loca-
tions,32 and imprisoning them.33 In apparent sensitivity to recent 
protests in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as an online 
call for ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests within China, authorities detained, 
‘‘forcibly disappeared,’’ or put under extralegal home confinement 
several dozen human rights defenders, including human rights law-
yers Jiang Tianyong, Li Tiantian, Liu Anjun, and Teng Biao, 
among others.34 
In October 2010, in apparent connection with the awarding of the 
Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, authorities restricted approxi-
mately three dozen human rights defenders’ freedom of movement. 
For example, authorities stationed police personnel, sometimes 
around-the-clock, outside of the homes of writer Yu Jie and democ-
racy advocate Hu Shigen,35 lawyer Li Fangping and activist Li 
Zhiying,36 and Christian house church leader Xu Yonghai.37 Au-
thorities also placed Ding Zilin, the organizer of the Tiananmen 
Mothers, under extralegal house arrest for 74 days; 38 and close as-
sociates of Liu Xia, wife of the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu 
Xiaobo, have not been able to reach her.39 
The Commission notes that, during this reporting period, au-
thorities employed particularly forceful techniques to intimidate 
and control the family members of human rights defenders and ac-
tivists. For example, authorities continued to confine, harass, and 
abuse legal advocate Chen Guangcheng and his family after his of-
ficial prison release date in September 2010.40 [See Case Update: 
Chen Guangcheng in Section II—Population Planning.] Officials 
have also kept Liu Xia under extralegal house arrest since October 
2010.41 In addition, authorities detained Xinna and Uiles, the wife 
and son of Mongol rights advocate Hada, on apparent charges of 
‘‘illegal business operations’’ and ‘‘drug possession.’’ 42 
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STATUS OF WOMEN 
Introduction 
Chinese officials continue to actively promote the protection of 
women’s rights and interests in accordance with international 
human rights norms; however, due in part to ambiguity and a lack 
of clearly outlined responsibilities in China’s national-level legisla-
tion, women still encounter gender inequality, discrimination, and 
other abuses in the community, in the workplace, and at home. 
Women’s representation in leadership positions at all levels of gov-
ernment still falls short of international norms and, according to 
the most recent available statistics, appears to have made little sig-
nificant progress for at least four decades. Chinese women contin-
ued to face gender-based employment discrimination during the 
Commission’s 2011 reporting year, including lower average wages 
than their male counterparts, gender bias in recruitment, and com-
pulsory retirement at an age set 5 to 10 years younger than that 
of men. Domestic violence and sexual harassment reportedly affect 
a majority of Chinese women, yet ambiguity in China’s existing na-
tional-level legislation on these issues limits preventative measures 
and makes it difficult for women to seek recourse when they en-
counter abusive treatment. Officials reportedly completed draft do-
mestic violence legislation that addresses longstanding concerns re-
garding issues such as domestic violence among cohabitating cou-
ples, psychological abuse, and physical violence, but it is unclear 
when and if such legislation will be placed on the legislative agen-
da. Sex-selective abortion continues, despite Chinese government 
regulations prohibiting the practice, and exacerbates China’s se-
verely imbalanced sex ratio. Observers have raised concerns this 
year that China’s skewed sex ratio may lead to an uptick in the 
trafficking of women for forced marriage or commercial sexual ex-
ploitation. 
Gender Equality 
In its domestic laws 1 and policy initiatives 2 and through its rati-
fication of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW),3 the Chinese government 
has committed to ensuring female representation in government. 
However, at the highest levels of the central government, as well 
as in the Communist Party, female representation remains low. 
Only one woman currently holds a position in the Party’s top-rank-
ing 25-person Political Bureau of the Communist Party Central 
Committee,4 and women hold only four positions in China’s 35-per-
son State Council.5 Official statistics on female political participa-
tion in the country’s legislature do not appear to be available for 
years more recent than 2008,6 at which time China’s National Bu-
reau of Statistics reported that women made up approximately 21 
percent of delegates to the National People’s Congress. This figure 
has shown little growth since the early 1970s 7 and remains short 
of the 30 percent standard set by the UN Commission on the Sta-
tus of Women in 1990.8 Song Xiuyan, Vice Chair of the National 
Working Committee on Children and Women under the State 
Council, reported in August 2011 that female leadership has in-
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creased in the provincial, municipal, and county levels of govern-
ment since 2000. When asked about the lack of women’s political 
participation at higher levels, she stated, ‘‘[W]e still have a lot of 
work to do to raise social awareness and guarantee gender equality 
through legal means.’’ 9 In August 2011, the State Council issued 
the PRC Outline for the Development of Women (2011–2020), 
which, among other goals, calls for ‘‘local governments at the coun-
ty level and above to have at least one female leader’’ by the end 
of 2020.10 
Against a backdrop of reportedly limited female representation at 
the village level,11 authorities revised national-level legislation this 
year, changing the language on female quotas in village committees 
and village representative assemblies. With limited decisionmaking 
power in village committees, women face challenges in protecting 
their rights and interests.12 The National People’s Congress Stand-
ing Committee passed the revised PRC Organic Law of the Vil-
lagers’ Committees in October 2010, changing the stipulation that 
village committees should have ‘‘an appropriate number of 
women’’ 13 to the stipulation that village committees ‘‘should have 
female members.’’ 14 The revised law also includes a new stipula-
tion requiring that ‘‘female village representatives should make up 
one-third or more of the village representative assembly,’’ a sepa-
rate decisionmaking body made up of village committee members 
and village representatives.15 According to one Peking University 
law professor, ‘‘The Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees is 
not directly aimed at furthering women’s rights, however, it is of 
great significance in protecting women’s rights, for it is related to 
women’s right to vote, which is vital in upholding and furthering 
women’s rights and gender equality.’’ 16 The impact that these revi-
sions will have on female representation at the village level in the 
future is unclear, but some domestic observers have hailed them as 
a positive step.17 An increase in women’s decisionmaking power at 
the village level may lead to greater protection of women’s property 
rights,18 an issue that plagues rural women who lose their land 
when they marry out of their village.19 [For additional information 
on the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees, see Section 
III—Institutions of Democratic Governance.] 
Employment Discrimination 
Gender-based employment discrimination with respect to issues 
such as wages, recruitment, and retirement age remains wide-
spread in China, despite government efforts to eliminate it and pro-
mote women’s employment. The Chinese government has signed 
and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and has committed under Article 7 to ensuring 
‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable con-
ditions of work,’’ including ‘‘equal pay for equal work,’’ and ‘‘equal 
opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than 
those of seniority and competence.’’ 20 Several domestic laws also 
prohibit gender discrimination and promote gender equality in the 
workplace,21 but according to an analysis in a February 2010 Wom-
en’s Watch-China report, these laws do not provide guidance for an 
enforcement mechanism. For example, if a female encounters dis-
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crimination in recruitment or on the job, she has no legal basis for 
filing a lawsuit against the discriminatory behavior; she can only 
request labor arbitration.22 
A number of domestic reports and surveys from the 2011 report-
ing year highlighted challenges that women continue to face in em-
ployment due to their gender: 
• Difficulty securing employment. According to a January 
2011 Shaanxi Provincial Women’s Federation survey, 70 per-
cent of those surveyed believed that males have an easier time 
finding a job than females. In addition, 44 percent of females 
surveyed reported that they had encountered discrimination 
based on their marital or childbearing status, compared to 13.9 
percent of their male counterparts. In addition, 19 percent of 
females surveyed reported that their height and physical ap-
pearance were obstacles in their job search, compared to 10.9 
percent of their male counterparts.23 
• Wage disparity. A survey released in February 2011 by 
the educational consulting firm MyCOS reported that the in-
come gap between male and female graduates increased with 
their level of education. For example, on a monthly basis, 
males with vocational school degrees reportedly earned an av-
erage of 169 yuan (US$26) more than females, males with un-
dergraduate degrees reportedly earned an average of 330 yuan 
(US$51) more than females, and males with graduate degrees 
earned an average of 815 yuan (US$126) more than females.24 
• Unequal treatment. A study released in March 2011 by 
the non-profit research group Center for Work-Life Policy re-
ported that, in a survey on the female talent pool in China, 35 
percent of those surveyed believed that women faced unfair 
treatment at work. The study also found that 48 percent of 
women choose to ‘‘disengage, scale back their ambitions or con-
sider quitting [their jobs]’’ due to ‘‘problems of bias.’’ 25 
• Forced early retirement. Mandatory retirement ages for 
women in China continue to be five years earlier than those for 
men.26 Public discussion on retirement age burgeoned in the 
2011 reporting year surrounding the publication of a white 
paper on the state of China’s human resources in September 
2010,27 the issuance of new social security regulations in 
Shanghai municipality in September 2010,28 passage of the 
PRC Law on Social Insurance in October 2010,29 proposals at 
the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress in March 
2011,30 and the release of the 2010 Census results in April.31 
The gender discrepancy in retirement age may obstruct some 
women’s career advancement and impact their economic rights 
and interests.32 In the past, the lower retirement age for 
women has also reportedly contributed to hiring discrimina-
tion, as employers in some cases preferred to hire women 
younger than 40 years of age.33 
In May 2011, the Shenzhen Municipal Women’s Federation 
passed draft regulations on gender equality.34 If adopted, the 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Gender Equality Promotion Regu-
lations would be the first legislation of their kind in China to spe-
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cifically focus on gender equality.35 The draft has reportedly been 
placed on the 2011 legislative agenda.36 
Violence Against Women 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The amended PRC Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and 
Interests (LPWRI) and amended PRC Marriage Law prohibit do-
mestic violence,37 and the crime of domestic violence is punishable 
under the PRC Criminal Law.38 The problem of domestic violence 
remains widespread, reportedly affecting more than one-third of 
Chinese families.39 Current national-level legal provisions regard-
ing domestic violence leave many victims unprotected, as they sim-
ply prohibit domestic violence without defining the term or clari-
fying specific responsibilities of government departments in preven-
tion, punishment, and treatment.40 During the Commission’s 2011 
reporting year, Chinese advocates continued to express concern re-
garding the nationwide problem of domestic violence and called for 
clear national-level legislation on domestic violence.41 According to 
state-run media sources, officials announced in March 2011 the 
completion of draft domestic violence legislation.42 Highlights re-
portedly include attention given to cohabitating couples, as well as 
to cases that involve ‘‘psychological violence.’’ 43 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Sexual harassment remains prevalent in China, yet those who 
encounter sexual harassment remain largely unprotected under 
Chinese law and face difficulties in defending their rights. An April 
2011 article published by a Chinese business investigation group 
reported that 84 percent of women in China had experienced some 
form of sexual harassment and that 50 percent of this harassment 
had occurred in the workplace.44 A Women’s Watch-China (WWC) 
survey released in May 2011 interviewed both men and women and 
found that 19.8 percent of those surveyed had experienced sexual 
harassment, and of those, 55.1 percent were women.45 The Chinese 
government has committed under Article 11 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to 
taking ‘‘all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment,’’ 46 and it introduced the 
concept of sexual harassment into legislation with the 2005 amend-
ment to the LPWRI.47 The amended LPWRI prohibits sexual har-
assment and provides an avenue of recourse for victims through ei-
ther administrative punishment for offenders or civil action in the 
court system, but it does not provide a clear definition of sexual 
harassment or specific standards and procedures for prevention 
and punishment.48 While most people who face sexual harassment 
choose to remain silent about it,49 those who decide to take legal 
action risk losing their lawsuits due to the challenge of supplying 
adequate evidence.50 
As reported in the Commission’s 2009 and 2010 Annual Reports, 
in February 2009, a study group led by three Chinese researchers 
submitted a draft proposal to the National People’s Congress for a 
law aimed at preventing sexual harassment in the workplace.51 
The proposed law would hold the Ministry of Human Resources 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
125 
and Social Security responsible for prevention and punishment of 
sexual harassment in the workplace, while also holding the All- 
China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth League, 
and the All-China Women’s Federation responsible for providing 
aid to those who experience sexual harassment.52 The Commission 
has not found indicators of progress on this or similar national- 
level legislation during the 2011 reporting year. 
Population Planning and Gender Equality 
According to reports during the Commission’s 2011 reporting 
year, sex-selective abortion continues, despite the government’s leg-
islative and policy efforts to deter such practices. In response to 
government-imposed birth limits and in keeping with a traditional 
cultural bias for sons, some Chinese parents choose to engage in 
sex-selective abortion, especially rural couples whose first child is 
a girl.53 The Chinese government issued national regulations in 
2003 banning prenatal gender determination and sex-selective 
abortion.54 Statistics and analysis from studies published in 
2008,55 2009,56 and 2010 57 regarding China’s significantly skewed 
sex ratio show that sex-selective abortion remains prevalent, espe-
cially in rural areas, suggesting that implementation of the ban on 
sex-selective abortion remains uneven. In August 2011, the State 
Council issued the PRC Outline for the Development of Children 
(2011–2020), which urged officials to ‘‘step up efforts against the 
use of ultrasound and other [forms of technology] to engage in non- 
medically necessary sex determination and sex-selective abor-
tion.’’ 58 Some observers, including Chinese state media, have 
linked China’s increasingly skewed sex ratio with an increase in 
forced prostitution, forced marriages, and other forms of human 
trafficking.59 [For more information regarding China’s skewed sex 
ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.] 




The Chinese government took steps to combat human trafficking 
during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, but challenges re-
main. Multiple factors shape the context of the ongoing human 
trafficking problem in China, including the government’s popu-
lation planning policies and their exacerbation of China’s skewed 
sex ratio; migrant mobility; uneven enforcement of anti-trafficking 
laws; lack of anti-trafficking training, education, and resources; 
and government corruption. In addition, officials in the past year 
continued to focus on the abduction and sale of women and chil-
dren,1 while giving proportionally less attention to other forms of 
trafficking. The government’s limited capacity restricts the number 
of trafficking victims that can access official protection, services, 
and care. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
passed amendments to the PRC Criminal Law in February 2011, 
including new language which, if implemented, may strengthen 
prosecution and punishment of forced labor cases. Authorities re-
ported taking action to combat trafficking in the 2011 reporting 
year. Gaps between domestic legislation and international stand-
ards remain and continue to limit the scope and effectiveness of 
anti-trafficking efforts. 
Anti-Trafficking Challenges 
The Chinese government acceded to the UN Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (Palermo Protocol) in December 2009,2 but it has not 
revised current domestic legislation to come into full compliance. 
The PRC Criminal Law prohibits the trafficking of persons, which 
it defines as ‘‘abducting, kidnapping, buying, trafficking in, fetch-
ing, sending, or transferring a woman or child, for the purpose of 
selling the victim.’’ 3 The law does not provide definitions for these 
concepts. The PRC Criminal Law separately prohibits forced pros-
titution,4 but it does not make clear whether minors under 18 
years of age who are engaged in prostitution may be considered vic-
tims of trafficking, regardless of the use of force. Chinese law does 
not clearly prohibit non-physical forms of coercion-including debt 
bondage and threats-or the recruitment, provision, or attainment of 
persons for forced prostitution,5 which are covered under Article 3 
of the Palermo Protocol.6 The Chinese government’s differing defi-
nition of human trafficking has negative implications for anti-traf-
ficking work in China, including limiting the Chinese government’s 
prosecution efforts, protection of victims, and victim services.7 It is 
unclear whether the Chinese government’s definition of human 
trafficking also has negative implications for program funding, as 
fiscal information on programs is not publicly available. 
Chinese officials continue to conflate human trafficking with 
human smuggling and therefore treat some victims of trafficking as 
criminals, although recent law enforcement efforts have sought to 
reduce this.8 According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
main international body responsible for implementing the Palermo 
Protocol, human trafficking and migrant smuggling differ with re-
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spect to consent, exploitation, transnationality, and source of prof-
it.9 Commonly, human trafficking involves the exploitation of an 
individual (either domestically or across borders) for forced labor or 
prostitution without the individual’s consent, whereas migrant 
smuggling involves the cross-border transport of an individual with 
the individual’s consent and for direct or indirect profit resulting 
from the transport.10 In conflating the two, Chinese officials may 
consider an individual’s illegal entry into China to be a crime of 
‘‘human smuggling’’ and punish the individual accordingly, while 
giving less consideration to the role exploitation may have played 
in the border crossing.11 The Chinese government continues to de-
port all undocumented North Koreans as illegal ‘‘economic mi-
grants’’ and does not provide legal alternatives to repatriation for 
identified foreign victims of trafficking.12 [For more information, 
see Section II—North Korean Refugees in China.] Reports from the 
2011 reporting year indicate that official corruption and lack of re-
sources in some areas also continue to deter or limit anti-traf-
ficking efforts and exacerbate the trafficking problem.13 
Prevalence 
China remains a country of origin, transit, and destination for 
the trafficking of men, women, and children.14 The majority of traf-
ficking cases are domestic; 15 however, human traffickers continue 
to traffic Chinese women and children from China to countries 
around the world.16 Women and girls from countries across Asia, 
as well as some countries in Europe and Africa, are also trafficked 
into China and forced into marriages, employment, and sexual ex-
ploitation.17 Forced labor continues, and certain cases gained wide-
spread media attention during this reporting year; 18 however, the 
full extent of the forced labor problem in China is unclear.19 [See 
Section II—Worker Rights for more information on child labor.] Ac-
cording to the Palermo Protocol, forced labor of any person under 
18 years of age constitutes ‘‘trafficking in persons.’’ 20 
Driving Factors 
Experts link the reported growth 21 of the trafficking market in 
China to several political, demographic, economic, and social fac-
tors. Reports indicate that China’s skewed sex ratio,22 which is in-
creasing against the backdrop of China’s population planning poli-
cies and Chinese families’ preference for sons,23 has increased the 
demand for trafficking for forced marriage and commercial sexual 
exploitation.24 In recent years, domestic and international observ-
ers have also linked the growing trafficking market with the lack 
of awareness and education on trafficking prevention for vulnerable 
women and parents 25 and conditions in bordering countries such 
as instability in Burma and poverty in the Democratic People’s Re-
public of Korea.26 [For additional information on China’s skewed 
sex ratio, see Section II—Population Planning.] 
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Representative Human Trafficking Cases 
From the 2011 Reporting Year 
• In December 2010, authorities detained an official from a govern-
ment-funded homeless shelter for his alleged involvement in a forced 
labor scheme.27 The official allegedly sold 11 workers, 8 of whom report-
edly had disabilities, to a building materials factory in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where they were held and forced 
to work for at least three years without pay or protective gear.28 
• Also in December, authorities detained a brick kiln employer in 
Shaanxi province on charges of forced labor after he brought people in 
who were mentally ill, deaf, mute, disabled, or otherwise vulnerable to 
exploitation.29 Authorities reportedly rescued 18 workers from the brick 
kiln.30 
• Despite a 2008 XUAR Department of Education circular stating that 
students enrolled in elementary and junior high school would no longer 
participate in work-study activities to pick cotton, a number of Chinese 
media and government reports from the 2011 reporting year indicate 
that authorities in the XUAR continued to implement work-study pro-
grams in 2009 and 2010 that required school-age students to pick cotton 
and engage in other forms of labor.31 [See Section IV—Xinjiang for more 
information on these programs.] 
• Individuals continued to force children to work in exploitative condi-
tions as child beggars.32 In one incident reported in February 2011, a 
man in Henan province ‘‘rented out’’ his daughter for 5,000 yuan 
(US$774) to an ‘‘acrobatic troupe’’ and discovered three years later that 
the eight-year-old had been made to beg and was physically abused.33 In 
another incident reported in August, a man in the XUAR sold his 12- 
year-old daughter to a group who trained her to pickpocket. When she 
was ‘‘rescued and sent back home,’’ the man reportedly sold her again to 
a different pickpocketing group.34 
• Authorities in the XUAR announced plans in April 2011 for a nation-
wide campaign to locate and retrieve children from the XUAR who are 
‘‘strays’’ and in some cases ‘‘steal or beg for a living.’’ 35 
Anti-Trafficking Efforts 
The Chinese government, non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals continued efforts to combat human trafficking during 
the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. As reported in the Commis-
sion’s 2010 Annual Report, in December 2009, the National Peo-
ple’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) approved China’s ac-
cession to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traf-
ficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (Palermo Pro-
tocol).36 On February 25, 2011, the NPCSC revised the PRC Crimi-
nal Law, making amendments to provisions on forced labor 37—a 
crime that constitutes human trafficking under the Palermo Pro-
tocol.38 The revised legislation broadens the scope of activity con-
sidered punishable for forced labor and strengthens punishments 
for ‘‘serious’’ crimes of forced labor; however, the legislation still 
does not clearly define what constitutes forced labor.39 [See box ti-
tled Strengthened Legislation on Forced Labor below.] The Com-
mission did not observe changes to other areas in which China’s do-
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mestic legislation does not comply with the Palermo Protocol dur-
ing the 2011 reporting year.40 
Strengthened Legislation on Forced Labor 
The National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed amend-
ments to the PRC Criminal Law in February 2011, which included addi-
tions to provisions on trafficking in Article 244.41 The revised provisions, 
if properly implemented, may strengthen prosecution and punishment of 
forced labor cases: 
• Widened scope of punishable persons. The new provision ex-
pands the scope of responsibility from ‘‘employer’’ to ‘‘whoever forces an-
other to work . . . .’’ In addition, the new provision adds language that 
provides a basis for punishing anyone who is ‘‘aware of a person com-
mitting the crime . . . and recruits or transports personnel for him, or 
otherwise aids forced labor.’’ 42 This added language, if implemented, 
may strengthen prosecution and punishment of middlemen, trans-
porters, and recruiters. 
• Lengthened prison sentences. The revised provision provides for a 
maximum three-year imprisonment for forced labor situations that are 
not considered ‘‘serious.’’ This period of time was unclear prior to revi-
sions. The new provision also provides for longer prison sentences (three 
to seven years, an increase from the former maximum of three years) for 
forced labor crimes that are considered ‘‘serious.’’ 43 While the term ‘‘se-
rious’’ is not clearly defined, this revised language, if implemented, may 
result in harsher punishments for those convicted of forced labor crimes. 
Chinese authorities, in cooperation with non-governmental orga-
nizations and international organizations, took steps to improve 
protection, services, and care for victims of trafficking but contin-
ued to focus such efforts only on women and children identified as 
victims through the government’s definition of trafficking. The 
International Organization on Migration and the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs conducted two training sessions during the Commission’s 
2011 reporting year that reportedly addressed issues including vic-
tim identification, protection, and assistance.44 According to the 
U.S. State Department, the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) 
is in the process of starting a network of shelters for women. At 
these shelters, women reportedly may access referrals for legal aid, 
report human trafficking violations, and seek assistance from social 
workers.45 In addition, in September 2010, Minister of Public Secu-
rity Meng Jianzhu and Vietnamese Minister of Public Security Le 
Hong Anh signed a cooperative agreement to work together on traf-
ficking prevention and control.46 
The Chinese government continued outreach and education cam-
paigns in concert with the ACWF and international organizations. 
The government continued trafficking education campaigns in 
areas with high numbers of migrant workers, including train and 
bus stations, and through television, cell phones, and the Internet, 
informing workers of their rights.47 Chinese authorities established 
nationwide and local hotlines for reporting suspected trafficking 
cases,48 although there appears to be limited public data on their 
use. 
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As the Chinese government continues to conflate human smug-
gling, illegal adoption, and child abduction with human trafficking, 
accurate statistics on the number of trafficking cases the govern-
ment investigated and prosecuted during the past reporting year 
are not available.49 Using the definition of human trafficking under 
Chinese law, the Supreme People’s Court reportedly convicted 
3,138 defendants in trafficking cases in 2010,50 up from 2,413 in 
2009,51 and of those convicted, authorities reportedly handed down 
2,216 prison sentences for terms of five years or more.52 In addi-
tion, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate prosecuted 4,422 individ-
uals for trafficking offenses,53 up from 4,017 in 2009.54 
The U.S. State Department placed China on its Tier 2 Watch 
List for the seventh consecutive year in 2011,55 listing several 
areas in which anti-trafficking efforts were insufficient, including 
that the Chinese government ‘‘does not fully comply with the min-
imum standards for the elimination of trafficking’’ and ‘‘did not 
demonstrate evidence of significant efforts to address all forms of 
trafficking or effectively protect victims.’’ 56 
CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS 
Individual citizens have also been active in the effort to combat 
human trafficking. One individual’s anti-trafficking efforts on an 
Internet blog launched during the 2011 reporting year have re-
ceived widespread attention.57 While the combined efforts of the in-
dividual, the blog’s photograph contributors, and a number of gov-
ernment agencies have resulted in the ‘‘rescue’’ of at least six ab-
ducted children,58 the online campaign has also raised concerns re-
garding the privacy of the children being photographed,59 potential 
for publicly misidentifying children as abducted,60 and the risk that 
traffickers might inflict further harm on their victims if they find 
pictures of them posted publicly.61 
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NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA 
Introduction 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment persisted in detaining and repatriating North Korean ref-
ugees to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite 
the harsh punishments refugees face once they have returned to 
the DPRK.1 In 2011, the Chinese government reportedly increased 
the presence of public security officials in northeastern China and 
erected new border barricades along the China-DPRK border. The 
Chinese government classifies all North Korean refugees in China 
as ‘‘illegal’’ economic migrants and not refugees (nanmin) and con-
tinues its policy of repatriating them.2 China’s repatriation of 
North Korean refugees, including those who leave the DPRK for 
fear of persecution, contravenes obligations under the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and 
its 1967 Protocol (1967 Protocol), to which China has acceded.3 In 
addition, the North Korean government’s imprisonment and torture 
of repatriated North Koreans renders North Koreans in China refu-
gees ‘‘sur place,’’ or those who fear persecution upon return to their 
country of origin.4 Under the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Pro-
tocol, the Chinese government is obligated to refrain from repa-
triating refugees ‘‘sur place.’’ 5 
Unlawful Repatriation 
During the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government ap-
peared to take new measures to stem streams of North Korean ref-
ugees.6 In September 2010, one overseas news organization re-
ported that Chinese public security authorities were cooperating 
with North Korean police agents to repatriate North Korean refu-
gees throughout China—including in regions such as Yunnan prov-
ince and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region—in organized 
‘‘manhunts.’’ 7 Chinese officials reportedly have deployed hundreds 
of People’s Armed Police and law enforcement officials to work with 
100 North Korean state security officials throughout China. In 
some instances, North Korean agents reportedly pose as North Ko-
rean defectors to target refugees in migrant communities.8 
Media reports indicated that Chinese officials continue to enforce 
a system of rewards to facilitate the capture of North Korean refu-
gees and members of their support network. Chinese authorities 
offer bounties to Chinese citizens who turn in North Koreans and 
fine,9 detain,10 or imprison 11 those who provide the refugees with 
humanitarian assistance. Chinese authorities reportedly offer re-
wards of up to 3,000 yuan (US$456) to Chinese nationals and Chi-
nese nationals of Korean descent (Sino-Koreans, or chaoxianzu) 
who provide information on North Koreans.12 As a result, many 
North Koreans living throughout China are now settling farther 
from the China-DPRK border.13 
China’s public security bureau agencies hold all detained North 
Korean refugees in detention centers that are not subject to inde-
pendent monitoring.14 Refugees cannot challenge their detention in 
court.15 The Chinese government continued to deny the UN High 
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) permission to operate along 
its northeastern border with the DPRK.16 
Punishment in the DPRK 
During the 2011 reporting year, the DPRK appeared to increase 
surveillance camera systems and reinforce barbed wire in areas 
along the Chinese-North Korean border in order to crack down on 
North Korean refugees to China.17 North Koreans repatriated by 
the Chinese government face the threat of imprisonment, torture, 
and capital punishment in the DPRK.18 Under the 2004 revised 
North Korean Penal Code, border crossers can receive sentences of 
up to two years’ imprisonment in a ‘‘labor-training center.’’ 19 North 
Korean authorities assign harsher punishment, including long sen-
tences and public execution, to repatriated North Koreans deemed 
to have committed ‘‘political’’ crimes, which include attempted de-
fection; conversion to Christianity; and having had extensive con-
tact with religious groups, South Koreans, or Americans.20 A sig-
nificant number of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
humanitarian workers assisting North Koreans in China and help-
ing them seek asylum are Christian, South Korean, or American.21 
In May 2011, Amnesty International (AI) released new informa-
tion demonstrating that North Korean political prison camps, 
which hold an estimated 200,000 people, have ‘‘expanded signifi-
cantly.’’ 22 It is unclear, based on the reports, how many of those 
detained were forcibly repatriated from China. Based on AI inter-
views with former detainees at one political prison camp, prisoners 
in some cases are reportedly forced to work in inhumane conditions 
and ‘‘are frequently subjected to torture and other cruel, inhumane, 
and degrading treatment.’’ 23 The North Korean Human Rights Ar-
chives organization claims that there are at least 480 prisons and 
detention facilities throughout the DPRK.24 
Trafficking and Denial of Access to Education 
The Chinese government’s policy of repatriating North Korean 
refugees and denying them legal status increases their vulner-
ability to trafficking, mistreatment, and exploitation in China. 
North Korean women, in particular, often fall victim to inhumane 
treatment and indentured servitude.25 NGOs and researchers esti-
mate that as many as 70 percent of the tens of thousands of North 
Korean refugees in China are women.26 In March 2011, an NGO 
worker estimated that 9 out of every 10 North Korean women in 
China are trafficked.27 Traffickers, many of whom operate in orga-
nized networks, use false promises to lure North Korean women 
into China and abduct those entering China on their own.28 Traf-
fickers reportedly blackmail North Korean women in China by 
warning them that if they do not obey, they will be reported to Chi-
nese authorities who will forcibly repatriate them.29 Chinese au-
thorities reportedly took steps to investigate and crack down on 
criminal syndicates trafficking North Korean women. In June 2011, 
for instance, public security officials in Hailun city, Heilongjiang 
province, detained traffickers but also detained three trafficked 
North Korean women with them.30 
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The trafficking of North Korean women has created a black mar-
ket in which refugees are ‘‘moved and traded like merchandise, 
with many sold as ‘brides,’ kept in confinement, and sexually as-
saulted.’’ 31 In a March 2011 Radio Free Asia article, a North Ko-
rean defector living in Yanji city, Yanbian Korean Autonomous Pre-
fecture, Jilin province, described how Chinese middlemen ‘‘ap-
praise’’ and sell trafficked women based on certain criteria.32 He 
said, ‘‘North Korean women in their 40s are sold for 3,000 yuan 
(US$457), those in their 30s for 5,000 yuan (US$761), and those in 
their 20s for about 7,000 yuan (US$1,066).’’ 33 There is a high de-
mand for wives in northeastern China where severe sex ratio im-
balances have spurred the Chinese market for trafficked North Ko-
rean brides, and where poor, disabled, or elderly men have dif-
ficulty finding wives.34 [See Section II—Population Planning for 
more information on sex ratio imbalance in China.] In other cases, 
North Korean women have been trafficked into commercial sexual 
exploitation and forced to work as prostitutes or in Internet sex op-
erations.35 Some women reportedly have been sold and resold mul-
tiple times,36 and trafficked North Korean women have testified to 
beatings, sexual abuse, and being locked up to prevent escape.37 
The Chinese government’s repatriation of trafficked North Ko-
rean women contravenes the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, and 
the Chinese government is obligated under Article 7 of the UN Pro-
tocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children (Palermo Protocol) to ‘‘consider adopt-
ing legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims 
of trafficking to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently 
. . . giving appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compas-
sionate factors.’’ 38 The Chinese government’s failure to prevent 
trafficking of North Korean women and protect them from revictim-
ization also contravenes its obligations under Article 9 of the Pa-
lermo Protocol and Article 6 of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.39 Although the cen-
tral government has taken limited steps to combat trafficking and 
protect trafficking victims,40 traffickers continue to traffic an esti-
mated 90 percent of the North Korean women in China,41 and the 
Chinese government refuses to provide these victims with legal al-
ternatives to repatriation.42 [For more information on the central 
government’s efforts to combat trafficking, see Section II—Human 
Trafficking.] 
Another problem that reportedly stems from China’s unlawful re-
patriation policy is the denial of education and other public goods 
for the children of North Korean women married to Chinese citi-
zens. The scope of this problem, however, is unclear based on lim-
ited public information. The PRC Nationality Law guarantees citi-
zenship and, by extension, household registration (hukou) to all 
children born in China to at least one parent of Chinese nation-
ality.43 The PRC Compulsory Education Law, moreover, provides 
that all children age six years and older with Chinese citizenship 
shall receive nine years of free and compulsory education, regard-
less of race or ethnicity.44 Some local governments refuse to reg-
ister Chinese-North Korean children without seeing documentation 
that the mother is a citizen, has been repatriated, or has run 
away.45 Local authorities contravene the PRC Nationality Law, the 
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PRC Compulsory Education Law, and the Chinese government’s 
commitments under international conventions when they refuse 
these children the hukou required to access public education and 
obtain healthcare.46 Denial of hukou forces these children to live in 
a stateless limbo. Estimates for the number of such stateless chil-
dren in China range from several thousand to several tens of thou-
sands.47 Moreover, when their North Korean mothers are repatri-
ated, a significant number of these children also are abandoned, as 
their fathers are unwilling or unable to take care of them.48 Ac-
cording to one non-governmental organization, China may have as 
many as 100,000 of these ‘‘orphans.’’ 49 [See Section II—Freedom of 
Residence and Movement.] 
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PUBLIC HEALTH 
Public Health Advocacy 
Despite official recognition of the positive role non-governmental 
actors have played in raising awareness about health concerns, 
combating stigma, and promoting prevention of diseases,1 many 
Chinese citizens involved in public health advocacy continued to 
face government harassment and interference in the past year. In 
addition to restrictions on registration and funding of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) that remain in effect and have been 
used to monitor and control NGO activities,2 government pressure 
on some public health advocates continued during this reporting 
year, as illustrated by the following cases. 
• Tian Xi. On February 11, 2011, the Xincai County People’s 
Court in Zhumadian municipality, Henan province, sentenced 
public health advocate Tian Xi to one year’s imprisonment for 
‘‘intentional destruction of property.’’ 3 Tian Xi reportedly was 
infected with HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C through a hos-
pital blood transfusion in 1996.4 Since learning of his diseases, 
he has persistently petitioned for resolution of his case and the 
cases of others who have been infected through transfusions.5 
Although Tian Xi’s sentence was reportedly related to his de-
struction of office supplies during a dispute with a hospital offi-
cial over his case,6 government and Communist Party official 
documents from Gulu township, Xincai county, indicate that of-
ficials had planned to take action against Tian Xi before the 
hospital dispute.7 Issued prior to the hospital dispute, the doc-
uments called for public security officials to take ‘‘security and 
stability control measures against Tian Xi’’ and to ‘‘intervene, 
prepare documentation, [and] strike.’’ 8 Tian Xi’s family, as well 
as international observers, expressed concern regarding his 
health while in prison.9 Authorities released Tian Xi on August 
18, 2011, upon the completion of his sentence.10 
• Aizhixing. Authorities continued to harass and interfere 
with the operations of Aizhixing Institute of Health Education, 
a Beijing-based public health advocacy NGO. In December 
2010, Beijing tax officials and public security personnel entered 
the organization’s office and confiscated documents as part of 
an investigation into Aizhixing’s compliance with tax regula-
tions.11 On March 11, 2011, Beijing officials demanded that 
Aizhixing remove from its Web site an open letter alleging that 
two central government officials were involved in a blood 
transfusion scandal which led to an HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Henan province in the 1990s.12 The letter noted that former 
Henan provincial officials (not named in the letter, but later 
identified as Li Changchun and Li Keqiang) 13 never faced 
legal action and instead were appointed to positions in China’s 
top policymaking organ.14 On March 15, without providing a 
reason, Beijing municipal press and publications officials noti-
fied Aizhixing that the organization’s Web site had been shut 
down.15 
• Chang Kun. On April 4, 2011, authorities in Linquan coun-
ty, Fuyang municipality, Anhui province, physically injured 
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public health advocate Chang Kun as he presided over an an-
nual meeting of the AIBO Youth Center, a public health edu-
cation NGO that he founded.16 Unidentified ‘‘thugs’’ reportedly 
entered the room while Chang was speaking and ‘‘beat him se-
verely,’’ leaving Chang unconscious for several hours.17 That 
morning, authorities had also destroyed his video camera.18 
The same local authorities who injured Chang reportedly had 
visited his organization a few days before the conference and 
destroyed several signs outside his office.19 
• Hu Jia and Zeng Jinyan. Authorities released prominent 
HIV/AIDS advocate Hu Jia from prison on June 26, 2011, upon 
completion of his three-and-a-half-year sentence for ‘‘inciting 
subversion.’’ On her Twitter page, Hu’s wife, Zeng Jinyan, re-
ported that the couple would not be able to receive visitors,20 
indicating that numerous security vehicles were stationed out-
side their home in Beijing.21 Zeng said that she had returned 
to Beijing on June 19 22 after her landlord, citing unidentified 
pressure, served her a notice of eviction from her apartment in 
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.23 According to Zeng, 
eight security officers escorted her from the airport upon her 
arrival in Beijing.24 
Health-Based Discrimination 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
China’s domestic legislation explicitly forbids discriminatory 
practices in employment.25 Nevertheless, health-based discrimina-
tion, including ‘‘mandatory testing of workers [including for infec-
tious diseases], denial of job opportunities, forced resignations[,] 
and restricted access to health insurance,’’ reportedly remains 
widespread.26 Those who experience such discrimination also con-
tinue to face challenges in seeking legal recourse,27 as highlighted 
by health-based discrimination lawsuits this past year in Hebei,28 
Anhui,29 and Sichuan 30 provinces. 
DISCRIMINATION IN HEALTHCARE 
Individuals living with infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS con-
tinue to face difficulties accessing medical care. Reports emerged 
during this past year indicating that people living with HIV/AIDS 
are, in some cases, refused medical treatment at ‘‘mainstream hos-
pitals’’ 31 and instead forced to seek treatment at separate infec-
tious disease facilities referred to as ‘‘HIV/AIDS hospitals.’’ 32 A 
joint study published in May 2011 by the International Labour Or-
ganization and the STD and AIDS Prevention and Control Center 
of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention found 
that underlying reasons for the denial of treatment included per-
ceived risks to other patients, lack of resources, potential loss of 
profit, and ‘‘poor feasibility of policies and mechanisms.’’ 33 
Mental Health 
In 2001, China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and in doing so committed itself to en-
suring ‘‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest at-
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tainable standard of physical and mental health.’’ 34 As the Com-
mission reported in its 2010 Annual Report, cases of mental illness 
are prevalent in China, and the burden these cases place on the 
country’s under-resourced mental healthcare system is signifi-
cant.35 The rate of treatment is low,36 and officials reportedly con-
tinue to abuse their power over psychiatric institutions and medical 
professionals by using them as ‘‘tools for detaining people deemed 
a threat to social stability.’’ 37 Against the backdrop of these con-
cerns, in October 2010, a court in Shandong province ordered com-
pensation for the plaintiff in China’s first case of misdiagnosed 
mental illness and compulsory psychiatric treatment,38 and in June 
2011, the central government took steps that could improve the leg-
islative framework for regulating the mental healthcare system. 
Draft Mental Health Law Released for Public Comment 
On June 10, 2011, the State Council Legislative Affairs Office an-
nounced the release of a draft Mental Health Law for public comment.39 
Officials and experts have reportedly been working on the draft for 26 
years.40 Individuals and organizations across a range of civil society sec-
tors reportedly participated in the 30-day public comment period, includ-
ing some individuals 41 who have experienced being ‘‘misidentified as 
mentally ill’’ (bei jingshenbing)—a strategy that Chinese officials often 
use to extralegally detain ‘‘troublemakers’’ in psychiatric institutions.42 
In March 2011, top government officials announced plans to enact the 
Mental Health Law by the end of the year.43 A list of selected highlights 
from the draft, as well as observers’ expressed concerns regarding the 
draft, follows. 
Highlights: 
• Article 3 provides for an integrated approach to prevention, treat-
ment, and recovery of those who live with mental illness, placing ‘‘pre-
vention as the priority.’’ It also provides for the establishment of a 
mechanism for implementing this approach, calling for the participation 
of both government and civil society actors.44 
• Article 4 prohibits infringement on a mentally ill individual’s human 
dignity and personal safety and calls for the legal protection of the indi-
vidual’s rights to education, work, medical treatment, privacy, and help 
from the state and society.45 
• The legislation outlines procedures for diagnosis and admittance for 
psychiatric treatment, including requirements that standards for diag-
nosis and treatment be determined by the State Council health adminis-
tration department (Article 22); 46 that diagnosis be performed by a 
practicing psychiatrist (Article 25); 47 and that, in cases of involuntary 
admittance, two or more psychiatrists should diagnose the individual, 
provide a written copy of the diagnosis within 72 hours, and notify the 
individual and the party who brought the individual in for diagnosis, 
which in some cases may include public security personnel (Article 
26).48 
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Draft Mental Health Law Released for Public Comment— 
Continued 
• Article 27 requires that admittance for psychiatric treatment be vol-
untary, but includes exceptions for cases in which the individual is in-
capable of recognizing or controlling his own conduct or is in danger of 
harming himself, endangering public safety or the safety of others, or 
disrupting public order.49 
Concerns: 
Aizhixing, a Beijing-based public health advocacy organization, raised 
the following concerns regarding the draft Mental Health Law.50 
• The draft does not clearly state protections for certain basic rights of 
individuals who live with mental illness, particularly the rights to le-
gally marry, pursue a divorce, and raise children. Reporting and super-
vision requirements in Articles 12 and 63 also may conflict with the pro-
tection of an individual’s privacy and human dignity.51 
• There are remaining questions regarding the protections provided for 
persons involuntarily committed to a mental institution. For example, 
there does not appear to be an upper limit for the amount of time a per-
son may be involuntarily institutionalized.52 
• There are remaining questions regarding how an individual or guard-
ian can seek legal recourse against a judicial determination of a medical 
diagnosis. The draft also does not make clear whether an individual 
may obtain legal representation to dispute a diagnosis in court.53 
• The draft calls for increased surveillance as part of a ‘‘mental health 
monitoring network’’ and reporting system (Article 20) to prevent major 
violent outbreaks by persons with mental illness. However, the draft 
does not appear to protect citizens from infringement on citizens’ rights 
to privacy and human dignity.54 




During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment continued to strengthen regulatory efforts to address Chi-
na’s serious environmental problems. Inadequate access to informa-
tion, unreliable access to legal remedies, an underdeveloped com-
pensation system for individuals and groups harmed by pollution, 
uneven enforcement and lax compliance, corruption, and other 
issues, however, have contributed to the continuation of these seri-
ous environmental problems and to the potential for the infringe-
ment of citizens’ rights. Chinese authorities have taken some steps 
to improve collection of environmental data and to expand ‘‘open 
environmental information,’’ but significant challenges remain, es-
pecially in relation to obtaining information on industrial pollution 
sources. Access to legal remedies also remains a challenge, and 
channels available to citizens to express environmental grievances 
are not always open, contributing to the rise of citizen anti-pollu-
tion demonstrations. Chinese authorities continued to selectively 
stifle environmental activism and environmental grievances or sup-
press people who were involved in or organized collective action to 
halt perceived environmental harms. During this reporting year, 
citizen grievances regarding hydroelectric dam construction, lead 
pollution, chemical plants, and waste incinerator and landfill oper-
ations were prominently covered in Chinese and foreign media. 
Serious Environmental Challenges: Focus on Rural and Heavy 
Metal Pollution 
China’s environmental problems reportedly remain severe, de-
spite some regulatory advances and isolated reductions in a limited 
number of pollutants.1 Examples highlight the seriousness of these 
problems and the legal challenges they pose. In October 2010, a 
Chinese research institute completed a ‘‘Green GDP’’ report on the 
economic impacts of environmental pollution in China, which as-
serts that the economic costs of environmental pollution and eco-
logical damage have risen 74.8 percent over a five-year period from 
2004 to 2008, equaling about 3 percent of GDP.2 In February 2011, 
a Chinese scholarly report revealed that 10 percent of the rice in 
markets in many cities contained cadmium levels above standard; 
soil pollution is seen as the culprit.3 In August, it came to light 
that the Luliang Chemicals Company dumped over 140 truckloads, 
totaling over 5,200 tons, of hexavalent chromium slag in Yunnan 
province, where it could wash into the Pearl River via its tribu-
taries.4 The chromium reportedly killed fish and livestock and 
threatens drinking water sources.5 The dumping case underscores 
the lack of official transparency and reportedly may have involved 
official complicity, highlighting governance problems.6 An employee 
of the plant reportedly admitted that the company had dumped or 
buried over 288 thousand tons of chromium dregs between 1989 
and 2003.7 Across 12 provinces, there reportedly may be 1 to 1.3 
million tons of chromium waste (from a variety of sources) not dis-
posed of properly, with some dumped in water sources and densely 
populated areas.8 
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During this reporting year, authorities continued to develop regu-
latory instruments to manage these pollution problems. Chinese of-
ficials currently have reduction targets for only two pollutants but 
have announced plans to expand this to four in the next five-year 
period (2011–2015).9 Environmental officials reportedly discussed 
revisions to the Environmental Protection Law, circulated a draft 
for comment of a technical guideline for public participation in en-
vironmental impact assessment processes, issued the Opinions Re-
garding Initiation of Environmental Pollution Damage Assessment 
Work, which outlines the initial steps toward an environmental 
compensation system, and issued several other relevant laws, poli-
cies, and measures on environmental issues.10 
Over the past year, officials focused on growing rural pollution 
problems, which highlight ongoing challenges in applying the laws 
evenly and in protecting citizens’ health, especially the health of 
children and the rural poor. Authorities reportedly acknowledged 
environmental conditions in many villages are still severe, partially 
due to the increasing movement of polluting enterprises from urban 
to village areas.11 In June 2011, a top environmental official stated 
that environmental protection efforts in rural areas lag far behind 
those in urban areas, the foundation for rural environmental man-
agement is weak, regulatory standards are incomplete, and the 
ability to monitor problems is insufficient.12 These problems put 
the health of rural populations at risk. In January 2011, central 
government officials announced long-term plans to address rural 
pollution challenges, primarily relying on the policy of ‘‘using re-
wards to promote control.’’ 13 In June 2011, Chinese news reports 
further described the steps officials said they would take during 
the next five-year period.14 The Minister of Environmental Protec-
tion stated that China would ‘‘work hard’’ to make initial improve-
ments in rural village environmental quality by 2015 and to control 
prominent environmental problems in key villages and townships 
across the country by 2020.15 
Environmental protection officials also prioritized heavy metal 
pollution problems, including lead pollution that is linked to cases 
of lead poisoning involving thousands of children in several prov-
inces in 2009 and 2010.16 Some of these cases involve the violation 
of citizens’ rights.17 [See Access to Justice and Suppression of Cit-
izen Demands for a Cleaner Environment in this section for more 
information on these cases.] In response to the series of lead poi-
soning cases, authorities reportedly released a circular in May 2011 
that outlined steps to address heavy metal pollution, including bet-
ter management and disposal of pollutants, punishment of viola-
tors, and enhanced transparency.18 However, the circular does not 
have the power of a legally binding regulation.19 In June 2011, en-
vironmental authorities launched a special campaign to try to re-
duce heavy metal pollution and asserted that they would use their 
authority to suspend approval of new projects in areas where heavy 
metal pollution cases have occurred.20 In August, the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection reportedly suspended production at 1,015 
lead battery manufacturing, assembly, and recycling plants and 
made public the names of these plants. Authorities shut down 583 
of the plants, but the news agency reporting the story did not indi-
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cate how many of the plants moved production facilities to other lo-
cations.21 
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Cleaner 
Environment 
Environmental problems, including heavy metal pollution, con-
tinued to trigger citizen grievances and demands for better environ-
mental quality. In June 2011, nearly 1,000 citizens blocked a road 
protesting pollution from a battery plant in Heyan city, Guangdong 
province; one citizen reported that 10 people were injured in the 
ensuing conflict between citizens and police and that police killed 
one person.22 In August, more than 10,000 citizens peacefully pro-
tested a chemical plant that manufactures paraxylene (PX) in 
Dalian city, Liaoning province, by ‘‘taking a stroll,’’ after a typhoon 
damaged an ocean wall protecting the plant, triggering citizen con-
cerns about a chemical leak.23 Prior to the storm, factory workers, 
reportedly ordered by plant bosses, stopped and beat reporters who 
wanted to investigate possible impacts of a storm on chemical stor-
age tanks.24 The story of this event reportedly was pulled from TV 
coverage.25 Local Communist Party and government leaders quick-
ly responded to the protest and reportedly put the ‘‘relocation of the 
plant on the government work agenda.’’ 26 One international press 
report noted that the government was considering closing down the 
plant prior to the protests. It also noted that the plant had been 
approved during the term of a previous Party Secretary, specu-
lating that the current cohort of authorities may have had political 
motives for allowing such a large demonstration.27 Nevertheless, 
the Global Times, which operates under the official People’s Daily, 
stated that citizens taking to the streets to express their views 
‘‘should not be advocated in China’’ and that ‘‘Chinese society ob-
jected’’ to the street protests as evidenced by the fact that ‘‘[r]eports 
on this incident have not gained much ground in China’s main-
stream media . . . .’’ 28 
Access to legal remedies remains unreliable, contributing to cit-
izen protests, despite a growing number of specialized environ-
mental courts. In 2010, regular Chinese courts completed 12,018 
environmental pollution compensation cases, an increase of 2.83 
percent over the previous year.29 However, notably, a study by a 
Peking University professor reportedly found that courts often 
refuse to take cases in the name of ‘‘social stability.’’ 30 One expert 
with an international environmental organization noted that Chi-
nese lawyers said they believe it is more difficult to have an envi-
ronmental damages case accepted by the courts now than in the 
past.31 The same expert noted that public supervision via the 
courts has been constrained in recent years, emphasizing that 
while litigation in some cases has driven legal reform or compelled 
a local government to act, it has not been as effective in stopping 
pollution problems or for compelling pollution cleanup.32 In some 
cases, the expert noted, litigation has led to compensation for citi-
zens, but he pointed out that compensation is sometimes difficult 
to obtain due to evidentiary burdens and problems in proving cau-
sality.33 In some cases, it can be difficult to obtain compensation 
even when a party has been ordered to pay it.34 One former envi-
ronmental protection official told a reporter that ‘‘[w]ith limited 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00147 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
142 
fines and low compensation, breaking the law is often cheaper than 
following it . . . .’’ 35 Specialized environmental courts may still 
benefit environmental litigation, although critics reportedly believe 
they have not resolved the challenges of local protectionism or judi-
cial independence.36 Some of these courts, which are growing in 
number, set local rules providing for public interest litigation cases 
brought by procuratorates, environmental agencies, non-govern-
ment organizations, and individuals.37 In January 2011, the 
Kunming Intermediate People’s Court in Yunnan province awarded 
approximately 4 million yuan (US$626,300) compensation for citi-
zens whose drinking water had been contaminated in a public in-
terest case brought by the Kunming City Environmental Protection 
Bureau and supported by the city procuratorate.38 The Commis-
sion’s 2010 Annual Report noted a couple of these courts have ac-
cepted a few cases brought by the All-China Environment Federa-
tion (ACEF), an environmental group that is overseen by the Min-
istry of Environmental Protection; 39 the ACEF demonstration 
cases appear to have been the only quasi-NGO or NGO public in-
terest cases accepted by the courts. 
In some cases, officials suppressed citizen demands for a cleaner 
environment. The study by the Peking University professor report-
edly found that criminal liability for pollution is rarely enforced 
and that in many cases, citizens exposed to environmental harms 
have little access to legal remedies and may resort to violence to 
pressure the polluter to act.40 Further, the study pointed out that 
those who use violence to protest pollution are often prosecuted.41 
Some recent incidents of official suppression of largely peaceful cit-
izen demands for a cleaner environment include the following: 
• According to a June 2011 Human Rights Watch Report, 
local officials in four provinces—Henan, Hunan, Shaanxi, and 
Yunnan—in recent years ‘‘imposed arbitrary limits on access to 
blood lead testing; refused appropriate treatment to children 
and adults with critically high lead levels; withheld and failed 
to explain test results showing unaccountable improvements in 
lead levels; and denied the scope and severity of lead poi-
soning.’’ 42 Other sources provide additional information on 
cases in Hunan and Shaanxi.43 Parents reportedly stated that 
local police threatened some people who tried to obtain infor-
mation and detained or arrested individuals protesting against 
polluting factories or seeking help for their sick children.44 In 
addition, journalists, including one foreign reporter, indicated 
they had been harassed when they tried to report on some of 
the lead poisoning cases.45 
• In October 2010, over 1,000 citizens in Pingnan county, 
Ningde city, Fujian province, signed a collective petition com-
plaining about pollution from a local landfill facility 46 fol-
lowing a protest that resulted in the detention of four citi-
zens.47 After receiving no response from local government offi-
cials, five village representatives took the collective petition to 
the provincial government office of letters and visits.48 County 
officials intercepted and detained the representatives on sus-
picion of ‘‘disrupting social order.’’ 49 Their detention triggered 
a protest by village residents.50 News reports do not provide 
additional information on those detained. 
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• In late 2010, authorities allegedly beat and detained 17 per-
sons who participated in protests or who petitioned against 
proposed mining operations in Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture, 
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).51 Also in late 2010, authori-
ties detained over 20 Tibetans, some briefly, for their protest 
or petitioning activities against a construction team said to 
have a mining permit.52 In August 2010, officials reportedly 
fired upon a group of 100 Tibetans and possibly killed one to 
four citizens. They were protesting gold-mining operations in 
Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan prov-
ince, because of the harmful environmental effects. Authorities 
also reportedly detained 35 Tibetans in this case.53 In July 
2011, authorities in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu 
(Chamdo) prefecture, TAR, reportedly detained about 50 Tibet-
ans because they protested mining activities.54 Authorities re-
portedly warned citizens that protest activities would be con-
sidered ‘‘politically motivated.’’ Officials detained the ‘‘village 
officials’’ who traveled to Lhasa, the TAR capital, to ‘‘protest’’ 
the mining and the other detentions, as well as the alleged 
protest ‘‘ringleaders.’’ 55 [See Section V—Tibet for more infor-
mation on these incidents.] 
• In May 2011, citizens and police clashed in a large-scale 
conflict involving as many as 10,000 56 residents in a village in 
Wuxi city, Jiangsu province, after residents gathered to protest 
the operation of a waste incinerator that they have opposed 
since 2007 because they claim to have been tricked into accept-
ing it.57 Authorities reportedly injured several citizens and 
took a few residents into custody,58 although reports do not 
provide further information on those detained. 
• In June 2011, Mongol herders in Bayannuur city, Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region, shut down the water pump to a 
lead mine, which had expanded into grazing land, after ‘‘re-
peatedly petitioning the government.’’ 59 Some protesters set up 
traditional tents outside of government offices for nearly two 
weeks.60 The herders believed the mine was polluting the envi-
ronment and endangering their health.61 The local government 
sent more than 50 riot police to the scene, and they reportedly 
beat and detained many of the protesters.62 A group of 600 
herders reportedly sought compensation for pollution linked to 
the mine.63 The mine reportedly agreed to compensate the 
group with 1.2 million yuan (US$188,000), and the herders 
ended their protest.64 News stories do not provide further de-
tails regarding the herders detained by police. The demonstra-
tion followed herder protests in May linked to the death of a 
herder at the hands of a mine worker.65 [See Section II—Eth-
nic Minority Rights for more information on the May protests.] 
Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Construction: Rights and 
Safety Controversies 
Increasing reliance on renewable energy and reducing China’s 
carbon dioxide and other air pollutant emissions are among the 
reasons Chinese authorities cite for escalating the construction of 
hydroelectric dams.66 Some of these projects reportedly continue to 
raise safety concerns and include forcible relocation practices. To 
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date, China has constructed 25,800 large dams, and the associated 
land requisition projects reportedly have led to the relocation of 
more than 10 million people.67 Central-level authorities announced 
in early 2011 that development of hydropower, including the con-
troversial series of dams along the Nu River (Salween River), is a 
‘‘must.’’ 68 Local officials rapidly built many smaller hydroelectric 
projects along the Nu River that did not need State Council ap-
proval over the past two years, some of which are in areas of rel-
ative geological instability, leading to heightened concerns among 
experts and citizens.69 In May 2011, Xinhua reported that the 
State Council had recognized ‘‘urgent’’ problems associated with the 
Three Gorges Dam.70 During the same month, the State Council 
Standing Committee passed a plan to address these issues.71 Esti-
mates of the number of people resettled because of the Three 
Gorges Dam so far range from 1.4 million to 4 million.72 There 
have been numerous reports of infringements on the rights of popu-
lations affected by the Three Gorges Dam, including an attack on 
activist Fu Xiancai that left him paralyzed.73 Additional areas with 
reports of forced resettlement practices include Fujian, Hunan, and 
Yunnan provinces.74 In some cases, these resettlement practices 
triggered citizen protests. For example, in March 2011, as many as 
2,000 to 3,000 citizens reportedly blocked roads to protest com-
pensation levels for their homes and farmland in Suijiang county, 
Zhaotong prefecture, Yunnan province, to make way for the 
Xiangjiaba Dam along the Yangtze River.75 Authorities reportedly 
administratively detained several men for two weeks in what ap-
peared to be punishment for participating in the demonstrations.76 
Central authorities acknowledged problems with compensation 
schemes, and the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on Na-
tional Economic and Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan) 
notes intended reforms to the land requisition system, including 
shrinking ‘‘the scope of requisitioned land, and increas[ing] the 
compensation standard for requisitioned land.’’ 77 
The relocation of some of the 330,000 people relocated in Hubei 
and Henan provinces to make way for the central route of the 
South-to-North Water Diversion Project, which is slated for comple-
tion in 2014 and will divert water from China’s southern regions 
to dryer northern regions,78 so far reportedly has involved less forc-
ible practices. The relocation projects, however, have already trig-
gered a protest and citizen grievances. According to an inter-
national non-governmental organization report released in August 
2010, authorities utilized persuasion rather than physical force in 
some citizen relocation projects in Danjiangkou city, Hubei prov-
ince, which the report described as an improvement from the prac-
tices employed in Three Gorges Dam relocations. The government 
employees who were responsible for persuading people to relocate, 
however, reportedly were required to live among the villagers and 
were not permitted to return home until the villagers all agreed to 
relocate.79 News reports indicate the project has already triggered 
a multi-day villager protest in Qianjiang city, Hubei province; 80 led 
to complaints by relocated farmers about inadequate compensa-
tion,81 poor job prospects, and unprofitable land; 82 and triggered at 
least one instance in which officials threatened citizens who took 
their grievances to higher levels.83 In addition, the central route of 
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the relocation project reportedly generated claims of dishonest offi-
cials and corruption, as well as additional citizen hardships.84 
Environmental Transparency and Public Participation 
Central and some local Chinese environmental protection offi-
cials have taken steps to improve environmental transparency, but 
regular disclosure of information remains a problem. Central au-
thorities took a positive step when they reportedly acknowledged 
the link between pollution in the Huai River basin and the high 
number of cancerous tumors found in residents along the river.85 
According to its 2010 annual work report, the Ministry of Environ-
mental Protection received 226 requests for information in 2010, an 
increase of 205 percent.86 The report does not indicate how many 
requests were granted or denied, only that the ministry responded 
to every request, except one which was still in process.87 The min-
istry received 25 requests for administrative reconsideration.88 A 
joint Chinese-international study released in December 2010 found 
that there had been some improvement in awareness of the need 
for transparency on the part of government officials but that more 
efforts are necessary to translate this awareness into regular dis-
closure of information.89 The study also found that the types of in-
formation hardest for researchers to obtain included ‘‘list(s) of pol-
luting enterprises whose pollutant discharge exceeds national or 
local standards, list(s) of enterprises with major or serious environ-
mental pollution accidents or incidents, and list(s) of enterprises re-
fusing to carry out effective environmental administrative pen-
alties.’’ 90 The results of a second joint study by Chinese and inter-
national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on open environ-
mental information in 113 cities released in December 2010 noted 
overall improvement in information disclosure from 2009 to 2010 
but also noted that some cities’ disclosure performance declined.91 
Eleven cities (9.73 percent) earned ‘‘passing’’ scores of 60 or above 
in 2009–2010, an increase from four cities (3.54 percent) in 2008.92 
The study noted that ‘‘many facilities in violation of emissions and 
clean production standards failed to publicly disclose emissions 
data as required by law.’’ 93 
During this reporting period, environmental groups have utilized 
environmental open government information procedures to obtain 
information, although barriers to transparency continue. A Decem-
ber 2010 article by a Chinese author noted that at least 35 organi-
zations joined an ongoing campaign promoting green consumption 
and that these NGOs had requested information on polluting fac-
tories.94 Over 300 enterprises reportedly responded to the requests 
by explaining the reasons for the pollution problems, and 50 of 
those companies consented to ‘‘third-party audits’’ by NGOs.95 Ad-
ministrative provisions, however, remain a major obstacle to trans-
parency as environmental protection authorities use them as the 
basis for restricting information disclosure.96 Authorities refused to 
grant information in two recent environmental information disclo-
sure cases discussed in the Chinese media. In the first case, the 
Ministry of Agriculture refused a 2011 request for information 
about the downsizing of a national nature reserve along the 
Yangtze River because it involved ‘‘procedural information.’’ 97 In 
the second case, local environmental officials in Hai’an county, 
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Nantong prefecture, Jiangsu province, denied a 2011 request re-
garding a waste incinerator, reportedly responding that they had 
‘‘already approved an environmental impact assessment’’ for the 
project. The lawyer who submitted the request on behalf of an envi-
ronmental group reportedly noted that ‘‘this answer was unrelated 
to the information requested.’’ 98 In May, the lawyer filed an ad-
ministrative reconsideration request to the environmental protec-
tion bureau at the next highest level.99 
Chinese citizens and experts have expressed concern over the 
perceived lack of transparency and the potential risks associated 
with the rapid development of nuclear power projects. The nuclear 
disaster in Japan in March 2011 appeared to embolden Chinese 
citizens and experts to speak out about safety concerns.100 For ex-
ample, a noted Chinese scientist stated that China is ‘‘seriously un-
prepared, especially on the safety front,’’ for speedy development of 
nuclear plants.101 The disaster also prompted Chinese officials to 
conduct a safety review of currently operating and planned nuclear 
power plants.102 In June, a Ministry of Environmental Protection 
vice minister announced that officials had found all of China’s 13 
operating nuclear reactors were safe.103 The Chinese government 
reportedly will adhere to its current medium- and long-term plans 
for nuclear power development.104 Chinese authorities are report-
edly considering a new nuclear energy law 105 that one researcher 
notes could spur transparency in China’s nuclear power indus-
try.106 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES 
Environmental protection remains a sector in which central au-
thorities state a need for greater public participation but within the 
confines of state control. In December 2010, the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection passed a guiding opinion, which states that 
China needs to further expand efforts to cultivate and guide envi-
ronmental social organizations, as well as further strengthen rela-
tions and cooperation between the government and social organiza-
tions.107 The opinion requires environmental social organizations 
that want to engage in cooperative projects with foreign non-gov-
ernmental entities to report to foreign affairs departments for ‘‘ex-
amination and approval.’’ 108 In addition, the opinion also stipulates 
that various levels of environmental departments must ‘‘strengthen 
political thought construction’’ (sixiang zhengzhi jianshe) of envi-
ronmental social organizations.109 
This past year, authorities’ responsiveness to citizen environ-
mental grievances varied across the country. One case that high-
lights the influence of environmental groups involves the shut-
tering and relocation of a polluting chemical plant in Qiugang vil-
lage, Bengbu municipality, Anhui province.110 Residents unsuccess-
fully utilized the court system over a period of years to find relief 
from pollution associated with nearby chemical plants but then 
worked with an environmental group to utilize alternative ways to 
bring pressure on officials to act.111 Local officials relocated one of 
the main polluting plants, although the site still requires a large 
cleanup effort.112 Another case involves a waste incineration plant 
in Beijing municipality. A Chinese newspaper reported in February 
2011 that authorities in Haidian district, Beijing, cancelled con-
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struction of the incinerator reportedly because of its environmental 
impacts, citizen protests, and its close proximity to ‘‘high-end resi-
dential complexes.’’ 113 In addition, authorities in Dalian munici-
pality, Liaoning province, responded quickly to the more than 
10,000 people who protested a paraxylene (PX) plant in the city.114 
In contrast, in May, in Panyu district, Guangzhou municipality, 
Guangdong province, 5,000 citizens signed a petition to voice oppo-
sition to five incinerators. Authorities, however, counted the peti-
tion only as ‘‘one opposition vote’’ because the citizens did not pro-
vide their addresses and phone numbers on the petition.115 [See 
Access to Justice and Suppression of Citizen Demands for a Clean-
er Environment in this section for more examples of less responsive 
authorities in pollution cases.] 
Challenges of Enforcement, Compliance, and Official Corruption 
Uneven implementation and enforcement of environmental laws 
and regulations, along with non-compliance and corruption, remain 
significant challenges for the development of rule of law in the en-
vironmental sector, including in relation to environmental impact 
assessments. In September 2010, a study done by a Peking Univer-
sity professor reportedly noted that officials face difficulties in en-
forcing legal sanctions, that environmental criminal law remains 
weak, and that often a law’s overall objectives contradict the arti-
cles within the law.116 In addition, news reports indicated high lev-
els of bribery and corruption among officials in ecological and envi-
ronmental protection during the first six months of 2010.117 A 2010 
international study found that enforcement of pollution standards 
varied across time and location in China for a variety of reasons, 
including the level of support from central authorities, public pres-
sure, the level of commitment of local government officials, enforce-
ment capacity, the characteristics of businesses, and the economic 
context.118 In August 2011, the Ministry of Environmental Protec-
tion (MEP) announced at least two special programs to ‘‘supervise’’ 
seven sewage plants across China because they turned off their 
systems ‘‘without good reason’’ and eight power plants across China 
for fabricating emissions monitoring data.119 In June, five non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) sent a letter to the MEP noting 
that the Chinese Academy of Meteorological Sciences (CAMS) had 
given a ‘‘grade A environmental impact assessment’’ to a waste in-
cineration plant and reportedly had ‘‘falsified public feedback.’’ The 
letter urged officials to reject the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA), investigate and fine CAMS, and reform the EIA system.120 
The Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau had pre-
viously revoked a different CAMS EIA in May for ‘‘fabricated public 
feedback.’’ 121 One report suggests that of the 68 hydropower 
projects approved by local authorities in Zhouqu (Drugchu) county, 
Gannan (Kanlho) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Gansu province, 
67 had not undergone an EIA or geological assessment.122 In Au-
gust, one Chinese newspaper article outlined several alleged prob-
lems with the current EIA system, including low penalties for con-
struction companies that break the law, EIA organizations’ lack of 
integrity, difficulties in getting public information on EIAs, and the 
symbolic nature of public participation.123 One Chinese expert 
notes that ‘‘it is more common in China for the public wish to par-
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ticipate in environmental impact assessments to be thwarted.’’ 124 
An international NGO noted that a Chinese scholar reported that 
there are times when local government officials will protect pol-
luting businesses.125 A December 2010 joint Chinese and inter-
national report noted that from 2009 to 2010, ‘‘[l]ocal environ-
mental protection bureaus often failed to impose any fines or take 
other actions in response as required by law.’’ 126 For example, in 
Shaanxi province, local environmental protection bureau personnel 
on several occasions reportedly agreed to an electric power com-
pany’s requests for a delay in execution of penalties for com-
mencing regular operations without first gaining environmental ap-
provals.127 
Climate Change: Rule of Law and Public Participation 
China’s efforts to address climate change relate to the develop-
ment of the rule of law in China, the incorporation of public partici-
pation in policy processes, and cases of rights infringement. China 
surpassed the United States to become the world’s top emitter of 
carbon dioxide in 2007 128 and reportedly may become responsible 
for one-third to one-half of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions by 
2030.129 Top officials reportedly consider China to be vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change 130 and during this reporting year 
undertook a variety of actions 131 and laid out plans 132 to address 
the issue, including engaging in cooperative programs with the 
United States.133 Chinese leaders signed the UN Cancun Agree-
ments in December 2010,134 but as a developing country, China is 
not bound to reduce greenhouse gases under relevant international 
climate change agreements.135 Nevertheless, domestically, Chinese 
leaders included a carbon dioxide intensity reduction target of 17 
percent in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National 
Economic and Social Development.136 In addition, the National De-
velopment and Reform Commission (NDRC) reportedly established 
a working group to draft a climate change law,137 for which offi-
cials sought public comments between March and September 
2011.138 Despite the call for public input, the lack of transparency 
hinders public participation in climate change policy processes.139 
While in general, participation in policy processes is minimal,140 
citizens do engage in some activities addressing climate change. 
For example, 60 NGOs reportedly organized 20 events surrounding 
the NGO side event at the UN Climate Change Conference in 
Tianjin municipality and published a position paper on Chinese 
NGOs’ response to climate change, among other projects.141 In re-
cent years, citizen protests reportedly took place in Shanxi and 
Liaoning provinces, as well as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region, because of the lack of public input and the land requisition 
practices associated with experimental carbon capture projects to 
help mitigate carbon dioxide emissions in industrial processes.142 
[For additional cases of policies to promote use of renewable energy 
sources to address climate change that can be linked to cases of 
rights infringement, see Hydroelectric Dam and Water Project Con-
struction: Rights and Safety Controversies in this section.] 
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Data Reliability and Transparency: Climate Change 
Chinese leaders have pledged to improve data reliability and 
transparency related to energy and climate change. Nevertheless, 
they reportedly face significant challenges, such as obtaining from 
provinces comprehensive statistics on coal, transportation energy, 
coal-bed methane, biomass, and clean energy sectors.143 China is 
reportedly still developing the institutions and capacity to evaluate 
energy figures provided by provincial governments, some of which 
may have incentives to provide false information.144 Authorities 
specified in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on Na-
tional Economic and Social Development the intention to establish 
a greenhouse gas emissions statistical accounting system,145 which 
could improve data collection if implemented. In October 2010, a 
high-level NDRC official stated that China would begin greenhouse 
gas inventory pilot projects in provinces and cities and develop a 
publicly available greenhouse gas inventory database.146 Chinese 
leaders have indicated they would continue to rely on domestic 
monitoring, reporting, and verification of China’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and reduction data in relation to projects using domestic 
financing and technology.147 They reportedly stated their willing-
ness to share this information with the international community 148 
and to do their utmost to improve transparency.149 
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III. Development of the Rule of Law 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
Introduction 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment continued to tighten control over civil society organiza-
tions (CSOs) in part because of concern over ‘‘social stability’’ in the 
midst of international attention surrounding Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Liu Xiaobo and the political upheavals in the Middle East. 
Authorities harassed and, in many cases, detained individuals that 
officials deemed to be threats to ‘‘social stability’’; raided the offices 
and shut down the Web site of at least one organization that con-
ducted activities and projects that officials considered to be politi-
cally sensitive; continued to impose controls over the receipt of for-
eign funding; and held ‘‘consultations’’ with ‘‘troublesome’’ students. 
Though several localities, including Beijing, have introduced reform 
experiments aimed at simplifying the legal registration process for 
some CSOs,1 something that the southern Chinese city of 
Shenzhen, a special economic zone, had initiated during the pre-
vious reporting year, it is too early to assess whether such reforms 
will succeed in broadening the space for the development of civil so-
ciety. Some experts on Chinese civil society, however, have noted 
that the latest reforms could strengthen government control over 
which types of CSOs are allowed to operate in the country as part 
of an official effort to ‘‘manage’’ and ‘‘guide’’ the development of 
civil society. 
Background 
As the number of CSOs in China grows, their impact continues 
to be evident. Official government statistics indicate that the num-
ber of registered groups increased from 288,000 in 2004 to approxi-
mately 447,000 in the first quarter of 2011.2 Nevertheless, unoffi-
cial estimates for the total number of groups, including unregis-
tered grassroots organizations, range from 2 to 8 million.3 CSOs in 
China address a wide array of social issues, such as HIV/AIDS, 
women’s rights, worker rights, and environmental concerns. For ex-
ample, one CSO that focuses on labor issues has reportedly worked 
with an enterprise to help prepare migrants to adjust to life as fac-
tory workers in urban areas.4 Some organizations focus primarily 
on women’s rights issues, such as providing practical skills training 
for migrant women and legal aid to those in need.5 In October 
2010, a few Chinese CSOs jointly organized events to highlight en-
vironmental concerns and published a position paper addressing 
‘‘the civil society response to climate change.’’ 6 In November 2010, 
four CSOs released a joint statement warning that a new regula-
tion on the management of persons with mental illness in Zhejiang 
province could lead to serious human rights abuses.7 In addition, 
at present, there are reportedly at least 100 CSOs in China dedi-
cated to providing support to people living with HIV/AIDS; some of 
these organizations distribute educational pamphlets and promote 
the use of condoms.8 
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Still, many Chinese officials hold conflicting views of civil society 
organizations (CSOs). While acknowledging that CSOs serve a nec-
essary and helpful function as mediating mechanisms between the 
government and society, Chinese authorities also look upon many 
groups with suspicion, fearing that ‘‘Western countries have used 
non-governmental organizations extensively . . . to intervene in 
the internal affairs of other countries, create turmoil, and even sub-
vert the regimes of the host countries.’’ 9 China, one Chinese schol-
ar warned, ‘‘has to be vigilant about [Western intervention].’’ 10 As 
such, Chinese authorities allowed many CSOs that focus on pro-
viding basic social services to operate freely, and forcibly closed 
some that tried to form networks or carry out projects that the gov-
ernment considers to be ‘‘politically sensitive.’’ A former editor of 
the China Development Brief, an online newsletter which focuses 
on Chinese civil society, explained, one never knows ‘‘where the 
line is, and it does shift’’—for it is ‘‘civil society with Chinese char-
acteristics,’’ where groups are ‘‘light, not antagonistic and not push-
ing the envelope too far.’’ 11 
The Chinese government’s actions to harass and tighten control 
over CSOs operating in China contravene Chinese law and inter-
national conventions. China’s Constitution states that ‘‘citizens of 
the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech . . . of as-
sembly, of association . . . .’’ 12 Article 22 of the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights provides that: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association 
with others . . . no restrictions may be placed on the exer-
cise of this right other than those which are prescribed by 
law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety . . . .13 
Legal Framework and Government Controls 
The Chinese government imposes strict registration require-
ments for civil society organizations (CSOs). Under the 1998 Regu-
lations for Registration and Management of Social Organizations, 
an individual who wishes to organize a CSO in China must first 
obtain a sponsorship agreement from a government administration 
department in a relevant ‘‘trade, scientific or other professional 
area’’ at the appropriate level of government, at the county level or 
above, before registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA).14 
Groups that wish to operate locally must register with the cor-
responding local government administrative departments and local 
MCA units and those that wish to operate nationally must register 
with national departments and the MCA. In their role as spon-
soring agencies, the public administration departments are charged 
with supervising the CSOs that they register, including ‘‘record 
keeping with respect to establishment, modification, and closure of 
social organizations,’’ completing annual reviews of the organiza-
tions, and ‘‘applying disciplinary sanctions to organizations which 
fail to comply’’ with MCA regulations.15 
Such a dual management process has presented problems for 
various groups, as permission to organize is difficult to obtain from 
local sponsors who are sometimes reluctant to take on the burdens 
of supervisory responsibilities.16 Groups that fail to obtain permis-
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sion to organize are not protected under the law, and often face dif-
ficulties gaining trust among the general public.17 Many experts 
conclude that the cumbersome dual management requirement has 
had a chilling effect on Chinese civil society.18 During the 2011 re-
porting year, the Commission monitored the continued difficulties 
that CSOs face as they operate without official registration status. 
Some unregistered CSOs perform their services under dangerous 
circumstances, occasionally in the aftermath of natural disasters, 
and volunteers working under these organizations have reportedly 
been injured or even killed.19 In these instances, as one Chinese 
grassroots CSO worker explained, many CSOs working in difficult 
situations are unable to receive help from local governments since, 
without registration papers, local officials ‘‘cannot identify which 
groups are genuinely providing compassionate [services] and which 
groups are using compassionate [services] as a pretext for illicit ac-
tivities.’’ 20 
In other cases, some CSOs conducting services that the Chinese 
government considers to be politically sensitive attempt to avoid of-
ficial government registration requirements by registering as ‘‘com-
mercial entities’’ rather than as CSOs subject to the Chinese gov-
ernment’s targeted oversight, even though registering as ‘‘commer-
cial entities’’ means that these groups are subject to different tax 
schemes than government-registered CSOs.21 These groups risk be-
coming targets for harassment, as in the case of the Beijing 
Aizhixing Institute (Aizhixing), a public health advocacy organiza-
tion founded by public health researcher Wan Yanhai in 1994, or 
even closure, as the Open Constitution Initiative, or Gongmeng, ex-
perienced in 2009.22 
In Aizhixing’s case, authorities from the domestic security unit of 
the Beijing Public Security Bureau and the local taxation bureau 
entered the organization’s offices in December 2010 and took with 
them ‘‘three large suitcases full of documents’’ as part of an inspec-
tion into Aizhixing’s compliance with tax regulations.23 Authorities 
took materials with financial and project information, some dating 
back to 2002, including funding agreements (with attachments and 
financial and donor work reports), account books and vouchers, fi-
nancial and audit reports, documents related to Aizhixing’s prop-
erty and taxes, and bank statements.24 On March 11, 2011, Beijing 
officials demanded that Aizhixing remove from its Web site a letter 
addressed to President Hu Jintao from Chen Bingzhong, a former 
senior Chinese health official. In the letter, Chen called on the gov-
ernment to reveal information and hold accountable the officials 
who were reportedly responsible for the blood transfusion scandal 
that took place in Henan province in the 1990s, in which tens of 
thousands of people were reportedly infected with HIV.25 The letter 
specifically pointed out that two former high-ranking Henan pro-
vincial officials, Li Changchun and Li Keqiang, never faced any 
legal actions, and later received appointments to the highest policy-
making institution in China, the Communist Party Political Bu-
reau Standing Committee.26 In response to the request to remove 
the letter, Aizhixing asked the Beijing officials to demonstrate the 
legal basis for their demand. On March 15, 2011, without providing 
a reason, the Beijing municipal news department notified Aizhixing 
that Aizhixing’s Web site had been shut down.27 
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On April 4, 2011, authorities in Linquan county, Anhui province, 
physically injured public health advocate Chang Kun, as he pre-
sided over an annual meeting of the AIBO Youth Center, an orga-
nization that he founded in May 2010 to ‘‘provide a place for stu-
dents to gather and also act as a venue for carrying out health, 
human rights, policy, and internet freedom education projects,’’ ac-
cording to Chinese Human Rights Defenders.28 One of Chang’s con-
tacts in the United States recounted that ‘‘thugs broke into the 
room where Chang was speaking, knocked him from the podium 
and beat him severely.’’ 29 Chang reportedly was unconscious for a 
few hours after the beating.30 The same local authorities who in-
jured Chang reportedly visited his organization a few days before 
the conference and destroyed several signs outside of his office as 
well as his video camera.31 
During this reporting year, a number of Chinese media organiza-
tions reportedly received a ‘‘propaganda directive’’ from the Com-
munist Party Central Propaganda Department instructing them to 
avoid using the term ‘‘civil society’’ (gongmin shehui).32 Media out-
lets that received the notice reportedly included the Southern Met-
ropolitan Daily, Southern Weekend, and the 21st Century Business 
Herald.33 Though some Chinese officials hold a generally sus-
picious view of civil society groups and their potential to challenge 
the government’s authority,34 the specific reasons, rationale, and 
geographic reach of such a reported ban remain unclear in this in-
stance, and it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of such a 
ban if propaganda authorities did, indeed, pursue its implementa-
tion fully.35 The China Media Project, an organization based at the 
University of Hong Kong that analyzes media trends in China, 
noted in a January 2011 analysis that the term ‘‘civil society’’ con-
tinued to appear in various publications after the reported release 
of the ban, but the People’s Daily has apparently made no ref-
erence to it since April 2009.36 Some Chinese publications, accord-
ing to the China Media Project’s analysis, attempted to circumvent 
the reported ban by using the term ‘‘public society’’ (gonggong 
shehui) instead of ‘‘civil society’’ (gongmin shehui).37 
Funding Difficulties and Proposed Regulatory Changes 
During this reporting year, Chinese academics, representatives of 
NGOs and foundations, and media reports continued to emphasize 
the need to expand the space for charitable foundations to develop 
in China.38 At present, there are 2,243 foundations in China,39 and 
they are classified as either ‘‘private’’ (fei gongmu jijin hui) or ‘‘pub-
lic’’ (gongmu jijin hui) foundations. ‘‘Private’’ foundations are not 
permitted to solicit donations through public fundraising activities, 
and media sources indicate that they continue to face operational 
hardships.40 ‘‘Private’’ foundations may become ‘‘public’’ founda-
tions, which are permitted to solicit donations through public fund-
raising activities, only if they can find government department 
sponsors and meet other required criteria, including specific levels 
of operating funds—reportedly 8 million yuan (US$1,236,000) for 
foundations to operate at the national level and 4 million 
(US$618,000) at the municipal level.41 Practically speaking, how-
ever, as one China Daily article reported, many foundations find it 
difficult to find sponsors ‘‘willing to take responsibility for them,’’ 
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and, for overseas charities operating in China, ‘‘99 percent of 
[them] . . . do not have legal identity because no government de-
partment wants to be affiliated with them.’’ 42 The lack of trans-
parency reportedly has also posed problems in the charity sector, 
as donors have complained that, at times, not enough information 
is available on how the funds were appropriated.43 
In part as a response to concerns over the difficulties that foun-
dations face in raising funds and questions over their operational 
transparency, among others, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) 
has reportedly drafted revisions to the 2004 Regulation on the 
Management of Foundations (Foundations Regulations).44 No infor-
mation is available on when these revisions will be issued, but one 
Chinese media source reported that it would be sometime before 
the end of 2011.45 Additional Chinese media reports indicate that 
the proposed regulations would: 
• Abolish the ‘‘dual management’’ system governing founda-
tions and allow private foundations to register directly with 
local MCA departments; 46 
• Require foundations to submit to audits by the MCA; 47 
• Make clear that both donors and the public share the same 
right to be able to ‘‘inquire’’ about a foundation’s use of dona-
tions; 48 
• Forbid foundations from increasing their total investments 
by more than 10 percent of the foundation’s total assets from 
the end of the previous year (Article 40); 49 
• Require private foundations to derive at least 70 percent of 
a given year’s total donations from the foundation’s ‘‘primary 
benefactor’’ (Article 37); 50 and 
• Prohibit foundations from ‘‘providing financial aid to unreg-
istered NGOs, cooperating with unregistered NGOs on develop-
ment programs, and absorbing new members’’ (Article 47).51 
Some private foundations and scholars have reportedly expressed 
concerns about the revisions. In particular, they believe that Article 
37 would restrict their ability to develop and tie them down to the 
primary benefactor, thereby restricting their independence.52 Oth-
ers have pointed out that Article 40 would compel the top 100 foun-
dations in China to cut their investments by at least half.53 In ad-
dition, some foundations argue that the restrictions delineated in 
Article 47 would ‘‘cut off the artery of support’’ for the estimated 
1 to 8 million CSOs operating in ‘‘gray zones’’—many of which de-
pend on foundations for funding.54 
The Legislative Affairs Office (LAO) of the State Council is also 
reportedly reviewing a draft of a national charities law.55 While a 
complete draft does not appear to be available publicly—thus mak-
ing it difficult to assess its scope and potential effectiveness—the 
China Daily has described several elements of the pending law’s 
content.56 In July 2010, the LAO reportedly released a ‘‘structure’’ 
of the draft, revealing that the proposed legislation, which report-
edly has three main goals, would: 57 
• Adjust the tax deduction and registration systems to give 
charities a more open and ‘‘regular’’ operating space; 58 
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• ‘‘Confine the power and responsibility of the government’’ in 
order to maintain the ‘‘voluntary and civil positions in the 
charity sector’’; 59 and 
• ‘‘Request’’ that charities are managed in a more ‘‘public and 
transparent way’’ in order to enhance their credibility.’’ 60 
Director Zhu Weiguo of the LAO revealed that defining the con-
cept of charity is difficult, and that a number of issues must be re-
searched regarding ‘‘charity organizations, charity fundraising, 
charity volunteer services, charity trusts, charity taxation systems, 
and the credibility and transparency of charities.’’ 61 Zhu also as-
serted that the primary actors in charities should be civilians and 
not government officials, and stipulated that the draft law on char-
ities must clearly distinguish the roles of government, industry, 
and society in philanthropic work.62 
Limited Reform in Several Localities 
During this reporting year, the Commission monitored official 
statements and media reports indicating that Beijing and Shanghai 
municipalities have introduced measures to ‘‘create a new model of 
development’’ for civil society organizations (CSOs) and to ease reg-
istration difficulties.63 The regulatory changes appear to reflect ele-
ments in the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National 
Economic and Social Development (12th Five-Year Plan).64 In par-
ticular, Chapter 39 of the 12th Five-Year Plan delineates the gov-
ernment’s goal to ‘‘improve social organization management,’’ and 
establish a sound social organization management system featuring 
unified registration65 and to ‘‘give priority to developing economic 
[organizations], public interest charity [organizations], civilian-run 
non-enterprise units, and urban and rural community social organi-
zations.’’ 66 One media report stated that, beginning in February 
2011, four types of CSOs in Beijing would be allowed to ‘‘register 
directly with the MCA.’’ 67 The four types include groups that carry 
out commercial, charity, social welfare, and social services activi-
ties.68 The report also mentioned the MCA’s goal to establish and 
improve the registration and management systems, enhance its su-
pervision over the daily activities and management of CSOs, and 
perfect the CSOs’ practices on information disclosure as well as 
their public commitment.69 
In addition, Shanghai municipal government officials signed the 
Cooperative Agreement To Formally Initiate the Building of a Na-
tional Model Civil Administration (Shanghai-MCA Agreement) in 
July 2010,70 an agreement that, according to one scholar on Chi-
nese civil society, may ‘‘establish a friendlier environment for reg-
istration of CSOs’’ in Shanghai.71 The MCA document addressing 
the changes in Shanghai stated that, as the foreground of China’s 
reform and opening up, the city has a responsibility and the capac-
ity to be the ‘‘front guard of civil affairs reform and innovation.’’ 72 
As such, the document indicated that the city will ‘‘launch a new 
‘one-stop shop’ method of government service’’ and ‘‘construct a sys-
tem for the government to purchase services from social organiza-
tions.’’ 73 Another government document, released by the Shanghai 
municipal government on July 5, 2011, described eight general 
areas of cooperation between Shanghai and the MCA as delineated 
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in the Shanghai-MCA Agreement.74 The document stated that the 
Shanghai government would establish a ‘‘scientific mechanism’’ for 
social assistance; promote ‘‘general benefit-type social welfare and 
charity undertakings’’; reform the community management system 
and service mechanism; create innovative models for the develop-
ment of CSOs; advance the building of a modern system of social 
work; enhance the management of social affairs and standard of so-
cial services; strengthen modern technology and its standard appli-
cations; and refine mechanisms to ensure advances in modern civil 
administration.75 
The changes in Beijing and Shanghai appear to mirror develop-
ments in the Shenzhen special economic zone, where in July 2009 
the Shenzhen government and the MCA signed the Cooperative 
Agreement on Pushing Forward With Integrated Reforms to Civil 
Affairs Undertakings (Shenzhen-MCA Agreement). As the Commis-
sion detailed in its 2010 annual report, the Shenzhen-MCA Agree-
ment delineates a deepening of reforms concerning the registration 
and management of social organizations.76 It calls for Shenzhen to 
‘‘take the lead in experimenting with some of the MCA’s major re-
form projects and measures,’’ and to ‘‘explore establishing a system 
whereby civil society organizations apply and register directly with 
the [MCA].’’ 77 According to one study, of the 81 CSOs registered 
in Shenzhen from January to September 2010, 42 reportedly reg-
istered directly with the MCA.78 
‘‘Guiding’’ Civil Society Development 
Some experts on Chinese civil society in China and abroad have 
cautioned that the latest reform efforts, while helpful to many 
grassroots organizations providing various kinds of social services, 
could also strengthen government control over which types of CSOs 
are allowed to operate in the country. An editor of a domestic Chi-
nese magazine that focuses on civil society told a Hong Kong news-
paper that ‘‘while there will be more social areas available for non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) to take part in, these NGOs 
must also have a better relationship with the government and fol-
low government leadership.’’ 79 Another Chinese expert added that 
‘‘the NGOs dealing with rights advocacy will certainly face more 
regulations.’’ 80 Even as reform efforts move forward in different lo-
calities in China, a People’s Daily article described the new guiding 
principle as ‘‘wide approval, strict control.’’ 81 During a speech ad-
dressing the topic of ‘‘social management,’’ Zhou Yongkang, a Polit-
buro Standing Committee member and the Secretary of the Com-
munist Party’s Central Committee Political and Legal Affairs Com-
mission, stated: 
. . . in fostering comprehensive social organizations, we 
must work hard to integrate various types of social organi-
zations into a social organization system led by the Party 
Committee and the government . . . in the management of 
social organizations, [we must] establish a system of sepa-
rate development and separate management to promote 
the healthy and orderly development of social organiza-
tions . . . in the management of foreign non-governmental 
organizations engaged in activities in China, we must es-
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tablish a unified management mechanism to ensure legiti-
mate exchanges and cooperation and strengthen manage-
ment according to the law.82 
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INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 
Introduction 
China’s political system is dominated by the Communist Party, 
and Party organizations extend into and influence every sector of 
society. There is limited participation by non-Party members in po-
litical decisions. During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, Chi-
nese authorities intensified Party-building efforts and efforts to 
strengthen controls over society in the name of improving ‘‘com-
prehensive management of public security’’ and ‘‘safeguarding sta-
bility.’’ Leaders launched a widespread crackdown to thwart citi-
zens’ attempts to gather for peaceful demonstrations around the 
country, dubbed ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests by the organizers, which in-
cluded advocating for democratic reforms. Leaders continued to 
have little tolerance for outspoken democracy advocates. Authori-
ties continued to voice support for enhanced accountability, ‘‘open 
government affairs,’’ and greater public participation, although im-
plementation of various measures was sporadic. The central gov-
ernment encouraged pilot grassroots-level ‘‘democratic manage-
ment’’ programs, partially to reduce corruption, improve relations 
between officials and citizens, promote transparency, and encour-
age ‘‘democratic’’ public participation. While village elections for 
‘‘village committees’’ have spread throughout China, their imple-
mentation remains problematic. Corruption remained a serious 
problem at all levels, and the central government issued the first 
‘‘white paper’’ on corruption and reportedly strengthened 
anticorruption efforts. 
China’s One-Party State and Political Control 
During this reporting year, Communist Party leaders accelerated 
efforts to reinvigorate the Party’s dominance and involvement in all 
sectors of society. July 1, 2011, marked the 90th anniversary of the 
founding of the Party, which reportedly had nearly 80.3 million 
members by the end of 2010 1 and has established more than 3.79 
million committees and branches throughout the country.2 These 
organizations exert influence over every sector of society, including 
villages and urban neighborhoods,3 as well as most enterprises,4 
public service organizations (including hospitals, schools, and re-
search institutes),5 government departments, and quasi-govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations.6 Chinese leaders con-
tinued to insist upon the leading role of the Party and the infusion 
of Party principles in various sectors including ‘‘managing talent’’ 
(human resources), education, and the media.7 This reporting year, 
Party officials focused Party-building efforts on urban residents’ 
committees,8 law firms, schools,9 and rural residents.10 
Increasing Social Controls in the Name of ‘‘Safeguarding Social 
Stability’’ 
Chinese government and Party officials expanded social controls, 
especially mechanisms to monitor citizens and groups, in the name 
of strengthening ‘‘comprehensive management of public security’’ 11 
and ‘‘safeguarding social stability.’’ Authorities also appeared to 
link social control strategies with service provision, whereby out-
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reach to citizens would involve both service provision and ‘‘manage-
ment’’ tasks.12 In July 2011, the Information Office of the State 
Council noted that officials across China had opened 2,842 govern-
ment affairs service centers at the provincial, autonomous prefec-
tural, and municipal levels, and 25,000 (rural) township and 
(urban) street service centers.13 In November 2010, central govern-
ment and Party officials issued an opinion about strengthening 
urban Party-affiliated resident committees that noted the growing 
role for the committees in ‘‘safeguarding social stability.’’ 14 In addi-
tion, local and sector-specific officials implemented measures ex-
panding controls over society: 
• In Beijing, authorities appear to be encouraging volunteers 
to monitor their fellow citizens; they are expected to play a 
‘‘leading’’ role in ‘‘comprehensive management’’ by providing in-
formation and reports related to ‘‘stability,’’ sometimes for a 
monetary reward.15 
• In March 2011, authorities in Shanghai reportedly began to 
establish Party organizations in some commercial buildings to 
monitor activities, as a part of implementing local regulations 
on ‘‘comprehensive management.’’ 16 The regulations are also 
the first to incorporate directives monitoring the Internet into 
the city’s ‘‘comprehensive management’’ system.17 
• Zhejiang provincial 18 and Shenzhen municipality 19 authori-
ties initiated measures to control the movements of ‘‘critical 
personnel’’ (zhongdian renshi). Zhejiang includes in this cat-
egory persons involved in ‘‘rights defense’’ activities, petitioners 
who take their grievances to higher administrative levels, and 
those suspected of ‘‘creating instability.’’ 20 
• Education authorities strengthened the ‘‘student security in-
formant’’ system, which reportedly operates covertly on cam-
puses to safeguard stability, and the ‘‘student informant sys-
tem,’’ 21 which authorities use to monitor the political expres-
sion and behavior of students and teachers.22 One school bul-
letin board posting reportedly disclosed that students who cele-
brated Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Peace Prize award would not be eli-
gible for scholarships.23 Peking University reportedly banned 
students from copying sensitive materials including those crit-
ical of the Party,24 and announced plans to arrange consulta-
tions for ‘‘troublesome students,’’ including students with ‘‘rad-
ical thoughts’’ who hold critical views of the university’s man-
agement or who complained about policy changes.25 
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2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors 
Authorities conducted a largely preventative crackdown amid calls for 
nonviolent, ‘‘Jasmine’’ protests in various cities in China. Authorities 
prevented some citizens from exercising their constitutional right 26 to 
freedom of assembly, association, and speech, as well as to advocate for 
change including democratic reforms. [For more information on the 2011 
crackdown, see Section II—Freedom of Expression and Section II— 
Criminal Justice.] Beginning in mid-February after the protests in the 
Middle East and North Africa, weekly calls for peaceful ‘‘Jasmine’’ pro-
tests in China to take place each Sunday appeared online, urging citi-
zens to ‘‘stroll’’ around designated areas at designated times, in a gradu-
ally increasing number of cities.27 The original anonymous statement 
circulated in China, also sent to and posted by an international Web 
site, Boxun, urged Chinese citizens to demonstrate for democratic re-
forms and against alleged corruption in China among other issues.28 On 
February 19, 2011, a few days after the appearance of the first online 
call for protests, and amid commemoration of 20 years of ‘‘comprehen-
sive management of social order’’ work launched in 1991,29 top Chinese 
officials held a seminar for key provincial and ministry-level leaders. At 
the meeting, President Hu Jintao outlined eight main tasks for leaders 
to strengthen ‘‘social management.’’ 30 According to the South China 
Morning Post, government-controlled newspapers including the Beijing 
Daily, the Jiefang Daily, and the Shanghai Morning Post issued front 
page articles warning against mass gatherings 31 and emphasizing the 
need to strengthen ‘‘social management’’ and ‘‘safeguard social harmony 
and stability.’’ 32 
Authorities have reportedly arrested, detained, ‘‘disappeared,’’ put 
under ‘‘soft detention,’’ or otherwise harassed over 200 citizens, writers, 
scholars, and political reform advocates since mid-February.33 Those ar-
rested included Chen Wei,34 Ding Mao,35 and Ran Yunfei.36 Relevant 
central or local authorities also reportedly: 
• Censored words and phrases related to the unrest in the Middle 
East and North Africa, and related to the word ‘‘Jasmine’’; 37 
• Declared jasmine flowers to be contraband and instructed at 
least one flower vendor in Beijing municipality to report on people 
seeking to purchase the flowers; 38 
• Urged some church followers not to join mass gatherings; 39 
• Detained two students in Chongqing municipality for posting 
news of the ‘‘Jasmine’’ protest strolls online, prevented some stu-
dents from leaving certain campuses at specific times, issued notices 
asking students to stay away from sensitive areas, and warned stu-
dents not to hold any collective gathering in order to avoid a mis-
understanding; 40 
• Presented a strong showing of security personnel and equipment 
at locations in municipalities designated as ‘‘Jasmine’’ rally sites 41 
and used water trucks to flood streets and sidewalks at those 
sites; 42 
• Closed some subway entrances and businesses near rally sites; 43 
• Assaulted at least 2 foreign journalists, detained more than 12 
international reporters in Shanghai and Beijing, and warned jour-
nalists in Beijing not to carry out interviews without permission; 44 
and 
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2011 Crackdown: From Reform Advocates to Flower Vendors— 
Continued 
• Disrupted mobile phone services.45 
Chinese authorities reportedly pressured European missions and 
interfered in at least 60 activities organized by the U.S. Embassy in Bei-
jing between February and April leading to their cancellation, including 
‘‘cultural forums, school programs, [and] ambassadorial visits.’’ 46 The 
Ministry of Education reportedly warned Chinese academics not to co-
operate with groups that promote democracy while they are abroad and 
have stepped up scrutiny of nonprofit groups, especially those that re-
ceive funding from the United States or the European Union.47 
Official Actions Against Democracy Advocates 
Authorities continued to detain, arrest, and impose sentences on 
democracy advocates who exercised their right to freedom of assem-
bly, speech, movement, and association guaranteed in China’s Con-
stitution and under international human rights standards. Authori-
ties imposed a 10-year sentence on Liu Xianbin for ‘‘inciting sub-
version of state power’’ for writing and posting overseas articles 
that advocated for democratization, criticized Party rule, and sup-
ported the development of a ‘‘strong opposition organization.’’ 48 In 
October 2010, officials in Wuhan city, Hubei province, arrested the 
prolific blogger Li Tie on charges of subversion.49 As of September 
2011, news stories have not provided information regarding his 
sentence. Authorities in Qianjiang city, Hubei province, also de-
tained, held incommunicado, illegally confined to his home, or de-
nied basic utilities to former local people’s congress delegate and 
elections expert Yao Lifa on at least seven occasions over the past 
reporting year, sometimes for a few days and other times for 
months.50 Amid the appearance of numerous ‘‘independent can-
didates’’ for local people’s congress elections, authorities took Yao 
into custody on June 20 without charging him, and had not re-
leased him as of early August 2011.51 
Intraparty Democracy and High-Level Debate Regarding Reform 
China’s political institutions do not comply with the standards 
defined in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights,52 which China has signed and declared an intention 
to ratify.53 Nor do China’s political institutions comply with the 
standards outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.54 These standards provide universal rights to freely choose 
accountable representatives through free and monitored elections, 
as well as protection for freedom of expression, assembly, and asso-
ciation. In China, however, the Communist Party continues to 
dominate government and allows only limited independent political 
participation. Chinese leaders maintain that intraparty democracy 
should come before democracy in society more widely.55 The notion 
of intraparty democracy has been a part of the Communist Party’s 
basic institutional design since 1956.56 
During the reporting period, official documents and statements 
continued to include vague support for undefined ‘‘democratic’’ 
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processes and reforms. At the same time, in September 2011, offi-
cials issued a white paper titled ‘‘China’s Peaceful Development’’ 
that states, ‘‘China is firm in upholding its core interests which in-
clude . . . China’s political system established by the Constitution 
and overall social stability. . . .’’ 57 This is the first time officials 
have designated the current political system as a ‘‘core interest.’’ 58 
A Communist Party communique issued in October 2010 empha-
sized that ‘‘[g]reat impetus should be given to economic system re-
form, while vigorous yet steady efforts should be made to promote 
political restructuring.’’ 59 The PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year 
Plan on National Economic and Social Development (12th Five- 
Year Plan) describes plans to ‘‘develop democracy and promote so-
cialist political culture development,’’ without providing specifics.60 
Premier Wen Jiabao continued to assert the need for undefined po-
litical reforms including in an August 2010 statement declaring 
that ‘‘[w]ithout political reform, China may lose what it has already 
achieved through economic restructuring and the targets of its 
modernization drive might not be reached.’’ 61 State press reports, 
however, criticized calls for rapid democratic reforms in an appar-
ent refutation of some of Wen’s remarks.62 Other officials appeared 
to criticize ideological pluralism and emphasize the need for China 
to maintain a ‘‘correct political orientation.’’ 63 At the March 2011 
National People’s Congress (NPC) annual meeting, Wu Bangguo, 
the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, said China would 
not ‘‘copy’’ western-style political systems.64 An October 2010 Peo-
ple’s Daily editorial reiterated that political development should 
proceed along a ‘‘correct political direction . . . . [P]olitical struc-
tural reform is not to weaken, but to strengthen and improve the 
Party’s leadership . . . .’’ 65 
Local People’s Congress Elections and Criticism of ‘‘Independent 
Candidates’’ 
Communist Party members continue to dominate local people’s 
congress elections, but the congresses reportedly are no longer the 
‘‘rubber stamps’’ they were in the past. Only township and county 
congress delegates are elected by the public, so higher level con-
gresses are not elected by ordinary citizens. In May 2009, an inter-
national researcher noted that Party members make up approxi-
mately 65 percent of township congresses and approximately 70 
percent of congresses above this level.66 In October 2010, the NPC 
Standing Committee passed revisions to the 1992 Deputies Law of 
the National People’s Congress and Various Levels of Local Peo-
ple’s Congresses of the People’s Republic of China.67 According to 
an official news source, the revisions will help to better protect del-
egates’ rights to information and more clearly define their rights 
and duties.68 
Central officials appeared to discourage and prevent ‘‘inde-
pendent candidates’’ from running in local people’s congress elec-
tions. While 10 or more citizens may nominate a candidate, some-
times resulting in a large number of ‘‘voter-nominated candidates,’’ 
i.e., ‘‘independent candidates,’’ in the early stages of election activi-
ties, by the time election day arrives, most such candidates report-
edly are winnowed out.69 Several articles in Party-affiliated news-
papers warned of the dangers of including ‘‘independent can-
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didates’’ in elections after blogger and writer Li Chengping, from 
Chengdu city, Sichuan province, gained more than 2.9 million fol-
lowers on the Internet when he declared his candidacy.70 Subse-
quently, more than 100 such candidates reportedly declared their 
candidacy online.71 In May 2011, in Xinyu city, Jiangxi province, 
security personnel from an enterprise reportedly held local ‘‘inde-
pendent candidates’’ Liu Ping, Wei Zhongping, and Li Sihua to pre-
vent them from campaigning or participating in a district-level 
election.72 The three were released shortly after the election took 
place.73 Officials also reportedly detained Du Quanbing, who trav-
eled to Xinyu to observe the election proceedings.74 In late June, 
news stories reported additional harassment of ‘‘independent can-
didates’’ and their families.75 A May article in the Party-affiliated 
Global Times noted that ‘‘independent candidates’’ could play a 
positive role, but also asserted that it was not suitable to allow 
candidates who held opinions different from those of the current 
political system to run; and that such candidates would bring ‘‘even 
more turbulence, threatening the cohesion of the nation.’’ 76 
Village Elections and ‘‘Democratic Management’’ Projects 
TRENDS IN VILLAGE ELECTIONS AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE 
DEVELOPMENTS 
While village elections have spread to all provinces and most vil-
lages in China, they reportedly continue to be plagued by official 
interference, corruption,77 and, in at least one case, violence.78 Cor-
ruption problems reportedly include such things as election brib-
ery 79 and gift-giving in exchange for votes.80 One example of offi-
cial interference occurred in July 2010 in a village in Fangshan, a 
suburban district in Beijing; officials there reportedly interfered 
with vote counting, allegedly upon orders of the incumbent village 
leader, leading to a standoff with villagers.81 Fangshan officials 
called in 200 police, who then detained several villagers, some for 
reportedly ‘‘obstructing traffic.’’ 82 
In October 2010, the NPC Standing Committee passed revisions 
to the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees,83 which 
clarified election and recall procedures.84 The revisions stipulate 
that every village must establish a ‘‘supervisory committee’’ or 
similar organization,85 which may permanently alter the distribu-
tion of power among village-governing organizations, possibly rein-
ing in the power of village committees. The ‘‘supervisory commit-
tees’’ are intended to promote a more ‘‘harmonious society,’’ prevent 
corruption, and deepen ‘‘open village affairs’’ and ‘‘democratic man-
agement.’’ 86 The deputy minister of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
noted in November 2010 that 85 percent of the country’s villages 
had already established supervisory committees or their equiva-
lent.87 Some news articles note that villages are now governed by 
‘‘three committees’’ (Party, village, and supervisory committees).88 
In general, it appears that the Party committee makes decisions, 
the village committee implements those decisions, and the super-
visory committee oversees the decisions.89 However, relative au-
thority among the three committees, as well as other village orga-
nizations, may vary from village to village. The revisions also ap-
pear to provide a stronger legal foundation for the authority of ‘‘vil-
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lager representative assemblies.’’ 90 Provincial-level authorities in 
at least three provinces (Guangdong, Hubei, and Qinghai) revised 
regulations governing village committee and/or urban resident com-
mittee elections, which for the first time stipulate the establish-
ment of official Party- and government-sponsored election observer 
systems.91 It is unclear whether officials will tolerate non-govern-
mental monitoring activities. 
Major trends in grassroots governance highlight the efforts of the 
Party to strengthen control at the grassroots level and central au-
thorities’ efforts to improve the competence of village officials. 
Higher level authorities continued to encourage the same person to 
serve as village Party secretary and village committee head, revers-
ing the trend started in the late 1980s to separate Party and gov-
ernment positions.92 While this development may reduce perceived 
conflict over power in villages,93 it strengthens Party control and 
may also decrease competition for and oversight of authority. This 
development highlights the importance of the order in which Party 
and village committee elections take place. Authorities reportedly 
sought to enhance village-level accountability and improve the com-
petence 94 of local officials in a variety of ways, including increasing 
salary levels,95 using college graduates 96 and ‘‘extra-payroll’’ offi-
cials,97 and incorporating Party members ‘‘without a post’’ or ‘‘old’’ 
Party members as ‘‘senators’’ into village governing processes to 
promote more ‘‘harmonious’’ relations and to improve decision-
making processes.98 In some localities, by the end of 2010, a great-
er percentage of elected village and Party leaders reportedly had 
higher educational and professional skill levels than in the past.99 
‘‘DIFFICULT VILLAGES’’ AND ‘‘DEMOCRATIC MANAGEMENT’’ PROJECTS 
Likely in response to growing discontent and erosion of Com-
munist Party legitimacy at the grassroots level, central and local 
authorities continued programs to ‘‘transform’’ so-called ‘‘difficult 
villages’’ and to implement ‘‘democratic management’’ projects. Pro-
grams to rectify ‘‘difficult villages’’ 100 (i.e., villages where tensions 
between citizens and officials are present, where people’s aspira-
tions and demands have not been met, or where there are unre-
solved economic or social problems, among other problems) 101 re-
portedly are basically complete.102 During this reporting year, 
‘‘democratic management’’ pilot projects in some localities focused 
on strengthening the role of the Party at the grassroots level, pro-
moting economic development, and improving participation and 
transparency while ‘‘safeguarding stability.’’ 103 Hebei, Guangdong, 
Hunan, Shaanxi, and other provinces issued ‘‘open village affairs’’ 
or similar regulations to accomplish these goals.104 Some villages 
also established ‘‘villager financial management groups,’’ 105 ‘‘trans-
parent account book systems,’’ 106 or ‘‘Sunshine Village Affairs 
Projects.’’ 107 The effects of most of these pilot projects remain un-
clear, and one Chinese researcher believes most to be transitory.108 
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Accountability and Transparency: Party and Government Reforms 
BUILDING A ‘‘RULE BY LAW GOVERNMENT,’’ ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
OFFICIAL EVALUATION SYSTEM REFORM 
The State Council and the National People’s Congress (NPC) con-
tinued or initiated policy measures to enhance government account-
ability. At the annual meetings of the NPC and the Chinese Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference in March 2011, Wu Bangguo 
reportedly promised that the NPC would enhance accountability 
through its work on supervision of the government, especially in 
the areas of ‘‘low-income housing, government budgets, education 
reform, and strengthening primary-level courts and procura 
torates.’’ 109 In November 2010, the State Council issued the Opin-
ion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Government That 
Rules by Law. The Opinion points out several problems that need 
to be addressed, including increasing ‘‘social contradictions’’ in 
some localities and fields, ‘‘mass incidents’’ occurring with some fre-
quency, ‘‘corruption in some fields,’’ ‘‘unjust law enforcement,’’ and 
‘‘negligible or arbitrary administration.’’ 110 The Opinion calls for 
deeper reforms, stronger institutions, enhanced government super-
vision, restriction of administrative powers, and ‘‘a government 
ruled by law.’’ 111 On June 30, the NPC Standing Committee adopt-
ed the PRC Law on Administrative Coercion, which will come into 
force on January 1, 2012, after a 12-year drafting process. The law 
is meant to resolve the problems of official infringement of citizens’ 
legal rights and weak enforcement of regulatory instruments by 
government agencies, according to an official with the NPC Stand-
ing Committee Legislative Affairs Commission as reported by the 
Beijing Review.112 In July, news reports indicated that the revi-
sions of the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law had ad-
vanced to the legislative planning phase and that it is possible the 
revisions will expand the scope of administrative reconsideration 
cases to be accepted in the future.113 The revised PRC State Com-
pensation Law, which came into effect on December 1, 2010, could, 
if implemented, provide citizens more opportunities to obtain com-
pensation when government officials violate their rights.114 
There have been both potentially encouraging and seemingly 
unconstructive developments in official evaluation system reforms. 
Authorities plan to revise official professional evaluation standards 
based on a new system that takes regional economic, geographical, 
and social differences into account.115 The new standards could 
lead to greater accountability because they could reduce incentives 
for falsifying information given to higher level officials to improve 
promotion chances. Official responsibility and evaluation systems 
sometimes provide incentives to suppress citizens who want to take 
their grievances to higher level authorities.116 One Chinese edi-
torial pointed out the dangers of incorporating ‘‘stability preserva-
tion’’ into cadre evaluation systems, because officials may put ‘‘safe-
guarding stability’’ above everything else or seek to ‘‘control peti-
tions’’ and, as a result, cover up problems.117 One document indi-
cates officials in one county can be marked down for collective peti-
tions received at higher levels of government and for the number 
of ‘‘unsafe political incidents that affect national security.’’ 118 In 
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one case, authorities said they would withhold grain subsidies if 
citizens made complaints to higher level officials.119 
Accountability and Corruption 
CORRUPTION 
Corruption reportedly remains high, and Premier Wen Jiabao re-
cently emphasized that corruption poses a significant danger to 
Communist Party rule.120 Corruption also reportedly continues to 
be one of the top concerns of Chinese citizens.121 During this re-
porting year, official discipline inspection and supervision entities 
reported receiving over 1 million accusations and complaints 
against officials from citizens between January and December 
2010.122 Authorities reportedly opened 7,349 malfeasance and 
rights infringement cases perpetrated by 10,227 government offi-
cials in 2010; 3,508 of these cases were considered major or seri-
ous.123 
MEASURES TO CURB CORRUPTION AND PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Chinese authorities took regulatory steps to address corrup-
tion,124 and in December 2010 the State Council issued China’s 
first white paper on corruption titled ‘‘China’s Efforts To Combat 
Corruption and Build a Clean Government.’’ 125 Prior to that, on 
December 8, 2010, top Party and government authorities jointly 
issued the Provisions on Economic Responsibility Audits for Chief 
Leading Cadres of the Party and the Government and Executives 
of State-Owned Enterprises, which seek to strengthen supervision 
and management of cadres.126 In addition, on December 15, 2010, 
authorities issued the Provisions Regarding Implementation of the 
Responsibility System for Construction of an Honest Party and a 
Clean Government.127 In February 2011, the NPC Standing Com-
mittee amended the PRC Criminal Law to criminalize the giving 
of items of value to an official of a foreign government or inter-
national organization in order to obtain an improper commercial 
benefit. The amendment went into effect on May 1, 2011.128 Au-
thorities issued a new anti-bribery law that went into effect in May 
and will apply to state-owned enterprises and private compa-
nies.129 In July, top Party and government officials issued the Pro-
visions Regarding Rural Village Grassroots Officials’ Honest Per-
formance of Duties (Trial Implementation), which prohibit 41 spe-
cific types of behavior of grassroots officials, including ‘‘partici-
pating in, coddling, or supporting criminal syndicates or evil forces’’ 
and ‘‘violating stipulations by seizing and taking citizens’ money or 
property, or by penalizing citizens.’’ 130 
Authorities also took limited steps to encourage reporting of cor-
ruption and to protect whistleblowers. Protections for whistle-
blowers, however, are insufficient and authorities have discouraged 
independent anticorruption Web sites. The Supreme People’s Court 
and provincial courts reportedly established corruption reporting 
Web sites.131 Revisions to the PRC Law on Administrative Super-
vision require authorities to inform a person who files a ‘‘real- 
name’’ report about the results of the corresponding inquiry. A new 
section stipulates that officials must keep confidential the informa-
tion they collect about citizens who provide tips.132 According to 
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the Legal Daily, 70 percent or more of the cases of work-related of-
fenses filed with procuratorate offices initially involved a tip from 
a citizen.133 According to material from the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate reported by the Legal Daily, 70 percent of the people 
who filed tips with procuratorate offices were subject to some form 
of retribution.134 In July, court officials in Tengzhou city, Shandong 
province, rejected an appeal by journalist Qi Chonghuai, known for 
his official corruption expose´s, sending him to prison for eight years 
on the charge of embezzlement.135 This follows the four-year sen-
tence he had already completed after being convicted of extortion 
and blackmail following his posting of stories online about alleged 
corrupt practices of municipal government officials.136 While au-
thorities have established official tip sites, some have blocked non- 
governmental whistleblower Web sites.137 In the summer of 2011, 
new sites based on ‘‘confess-a-bribe’’ Web sites in India began to ap-
pear in China.138 As of mid-June 2011, there were at least eight 
Chinese independent platforms for reporting bribes, reportedly re-
ceiving tens to hundreds of thousands of hits.139 The sites were un-
registered, leaving them vulnerable to closure.140 Authorities began 
blocking access to the sites and warning some of the webmasters 
to close their sites by mid-June.141 At least two of these sites were 
targets of cyber attacks.142 
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
Authorities reportedly strengthened policies favoring government 
information disclosure, although the State Council has imple-
mented transparency commitments inconsistently, and citizens con-
tinued to face challenges in accessing information and bringing 
cases to court. An April 2011 report by the US-China Business 
Council noted that China has pledged to publicly release drafts of 
all economic laws and regulations for 30 days.143 The report found, 
however, that over a recent 11-month period the State Council had 
posted no more than half of its rules and regulations for public 
comment, with only a few being posting for the full 30 days.144 In 
contrast, the report found that the National People’s Congress had 
posted drafts of most laws for the full 30 days.145 At the May 2011 
U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue, China pledged to issue 
a measure in 2011 requiring that all proposed trade- and economic- 
related administrative regulations and departmental rules (with 
certain exceptions) be published on the State Council Legislative 
Affairs Office Web site for at least 30 days.146 
In November 2010, the State Council Opinion Regarding 
Strengthening Construction of a Government That Rules by Law 
(the Opinion) reiterated that ‘‘making government information pub-
lic is the principle, while a few exceptions are allowed.’’ 147 Authori-
ties reportedly also sought to strengthen information disclosure at 
the grassroots level.148 In December 2010, the Supreme People’s 
Court passed a provision that stipulates courts shall accept five 
types of administrative cases brought by citizens suing government 
departments for failing to provide information that legally should 
be open to the public. The provision also stipulates that courts are 
not authorized to accept cases under four types of vaguely defined 
conditions,149 leaving significant leeway for courts not to accept 
cases. The 12th Five-Year Plan, issued in March 2011, specifies 
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that China will establish and improve ‘‘open information’’ to ad-
vance digitalization of government affairs.150 In August, just after 
Chinese citizens flooded the Internet with inquiries regarding the 
lack of transparency about a high-speed train accident in Wenzhou 
city, Zhejiang province,151 central Party and government officials 
issued the Opinion Regarding Deepening Open Government Affairs 
and Strengthening Government Services, which includes an item 
stating that officials should ‘‘take great efforts to make transparent 
information about major sudden incidents and issues of concern to 
citizens . . . and correctly guide public opinion.’’ 152 [For more in-
formation on media coverage of the train incident and ‘‘guiding 
public opinion,’’ see Section II—Freedom of Expression.] 
Nevertheless, officials continued to deny open government infor-
mation requests for reasons that appear to contradict the spirit of 
the law. One study of open government information annual reports 
submitted by national, provincial, and some city government orga-
nizations conducted by researchers in China reportedly found that 
officials continue to refuse to grant information disclosure requests 
because officials claimed the ‘‘information is not available,’’ the in-
formation would ‘‘influence social stability,’’ and the information 
‘‘involves state secrets.’’ 153 
Voluntary disclosure of government budgetary information re-
mained an area of progress, although challenges remain. The State 
Council Opinion Regarding Strengthening Construction of a Gov-
ernment That Rules by Law stipulates that officials should more 
actively make government information public and focus on ‘‘finan-
cial budgets, allocation of public resources, approval and implemen-
tation of major construction projects, and non-profit social 
causes.’’ 154 In early July 2011, government departments under the 
State Council began to make public information on expenditures 
for overseas trips, public relations, and vehicles, otherwise known 
as the ‘‘Three Publics.’’ By late July, 86 of the 98 departments 
under the State Council had made their expenditures public.155 
Central officials also have required central government depart-
ments that have their budgets approved by the National People’s 
Congress to make their annual budgets public. As of the end of 
May, 88 of the 98 departments reportedly had disclosed their budg-
ets to the public.156 In July, the State Council Standing Committee 
reportedly said it was necessary to ‘‘vigorously advance’’ budget 
transparency, to expand the scope of transparency, and refine dis-
closed content.157 According to one survey, the Ministry of Finance 
expanded the number of items it made public in the national budg-
et.158 Although central-level ministries, the governments of 
Shaanxi province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and 
other areas have opened their 2011 budgets to the public, many 
citizens reportedly believe that the information provided is incom-
plete and that the budget category of ‘‘other expenses’’ hides infor-
mation.159 
Central Party leaders continued to make policy announcements 
regarding their intent to expand the transparency of Party affairs, 
and the Beijing municipal government took policy steps to enhance 
Party accountability. In October 2010, a top Party organization 
issued a policy document that outlined the ‘‘guiding thought’’ and 
basic principles for putting into practice ‘‘open Party affairs’’ at the 
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lowest administrative levels, as well as the content to be made pub-
lic.160 The Beijing municipal government issued the Beijing Munic-
ipal Implementation Measure in January 2011, which for the first 
time includes Party leaders in the ‘‘scope of accountability.’’ 161 Au-
thorities announced that 13 central Party departments, 31 prov-
inces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, and nearly half of 
China’s prefectural-level cities have already established Party press 
spokesperson systems.162 
Public Input in Decisionmaking, Interest Articulation, and Public 
Hearings 
Citizens and groups in China have little direct access to political 
decisionmaking processes; however, they are increasingly able to 
utilize various channels to express opinions regarding proposed 
policies and regulatory instruments. The 12th Five-Year Plan stip-
ulates that ‘‘it is necessary to give full play’’ to ‘‘people’s organiza-
tions, trade associations, and mass media to express social inter-
ests’’ and that authorities will expand the ‘‘degree of public partici-
pation’’ in decisionmaking.163 The Opinion Regarding Strength-
ening Construction of a Government That Rules by Law (Opinion), 
issued in November, stipulates that ‘‘before major decisions are 
made [authorities] should widely solicit and adequately assimilate 
opinions from all sides.’’ 164 It requires that ‘‘public opinion . . . be 
solicited’’ with respect to ‘‘administrative laws and regulations . . . 
that have direct influence on rights and obligations of citizens, 
legal person [sic] or other organizations.’’ In addition, the Opinion 
stipulates that ‘‘what opinions are adopted, and why, should be 
made public in appropriate formats.’’ 165 
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COMMERCIAL RULE OF LAW 
Introduction 
As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is 
bound by commitments outlined in both the WTO agreements and 
China’s accession documents.1 China must abide by obligations 
that prohibit it from discriminating among WTO members or from 
discriminating between foreign and Chinese goods, services, and in-
tellectual property rights. China must adhere to WTO obligations 
to publish promptly all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and ad-
ministrative rulings related to trade in goods, services, trade-re-
lated intellectual property rights, or control of foreign exchange. 
While China has taken many steps to open its economy and reform 
its legal system since acceding to the WTO in December 2001, it 
has not fully met its commitments.2 According to the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), ‘‘in some areas, it appears that 
China has yet to fully implement important commitments, and in 
other areas, significant questions have arisen regarding China’s ad-
herence to ongoing WTO obligations, including core WTO prin-
ciples.’’ 3 For example, China has failed to adhere to the WTO’s 
transparency principle, and this in itself has made it difficult for 
other WTO members, including the United States, to monitor Chi-
na’s overall WTO compliance.4 China agreed when it acceded to the 
WTO to begin negotiations to join the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA) ‘‘as soon as possible.’’ 5 It has not yet done so. 
USTR notes that China is moving slowly toward joining the GPA, 
while ‘‘maintaining and adopting government procurement meas-
ures that give domestic preferences.’’ 6 
The USTR has indicated that problems in China’s WTO compli-
ance can be traced to China’s use of industrial policies and ‘‘govern-
ment intervention intended to promote or protect China’s domestic 
industries and state-owned enterprises.’’ 7 The Chinese govern-
ment’s use of industrial policies to direct economic growth, rather 
than relying on market-based principles, both hinders development 
of the rule of law 8 and limits the access of non-Chinese companies, 
including those from other WTO members, to the Chinese market,9 
thereby violating the core WTO principle of national treatment.10 
Chinese government departments’ use of industrial policies has 
been accompanied by, and in some cases provides for, the growth 
of the state sector in the Chinese economy,11 a trend called ‘‘the 
state advances, the private sector retreats.’’ 12 It is not clear that 
a large state-owned sector is compatible with rule of law. The state, 
as the main shareholder, controls the courts, the police, and the 
legislature, which renders equal treatment before the law and an 
independent judiciary impossible.13 
Transparency 
In its Protocol of Accession to the WTO, China committed to pub-
lish all laws, regulations, or other measures affecting trade (with 
certain exceptions), to allow a reasonable comment period before 
implementation, and to establish or designate an official journal for 
this purpose.14 USTR notes in its 2010 report on China’s WTO 
compliance that China’s implementation of its WTO transparency 
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obligations has been uneven.15 In its April 2011 PRC Transparency 
Tracking report, the US-China Business Council reported that reg-
ulatory transparency remains one of the top concerns of the coun-
cil’s member companies.16 This was raised at the May 2011 meet-
ing of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), 
and China agreed to issue a measure in 2011 requiring publication 
in most cases of all proposed measures related to trade and eco-
nomics on the Web site of the State Council Legislative Affairs Of-
fice for a 30-day comment period.17 At the S&ED, China and the 
United States broadened discussions of transparency to encompass 
provision of export credits and arrangements for export financing.18 
China has two official export credit agencies (ECAs), China 
Eximbank and Sinosure, and the state-owned policy bank, China 
Development Bank, performs a function similar to that of an 
ECA.19 As China is not a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), China’s ECAs are not re-
quired to adhere to the standards set out in the OECD Arrange-
ment on Export Credits, which includes provisions for consultation 
and exchange of information on export credit offers.20 (Eximbank’s 
Export Seller Credit program typically supports ‘‘exports of ‘na-
tional champion’ companies that are oftentimes State Owned En-
terprises (SOEs) as well.’’) 21 At the S&ED, China also committed 
to ‘‘steadily increase its solicitation of public opinions on regulatory 
documents with a direct influence on the rights and obligations of 
citizens, legal persons, or other organizations.’’ 22 
State-Owned Enterprises and the Communist Party 
China’s state-owned sector continues to enjoy preferential treat-
ment, crowding out private companies in certain key sectors.23 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) enjoy a number of direct and indi-
rect subsidies, some of which violate China’s WTO commitments. 
[For a discussion of the WTO case against China concerning its 
subsidies in the wind energy industry, see China and the World 
Trade Organization in this section.] According to an American 
economist, ‘‘SOEs operate within markets but they operate pri-
marily within state-controlled markets. This regulatory protection 
is the most powerful subsidy many SOEs receive.’’ 24 Further, the 
government plays a key role in allocating inputs to production, 
such as land, financing, resources, and corporate management.25 
Through ownership of land 26 and the SOEs, the state held 76 per-
cent of productive wealth in China at the end of 2006.27 According 
to a Yale University expert, this is a ‘‘[b]arrier to legal development 
and the rule of law.’’ 28 
SOES AND COMMERCIAL SECRETS/STATE SECRETS 
One area in which SOEs may receive extra protection is the ap-
plication of state secrets rules. Chinese legislation on state secrets 
is vague as to whether information concerning the SOEs falls 
under China’s rules on commercial secrets 29 or the PRC State Se-
crets Law.30 This creates potential risks for individuals and compa-
nies competing or contracting with the SOEs or trying to obtain in-
formation on sectors controlled by the SOEs.31 Under Chinese law, 
a commercial secret can be elevated to a state secret when the in-
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formation is not publicly available and if ‘‘state interests are in-
volved.’’ 32 Further, the use of such legislation to protect secrets in 
a way to benefit the SOEs may raise trade issues.33 
The importance of this lack of clarity was highlighted in the 2010 
case of Xue Feng, a U.S. citizen who was charged with violating the 
State Secrets Law when he helped his U.S.-based employer pur-
chase a commercial database in China. The database was not clas-
sified as a state secret at the time of the transaction.34 In February 
2011, a Chinese court upheld Xue’s sentence of eight years’ impris-
onment.35 The New York Times noted, ‘‘Some analysts have viewed 
Xue’s prosecution as a reflection of China’s sensitivity to matters 
regarding natural resources.’’ 36 
SOES AND THE PARTY 
As government-owned entities, SOEs are closely linked to the 
Communist Party. State Council regulations provide for building 
primary Party organizations in the SOEs pursuant to the Party 
constitution.37 Further, the Party is active in management of the 
SOEs, including through appointment of senior management by the 
Party’s Central Organization Department, which appoints per-
sonnel for all important jobs in China.38 There are also reports of 
Party organizations in the overseas operations of SOEs.39 Accord-
ing to one Chinese article, ‘‘Any major Party activity happening in 
the mainland shall be executed simultaneously overseas.’’ 40 
Industrial Policy 
Industrial policy continues to play an important role in the Chi-
nese economy, guiding important sectors such as the automotive, 
software, and ‘‘cultural’’ industries.41 China’s industrial policies en-
courage the transfer of technology to, and consolidation of, the 
SOEs, and creation of ‘‘domestic champions.’’ 42 In March 2011, the 
National People’s Congress passed the PRC Outline of the 12th 
Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development 
(12th Five-Year Plan), which supplements current industrial poli-
cies by prioritizing seven ‘‘strategic emerging industries’’ for devel-
opment over the coming five years. These industries—energy con-
servation, new generation information technology (IT), bio-
technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, new energies, new 
materials, and new energy vehicles—will enjoy preferential tax and 
financial policies.43 Since issuance of the 12th Five-Year Plan, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other govern-
ment departments have issued sector-specific plans.44 
To promote the development of the information technology (IT) 
industry, in January 2011, the State Council issued a circular on 
encouraging the development of the software and integrated circuit 
(IC) industries, providing for various incentives to improve the en-
vironment for these industries.45 The circular is a supplement to 
a document the State Council passed in 2000,46 which subse-
quently was revised to settle a WTO dispute the United States 
brought against China.47 ICs and software are included as ‘‘encour-
aged investments’’ in both the 2007 and the draft 2011 Foreign In-
vestment Guidance Catalogue,48 with an additional entry in the 
2011 draft for next-generation Internet.49 
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Intellectual Property Rights 
Chinese authorities’ enforcement of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) continues to be poor, notwithstanding government cam-
paigns, crackdowns, and commitments.50 Poor enforcement is com-
bined with government policies to compel foreign companies to 
transfer technology to entities in China in exchange for market ac-
cess. Further, U.S. businesses have continued to express concerns 
that Chinese authorities are using technical standards 51 and the 
PRC Antimonopoly Law as tools to acquire foreign technology and 
other forms of intellectual property.52 
During the 2011 reporting year, the Chinese government took 
some actions to improve enforcement of IPR. The State Council 
launched a six-month campaign starting in October 2010 to combat 
the manufacture and sale of counterfeit and shoddy goods.53 In 
March 2011, the government extended the campaign an additional 
three months.54 In December 2010, nine central-level government 
departments issued a notice on stopping the sale of such goods on-
line.55 In March 2011, the Chinese search engine Baidu announced 
plans to address copyright infringement through its Web site.56 
There have been reports of greater IPR protection in certain indus-
tries subject to industrial policy, including a campaign to enforce 
IPR in Shanghai’s cultural markets 57 and protection of IPR in soft-
ware and integrated circuits under the policies for development of 
the software and integrated circuit industries. [See Industrial Pol-
icy in this section.] 58 However, infringement of IPR continues to be 
a major challenge for Chinese consumers 59 and for U.S. companies 
operating in China.60 
The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative kept China on the 
Priority Watch List in its 2011 Special 301 Report because of ‘‘on-
going concerns about the prevalence of piracy and counterfeiting in 
China, and China’s implementation of ‘indigenous innovation’ and 
other industrial policies that discriminate against or otherwise dis-
advantage U.S. exports and U.S. investors.’’ 61 During the 2010 
meeting of the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), 
China agreed to carry out special campaigns on IPR enforcement 
and to ‘‘actively work to advance software legalization,’’ and to ad-
dress certain other issues in IPR protection.62 President Hu Jintao 
made additional commitments on IPR protection during his visit to 
Washington in January 2011, including an agreement for funding 
and auditing the use of licensed software by the Chinese govern-
ment and for promoting the use of licensed software by private 
companies and state-owned enterprises.63 In February, according to 
Chinese press and government reports, the Chinese government 
agreed that by the end of May 2011, all central government depart-
ments would use legitimate software, and local governments would 
implement the same plan by the end of October.64 
INDIGENOUS INNOVATION 
During this reporting year, foreign investors continued to raise 
concerns that China’s indigenous innovation policy 65 for Chinese 
domestic development and ownership of technology is a means to 
force foreign companies to transfer their technology to China and 
a trade barrier, disadvantaging certain types of companies seeking 
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to access some of China’s markets, particularly China’s large gov-
ernment procurement market, including through discriminatory 
use of technical standards.66 The U.S. Government raised these 
concerns at the December 2010 meeting of the JCCT, at which 
China made commitments concerning IPR and non-discrimination 
in its indigenous innovation policies.67 At a meeting in January 
2011 between U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, President Hu agreed that China would eliminate cer-
tain discriminatory innovation policies,68 and at the third meeting 
of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2011, 
China committed to ‘‘eliminate all of its government procurement 
indigenous innovation products catalogues . . . .’’ 69 The Ministry of 
Finance announced revocation of three discriminatory measures on 
government procurement effective July 1, 2011.70 One commentator 
noted that the change does not ‘‘by its terms extend to sub-central 
agencies.’’ 71 Several provincial and municipal authorities, however, 
posted the Ministry of Finance announcement on their Web sites, 
or posted notices revoking related legislation.72 
Indigenous innovation has continued to play an important role in 
China’s economic planning. In October 2010, the State Council 
issued the Decision on Accelerating Cultivation and Development 
of Strategic Emerging Industries,73 presaging the strategic indus-
tries outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan. The decision calls for co-
operation with foreign companies and research centers, including 
encouraging them to set up research centers in China.74 The Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce in the People’s Republic of China con-
siders the decision as ‘‘an extension of the indigenous innovation 
drive and a complement to the 2006 [Medium- and Long-Range 
Plan for Development of Science and Technology].’’ 75 Further, 
Chapter 27 of the 12th Five-Year Plan, titled ‘‘Increase Science and 
Technical Innovation Capabilities,’’ calls for continuation of indige-
nous innovation.76 Article 3 of the chapter discusses ‘‘surrounding 
the enhancement of the capabilities of original innovation, inte-
grated innovation, and of absorbing and re-innovating imported 
technologies . . . .’’ 77 
China and the World Trade Organization 
China is an active member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In the period since becoming a member in December 2001 
through July 2011, China has been a respondent in 21 cases, com-
plainant in 8, and a third-party participant in 78.78 According to 
the 2010 U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Report to Congress on 
China’s WTO Compliance, there were six active disputes against 
China in 2010.79 
In September 2010, the United Steelworkers filed a Section 301 
petition with USTR concerning China’s support for its domestic 
wind energy industry, citing five areas.80 In January 2011, the U.S. 
requested consultations with China at the WTO concerning China’s 
provision of subsidies to Chinese wind turbine manufacturers 
through a ‘‘Special Fund for Industrialization of Wind Power 
Equipment.’’ 81 This was much narrower than the areas covered in 
the United Steelworkers’ petition. In March, USTR indicated its 
preference to settle the dispute, and in June, USTR announced 
that China had ended the challenged subsidies.82 USTR noted dif-
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ficulties uncovering subsidies given China’s lack of transparency.83 
China is required to notify the WTO of subsidies on a regular basis, 
which it has failed to do.84 Further, while USTR depends on com-
panies to gather the information necessary for a trade case, compa-
nies often hesitate to do so, ‘‘fearing Chinese officials’ reputation 
for retaliating against joint ventures in the country and potentially 
denying market access to any company that takes sides against 
China.’’ 85 [See Investment Regulation—Foreign Investment in 
China in this section, concerning China’s discretionary foreign in-
vestment approval procedures and annual inspection require-
ments.] 
In September 2009, the United States imposed tariffs on certain 
passenger vehicle and truck tires from China in accordance with 
Article 16 of China’s Protocol of Accession, which provides for a 
transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism to give tem-
porary relief from ‘‘market disruption’’ to a domestic industry 
caused by a surge in imports from China.86 Within days, China ini-
tiated proceedings at the WTO against the U.S. action, and in De-
cember 2010, the WTO panel decided against China.87 China ap-
pealed the panel’s decision, and in September 2011 the WTO Ap-
pellate Body upheld the panel’s decision, once again finding against 
China.88 The provision for the transitional product-specific safe-
guard mechanism will terminate 12 years after the date of China’s 
WTO accession, in December 2013.89 
In a case concerning market access for certain publications and 
audiovisual products, including films for theatrical release, audio-
visual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and publi-
cations, and foreign service providers that distribute publications 
and certain audiovisual home entertainment products, the WTO 
Appellate Body decided against China. China had until March 2011 
to comply with the WTO decision, but failed to do so.90 A USTR 
spokesman stated that the U.S. Government had ‘‘communicated 
its concerns to China, and is working to ensure that China prompt-
ly brings its measures into full compliance.’’ 91 In an August 2011 
status report to the WTO, China noted that it had ‘‘made tremen-
dous efforts’’ to implement the rulings, listing completed amend-
ments to legislation and a draft amendment to the foreign invest-
ment guidance catalogue.92 [Concerning the amendment to the 
catalogue, see Investment Regulation—Foreign Investment in 
China, in this section.] The decision is complicated for China to im-
plement, because it conflicts directly with China’s restrictions on 
media. As one U.S. lawyer in China noted, ‘‘China’s current policy 
is to strengthen control over domestic media and further restrict 
foreign access. Thus the WTO ruling is 180 degrees contrary to 
very strong current movements in Chinese policy.’’ 93 [See Section 
II—Freedom of Expression for more information on Chinese gov-
ernment restrictions on media.] 
In its report of October 2010, a WTO dispute panel rejected Chi-
na’s claims against the United States in a case China brought in 
2008 concerning the United States’ imposition of both anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties on four products from China (circular 
welded carbon quality steel pipe, certain new pneumatic off-the- 
road tires, light-walled rectangular pipe and tube, and laminated 
woven sacks) and certain other issues.94 China appealed, con-
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testing several of the panel’s findings, including those concerning 
the concurrent application of both duties (i.e., ‘‘double remedy’’) and 
its standard as to when state-owned enterprises are ‘‘public bodies’’ 
for purposes of determining whether the government is providing 
subsidies.95 In March 2011, the Appellate Body reversed in part 
the panel’s decision, including its findings on double remedy, its 
standard for when SOEs are ‘‘public bodies,’’ and certain other 
issues.96 The U.S. Trade Representative, Ron Kirk, said that he 
was ‘‘deeply troubled’’ by the reversal, which, he said, ‘‘appears to 
be a clear case of overreaching by the Appellate Body,’’ 97 and the 
United States raised these concerns at the March 2011 meeting of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.98 
In July 2011, the WTO decided against China in a case the 
United States initiated in 2009 concerning China’s restraints on 
the export of various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, 
manganese, silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus, and 
zinc.99 The export restraints at issue included ‘‘export quotas, ex-
port licensing requirements, and minimum export price require-
ments.’’ 100 The WTO panel rejected China’s defense that various 
restraints were permitted if needed to address a critical shortage, 
to conserve natural resources, and for environmental protection.101 
China’s central news agency, Xinhua, called the ruling ‘‘regret-
table,’’ 102 and in August 2011, China notified the WTO of its deci-
sion to appeal the ruling.103 
RARE EARTHS 
The WTO case decided in July 2011 on China’s export restraints 
did not cover exports of rare earths, minerals essential in a range 
of important industries, such as ‘‘advanced technology, renewable 
energy, electronics, and defense.’’ 104 China has a number of meas-
ures in place to restrict exports of rare earths, under the rationale 
that restrictions are necessary for environmental reasons and to 
protect exhaustible resources.105 The WTO panel rejected this ar-
gument in July’s decision in the export restraints case 106 and, ac-
cording to a spokesperson for the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative (USTR), USTR is ‘‘deeply troubled by China’s use of 
market distorting export restrictions on raw materials including 
rare earths,’’ especially in light of the WTO decision.107 Within 
days of the WTO decision, China’s Ministry of Commerce an-
nounced rare earth export quotas that restore 2011 levels to those 
of the 2010 quotas, but incorporate a new category, thereby effec-
tively tightening the quota.108 
A five-year plan for the sector, announced in February 2011, in-
cludes ‘‘increased state oversight, raising environmental standards, 
a crackdown on smuggling, the closure of illegal mines and consoli-
dation of rare earth producers.’’ 109 Furthermore, Chinese authori-
ties are instituting greater control by consolidating rare earth as-
sets under state-owned companies.110 
Currency 
The value of the Chinese yuan continues to be of concern to pol-
icymakers inside and outside China. Since 2005, China has main-
tained an exchange rate system under which the value of the yuan 
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is tied to a basket of currencies.111 Under this system, China’s reg-
ulators allow the yuan to float against the U.S. dollar within a nar-
row band.112 Chinese authorities control the value of the yuan in 
part because a revalued yuan would increase the cost of Chinese 
exports.113 This arguably raises trade issues. Article XV(4) of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides that 
WTO members ‘‘shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent 
of the provisions of [the GATT], nor, by trade action, the intent of 
the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund.’’ 114 The Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) state that ‘‘each member shall . . . avoid 
manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system 
in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to 
gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members[.]’’ 115 
One U.S. economist notes several reasons it is in China’s inter-
ests to revalue the yuan: Revaluation would help China manage its 
rising inflation rate and help ease an asset bubble in real es-
tate; 116 revaluation would be in keeping with China’s goal to shift 
from reliance on exports to reliance on consumption, as outlined in 
the 12th Five-Year Plan; 117 and revaluation would benefit China’s 
trading partners.118 Furthermore, in order to artificially keep the 
value of the yuan low, China must accumulate large reserves of for-
eign currency, which leads to market distortions.119 
Against the backdrop of discussions concerning revaluation, some 
Chinese government departments have been urging liberalization 
of the exchange rate mechanism, including allowing wider use of 
the yuan internationally, or ‘‘internationalization.’’ 120 An article in 
the Communist Party School newspaper, Study Times, in April 
2011 called for making the yuan a reserve currency,121 suggesting 
five actions: Accelerating China’s outbound investments, entering 
into currency exchange agreements, encouraging the use of yuan in 
trade, issuing yuan-based bonds, and making better use of finance 
centers such as Hong Kong.122 However, as China takes these 
steps to internationalize the yuan, analysts note the contradiction 
between internationalizing the yuan and not making it fully con-
vertible.123 Nonetheless, during this reporting year, Chinese au-
thorities have made several moves on the internationalization of 
the yuan.124 
Investment Regulation 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA 
Foreign investment in China is highly regulated, and the Chi-
nese government uses the approval process to ensure that foreign 
investment in China is in keeping with government policy. The two 
government departments with primary responsibility are the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which formu-
lates industrial policy and economic strategy, and the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM), which is responsible for approval of foreign 
investment in China. NDRC and MOFCOM in certain cases dele-
gate authority to their counterparts at lower levels of govern-
ment.125 Approval is discretionary on the part of the approving au-
thority. Most foreign investment in China must undergo a govern-
ment approval process, with larger investments, or investments in 
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certain sectors, requiring approval at a higher level of govern-
ment.126 In February 2011, MOFCOM issued a Circular on Issues 
in the Administration of Foreign Investment, delegating some ap-
provals to provincial-level departments and eliminating or simpli-
fying other administrative requirements.127 The Foreign Invest-
ment Guidance Catalogue, which is updated periodically, lists in-
dustries in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted, or 
forbidden, including, in some cases, provisions concerning the 
structure, shareholding, or management of the investment.128 (In 
addition to the foreign investment approval process, enterprises in 
China must undergo a governmental annual review process to 
maintain their business licenses.) 129 
In April 2010, the State Council issued opinions that called for 
revising the catalogue to encourage foreign investment in ‘‘high-end 
manufacturing, ‘high-tech’ industries, modern services, new energy 
sources, and energy conservation and environmental protection sec-
tors.’’ 130 The opinions’ introduction notes, ‘‘Utilizing foreign invest-
ment has always been an important part of China’s basic state pol-
icy of opening up,’’ and underscores the important role of foreign 
investment in scientific and technological innovation.131 The State 
Council issued a draft revision to the current 2007 catalogue in 
April 2011 which includes provisions adding the strategic indus-
tries listed in the 12th Five-Year Plan to the ‘‘encouraged’’ cat-
egory.132 
In February 2011, the State Council issued the Circular on Es-
tablishing a Security Review System for Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors, with the goal of guiding such ac-
quisitions and protecting national security.133 The security review 
applies to transactions involving foreign investors and domestic 
military industries, or military industry parts, or important enter-
prises near military facilities; or acquisitions through which foreign 
investors may acquire a controlling share in other entities relevant 
to national security, as well as entities providing important agricul-
tural products, energy and natural resources, infrastructure, trans-
portation services, key technologies, and major equipment manu-
facturers.134 The security review will evaluate the effects of an ac-
quisition on national security, the national economy, and society, 
and the research and design capabilities of important domestic 
technologies relevant to national security.135 A panel to carry out 
security reviews will be established under the State Council, with 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
MOFCOM in the lead.136 Under the review procedure, a foreign in-
vestor must file an application with MOFCOM.137 If MOFCOM 
finds that the acquisition should be subject to security review, 
MOFCOM will file a request with the panel.138 Even if a foreign 
investor does not file for a review, the relevant Chinese industry 
association or government department can file for a review.139 In 
March 2011, MOFCOM issued provisions, effective from March 5, 
2011 to August 31, 2011, which provide procedural rules for a secu-
rity review.140 
CHINA’S OUTBOUND INVESTMENT 
Like foreign investment into China, China’s outbound investment 
is subject to a government approval process, with approval author-
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ity under MOFCOM and the NDRC. MOFCOM measures issued in 
2009 set out the approval process for outbound investment,141 gen-
erally requiring approval at higher government levels for larger in-
vestments. Relatively larger investments in the energy or mineral 
sectors can be approved at the provincial level, which expedites 
these transactions.142 In addition, certain large investments re-
quire the approval of the NDRC.143 Outbound investments by cen-
tral-level state-owned enterprises must make a filing with the 
NDRC.144 
As China encourages its companies to ‘‘go global’’ under the 12th 
Five-Year Plan,145 Chinese government departments are revising 
regulation of outbound investments. MOFCOM and other depart-
ments are preparing draft regulations on outbound investment and 
foreign labor service cooperation, and there are discussions con-
cerning regulations on foreign contracted projects.146 In February, 
the National People’s Congress amended the Criminal Law to crim-
inalize the giving of items of value to foreign governments or inter-
national organizations for purposes of obtaining improper commer-
cial benefits.147 The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Adminis-
tration Commission issued two sets of interim measures on moni-
toring and supervising financial activities of the central-level state- 
owned enterprises (SOEs) offshore.148 
There are a number of avenues for SOEs to obtain financing for 
outbound investment, including loans by China’s state-owned 
banks, outbound investment funds, and use of yuan. According to 
a report in People’s Daily, the head of the China Nonferrous Metals 
Industry Association indicated that the government will certify en-
terprises that meet standards for mine exploration and develop-
ment, which will be given priority when applying for loans.149 Ac-
cording to a 2011 report by the Heritage Foundation, most funding 
for outbound investment has gone into energy and power, and at 
the end of 2010, there was a ‘‘rush of energy acquisition and plant 
construction deals. Metals draw the second-most investment, fol-
lowed by finance and real estate.’’ 150 Though there have been alle-
gations of subsidies for overseas investments, a MOFCOM official 
called the allegations ‘‘entirely groundless.’’ 151 [For information on 
China’s liberalization of the yuan in outbound investment, see Cur-
rency in this section.] 
Antimonopoly Law 
In December 2010, two of the three Chinese government depart-
ments charged with enforcing the PRC Antimonopoly Law (AML) 
issued new regulations.152 The State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (SAIC), which is responsible for regulating monop-
oly agreements and abuse of dominance not involving pricing, 
issued provisions prohibiting monopoly agreements,153 provisions 
on abuse of dominance,154 and provisions covering abuse of admin-
istrative power to restrict competition.155 The NDRC, which covers 
monopoly agreements and abuse of dominance involving pricing, 
issued provisions on monopolies involving pricing 156 and enforce-
ment procedures.157 While four of these measures address business 
conduct, the SAIC provisions on abuse of administrative power 
could, if fully implemented, constrain abuse by local officials and 
allow freer movement of goods within China, both of which would 
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benefit Chinese consumers.158 These regulations all took effect on 
February 1, 2011. 
After issuing the new regulations, but before the effective date, 
SAIC imposed its first fine for a violation of the AML, in a case 
concerning a concrete cartel in Jiangsu province.159 The cartel was 
organized by a trade association and resulted in concrete producers 
dividing the market.160 In another case, Hudong, an online encyclo-
pedia in China, filed a complaint with SAIC against Chinese search 
engine Baidu, alleging that Baidu abused its dominant position by 
ranking Hudong’s Web site lower on search results. According to a 
report in China Daily, however, there have been at least three com-
plaints against Baidu that Chinese regulators declined to pur-
sue.161 
In January 2011, the NDRC announced that the Zhejiang Provin-
cial Price Bureau fined the Zhejiang Fuyang Paper Industry Asso-
ciation for price fixing.162 According to the announcement, the case 
was to be used as an example to educate other industry associa-
tions.163 In one of the first administrative monopoly cases, in June 
2011 the Guangdong provincial government found that the Heyuan 
Municipal People’s Government violated the AML’s provisions on 
administrative monopoly by restricting the promotion and sale of 
global positioning systems.164 The administrative monopoly provi-
sions of the AML forbid conduct by administrative departments to 
restrict competition or protect local businesses.165 
The U.S. business community in China has expressed concern 
that the AML may be used in ways that do not support consumer 
interests and market efficiency but may be ‘‘selectively or 
discriminatorily enforced to promote industrial policy and other 
ends.’’ 166 This is of greatest concern in the context of merger re-
views, which MOFCOM, the third government department charged 
with responsibility under the AML, handles. MOFCOM held up ap-
proval of an offshore transaction for the sale of Motorola’s network 
assets to Nokia. Antitrust authorities in other jurisdictions, includ-
ing the United States and European Union, had approved the 
deal.167 One management consultant noted that the Chinese gov-
ernment may have been using the approval process as leverage be-
cause of controversy over Chinese telecommunications equipment 
suppliers that were not allowed access to the U.S. market.168 In 
June, MOFCOM gave only a conditional approval to the merger of 
two Russian potash producers in a decision that made clear that 
MOFCOM would evaluate the effect of the merger on national eco-
nomic development.169 
There have been no reports of MOFCOM not approving, or giving 
conditional approval to, mergers between Chinese companies. The 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC) has encouraged the consolidation of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) in China (a process some industrial policies mandate, 
such as that for automobiles). For example, SASAC is consolidating 
China’s two largest train manufacturers so that they do not com-
pete with each other, especially in international markets.170 
SASAC is also consolidating the crucial rare earth industry so that 
there will be three companies with 80 percent of the rare earth 
market in southern China.171 Furthermore, the NDRC has formu-
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lated a plan to adjust nine major industries in China to improve 
their efficiency.172 
Food Safety 
During the 2011 reporting year, food safety problems persisted in 
China, with incidents ranging from exploding watermelons to toxic 
bean sprouts ‘‘soaked in banned additives’’ and poisonous pepper in 
Chongqing hotpots.173 To address reporting of these incidents, the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) will create a media platform to provide 
public notifications of food safety issues.174 In addition, however, 
MOH also said they will ‘‘blacklist’’ reporters who ‘‘mislead the 
public,’’ according to a Chinese media report.175 The Chinese gov-
ernment has continued to develop its food safety system, as estab-
lished under the 2009 PRC Food Safety Law, and the 12th Five- 
Year Plan on National Economic and Social Development devotes 
a section to food and drug safety, including the need for a tracing 
system, risk monitoring, and supervision.176 In September 2010, 
the MOH passed the National Food Safety Standards, which took 
effect in December,177 and in November, six government depart-
ments issued measures on disclosure of food safety information.178 
The central government is investing in improvements to local-level 
food inspection.179 The State Council issued a comprehensive docu-
ment on food safety work for 2011, which addresses cracking down 
on illegal behavior, improving supervision of food safety, and 
strengthening education.180 In June, MOH banned the use of 
bisphenol-A (BPA) in infants’ milk bottles.181 
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Introduction 
Chinese citizens’ ability to seek redress against government ac-
tions that violate their legal rights has changed significantly over 
the past 30 years. More than 200 laws have been enacted,1 but citi-
zens continue to face significant obstacles to accessing justice. Arti-
cle 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
‘‘[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law.’’ 2 Article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) requires states to 
ensure that persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ‘‘have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.’’ 3 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting period, key policies and 
regulations relating to access to justice reflected the Communist 
Party’s ongoing concern with maintaining stability. Authorities em-
phasized the use of mediation over trials in civil cases and pro-
moted mediation as the solution to social unrest. At the same time, 
authorities sought to enact measures that could curb corruption 
and lead to greater professionalism within the courts. Authorities’ 
concern with maintaining stability extended to citizen petitioning, 
an area beset with well-documented human rights violations such 
as arbitrary detention. During this reporting year, Chinese media 
exposed a ‘‘stability maintenance’’ organization tasked by some 
local governments with retrieving petitioners from Beijing, a prac-
tice that often led to abuse of petitioners. In addition, petitioner 
cases involving land disputes continued as a trend as officials 
sought to develop more rural land. 
Against the backdrop of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to 
China’s prominent imprisoned intellectual and writer Liu Xiaobo in 
October 2010, and amidst the online ‘‘Jasmine’’ call for reform do-
mestically, the government enforced measures that further re-
stricted human rights lawyers’ advocacy efforts. Officials at various 
levels of the government continued to take steps to discourage, in-
timidate, and detain human rights lawyers and defenders who take 
on issues, cases, and clients that officials deem to be ‘‘sensitive.’’ In 
spite of apparent efforts to train more legal aid representatives, 
measurable positive effects in citizens’ access to justice remain elu-
sive. 
Mediation as a Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability 
During the 2011 reporting year, government and party officials 
continued to use courts as a tool in their efforts to maintain social 
stability. In particular, the Supreme People’s Court encouraged the 
use of mediation over trials as means to resolve disputes in civil 
cases.4 The PRC People’s Mediation Law became effective in Janu-
ary 2011,5 and stresses the need to resolve civil disputes through 
mediation and to maintain social harmony and stability.6 It encour-
ages disagreeing parties to reach a voluntary resolution through 
people’s mediation committees.7 Furthermore, the mediation serv-
ices are free of charge and legally binding on the parties.8 To fur-
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00188 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
183 
ther strengthen enforcement efforts, in July 2010, authorities 
issued a joint opinion involving multiple agencies in an effort to im-
prove enforcement of legally binding decrees.9 The joint opinion es-
tablishes general policy provisions for each agency and allows the 
courts to coordinate among agencies.10 Since passage of the PRC 
People’s Mediation Law, authorities have actively promoted it as 
the ‘‘first line of defence [sic]’’ 11 against mass conflicts. In January 
2011, the Supreme People’s Court further emphasized the impor-
tance of mediation to all basic-level people’s courts by stressing the 
need to uphold the principle of ‘‘mediation first, then integrate me-
diation and adjudication.’’ 12 
Authorities also praised the national model judge for 2010, who 
resolved more than 3,100 cases in 14 years ‘‘all without a single 
mistake, appeal, or citizen petitioning [against her decisions].’’ 13 
Judge Chen explained that one of her key work principles is to 
prioritize mediation over litigation, especially in cases involving 
neighborhood disputes and marital discord.14 
In spite of the push for mediation, the broader implications of the 
law remain unclear. While mediation is an effective tool in some 
types of cases, concerns about mediation center on three main 
issues: Curtailed access to courts for Chinese citizens, adequate 
resolution of disputes without coercion, and effective enforcement.15 
A particular concern is the potential use of the PRC People’s Medi-
ation Law to pressure and silence human rights activists. For ex-
ample, in June 2011, public security officials reportedly approached 
members of the Tiananmen Mothers, a non-governmental organiza-
tion that seeks public discussion and accountability for people 
killed during the 1989 Tiananmen protests. The officials reportedly 
offered to pay compensation to settle individual cases.16 The terms 
of the settlement, however, did not include public discussions about 
the 1989 Tiananmen protests, investigations, or accountability—ob-
jectives that the Tiananmen Mothers aim to achieve.17 To further 
promote mediating disputes over trial work, the government and 
the Party reportedly have mandatory mediation quotas, offer finan-
cial rewards and career advancements to judges who have high 
rates of mediation, and punish judges who issue decisions that re-
sult in citizen petitioning.18 This approach can lead some judges to 
engage in unfair settlement tactics that could ‘‘detract from the 
substantive fairness of the process and undermines the legitimacy 
of the court system.’’ 19 Survey data also suggests that the enforce-
ment of mediated agreements remains weak.20 
Efforts To Professionalize the Courts 
During this reporting year, the Supreme People’s Court sought 
to professionalize courts by issuing codes of conduct, recusal regula-
tions, and guiding cases. In December 2010, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued two documents concerning judges’ conduct: The Model 
Judicial Behavior Code 21 and the Basic Code of Professional Con-
duct for Judges.22 The two documents seek to guide judges in their 
judicial work and conduct outside of work,23 set forth five prin-
ciples of loyalties for judges,24 and stress allegiance and loyalty to 
the Party.25 In early 2011, the Supreme People’s Court issued two 
regulations intended to limit improper influence on the courts. The 
Trial Implementation of the Provisions Regarding Professional 
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Avoidance of Trial Judges and Court Leadership When a Spouse or 
Child Practices as a Lawyer 26 (‘‘Trial Implementation Provisions’’) 
requires the court officials and some trial judges to recuse them-
selves in some professional settings when a spouse or child prac-
tices as a lawyer in the jurisdiction they oversee. The Provisions 
Regarding the Prevention of Interference With Casework by Inter-
nal Court Personnel 27 prohibit current and retired court personnel 
from conducting private meetings with parties, as well as their rel-
atives and legal representatives, whose cases are being adjudicated 
by the court. The provisions also prohibit current and retired court 
personnel from forwarding documents, inquiring, or interceding on 
behalf of the parties.28 The efficacy of these regulations remains 
unclear. For example, the Trial Implementation Provisions do not 
include limitations on the procuratorate, public security personnel, 
or anyone else who shares a close relationship with the parties or 
the court. 
Authorities also sought to limit the lower courts’ ability to re-
quest instructions from higher level courts when adjudicating 
cases. This practice occurs when lower level courts seek to avoid re-
sponsibility or are unwilling to decide a case based on the facts and 
law as presented. The Opinion Concerning the Standardization of 
Trial Work Between Higher Level and Lower Level Courts,29 
issued in December 2010, is the latest in a series of efforts by the 
central government to address this practice. Key provisions in the 
opinion limit the types of cases where instructions can be sought 
and prohibits ‘‘in principle’’ the court of second instance from re-
manding a case based on unclear facts and insufficient evidence, 
when the court of first instance has fully investigated the facts.30 
The Supreme People’s Court issued the long-awaited Regulations 
Regarding Guiding Cases in November 2010, which could lead to 
greater uniformity in the handling of cases.31 The regulations an-
nounced that the Supreme People’s Court will publish uniform 
guidelines for some cases that have generated broad societal inter-
est; where the regulation is general; where cases are representative 
of other cases similarly situated; or where cases are particularly 
complex, difficult or novel, or otherwise have guiding value.32 The 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) reportedly was selecting its first se-
ries of guiding cases in May 2011.33 In addition, according to the 
director of the SPC research department, the guiding cases will 
eventually include three series covering public security, the 
procuratorate, and the courts.34 One of the key questions that re-
mains unanswered is the degree to which the guiding cases are 
binding on lower courts.35 
In September 2010, the Supreme People’s Court issued sen-
tencing guidelines on a trial basis that could improve transparency, 
uniformity, and fairness in sentencing criminal defendants.36 The 
key provisions of the guidelines provide baseline sentences for 15 
of the most commonly encountered crimes such as traffic offenses, 
battery, rape, robbery, larceny, fraud, and drug offenses, among 
others, and establish sentencing factors in aggravation and in miti-
gation.37 If implemented at the local level, the guidelines could po-
tentially promote greater transparency and consistency in sen-
tencing by limiting individual discretion of judges. 
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Corruption Within the Judiciary 
Corruption within the judiciary has been a longstanding prob-
lem.38 The extent and scope of corruption are unclear due to a lack 
of independent data. According to official sources, from January to 
November 2010, the government ‘‘investigated 119,000 graft cases, 
resulting in 113,000 people being punished, of whom 4,332 were 
prosecuted . . . .’’ 39 In addition, a report published by the Supreme 
People’s Court in February 2011 singled out 187 people within the 
judicial system for improper conduct, ranging from private use of 
public property to charging inflated fees in 2010.40 Anecdotal but 
numerous incidents of corruption reported in the media involved 
judges extorting money from litigants,41 engaging in collusion,42 
and accepting bribes.43 
During this reporting year, key policies continued to reflect the 
authorities’ ongoing efforts to root out corruption within the judici-
ary,44 and within the confines of the existing political structure 
where the courts are subject to the control of the Party.45 The cur-
rent approach to combat judicial corruption appears to particularly 
emphasize the role of state supervision.46 In October 2010, the Su-
preme People’s Court announced it would gradually undertake 
tours of inspection of local-level courts where one of the main pur-
poses is to investigate the lower level courts’ ability to handle mat-
ters diligently and free from corruption.47 In addition, the authori-
ties continued to promote the policy of ‘‘Five Prohibitions’’ first pro-
mulgated in 2009.48 The ‘‘Five Prohibitions’’ policy proscribes 
judges from engaging in improper conduct such as accepting gifts, 
interceding on behalf of another party, divulging work secrets, and 
engaging in favoritism.49 The courts have also instituted an online 
forum where citizens can report on corrupt judges and monitor the 
progress of whistleblowing tips.50 The efficacy of the online forum 
remains unclear. 
Administrative Law 
Administrative law provides channels for citizens to seek limited 
remedy when they believe the government has violated their rights. 
Because Chinese courts do not have the power either to apply con-
stitutional provisions or to strike down laws or regulations that are 
inconsistent with China’s Constitution,51 administrative laws serve 
as a tool to allow citizens to express grievances, challenge alleged 
official wrongdoing, and impose constraints on official misconduct. 
Overall, Chinese citizens today have more options for redress 
against government violations than they did 20 years ago, when 
the field of administrative law first began to develop. In spite of 
these developments, the administrative law system still faces fun-
damental institutional challenges. For example, Chinese citizens 
cannot challenge administrative regulations that violate constitu-
tional or legal rights. Article 12 of the PRC Administrative Proce-
dure Law forbids courts from accepting citizen challenges of admin-
istrative rules and regulations that have ‘‘general binding force.’’ 52 
In addition, the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law does not 
allow adjudication of State Council rules or regulations.53 During 
this reporting period, the Chinese government continued to pro-
mote administrative law reforms that seek to provide greater over-
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sight of state agencies and government employees and to protect 
citizens’ interests. In June 2010, the amended PRC Administrative 
Supervision Law became effective.54 The key amendments provide 
some protection for whistleblowers.55 For example, Article 6 stipu-
lates that administrative agencies shall keep whistleblowers’ infor-
mation confidential, and Articles 46 and 47 provide that individ-
uals [should] be punished or prosecuted for revealing information 
about whistleblowers or bringing retaliatory charges against re-
porting parties.56 In December 2010, the amended PRC State Com-
pensation Law became effective.57 The amended compensation law 
expands the scope of the existing law by allowing negligence to go 
forward as a cause of action against the government under some 
circumstances.58 In addition, the amended law eliminates certain 
procedural loopholes making it easier to establish a valid claim 59 
and allows compensation for ‘‘psychological injury.’’ 60 
The Commission notes that overall, Chinese citizens remain re-
luctant to bring cases against government officials using adminis-
trative law provisions. According to the Supreme People’s Court’s 
work report, the courts handled 135,679 administrative cases, or 
approximately 1 percent of the 11.7 million cases handled by local 
courts at various levels.61 The key reasons include a lack of con-
fidence in the judicial system, historical context, and the belief that 
the xinfang system is a more appropriate channel for citizens’ 
grievances.62 
Citizen Petitioning (Xinfang) 
The petitioning, or xinfang (letters and visits), system exists to 
provide a channel, outside court challenges, for citizens to appeal 
government, court, and Communist Party decisions and present 
their grievances. Due to institutional weaknesses in the judiciary 
and limits on citizens’ ability to air grievances, citizens often use 
petitioning as a means to seek redress for perceived wrongs. Com-
mon citizen petitioning cases involve reports of official corruption 
causing perceived injustice, alleged abuse of power, and unfair land 
compensation. 
China’s Constitution and the 2005 PRC National Regulations on 
Letters and Visits provide that Chinese citizens have the right to 
petition without retribution. Xinfang bureaus are found throughout 
the Chinese bureaucracy, including offices of the Party, police, gov-
ernment, procuratorates, courts, and people’s congresses. Indi-
vidual petitioning may take the form of one dissatisfied citizen 
going to multiple xinfang bureaus repeatedly over the course of 
several months or years. Collective or mass petitioning may involve 
attempts to organize demonstrations, speeches, or marches of peo-
ple seeking to present their grievances. The capital city, Beijing, 
where the central government and high-level officials are located, 
is an especially prominent destination for petitioners from all over 
China. According to a 2007 research study conducted by the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences, there were ‘‘more than 10,000 pe-
titioners that have set up temporary residence’’ in Beijing.63 How-
ever, only approximately 0.2 percent of the petitioners reportedly 
achieve resolution through petitioning.64 
Based on official information from Xinhua in March 2011, the 
xinfang system ‘‘ferreted out a total of 2,076,000 cases of varying 
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kinds of conflicts since April 2010, of which 1,643,000 cases,’’ or 
79.1 percent, have been resolved.65 According to the latest Supreme 
People’s Court’s annual report, the number of citizen-petitioning 
cases in 2010 declined by 22 percent at local levels.66 The declining 
figures could mean, however, that the local officials, whose career 
advancement is often correlated with lower instances of citizen pe-
titioning,67 are becoming more skilled at preventing petitioners 
from reaching higher level xinfang bureaus. 
In spite of Premier Wen Jiabao’s show of support for petitioners’ 
problems during a visit to Beijing’s top petitioning bureau,68 Chi-
nese citizens continued to face official reprisals, harassment, and 
violence. During this reporting year, the central government, and 
its extensive network of ‘‘social stability preservation’’ organiza-
tions under the leadership of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee, continued to assess local government in part based on the 
number of ‘‘abnormal petitions.’’ 69 To cope with the assessment, 
local governments continued to employ private security companies 
that sometimes resorted to extralegal measures to prevent peti-
tioners from reaching the central government.70 In October 2010, 
Southern Metropolitan Daily exposed a private security company, 
Anyuanding, under contract by local governments to ‘‘retrieve’’ peti-
tioners who attempted to petition in Beijing, where the central gov-
ernment is located.71 Anyuanding employed a variety of methods to 
prevent petitioners from making their grievances heard at the cen-
tral level. The methods reportedly included coaxing, threats, abduc-
tion, detention in ‘‘black jails’’ for extended periods of time, and 
beatings.72 Official mistreatment of petitioners was especially 
harsh during national holidays, meetings held by the Party, and 
‘‘politically sensitive periods.’’ 73 
Maintaining social stability and containing the petitioning sys-
tem remained a priority for central and local authorities. In May 
2011, the Supreme People’s Court issued a series of documents for 
lower level courts on how to handle petitioning. The documents 
outlined ‘‘four musts and five systems.’’ The four ‘‘musts’’ include: 
Strengthening the ideology of the masses, finding the problem at 
the source, building long-term capacity, and focusing on the 
masses. The five systems focus on risk assessment, notification, re-
ception of petitioners, multi-faceted solutions, and establishing a 
system of finality in petitioning.74 Key elements of the documents 
echoed the push for mediation and social stability observed 
throughout the court system during this reporting period. [See Me-
diation as a Vehicle To Maintaining Social Stability in this section.] 
During this reporting year, local governments continued to mis-
apply legal regulations to punish petitioners for the sake of main-
taining social stability. Public security officers on occasion detained 
petitioners under Article 23 of the PRC Public Security Administra-
tion Punishment Law.75 The provision proscribes conduct that ‘‘dis-
turbs social order.’’ Specifically, Subsection 1 prohibits ‘‘disturbing 
order of organizations, groups, enterprises, institutions, causing in-
terference in their routine operations in work production, oper-
ation, medical care, education and research, but not yet causing se-
rious harm.’’ 76 Subsection 2 prohibits ‘‘disturbing order in bus sta-
tions, ports, wharfs, airports, shopping facilities, parks, exhibition 
centers, and other public places.’’ 77 The punishment for ‘‘disturbing 
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social order’’ under Article 23 ranges from warning to 15 days of 
detention. For example, public security officers from the Beijing 
Public Security Bureau’s Haidian district took petitioner Cai 
Fuxian into custody for 10 days under Article 23 on October 17, 
2010, for distributing leaflets near the meeting place of the fifth 
plenum of the Communist Party’s Central Committee. Cai was 
seeking redress for the alleged wrongful death of her father, a vet-
eran cadre of the Party, and claimed that a current Central Com-
mittee member was involved.78 
Authorities and rural petitioners who petitioned about demolition 
of or eviction from their land and residences continued to confront 
each other, often violently.79 Under the rubric of land and hukou 
reform, there appeared to be increasing tension between some local 
governments’ plans to develop rural land for urbanization and some 
rural residents’ desire to stay put. According to data made avail-
able by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in December 2010, 
petitioning related to land makes up 73 percent of all petitioning 
cases.80 Presently, there are approximately 50 million farmers who 
have lost their farmland due to urban development, a number pro-
jected to double in 10 years’ time.81 Against this backdrop, the Na-
tional People’s Congress Standing Committee passed the PRC Ad-
ministrative Coercion Law on June 30, 2011, to become effective on 
January 1, 2012.82 The law aims to establish a framework for regu-
lating coercive measures government authorities can use against 
citizens.83 Key chapters in the law define government actions that 
fall within the scope the law,84 set out a standardized process by 
which forcible measures may be imposed against citizens,85 and 
allow citizens to sue for damages under certain circumstances.86 
Citizen petitioning and its abuses reflect two contradictory goals 
of the system: Stability preservation—embodied by the need for 
conflicts to remain at the local level—and the central government’s 
use of citizen petitioning as a check on local governments.87 Fur-
thermore, the existing system partially reflects the limited options 
available to Chinese citizens seeking redress through the rule of 
law. 
Human Rights Lawyers and Defenders 
The Commission observed increasing efforts by Chinese authori-
ties to discourage, intimidate, and physically harm human rights 
lawyers and defenders who took on ‘‘sensitive’’ causes.88 Authorities 
continued to employ a spectrum of harsh measures such as sta-
tioning police personnel to monitor the whereabouts of rights de-
fenders,89 forcing rights defenders to ‘‘travel’’ to remote or unknown 
locations,90 inviting them to ‘‘drink tea’’ with security personnel,91 
and imprisoning them.92 In addition, the Chinese government ap-
pears to increasingly target human rights defenders under the 
color of law. For example, throughout this reporting year, the gov-
ernment denied annual license renewals for human rights law-
yers,93 charged some human rights defenders and activists with 
crimes such as ‘‘disturbing social order,’’ 94 and prohibited others 
from leaving the country, citing national security concerns under 
the PRC Law on the Control of the Exit and Entry of Citizens.95 
[See Section II—Criminal Justice and Section II—Freedom of Resi-
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dence and Movement for additional information on human rights 
lawyers and defenders.] 
Legal Aid 
Chinese law grants criminal defendants the right to hire an at-
torney but guarantees pro bono legal defense only if the defendant 
is a minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or 
mute.96 In other cases in which defendants cannot afford legal rep-
resentation, courts may appoint defense counsel or defendants may 
apply for legal aid, in theory, as early as the investigative stage of 
their cases.97 
During the 2011 reporting year, the Commission observed nu-
merous reports of legal aid initiatives aimed at serving disadvan-
taged regions and improving access to justice for citizens. In early 
February 2011, the Ministry of Justice announced that legal aid 
funds nationwide increased to more than 1 billion yuan (US$153 
million) in 2010, as the central government and provincial govern-
ments allocated more funds to establish legal aid programs in rural 
localities.98 In addition, the China Legal Aid Foundation—a gov-
ernment agency established to raise, manage, and allocate funding 
for the legal aid system—increased legal assistance funding with 
allocations from the public welfare lottery.99 The increase in legal 
aid funding comes as officials report that legal aid organizations 
across China handled record numbers of cases on behalf of dis-
advantaged applicants.100 
According to a February 9, 2011, China Daily article, a senior of-
ficial with the Ministry of Justice announced that the government 
would send lawyers to assist disadvantaged groups in 213 destitute 
counties in central and western China.101 On February 14, 2011, 
the China Daily reported that the Beijing Legal Aid Center an-
nounced free legal aid consultations and services for families of 
trafficked children seeking to sue child traffickers, in response to 
a high-profile government crackdown on child abductions.102 On 
February 25, 2011, China Tibet News reported that the Ministry 
of Finance allocated a special legal aid fund of 700,000 yuan 
(US$107,200) to assist migrant workers, minors, the elderly, 
women, and persons with disabilities in the Tibet Autonomous Re-
gion.103 In a March 1, 2011, China Daily article, the Beijing Munic-
ipal Bureau of Justice announced its Legal Services in the Commu-
nity project would place lawyers in all 2,600 communities and 
3,900 villages within the Beijing municipality.104 
Despite the expansion of the legal aid system, China’s legal aid 
structure faces systemic challenges in meeting the demands of its 
disadvantaged citizens and rural localities. According to a February 
2010 article in Zhengyi Net (a Web site under the authority of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate), a large number of citizens are in 
need of legal assistance—including 40 million poor rural residents 
and 82 million persons with disabilities.105 The article notes that 
‘‘the staffs of legal aid agencies in China are far from meeting these 
needs.’’ 106 In February 2011, China Daily reported that China con-
tinues to face an imbalance in legal professionals, as only 5,000 of 
China’s 200,000 lawyers work in the relatively poorer central and 
western regions.107 In some of China’s underdeveloped regions, 
courts may have no defense attorneys.108 Furthermore, even in 
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areas with a higher proportion of lawyers, citizens are often unable 
to manage the high costs associated with legal representation. Ac-
cording to one estimate, 80 to 90 percent of criminal defendants in 
China are unable to hire a lawyer.109 Despite increases to legal aid 
funding by the China Legal Aid Foundation, the legal aid system 
needs substantially more financial support to expand legal aid re-
sources nationwide and to improve training for lawyers handling 
the challenges of legal aid cases.110 
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PROPERTY 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the press, includ-
ing Chinese media, have reported numerous cases of expropriation 
and abuses of citizens’ land use rights by local governments and 
property developers, including forced evictions, and related protests 
by Chinese citizens.1 These cases reflect a failure of rule of law 2 
in the face of a ‘‘‘great’ and ‘unrelenting’ gap between available 
land and demand for construction sites,’’ which likely will lead to 
continued illegal land seizures as the Chinese economy grows.3 In 
April 2011, a Ministry of Land and Resources official was para-
phrased as warning of ‘‘a growing number of illegal land seizures 
in the future.’’ 4 Currently, land disputes, especially forced evic-
tions, are a major cause of social unrest in China.5 A March 2011 
report by a Chinese research institute found that land confiscation 
and housing demolition were one of three problems that drew the 
most attention from Chinese Internet users.6 To address these 
problems, in January 2011, the State Council issued new regula-
tions on expropriation of urban land.7 If fully implemented, these 
regulations should provide greater protection to urban land use 
rights holders. Nevertheless, the regulations only apply to 
confiscations of state-owned land—which generally is urban land— 
and not to rural land confiscations. 
The Chinese government has tried to improve regulation of the 
real estate market, including reining in prices, boosting the supply 
of low-income housing, and protecting scarce arable land. In Janu-
ary 2011, the State Council issued a circular on regulating the 
property market, which included provisions on boosting the hous-
ing supply and on holding officials responsible for stabilizing the 
market.8 Property prices have been climbing sharply since mid- 
2009, making housing increasingly unaffordable for many urban 
dwellers, and the government has set a target of 10 million apart-
ments in 2011 for low-income families.9 Furthermore, the govern-
ment has taken a number of measures to control prices, which have 
risen as much as 50 percent in the 18-month period ending April 
2011. For example, Beijing municipality issued rules that impose 
restrictions on who can buy property.10 Finally, the government 
was conducting a pilot project as of April 2011 to establish a na-
tionwide system of land registration, with the stated aim of improv-
ing regulation of the market and protecting farmland.11 
Urban Land and Collectively Owned—or Rural—Land 
In China, urban and rural land are regulated differently. Under 
China’s Constitution and system of property law, land is cat-
egorized as ‘‘urban land,’’ or rural ‘‘collectively owned land.’’ 12 
Urban land is owned by the state.13 Urban land cannot be sold, but 
the state can grant the right to use it for a term of years, upon 
payment of a land grant premium. The term is 70 years for resi-
dential land, 50 years for industrial land, and 40 years for commer-
cial land, including land used for tourism and recreation.14 While 
only the state can grant urban land use rights,15 a grantee can 
transfer such rights.16 Collectively owned land is owned by the 
rural collectives and can be used only for agricultural purposes or 
for residences or services for farmers.17 Rural residents can enter 
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into land use contracts with the collective for a period of 30 
years.18 
As discussed below, holders of urban land use rights enjoy great-
er protection against expropriation than holders of interests in col-
lectively owned land. Under certain circumstances, collectively 
owned land use rights can be requisitioned and converted into 
urban—or state-owned—land, which the local government can then 
grant.19 The sales of such land grants provide revenue for local 
governments.20 Furthermore, according to at least one U.S. expert, 
China subsidizes production by its state-owned enterprises in part 
by providing them with free land.21 The provision of subsidized 
land allows the Chinese government to support certain industries 
or companies, including in clean energy.22 One official who spoke 
at a press conference in April 2011 about illegal land seizures stat-
ed that the ‘‘supply of land will be unrelentingly tighter and the 
tension it causes will accompany the whole process of China’s ur-
banization, industrialization and modernization.’’ 23 [For a discus-
sion of rural land conversion and hukou reform, see Section II— 
Freedom of Residence and Movement—Freedom of Residence.] 
Expropriation of Urban and Rural Land, Compensation, and 
Abuses 
During this reporting year, the Chinese government and Com-
munist Party have taken actions to try to address abuses in prop-
erty expropriations. For example, the Ministry of Public Security 
Party Committee in March 2011 issued an opinion on Party work 
in building clean government and fighting corruption, which in-
cluded a ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy toward involvement of public secu-
rity officers in illegal actions to expropriate land.24 The Supreme 
People’s Court issued an opinion in February 2011 calling on local 
courts to handle expropriation cases cautiously.25 According to a re-
port on a meeting of Chinese legal experts, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) is considering a draft Immovable Property Expro-
priation and Relocation Law, and one of the drafters commented 
China should have a law that creates a uniform system for expro-
priation of both urban and rural land.26 Furthermore, the NPC is 
considering a draft Law on Administrative Coercion which, accord-
ing to some reports, would address the problem of abuse and vio-
lence in expropriations.27 According to a professor of administrative 
law at Peking University who was cited in official media, the draft 
is an attempt ‘‘to restrain administrative coercive power on one 
hand, and to maintain [urban management officers’] ability to un-
dertake social management on the other.’’ 28 Article 11 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which 
China has ratified, provides for the right to housing.29 General 
Comment 4 to Article 11 provides that ‘‘instances of forced evictions 
are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of the Cov-
enant and can only be justified in the most exceptional cir-
cumstances . . . .’’ 30 
URBAN LAND EXPROPRIATION 
The PRC Regulations on Expropriation and Compensation for 
Housing on State-Owned Land (Urban Expropriation Regulations) 
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came into effect in January 2011 31 and, if fully implemented, 
should offer greater protection to urban land rights holders.32 The 
PRC Property Law and the PRC Law on Administration of Urban 
Real Property allow expropriation of urban land in the ‘‘public in-
terest,’’ subject to compensation for demolition and resettlement,33 
but neither law defines ‘‘public interest.’’ Article 8 of the Urban Ex-
propriation Regulations defines ‘‘public interest’’ in the context of 
land takings for purposes including, for example, national defense 
and government infrastructure construction. Unlike previous legis-
lation, the Urban Expropriation Regulations also provide for pay-
ment of market value, grant rights holders some procedural protec-
tions, such as payment of the purchase price before the owner va-
cates the property, and include a process for administrative review 
of the compensation amount if desired.34 
EXPROPRIATION OF COLLECTIVELY OWNED LAND 
Chinese laws and regulations provide rural residents, who live on 
collectively owned land, a lower level of procedural protection and 
a lower standard of compensation during expropriations.35 Though 
widespread abuse continues in the countryside, there is no legisla-
tion covering rights similar to the Urban Expropriation Regula-
tions. According to a survey conducted in mid-2010 by Landesa, a 
U.S.-based rural development institute, together with a U.S. uni-
versity and a Chinese university, according to an official media re-
port, ‘‘[a]bout 37 percent of the 1,564 villages in 17 provinces and 
autonomous regions that were covered by the survey have experi-
enced land confiscation since the late 1990s.’’ 36 Of these, farmers 
in 60 percent of the villages felt compensation was insufficient, and 
29 percent of the farmers had no prior notice before their land was 
taken forcibly.37 Farmers who try to protect their land may face 
beating and detention, according to Western media reports.38 




Human rights conditions in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) remained poor during the Commission’s 2011 re-
porting year. Following demonstrations and riots in the region in 
July 2009, authorities maintained repressive security policies that 
targeted peaceful dissent, human rights advocacy, and independent 
expressions of cultural and religious identity, especially among 
Uyghurs, as threats to the region’s stability. Authorities bolstered 
security in the region in summer 2011 following incidents they de-
scribed as terrorist attacks and in advance of an expanded trade 
expo. The government continued to obscure information about peo-
ple tried in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots, 
while overseas media reported on cases of people imprisoned for 
peaceful speech and assembly during that time. Implementation of 
a series of central government-led development initiatives, first an-
nounced at a May 2010 meeting known as the Xinjiang Work 
Forum, spurred an intensification of longstanding policies—includ-
ing Mandarin-language schooling, herder resettlement, and urban 
development projects—that have undermined the rights of Uyghurs 
and other non-Han groups to maintain their cultures, languages, 
and livelihoods. Authorities enforced tight controls over religion, es-
pecially Islam, and maintained restrictions on religious practice 
that are harsher than curbs articulated in national regulations. 
Discriminatory job hiring practices against Uyghurs and other non- 
Han groups, who comprise roughly 60 percent of the XUAR popu-
lation, continued in both the government and private sectors. The 
Chinese government maintained its disregard of international legal 
protections for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, and infor-
mation on the status of Uyghurs forcibly returned to China in re-
cent years, including multiple cases in 2011, remained limited. 
Security Measures 
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
continued to use security measures to bolster political and social 
controls in the region. At the same time XUAR authorities reiter-
ated the Xinjiang Work Forum’s call for ‘‘developments by leaps 
and bounds’’ and ‘‘long-term stability’’ in the XUAR, high-level offi-
cials also continued to emphasize ‘‘placing stability above all else’’ 
and ‘‘striking hard’’ against the ‘‘three forces’’ of terrorism, sepa-
ratism, and religious extremism.1 Authorities continued to apply 
the term ‘‘three forces’’ to include peaceful dissent, human rights 
advocacy, and independent expressions of cultural and religious 
identity, especially among Uyghurs.2 XUAR Communist Party Sec-
retary Zhang Chunxian emphasized in a December 2010 meeting 
that stability was the ‘‘prerequisite’’ and ‘‘guarantee’’ for the re-
gion’s development.3 In addition, officials at the meeting affirmed, 
as the region’s guiding principle for stability work, central authori-
ties’ ‘‘correct assessment’’ that ‘‘ethnic separatism’’ is the main 
threat to the region’s stability.4 The government and media also re-
ported that terrorist incidents took place in the region in the past 
year, including incidents in Hoten and Kashgar districts (prefec-
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tures) in July.5 As in the past, authorities provided limited infor-
mation on the events and continued to enforce restrictions on re-
porting that hindered efforts to investigate the incidents.6 The gov-
ernment reported the July incident in Hoten municipality, Hoten 
district, as a premeditated terrorist attack on a police station.7 
Some people in Hoten contradicted the government’s account, and 
some sources reported that the incident involved authorities sup-
pressing a protest that started at another location.8 
In line with directives to guard against stated terrorist threats 
and other stability concerns, the regional government and lower 
level governments within the XUAR reported implementing a 
range of security measures. The XUAR Public Security Department 
launched a 100-day ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign in December 2010 that 
focused on preventing ‘‘serious violent crimes’’ and ‘‘large-scale 
mass incidents’’ and called on localities to expand the scope of 
round-the-clock street patrols.9 In February, the regional govern-
ment established a leading group on state security to ‘‘mobilize’’ so-
ciety to ‘‘wage battle against various acts that harm state security 
and social and political stability.’’ 10 Authorities heightened security 
following reported terrorist attacks in July and surrounding an in-
augural ‘‘China-Eurasia Expo’’ in September.11 The XUAR Public 
Security Department launched a two-month ‘‘strike hard’’ anti-ter-
rorism campaign in August, pledging an increased security pres-
ence and including among its targets ‘‘illegal religious activities,’’ 
‘‘religious extremism,’’ and ‘‘illegal propaganda materials.’’ 12 In the 
XUAR capital of Urumqi (population approximately 2.6 million),13 
state-controlled media reported in January 2011 that authorities 
had added almost 17,000 security cameras in the previous year to 
existing surveillance cameras in the city.14 Authorities had an-
nounced plans in early 2010 to increase the number of 24-hour sur-
veillance cameras in the city to 60,000 by that year’s end,15 and the 
17,000-camera addition appeared to exceed this target.16 After 
Urumqi authorities strengthened controls over the rental housing 
market in late 2009—steps they connected to the alleged involve-
ment of Uyghur migrants to the city in the July 2009 demonstra-
tions and riots 17—authorities launched a three-month campaign in 
late 2010 to strengthen controls over migrants and housing rent-
als.18 In Shuimogou district, Urumqi city, authorities used the 
campaign to ‘‘strike hard’’ against ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ and 
other ‘‘three forces’’ crimes.19 Districts throughout Urumqi report-
edly have used a range of technologies and methods to monitor mi-
grants and rental housing, including computerized entry cards in 
rental housing keyed to data about the user, and sealed-off neigh-
borhoods with security checkpoints for vehicles and pedestrians.20 
XUAR residents reported that authorities have maintained restric-
tions on passport applications from Uyghurs and members of other 
non-Han groups since the July 2009 demonstrations and riots.21 
Uyghurs from the XUAR also faced scrutiny elsewhere in China. 
As part of a campaign to promote a ‘‘peaceful Asian Games’’ 
launched in advance of the November 2010 event hosted in 
Guangdong province, authorities in Zhongshan city, Guangdong, 
called for continuing work to resolve ‘‘contradictions’’ and disputes 
in areas where ‘‘Xinjiang Uyghurs’’ ‘‘assemble, live, or are active.’’ 22 
A December 2010 directive on promoting stability from the 
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Changde city, Hunan province, ethnic and religious affairs bureau 
called for ‘‘launching investigation and research into the situation 
for managing Xinjiang Uyghurs.’’ 23 
Ideological Campaigns 
Authorities within the XUAR continued to promote ideological 
and ‘‘ethnic unity’’ campaigns throughout the region and main-
tained a regional regulation on promoting ethnic unity that entered 
into force in February 2010. Both the regulation and related cam-
paigns have promoted state-defined notions of ethnic unity and eth-
nic relations and have sought to quell or punish forms of speech 
deemed ‘‘not beneficial’’ to government and Party objectives.24 Au-
thorities continued a ‘‘patriotic education’’ campaign, launched in 
June 2010, titled ‘‘Ardently Loving the Great Motherland, Building 
a Glorious Homeland.’’ A description from the state-run Xinhua 
news agency described the campaign as ‘‘a fundamental project for 
promoting Xinjiang’s development by leaps and bounds and long- 
term stability.’’ 25 Authorities reportedly organized 13,300 teams 
made up of 57,600 staff and held 91,000 lectures for a total of 11 
million listeners, thereby ‘‘conveying the voice of the Party and gov-
ernment to people at the grassroots level,’’ according to the head 
of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.26 Venues for the cam-
paign included mosques, schools, and individual households.27 
Xinjiang Work Forum 
In the past reporting year, central and XUAR government and 
Communist Party offices continued to implement a series of initia-
tives first announced at the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum, con-
vened in Beijing by top central government and Party leaders. The 
inaugural forum set government and Party objectives for the 
XUAR’s economic and political development, intensifying a trend of 
top-down initiatives that prioritize state economic and political 
goals over the promotion of regional autonomy and broader protec-
tion of XUAR residents’ rights.28 Throughout the year, authorities 
emphasized the political importance of fulfilling the work forum’s 
aims of ‘‘developments by leaps and bounds’’ and ‘‘long-term sta-
bility.’’ 29 As authorities renewed ‘‘counterpart support’’ programs 
that bring personnel and funding to the XUAR from other provin-
cial-level areas, they stressed dispatching ‘‘politically steadfast’’ 
cadres to serve development projects in the XUAR.’’ 30 
Implementation of the initiatives announced at the May 2010 
forum and its immediate aftermath brought an intensification of 
longstanding policies that have challenged the ability of Uyghurs 
and other non-Han groups to protect their cultures, languages, and 
livelihoods. Authorities accelerated implementation of Mandarin-fo-
cused ‘‘bilingual education,’’ a program that has diminished the use 
of Uyghur and other non-Mandarin languages in XUAR schools. 
[See Language Policy and Bilingual Education in this section for 
more information.] XUAR authorities bolstered steps to resettle 
farmers and resettle herders away from grasslands, as part of ini-
tiatives from the Xinjiang Work Forum and longstanding grass-
lands policies that have restricted grazing for the stated goal of 
combating grasslands degradation.31 The grasslands policies affect 
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Mongols, Kazakhs, and other groups in the XUAR with cultural 
ties to pastoral livelihoods. [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights 
for more information on grasslands policies throughout China and 
its impact on non-Han groups.] An August 2011 report from official 
media cited animal excrement upsetting tourists and grasslands 
degradation as impetuses for a grazing ban imposed at a tourist 
site containing grasslands.32 August media reports also detailed 
plans to resettle herders from grasslands areas, including other 
tourist sites, and shift them to different occupations.33 The XUAR 
government reported in November 2010 on already resettling 
669,000 farmers and herders and described plans to resettle a total 
of 106,000 nomadic herding households and 700,000 rural house-
holds by 2015.34 
Following the Xinjiang Work Forum, authorities also accelerated 
urban development, raising concerns about the resettlement of resi-
dents, equitable distribution of resources, and cultural preserva-
tion. Projects described as ‘‘slum transformations’’ took place in the 
past year in localities throughout the XUAR.35 A report from the 
state-run Xinhua news agency noted ‘‘mostly ethnic Uyghurs’’ made 
up the 250,000 residents of Urumqi city’s ‘‘slum areas,’’ which the 
report said ‘‘are considered the breeding ground for the resentment 
which underpinned the deadly riots that rocked the city two years 
ago.’’ 36 In the past year XUAR authorities also detailed plans for 
developing part of Kashgar municipality and Korgas Port, along 
with part of Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autonomous 
Prefecture, as two special economic zones reportedly ‘‘modeled on 
Shenzhen’’ and for developing Urumqi into a ‘‘core city’’ of western 
China and an ‘‘international trade center,’’ 37 with reported plans to 
double or almost double the populations of Urumqi and Kashgar.38 
Authorities expanded a longstanding trade fair in Urumqi into an 
inaugural ‘‘China-Eurasia Expo’’ held in September, describing it 
as a ‘‘major strategic measure to achieve rapid development and 
the long-term stability of Xinjiang,’’ with focus on ‘‘making Xinjiang 
a bridgehead in the development of [the] western region.’’ 39 In ad-
dition, officials announced plans to construct a railway line be-
tween Golmud city, Qinghai province, and Korla city within the pe-
riod of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic and Social 
Development (2011–2015).40 Some Uyghurs and outside observers 
have expressed concern about the ability of Uyghur communities to 
maintain their culture amid top-down development projects and 
questioned whether Uyghurs would enjoy economic benefits on par 
with Han residents, against a backdrop of prior development 
projects that have brought disproportionate benefits to Han Chi-
nese.41 The Kashgar plans come as authorities continue a five-year 
project to raze and rebuild the city’s historic area. [See Preserva-
tion of Cultural Heritage in this section for more information.] 
Criminal Law and Access to Justice 
Authorities in the XUAR continued to stress the role of the jus-
tice system in ‘‘striking hard’’ against the ‘‘three forces’’ of ter-
rorism, separatism, and religious extremism. In 2010, the Supreme 
People’s Court issued an opinion on nationwide work to assist the 
XUAR court system. The opinion called for strengthening ‘‘guid-
ance’’ for trying cases connected to endangering state security, in-
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cluding cases involving the ‘‘three forces,’’ as well as cases ‘‘influ-
encing ethnic unity’’ and social ‘‘harmony and stability.’’ 42 The 
opinion also called for dispatching ‘‘politically steadfast’’ judges to 
the XUAR.43 The Communist Party-controlled Xinjiang Lawyers 
Association held a training session for non-Han (‘‘ethnic minority’’) 
lawyers in December. In addition to providing professional train-
ing, the session’s stated aim was strengthening ‘‘ideological and po-
litical construction’’ and cultivating ‘‘politically steadfast’’ law-
yers.44 Speaking at the event, XUAR Justice Department head 
Abliz Hoshur noted ethnic minority lawyers’ ‘‘special role’’ in deal-
ing with sensitive cases, including those connected to events in 
July 2009.45 He called on the lawyers to ‘‘fully utilize the weapon 
of the law’’ to battle the ‘‘three forces.’’ 46 
Following a statement in March 2010 by XUAR government 
chairperson Nur Bekri that courts had tried 198 people in 97 cases 
in connection to the July 2009 demonstrations and riots,47 Chinese 
government and media reports appeared to provide no additional 
details on trials connected to the July events. Nur Bekri said in his 
March 2010 remarks, however, that trials were ongoing.48 Later, in 
January 2011, Rozi Ismail, head of the XUAR High People’s Court, 
also made a brief reference to ongoing cases connected to the 
events,49 but authorities did not provide specific information on the 
trials. Overseas media and a non-governmental organization re-
ported on trials that took place in April and July 2010.50 A lawyer 
in the XUAR reported to overseas media in fall 2010 that she and 
other judges and lawyers had been sent to Urumqi, the XUAR cap-
ital, from other localities in the XUAR to handle July 2009-related 
cases and that they were ordered to finish handling the cases by 
the end of 2010.51 
The number of trials completed in the XUAR for crimes of endan-
gering state security (ESS)—a category of criminal offenses that 
authorities in China have used to punish citizen activism and dis-
sent—decreased in 2010 compared to 2009 figures, but remained 
higher than in years before 2009.52 Courts in the XUAR completed 
trials in 376 ESS cases in 2010, a decrease of 61 cases over the pre-
vious year.53 The 2009 figure of 437 was a sharp increase over the 
268 ESS cases tried in the region in 2008, as well as cases tried 
earlier in the decade.54 Officials did not report the reason for the 
high number of cases in 2009 and 2010, although Rozi Ismail, 
President of the XUAR High People’s Court, said the 2010 figures 
included cases connected to ‘‘violent terrorist crimes,’’ including 
crimes reported to have taken place in 2008.55 Rozi Ismail did not 
link the ESS cases from 2010 to trials connected to the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots. To date, official reports have not clearly 
specified how many trials connected to the July events involved 
ESS cases.56 Unofficial sources have reported on a limited number 
of trials connected to the July 2009 events that involve ESS 
charges, including the cases of Gulmira Imin, Gheyret Niyaz, Nijat 
Azat, Dilshat Perhat, and Nureli.57 [See Section III—Access to Jus-
tice for information on legal aid initiatives in western China.] 
Controls Over Free Expression 
The XUAR government continued to exert tight controls over free 
expression. The government maintained regulations passed in the 
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aftermath of the July 2009 demonstrations and riots that repress 
free speech,58 while a series of reports from the past year under-
scored continuing government repression of people who exercised 
their right to free expression. Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported in 
December 2010 that Uyghur journalist and webmaster Memetjan 
Abdulla received a life sentence in April 2010 in apparent connec-
tion to translating an announcement calling on Uyghurs to hold 
demonstrations in July 2009 and in connection to interviews he 
gave to foreign journalists.59 RFA reported in March 2011 on the 
seven-year sentence of Uyghur webmaster Tursunjan Hezim in 
July 2010, following his detention in the aftermath of the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots.60 A number of other Uyghur writers, 
journalists, and Web site workers continued to serve prison sen-
tences in connection to exercising their right to free expression 
about the demonstrations and riots in July 2009 or otherwise 
deemed to have a connection to the events. They include Dilshat 
Perhat, Gheyret Niyaz, Gulmira Imin, Nijat Azat, and Nureli.61 
Kajikhumar (Qazhyghumar) Shabdan, an ethnic Kazakh writer in 
the XUAR, remained under home confinement until his death in 
February 2011. Authorities had held him under home confinement 
following a 15-year prison sentence in 1987 for ‘‘espionage,’’ in re-
ported connection to allegations that he belonged to an illegal 
group with ties to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic and after 
he wrote a book critical of Chinese government policy toward 
Turkic groups.62 Outside the XUAR, Beijing authorities held Bei-
jing-based Uyghur professor and webmaster Ilham Tohti and his 
family in custody at a resort in southern China for almost a week 
in December 2010 and placed additional restrictions on their activi-
ties and travel at other times.63 
The XUAR government continued to enforce censorship cam-
paigns in the region, in line with both national campaigns and local 
directives to ‘‘strike hard’’ against the ‘‘three forces’’ of terrorism, 
separatism, and religious extremism. The XUAR Press and Publi-
cations Bureau said in July 2010 that the bureau would deepen its 
implementation of censorship work during the last half of 2010 and 
would focus on ‘‘striking hard’’ against ‘‘reactionary propaganda 
materials’’ and ‘‘illegal’’ political and religious publications pub-
licized and disseminated by the ‘‘three forces.’’ 64 At a meeting in 
January 2011, an official called for strengthening inspection and 
prosecution connected to these publications and cited concerns 
about ‘‘western enemy forces’’ and the ‘‘three forces’’ ‘‘importing 
western values and an ideological trend in ‘Xinjiang independ-
ence.’ ’’ 65 The official also called for strengthening oversight of 
transportation of published materials, and one locality reported 
finding ‘‘suspicious items’’ at a transportation inspection point that 
authorities later determined were ‘‘illegal religious publications’’ 
consisting of Uyghur- and Arabic-language items.66 Other localities 
within the XUAR also reported targeting or confiscating religious 
and political items.67 The World Uyghur Congress reported in De-
cember 2010 and February 2011 on people detained or charged for 
possessing religious materials and ‘‘illegal’’ DVDs and CDs with 
‘‘overseas enemy propaganda.’’ 68 
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Freedom of Religion 
Authorities in the XUAR continued to target ‘‘illegal religious ac-
tivities’’ and ‘‘religious extremism’’ as threats to the region’s sta-
bility, and they maintained curbs over religious activities inde-
pendent of government control in the region’s security campaigns, 
singling out Islamic practices in a number of cases. Authorities con-
tinued to define ‘‘illegal religious activities’’ and ‘‘religious extre-
mism’’ to encompass religious practices, group affiliations, and 
viewpoints protected under international human rights guarantees 
for freedom of religion. A December meeting of the XUAR Party 
Committee Standing Committee called for ‘‘resolutely preventing il-
legal religious activities and striking in accordance with law 
against religious extremist forces’’ as part of work in the region to 
maintain stability.69 XUAR Communist Party Secretary Zhang 
Chunxian reiterated the pledge to curb illegal religious activities in 
August 2011, following attacks the previous month that officials la-
beled as terrorist.70 The region’s two-month ‘‘strike hard’’ anti-ter-
rorism campaign launched in August included ‘‘illegal religious ac-
tivities’’ and ‘‘religious extremism’’ among its targets.71 Regional 
regulations and directives maintained restrictions on religious 
practice that are absent in national regulations or harsher than 
curbs articulated in national documents.72 Authorities continued to 
enforce a document of unclear legal status that defines ‘‘23 kinds 
of illegal religious activity,’’ including ‘‘letting students pray,’’ con-
ducting certain Islamic practices pertaining to marriage and di-
vorce, holding private religious instruction classes, ‘‘distorting reli-
gious doctrine,’’ and advocating ‘‘Pan-Islamism’’ and ‘‘Pan- 
Turkism.’’ 73 The region’s 2009 regulation on the protection of mi-
nors stipulates penalties for people who ‘‘lure or force minors to 
participate in religious activities’’ and appears to provide the most 
extensive curbs in China on children’s religious activities, while 
lacking a clear basis in Chinese law.74 
In line with regionwide directives restricting the scope of reli-
gious activity, local authorities in the XUAR reported on enforcing 
a range of controls over religion. Villages within Hoten district and 
a limited number of other localities continued to implement and ex-
pand a system of ‘‘voluntary pledges’’ to regulate villagers’ behavior 
and to fine villagers for noncompliance, placing special emphasis on 
the pledges to curb ‘‘illegal religious activity.’’ 75 In January 2011, 
authorities in a township in Chapchal Xibe Autonomous County, Ili 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, described implementing a system 
for government religious affairs employees to set the schedule for 
Friday sermons at the township’s mosques and for using ‘‘religious 
information gatherers’’ of ‘‘high political consciousness’’ to provide 
information on the sermon delivery and the ‘‘ideological trends’’ of 
mosque attendees.76 Authorities in a district in Urumqi described 
an emergence of ‘‘illegal religious sects’’ that they deemed are ‘‘con-
trary’’ to the teachings of the Quran and they called on religious 
personnel to interpret religious doctrine in accordance with ‘‘social 
advancement.’’ 77 Local governments throughout the XUAR contin-
ued to place restrictions on the observance of the holiday of Rama-
dan, barring some people from fasting, ordering restaurants to stay 
open, and increasing oversight of religious venues.78 In April, a 
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court in Shihezi municipality reportedly sentenced Muslim reli-
gious leaders Qahar Mensur and Muhemmed Tursun to three 
years’ imprisonment in connection to storing and distributing ‘‘ille-
gal religious publications,’’ which Shihezi residents reportedly de-
scribed as retaliation after Qahar Mensur refused to comply with 
government demands such as bringing government documents into 
the mosque where he worked.79 
Authorities throughout the XUAR also continued campaigns tar-
geting Muslim men who wear beards and women who wear veils 
or clothing deemed to carry religious connotations, practices au-
thorities connect to ‘‘religious extremism’’ and ‘‘backwardness.’’ 80 
Under the direction of the Party-controlled women’s federation in 
the XUAR, multiple localities reported continuing a campaign 
aimed at dissuading women from veiling their hair and faces.81 
Management rules in force for the ‘‘information corps’’ in a residen-
tial district in Usu city, Tacheng (Tarbaghatay) district, included 
requirements to immediately report scenarios such as the presence 
of ‘‘people from outside [the district] abnormally wearing large 
beards or veiling their faces’’ along with ‘‘residents holding extrem-
ist religious thoughts.’’ 82 A township in Aqsu district included veil-
ing and wearing large beards or ‘‘bizarre clothes’’ among targets of 
a campaign against ‘‘illegal’’ religious activities.83 Authorities also 
continued to increase oversight of Muslim women religious special-
ists known as bu¨wi.84 [See Section II—Freedom of Religion for ad-
ditional information on religion in China, including cases from the 
XUAR.] 
Language Policy and Bilingual Education 
The XUAR government accelerated implementation of ‘‘bilingual 
education,’’ a policy that promotes the use of Mandarin Chinese in 
school instruction for non-Han students and increasingly has cur-
tailed the opportunity for non-Han groups to choose to receive edu-
cation in Uyghur and other languages. The policy has conflicted 
with legal protections for non-Han groups to maintain and use 
their own languages, as provided in both Chinese and international 
law,85 and underscores government failure to maintain the use of 
Uyghur and other languages as lingua franca within the XUAR in 
line with the promotion of regional autonomy. Following goals set 
after the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum to universalize ‘‘bilingual 
education’’ in the region’s schools,86 the XUAR government and 
Party Committee issued a 10-year education reform plan in Janu-
ary 2011 that provides for ‘‘basically universalizing’’ elementary 
and secondary school ‘‘bilingual education’’ among non-Han stu-
dents (designated as ‘‘ethnic minorities’’ by the Chinese govern-
ment) to reach a coverage rate of 75 percent of such students by 
2015 and over 90 percent by 2020.87 The plan adds that all ethnic 
minority high school graduates shall ‘‘basically have a skilled grasp 
and use’’ of spoken and written Mandarin by 2020.88 The plan also 
calls for coverage of at least 85 percent of ethnic minority pre-
schoolers by 2012, a target authorities appear to have articulated 
since 2008.89 The plan describes the promotion of ‘‘bilingual edu-
cation’’ of ‘‘strategic significance’’ for goals including ‘‘building a 
new model of socialist ethnic relations’’ and ‘‘promoting cohesion 
and centripetal force toward the Chinese nation (zhonghua 
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minzu).’’ 90 The plan also calls for protecting the right to instruction 
using minority languages and allows for preserving instruction 
using such languages in the process of implementing ‘‘bilingual 
education.’’ 91 The future role of non-Mandarin languages in XUAR 
schools and broader society, however, remains uncertain as the 
plan and accompanying measures bolster overall support for in-
struction in Mandarin. The implementation of Mandarin-focused 
‘‘bilingual’’ programs and accompanying reduction in classes using 
minority languages reportedly has provoked dissatisfaction among 
some students, parents, and teachers, and a few localities report-
edly reinstated some Uyghur-language instruction in the past 
year.92 
XUAR authorities also have accelerated steps to staff ‘‘bilingual’’ 
classes and address a shortage of ‘‘bilingual’’ teachers. In 2010, the 
Xinjiang Education Department announced plans to recruit 5,109 
elementary and secondary school ‘‘bilingual’’ teachers, reportedly 
marking the largest scope of recruitment for ‘‘specially appointed 
teachers’’ as of that date.93 Authorities announced plans to recruit 
over 11,500 teachers in 2011, of whom 9,200 would be ‘‘bilingual’’ 
teachers.94 Localities within the XUAR also reported increasing ‘‘bi-
lingual’’ training among ethnic minority teachers.95 Authorities 
have dismissed or reassigned some Uyghur teachers deemed not to 
have adequate Mandarin skills—with a minimum of 1,000 elemen-
tary school teachers dismissed since 2010, according to one report— 
and in some cases, authorities detained teachers for protesting ‘‘bi-
lingual’’ policies or dismissals from their teaching posts.96 
Authorities also reported taking some steps to promote ethnic 
minority language arts classes within Mandarin-focused schools 
and to train Mandarin-speaking teachers in minority languages. A 
pilot project in two prefectural-level areas called for implementing 
language arts classes in minority languages for ethnic minority 
students (minkaohan students) in longstanding programs that pro-
vide schooling solely in Mandarin.97 A January 2011 plan called for 
providing 320 class hours of instruction in basic ‘‘ethnic minority 
languages’’ for teachers at ‘‘bilingual’’ preschools who are native 
Mandarin speakers.98 
Population Planning Policies 
XUAR authorities continued to expand a system of rewarding 
non-Han households (‘‘ethnic minority’’ households) that have been 
‘‘certified’’ as having fewer children than the maximum allowed 
under the region’s regulation on population and family planning.99 
This step builds on similar reward systems present throughout 
China, while intensifying a regional focus on ethnic minority house-
holds. The XUAR Party Committee and government reported plans 
in the past year to expand the existing reward system in 2011 to 
any XUAR county or city where rural ethnic minorities comprise 
over 50 percent of the population.100 Authorities initially imple-
mented the reward system for ethnic minorities in 3 southern 
XUAR prefectural-level areas in 2007 101 and expanded the reward 
system in 2009 to an additional 26 ‘‘poor and border counties.’’ 102 
Local governments reported enforcing the reward system in the 
past year.103 
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Pledge System To Regulate Village Behavior 
Some villages within the XUAR continued to implement and ex-
pand a system of ‘‘voluntary pledges’’ to regulate villagers’ behavior 
and to fine villagers for non-compliance, a practice that has no ex-
plicit basis in Chinese law and appears to exceed the scope of vil-
lages’ authority to enforce penalties.104 Under the pledge system, 
first implemented in Hoten district in 2006 105 and almost wholly 
unique to the XUAR,106 village residents and village officials enter 
into agreements (cungui shouyue chengnuoshu) with villagers’ com-
mittees to abide by local village ‘‘codes of conduct’’ (cungui 
minyue).107 Villages throughout China use codes of conduct, which 
are stipulated under the PRC Organic Law of the Villagers’ Com-
mittees,108 to implement population planning requirements, regu-
late social order, and manage local production, among other 
tasks.109 In the XUAR, authorities have used the pledge system to 
bolster the efficacy of these codes of conduct, placing special em-
phasis on the pledges and codes of conduct to curb ‘‘illegal religious 
activity.’’ 110 An official described the villagers’ participation in the 
pledge system as voluntary,111 but a 2007 government and Party 
directive from one district called for achieving a participation rate 
of over 98 percent within each village.112 
Labor 
DISCRIMINATION 
Hiring practices that discriminate against non-Han groups con-
tinued in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the 
past year. Some job recruitment announcements from the region 
continued to reserve positions exclusively for Han Chinese in civil 
servant posts and private-sector jobs, in contravention of provisions 
in Chinese law that forbid discrimination.113 A job announcement 
for a hospital in Urumqi city, for example, advertised in late 2010 
for 28 positions, all of which were reserved for Han.114 Civil serv-
ant recruitment in fall 2010 for county-level discipline inspection 
and supervision offices reserved 93 of 224 open positions for Han, 
leaving 93 of the remaining positions unrestricted by ethnicity and 
reserving 38 for members of non-Han (‘‘ethnic minority’’) groups.115 
In an apparent shift from previous years, however, 2011 annual re-
cruiting for the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC) left almost all positions unreserved by ethnicity—marking 
a change from past practice of formally reserving a majority of po-
sitions for Han—but the XPCC continued restrictions based on 
sex.116 
A XUAR government and Party committee opinion on employ-
ment promotion issued in October 2009 called for enterprises reg-
istered in the XUAR and enterprises working there to recruit no 
fewer than 50 percent of workers from among local XUAR residents 
and to ‘‘recruit more ethnic minority workers to the extent pos-
sible,’’ 117 including an unspecified ‘‘fixed proportion’’ of positions 
for ethnic minority college graduates.118 The extent to which some 
enterprises adhered to the opinion’s provisions on minority workers 
in the past year is unclear.119 In January 2011, several XUAR gov-
ernment and Party offices issued an opinion on sending ethnic mi-
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nority university graduates to train in areas engaged in counter-
part support relationships with the region. Citing concerns about 
employment pressures on the region’s stability and economic devel-
opment, the opinion outlines plans to train 22,000 unemployed col-
lege graduates from the XUAR in the next two years,120 after 
which trainees reportedly may take up set posts within the XUAR 
or remain in areas elsewhere in China to find work.121 The opinion 
states the program’s usefulness in ‘‘transforming ideas,’’ promoting 
‘‘good sentiments’’ among the ethnicities, strengthening a ‘‘sense of 
identification toward the Chinese nation’’ (zhonghua minzu), and 
promoting ‘‘social stability’’ and ‘‘ethnic assimilation’’ (minzu 
ronghe).122 The opinion does not address barriers to employment 
due to job recruiting practices that reserve positions for Han. 
LABOR TRANSFERS 
Government programs to send rural non-Han men and women to 
jobs elsewhere in China continued in the past year. As documented 
by the Commission in recent years, some participants and their 
family members have reported coercion to participate in the pro-
grams, the use of underage workers, and exploitative working con-
ditions.123 XUAR authorities have described the programs as a way 
for XUAR workers to gain income, build job skills, and transform 
participants’ ‘‘outmoded thinking.’’ 124 A XUAR Department of Agri-
culture official said in September 2010 that ‘‘the state policy of en-
couraging relatively developed areas to recruit workers from 
Xinjiang will not change.’’ 125 Another official described ‘‘Xinjiang’s 
organizing ethnic minority youth to go [elsewhere in China] to en-
gage in manufacturing and construction activities’’ as an ‘‘inevi-
table large trend’’ in professional resources exchange in a market 
economy.126 Official media reported in May 2011 that there have 
been 800,000 instances since 2005 of XUAR laborers going to work 
in other provinces under government auspices.127 The ongoing 
work to export the labor force comes amid a reported shortage of 
agricultural and factory workers within the XUAR, for which em-
ployers have recruited laborers from other provinces and used stu-
dent labor.128 
WORK STUDY 
Education authorities in the XUAR continued to require students 
to pick cotton and engage in other forms of labor in ‘‘work-study’’ 
programs that have exceeded permitted parameters for student 
labor under Chinese law and international standards for worker 
rights.129 Under the programs, schools take students out of class 
for periods of one to two weeks during the academic year to engage 
in full-time labor; in some reported cases, students have worked for 
longer periods and under hazardous conditions.130 Although the 
XUAR Education Department issued a circular in 2008 stating that 
students in junior high and lower grades would no longer pick cot-
ton in the work-study programs,131 reports from 2010 indicated 
that some localities continued to use these younger students to 
meet the shortage of cotton-pickers.132 Officials stressed the impor-
tance of using students to meet labor shortages following dem-
onstrations and riots in the region in July 2009.133 
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Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
National and XUAR government officials continued to implement 
projects that have undermined Uyghurs’ ability to protect their cul-
tural heritage. Authorities continued steps to demolish and ‘‘recon-
struct’’ the Old City section of Kashgar city and relocate residents. 
The five-year project, launched in 2009, has drawn opposition from 
Uyghur residents and other observers for requiring the resettle-
ment of residents and for undermining cultural heritage protec-
tion.134 Official media reported in July 2011 that authorities re-
vived the project in August 2010 after ‘‘nearly falling into stagna-
tion’’ following the July 2009 demonstrations and riots and re-
ported plans to complete restoration of 10,566 homes during the 
year.135 A Kashgar official reported in October 2010 that 9,378 
houses had been ‘‘removed’’ to date, while 16,557 homes had been 
built or restored.136 The Chinese government also continued to po-
liticize the preservation of Uyghur intangible cultural heritage. In 
November 2010, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga-
nization (UNESCO) accepted China’s nomination to place the 
meshrep, a Uyghur social and artistic gathering, on its List of In-
tangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.137 
While the designation obligates China to take measures to promote 
the practice’s sustainability,138 the Chinese government defined the 
meshrep narrowly to exclude forms of the practice that have incor-
porated religious elements and social activism.139 In the mid-1990s, 
authorities in Yining (Ghulja) municipality, Ili Kazakh Autono-
mous Prefecture, prohibited meshrep gatherings where participants 
sought to reduce alcohol and drug use and had become active in or-
ganizing a boycott of alcohol stores.140 
Forced Return of Uyghur Asylum Seekers and Migrants 
In the past year, information remained limited on the status of 
Uyghur asylum seekers forcibly returned to China from Cambodia 
in December 2009, before the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) could make a determination of the asylum seekers’ ref-
ugee status.141 Following the forced deportation of the 20 asylum 
seekers and disappearance of another 2 who escaped forced return, 
the Chinese government reported in June 2010 that 3 of the 20 
people returned to China were suspected of terrorist crimes, and 
that all 17 who remained in custody were members of a terrorist 
group 142—charges that, even if made at the time of extradition, 
would not have precluded an assessment of the asylum cases by 
UN officers.143 The government appeared to provide no additional 
information on the cases in the past reporting year. According to 
a March 2011 Radio Free Asia article, the group was held in deten-
tion in Kashgar district, and their cases had not gone to trial.144 
One of the asylum seekers who had escaped forced return from 
Cambodia and was deported from Laos to China in March 2010 re-
portedly was held in detention in Kashgar with the group, where 
he reportedly was in poor health and was denied medical care for 
an arm infection.145 
In May 2011, Chinese security officials in cooperation with au-
thorities in Kazakhstan forcibly returned Ershidin Israil, a Uyghur 
man from the XUAR, from Kazakhstan to China.146 Ershidin Israil 
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left China in 2009 after Chinese authorities reportedly sought him 
for providing information to Radio Free Asia about the death of 
Shohret Tursun, a Uyghur man held in custody after the July 2009 
demonstrations and riots in the XUAR.147 Ershidin Israil received 
refugee status from the UNHCR in March 2010 and had awaited 
resettlement to Sweden before authorities in Kazakhstan took him 
into custody and the UNHCR revoked his refugee status.148 Upon 
his return, Chinese authorities reportedly charged him for terrorist 
acts. A family member and advocates for Ershidin Israil said that 
the charges and bases for revoking his refugee status were based 
on false information.149 In August, authorities in Thailand de-
tained Nur Muhammed, a Uyghur man from the XUAR, on 
grounds of illegal entry. Thai authorities bypassed a court appear-
ance as provided by Thai law and turned him over to Chinese au-
thorities, who are presumed to have returned him to China.150 The 
same month, authorities in Pakistan reportedly forcibly returned 
five Uyghurs, including two children, to China.151 Later in August, 
Malaysian authorities deported 11 Uyghur men from Malaysia to 
China, following the arrests of a group of 16 Uyghurs earlier in the 
month.152 
The forced returns violate the Convention Against Torture, which 
provides, ‘‘No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite 
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture.’’ 153 [See Section II—Criminal Justice for additional informa-
tion on the use of torture in China.] In addition, the return of 
Uyghur asylum seekers violates the principle of non-refoulement as 
stipulated in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees.154 The forced returns from Cambodia, Laos, Kazakhstan, 
Pakistan, and Thailand are among several documented cases of 
forced deportation in recent years, highlighting the ongoing risks of 
refoulement and torture that Uyghur asylum seekers, refugees, and 
migrants have faced in neighboring countries under the sway of 
China’s influence and its disregard for international law.155 




Developments during the Commission’s 2011 reporting period 
show that expanding Chinese government and Communist Party 
use of legal and policy measures to increase pressure on Tibetan 
culture—especially religion and language—are resulting in con-
sequences that Tibetans believe threaten the viability of their cul-
ture. Declining well-being of Tibetan culture contrasts with in-
creases in economic development and social services such as edu-
cation in government-provided statistics. Tibetans who peacefully 
express disapproval of Chinese government policy on Tibetan af-
fairs are at increased risk of punishment as governments expand 
the use of legal measures to safeguard ‘‘social stability’’ by crim-
inalizing such expression. 
Status of Negotiations Between the Chinese Government and the 
Dalai Lama or His Representatives 
No formal dialogue took place between the Dalai Lama’s rep-
resentatives and Chinese government and Communist Party offi-
cials during the Commission’s 2011 reporting year. The environ-
ment for dialogue deteriorated as the Chinese government pressed 
forward with implementation of legal measures and policies that 
many Tibetans—including the Dalai Lama—believe threaten the 
Tibetan culture, language, religion, heritage, and environment. In 
his March 10 address to Tibetans,1 the Dalai Lama expressed dis-
appointment with previous rounds of the dialogue. He noted the 
‘‘lack of any positive response’’ to proposals set out in his Middle 
Way Approach 2 and suggested that the Communist Party United 
Front Work Department officials who met with the Dalai Lama’s 
envoys may not have accurately or completely informed higher 
ranking officials about the Tibetan proposals.3 
In March 2011, the Dalai Lama took steps to end the official role 
of a Dalai Lama in the India-based organization that is commonly 
referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile.4 The change, he 
said, would enable him to focus ‘‘more effectively’’ on spiritual mat-
ters.5 He explained in his March 10 address that he had reached 
a ‘‘decision to devolve [his] formal authority to the elected leader’’ 6 
and the next day outlined his decision to end the centuries old Ti-
betan government structure that positioned the Dalai Lama as the 
highest-ranking figure in both government and religious affairs.7 
The Dalai Lama’s renunciation of an official role in exiled Tibetans’ 
governance has the potential to alter the dialogue’s dynamics by 
eliminating an institutional basis for the Party and government to 
characterize the Dalai Lama as a ‘‘political’’ figure.8 
In July 2011, Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global 
Affairs Maria Otero reiterated U.S. Administration objectives to 
‘‘promote a substantive, results-oriented dialogue between the Chi-
nese Government and the Dalai Lama or his representatives’’ and 
‘‘to help sustain Tibet’s unique religious, linguistic, and cultural 
heritages.’’ 9 She observed that it is in the Chinese government’s in-
terests to resolve problems and that counterproductive policies ‘‘will 
exacerbate already existing tensions that could, in turn, undermine 
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China’s efforts to maintain its current social and economic develop-
ment.’’ 10 
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists 
During the past year, the Chinese government and Communist 
Party continued the campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a re-
ligious leader 11 and expanded government and Party control over 
Tibetan Buddhism in order to impose what officials describe as the 
‘‘normal order’’ of the religion.12 In April 2011, Zhu Weiqun, Execu-
tive Deputy Head of the Party’s United Front Work Department 13 
(and principal interlocutor for the Dalai Lama’s envoys) summed 
up Party intentions toward the Tibetan Buddhist religion, mon-
asteries, and nunneries during a working group ‘‘investigation’’ he 
led in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).14 A Party-run news-
paper described his remarks: 
He expressed his hopes that religious personages and be-
lievers will always implement the line, principle, and poli-
cies of the Party, unswervingly carry out struggle against 
the Dalai clique, expose the reactionary essence of Dalai, 
establish a sound and permanent mechanism for the man-
agement of monasteries, and ensure that all activities of 
monasteries will have rules to follow. In addition, their in-
terpretations of religious doctrines and rules must be [in] 
line with social development and progress and ensure that 
Tibetan Buddhism will actively adapt itself to socialist so-
ciety.15 
OFFICIALS PRESS ATTACK ON DALAI LAMA, SET SIGHTS ON SELECTING 
NEXT DALAI LAMA 
Chinese government and Communist Party officials pressed their 
campaign to discredit the Dalai Lama as a religious leader. Zhang 
Qingli, Secretary of the TAR Party Committee, at a March 2011 
meeting of TAR delegates to the National People’s Congress, ac-
cused the Dalai Lama of being ‘‘the boss of splittism’’ and a ‘‘double 
dealer’’ who, ‘‘under the signboard of religion,’’ seeks to ‘‘deceive re-
ligious believers’ simple feelings.’’ 16 Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba 
Pingcuo), Chairman of the Standing Committee of the TAR People’s 
Congress, said the same month during a visit to the United States 
that Tibetans ‘‘could have developed much better without the Dalai 
Lama and his followers,’’ and that if the Dalai Lama ‘‘is indeed a 
religious person’’ he should ‘‘not dabble in’’ political issues.17 Chi-
na’s official media reported in August that as part of a ‘‘major lead-
ership reshuffle’’ the Party Central Committee transferred Hebei 
province Deputy Party Secretary Chen Quanguo to the TAR to re-
place Zhang as Secretary, and posted Zhang to Hebei as Party Sec-
retary.18 
During the past reporting year, senior officials continued to as-
sert the Chinese government’s intention to supervise the selection 
of the next Dalai Lama and to challenge the current Dalai Lama’s 
views on the matter. Jampa Phuntsog, also Executive Deputy Sec-
retary of the TAR Party Committee,19 characterized the Dalai 
Lama’s recent remarks as ‘‘the biggest obstacle to the normal con-
tinuation of Tibetan Buddhism’’ and objected to the Dalai Lama’s 
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remarks about his own reincarnation.20 He observed: ‘‘The Dalai 
Lama’s attitude on this question is that there is sometimes reincar-
nation and sometimes no reincarnation, and the living Buddha may 
return as a man, a woman or a foreigner. Recently he even talked 
about stopping the reincarnation.’’ 21 The comment refers to re-
marks attributed to the Dalai Lama as recently as October 2010 
stating that his reincarnation would take place ‘‘in a free coun-
try,’’ 22 and that he may choose to identify and train his successor 
before he dies, or Tibetans might elect to discontinue the institu-
tion of the Dalai Lama.23 Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chairman 
of the TAR People’s Government and Deputy Secretary of the TAR 
Party Committee, said the Dalai Lama’s views on reincarnation are 
‘‘impossible.’’ 24 In July 2011, the Dalai Lama rejected government 
and Party intrusion into the matter of Tibetan Buddhist reincarna-
tion as a ‘‘disgrace’’ and stated with respect to his own reincarna-
tion, ‘‘[The] final authority is myself and no one else, and obviously 
not China’s Communists.’’ 25 
PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES TIGHTEN CONTROL ON 
‘‘TIBETAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS’’ 
The central government and 9 of the 10 Tibetan autonomous pre-
fectural governments 26 issued or drafted regulatory measures as of 
August 2011 that increase substantially the state’s infringement of 
freedom of religion in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and nun-
neries. The measures increase curbs on protection of ‘‘freedom of 
religious belief’’ 27 as provided under China’s Constitution by im-
posing greater subordination of ‘‘Tibetan Buddhist affairs’’ to gov-
ernment regulations that enforce Communist Party policy. 
In Qinghai province, for example, from July 2009 to September 
2010, people’s congresses in five of Qinghai’s six Tibetan Autono-
mous Prefectures (TAPs) put into effect regulations on Tibetan 
Buddhist affairs to fulfill Party objectives.28 The regulations fol-
lowed a provincial Party committee determination in May 2008 
that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries in the province had ‘‘drifted 
freely beyond the government’s management by law and super-
vision by the public.’’ 29 As a result, the Qinghai government issued 
an ‘‘opinion’’ 30 proposing that Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and 
nunneries be required to implement a ‘‘new system’’ based on 
‘‘Party committee leadership, government responsibility, . . . and 
management in accordance with the law by religious affairs depart-
ments and other concerned departments.’’ 31 
As of April 2011, new regulatory measures on ‘‘Tibetan Buddhist 
affairs’’ were in effect in a total of seven TAPs located in three 
provinces: 32 Huangnan (Malho) TAP,33 Hainan (Tsolho) TAP,34 
Haibei (Tsojang) TAP,35 Guoluo (Golog) TAP,36 and Haixi (Tsonub) 
Mongol and Tibetan AP in Qinghai province; 37 Aba (Ngaba) Ti-
betan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T&QAP) in Sichuan 
province; 38 and Diqing (Dechen) TAP in Yunnan province.39 Pre-
fectural regulations reportedly were in the legislative process in 
Yushu (Yulshul) TAP, Qinghai,40 and Ganzi (Kardze) TAP, 
Sichuan.41 As of August 2011, the Commission had not observed 
information on whether Gannan (Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, 
was preparing such a regulation. The 10 TAPs make up approxi-
mately half the area the Chinese government designates as ‘‘Ti-
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betan autonomous,’’ and approximately half the Tibetan population 
of the Tibetan autonomous areas lives in the 10 TAPs.42 The cen-
tral government issued national-level regulations effective Novem-
ber 1, 2010,43 that along with the prefectural-level regulations 
tighten and expand existing means of government control and mon-
itoring of Tibetan Buddhist institutions.44 
COMMON FEATURES AMONG NEW TIBETAN BUDDHIST AFFAIRS 
MEASURES 
A summary of the Commission’s analysis of the points of simi-
larity among the national regulations 45 and four of the prefectural- 
level regulations (Huangnan TAP 46 and Hainan TAP 47 in Qinghai, 
Aba T&QAP 48 in Sichuan, and Diqing TAP 49 in Yunnan) follows.50 
Prioritizing Tibetan Buddhist obligation to support Chi-
nese government policies. The regulatory measures build on ex-
isting government and Communist Party policies mandating that 
Tibetan Buddhist institutions (like other state-sanctioned religious 
institutions) must protect Chinese national and ethnic unity and 
‘‘social stability,’’ 51 promote patriotism toward China and adher-
ence to socialism,52 and obey Chinese government laws and regula-
tions.53 
‘‘Buddhist Associations’’ (BAs): Greater authority over mo-
nastic institutions. BAs—institutional links between Tibetan 
Buddhist institutions and the Chinese government and Party that 
facilitate the exercise of government and Party authority over Ti-
betan Buddhist activity 54—must, among other duties, approve or 
revoke the official status of monks and nuns as ‘‘religious per-
sonnel’’ in accordance with government requirements; 55 approve 
quotas on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at a mon-
astery or nunnery; 56 and conduct classes educating Tibetan Bud-
dhist ‘‘religious personnel’’ on patriotism toward China, Chinese 
laws and regulations (including on religion), and adapting Tibetan 
Buddhism to socialism.57 
‘‘Democratic Management Committees’’ (DMCs): Subject to 
greater scrutiny, subordination to government authority. 
The regulatory measures impose closer supervision of each mon-
astery’s Democratic Management Committee—a monastic group le-
gally obligated to ensure that monks, nuns, and teachers obey gov-
ernment laws, regulations, and policies.58 The measures empower 
three types of agencies to supervise or monitor DMCs: BAs, govern-
ment religious affairs bureaus (RABs), and village-level ‘‘peoples’’ 
or ‘‘masses’’ committees.59 Provisions require DMCs (under BA su-
pervision and in compliance with central government measures 
issued in 2007 60) to direct the process of identifying, seating, and 
educating trulkus 61—teachers whom Tibetan Buddhists believe are 
reincarnations. For the first time, DMCs must fulfill a central gov-
ernment requirement to apply for, justify, and receive approval for 
a fixed quota on the number of monks or nuns who may reside at 
a monastery or nunnery.62 
‘‘Religious personnel’’: Subject to more detailed control 
over religious contact, travel, study. The measures strengthen 
external supervision of DMCs, Tibetan Buddhist teachers, trulkus, 
monks, and nuns by requiring their submission to administration 
and guidance by governments at the prefectural, county, and town-
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ship levels, and by village-level residents committees.63 Most of the 
prefectural measures impose requirements on ‘‘religious personnel’’ 
who wish to travel to another county or prefecture to study or 
teach Buddhism.64 The national measures impose the most difficult 
requirements: First, ‘‘religious personnel’’ must apply for and re-
ceive approval from the prefectural-level BA where they live and 
from the prefectural-level BA where they hope to study or teach; 
then each BA granting approval must report the approval to the 
corresponding prefectural-level RAB.65 
Township-level governments: Expanded responsibility, au-
thority over monasteries, nunneries. The prefectural regu-
latory measures expand significantly township-level government 
authority to implement regulations on Tibetan Buddhist activity at 
monasteries and nunneries. All five of the regulations for Qinghai 
TAPs for which text was available online as of August 2011 con-
tained articles empowering township-level governments to monitor 
and supervise monastic activity.66 Regulations for four of the 
Qinghai TAPs state explicitly that township governments have the 
responsibility to ‘‘manage’’ Tibetan Buddhist affairs within the 
township area.67 Enabling township governments to take on great-
er responsibility for regulating Tibetan Buddhist affairs is impor-
tant because there are so many township-level governments. As of 
2007, there were a total of 998 township-level governments subor-
dinate to 75 county-level governments in the 10 TAPs outside the 
TAR 68—an average of 13 township governments under each county 
government. 
Village-level committees: Expanded role as grassroots 
monitors, supervisors. Most of the prefectural regulatory meas-
ures for which text was available online as of August 2011 included 
a greater monitoring, supervisory, and reporting role for village- 
level committees than did previous measures.69 Measures effective 
in Aba T&QAP, Sichuan, for example, provide village committees 
a role in reviewing applications from persons who wish to become 
monks or nuns, and in supervising monks and nuns.70 The national 
regulations provide for the first time a legal basis for placing a vil-
lage committee member on a DMC—and by doing so, empower the 
village committee member to participate directly in DMC decision-
making.71 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE PREFECTURAL REGULATORY MEASURES 
A summary of some principal areas of distinction between the 
seven prefectural-level regulatory measures for which text was 
available online as of August 2011 follows. 
Dedicated village-level committees monitor, supervise, re-
port on monastic activity. All five of the Qinghai province TAP 
regulations include provisions that establish ‘‘masses supervision 
and appraisal committees’’ (MSACs, qunzhong jiandu pingyi 
weiyuanhui).72 MSACs are a new development with respect to their 
specific role in government management of Tibetan Buddhist af-
fairs.73 Township governments guide selection of MSAC members 
from among village residents, herders, and monastery staff.74 Reg-
ulations mandate MSACs to fulfill specific duties in supervising, 
monitoring, and appraising monastic management (especially 
DMCs), administration (including financial affairs), and Buddhist 
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teaching.75 MSACs must submit periodic reports to township- and 
county-level governments.76 
Extent of provisions for administrative and criminal pun-
ishment. The regulatory measures vary in the extensiveness and 
specificity of language describing activity that may result in admin-
istrative penalties (e.g., expulsion) or criminal punishment (e.g., 
imprisonment) of ‘‘religious personnel.’’ 77 Three prefectural meas-
ures (Hainan, Guoluo, Aba) contain more extensive descriptions of 
punishable activity; 78 three prefectural measures (Haibei, Haixi, 
Diqing) contain less extensive descriptions of punishable activity; 79 
and one prefectural measure (Huangnan) contains language that is 
mid-range.80 Information available as of February 2011 in the 
Commission’s Political Prisoner Database demonstrated a positive 
correlation between the number of Buddhist monks, nuns, teachers, 
or trulkus detained in each TAP on or after March 10, 2008, and 
the extensiveness of regulatory measures’ provisions on punish-
ment.81 
Provision for potential redress against administrative 
punishment. Four of the prefectural regulations (Huangnan, Hai-
nan, Guoluo, Diqing) for which text was available online as of Au-
gust 2011 contain provisions allowing a person punished adminis-
tratively under the regulations either to seek administrative recon-
sideration of the punishment or to file a lawsuit against the pun-
ishment.82 Three of the four regulations (Huangnan, Haibei, 
Guoluo) cite the PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law 83 and 
PRC Administrative Litigation Law 84 as the legal instruments for 
undertaking such action.85 The Hainan, Haixi, and Aba regulatory 
measures do not mention administrative reconsideration or filing 
an administrative lawsuit. 
Tibetan Cultural Expression: Increasing Pressure, Punishment 
Chinese government and Communist Party policies and their im-
plementation increased pressure on and sometimes threatened Ti-
betan cultural expression during the Commission’s 2011 reporting 
year. Political detentions in 2011 increased compared to 2009 and 
2010 but were lower than the high level of 2008.86 Security and ju-
dicial officials used China’s legal system to detain and imprison Ti-
betan writers, artists, intellectuals, and cultural advocates who 
turned to veiled language to lament the status of Tibetan culture 
or criticize government policies toward the Tibetan people and cul-
ture. The government seeks to prevent such Tibetans from influ-
encing other Tibetans and uses imprisonment to remove them from 
society. Examples follow of developments this reporting year that 
involved imprisonment, detention, and a police manhunt. In two 
separate cases, monks committed self-immolation to protest China’s 
handling of Tibetan issues. 
January 2011: Detention after publishing an article.87 Pub-
lic security officials reportedly detained monk-writer Tsering 
Tenzin of Palyul Monastery, located in Ganzi (Kardze) Tibetan Au-
tonomous Prefecture (TAP), in connection with an essay he wrote 
that was published in 2010 in a collection of articles on ‘‘the situa-
tion inside Tibet.’’ 88 In February 2010, officials in Hongyuan 
(Marthang) county,89 Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
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Prefecture, detained monk Tsering Dondrub of Rongtha Monastery 
for assisting with publication.90 
Winter 2010: Detention for downloading banned songs.91 
During a winter ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR), security officials punished Tibetans who had 
downloaded ‘‘prohibited’’ songs such as ‘‘Voice of Unity,’’ ‘‘My 
Lama,’’ and ‘‘I Miss the Sun, Moon, and Stars,’’ with 10 to 15 days 
of detention and a fine. Police allegedly beat some detainees.92 
December 2010: Imprisonment for writing articles about 
the 2008 Tibetan protests.93 The Aba Intermediate People’s 
Court sentenced three contributing editors of a Tibetan-language 
magazine to imprisonment for ‘‘inciting splittism’’ (PRC Criminal 
Law, Article 103(2)): Buddha (a pen name) and Jangtse Donkho, 
four years; and Kalsang Jinpa, three years.94 
December 2010: Redetention for making video appeal.95 
Public security officials in Xiahe (Sangchu) county, Gannan 
(Kanlho) TAP, Gansu province, reportedly redetained monk-writer 
Kalsang Tsultrim of Labrang Tashikhyil Monastery on December 
16, 2010.96 Officials released him on bail the previous October after 
detaining him in July 2010 for distributing a video CD of him 
speaking about concern for the Tibetan culture and religion.97 
December 2010: Detention after publishing articles, orga-
nizing conferences.98 Public security officials in Lhasa city re-
portedly detained monk-writer Tenpa Lodroe on December 29, 
2010, reportedly in connection with a December 20 conference on 
‘‘the situation in Tibet’’ arranged in Ganzi TAP, Sichuan prov-
ince.99 
September 2010: Arrest warrant issued for singer after CD 
release.100 In the second half of September, public security offi-
cials in Lhasa city reportedly issued an arrest warrant for singer 
Pasang Tsering and banned his newly released CD.101 Officials al-
legedly suspected the lyrics of praising the Dalai Lama and ‘‘incit-
ing ethnic sentiments.’’ 102 As of late September 2010, relatives had 
lost contact with him.103 
March 2011: Self-immolation to mark anniversary of 2008 
protest.104 On March 16, 2011, monk Phuntsog of Kirti Mon-
astery, located near the Aba county seat, Aba T&QAP, set himself 
on fire to protest the fatal shooting on the same date in 2008 of 
at least 10 Tibetan protesters.105 As he burned, Phuntsog report-
edly shouted slogans calling for the Dalai Lama’s long life.106 
Phuntsog died in a hospital the next morning.107 Officials forced 
Kirti monks to submit to political education starting March 21; 108 
on April 21, People’s Armed Police (PAP) removed at least 300 of 
the monks and took them to other counties to undergo ‘‘legal edu-
cation.’’ 109 PAP and other police allegedly beat severely Tibetans 
who attempted to block removal of the monks, resulting in serious 
injuries and the deaths of two elderly Tibetans.110 On August 29 
and 30, 2011, a county-level court in Aba T&QAP sentenced three 
Kirti monks to 10-, 11-, and 13-year prison terms for Phuntsog’s 
‘‘intentional homicide,’’ claiming that two monks ‘‘plotted, insti-
gated and assisted’’ in the self-immolation and one monk delayed 
medical treatment.111 International media and advocacy group re-
ports described the convicted monks’ intentions toward Phuntsog in 
terms of providing rescue, protection, and shelter.112 
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August 2011: Self-immolation to protest Chinese policies. 
On August 15, monk Tsewang Norbu of Nyitso Monastery, located 
in the seat of Daofu (Tawu) county, Ganzi TAP, died after setting 
himself on fire as he shouted slogans calling for Tibetan freedom 
and the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.113 
Education and Economic Development: Government Initiatives, 
Tibetan Protests 
Tibetan students and farmers protested government and Com-
munist Party policies on education, the environment, and rural Ti-
betans’ use of farming and grazing lands during the Commission’s 
2011 reporting year. Such protests indicate that Tibetans 114 con-
sider the policies a threat to the Tibetan culture, language, and en-
vironment, and the viability of farming and herding as a means of 
livelihood for rural Tibetans—who made up approximately 87 per-
cent of Tibetans in China in 2000.115 
TIBETAN STUDENTS, TEACHERS PROTEST GOVERNMENT EDUCATION 
POLICY 
Events this past year, detailed below, highlighted the importance 
Tibetans attribute to the status of Tibetan language, its level of use 
in the education system,116 and the threat that government and 
Party policy pose to the status and use of Tibetan language.117 
Senior Party and government officials issued a series of state-
ments 118 on plans to reduce the status and level of use of Tibetan 
language during the period from 2010 to 2020.119 Tibetan student- 
led protests, principally in Qinghai province,120 resulted in retired 
Tibetan cadres and educators submitting a petition (or ‘‘letter’’) to 
Communist Party and government offices asserting that the 
Qinghai government was implementing reforms that contravene 
provisions in China’s Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Auton-
omy Law (REAL).121 
The speed with which protests spread suggests that Tibetan dis-
content with education policy may be widespread.122 Tibetan teach-
ers’ and students’ views in Qinghai on the role of Tibetan language 
in education are unlikely to differ significantly from Tibetan views 
in other Tibetan autonomous areas.123 A chronology of principal 
events from October 15 to 29, 2010, follows. 
October 15: Teachers sign letter criticizing bilingual edu-
cation reform. As a ‘‘Tibetan Language Course Reforms Training’’ 
attended by more than 300 teachers employed at Qinghai province 
Tibetan-language primary and middle schools concluded,124 
attendees reportedly signed a petition (or ‘‘letter’’) on October 15 
calling on Qinghai officials to continue to treat Tibetan language as 
the ‘‘language of instruction’’ in Tibetan schools.125 The teachers re-
portedly were responding to the ‘‘Qinghai Province Mid- and Long- 
Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010– 
2020)’’ 126 (the Plan).127 The petition reasoned that ‘‘choice of lan-
guage of instruction should depend entirely on those being 
taught.’’ 128 
October 19: Student protests begin. Students at schools in 
Tongren (Rebgong), the Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture (TAP) capital,129 reportedly protested on October 19 in 
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response to a report that Qinghai Party Secretary Qiang Wei ‘‘or-
dered that the language used in textbooks should be changed to 
Chinese.’’ 130 Students carried banners demanding expanded use of 
Tibetan language 131 and circulated a text message claiming the 
central government had decided to cancel ‘‘Tibetan-language cen-
tered’’ education.132 Qiang had instructed educators in September 
to increase Chinese-language teaching and ‘‘conquer the erroneous 
thinking that if minority nationality students undergo an education 
based on the state’s common language [Mandarin] and script it will 
hurt the feelings of the minority nationality masses, or effect the 
development of the minority nationality culture, or impact social 
stability.’’ 133 Protests reportedly spread to Beijing and Hainan 
(Tsolho), Haibei (Tsojang), and Guoluo (Golog) TAPs in Qinghai.134 
October 22: Qinghai education head defends reform. Direc-
tor Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Department of Education acknowl-
edged on October 22 that students had ‘‘expressed their dissatisfac-
tion’’ with the ‘‘bilingual education reform plan,’’ and attributed the 
incidents to students’ ‘‘misunderstanding.’’ 135 He referred to an 
‘‘outline’’ of the Plan issued by the provincial government and 
Party on September 12, and confirmed that among the ‘‘main 
goals’’ was for instructors to ‘‘adhere to mainly teaching with the 
state’s standard spoken and written language [Mandarin].’’ 136 
October 24: Retired cadres and educators argue that edu-
cation reforms are illegal. A petition signed on October 24 by 
‘‘retired Tibetan cadres and veteran education workers’’ in 
Qinghai’s capital, Xining, analyzed perceived violations of China’s 
Constitution and Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL),137 and 
other laws that resulted in the infringement of ethnic minorities’ 
rights.138 The educators submitted the letter to central-, provincial- 
, and prefectural-level Party, legislative, government, and consult-
ative bodies.139 The petition ‘‘proposed’’ that the Qinghai Province 
Education Department ‘‘immediately stop the enforcement of the il-
legal provision for using Chinese as the only language for teach-
ing’’ 140 and cited the Constitution and REAL, Article 20, as the 
legal basis for non-implementation.141 
October 25: Officials describe diminished scope for Ti-
betan language use. At a forum convened on October 25 to ‘‘study 
and implement the spirit’’ of the Plan,142 Gao Yunlong, Vice Chair-
man of the Qinghai People’s Government, told government, aca-
demic, and other personnel that Mandarin is the appropriate lan-
guage for use in ‘‘public places’’ and ethnic languages are suitable 
for ‘‘one’s home location.’’ 143 He justified the decision to exclude 
ethnic languages from teaching ‘‘scientific’’ subjects such as ‘‘math-
ematics, physics, and chemistry’’ and said that exclusion ‘‘does no 
harm to carrying ethnic culture forward.’’ 144 
October 27: Party Secretary ties reforms to ‘‘national 
unity,’’ protests to ‘‘plots.’’ Qiang Wei on October 27 linked sup-
port of bilingual education reform to protecting ‘‘national sov-
ereignty’’ and promoting ‘‘national and ethnic unity.’’ 145 He de-
scribed ‘‘unity of spoken and written language’’ as ‘‘a fundamental 
and essential condition for a unified country.’’ 146 He warned 
Qinghai Party members that ‘‘domestic and foreign hostile forces 
will seek to exploit our promotion of bilingual education reform as 
an opportunity to plot, orchestrate, incite, and provoke disturb-
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ances, . . . and to destroy our social situation of unity and sta-
bility.’’ 147 
RURAL TIBETANS PROTEST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MAINSTAY: 
MINING 
Rural Tibetans protested during the 2011 reporting year against 
what they consider to be adverse effects of Chinese government 
and Communist Party economic development policies—especially 
mining—that prioritize government objectives above respecting or 
protecting the Tibetan culture and environment.148 Officials justify 
such policies in part by publicizing statistical indicators such as 
rising GDP 149 and household income.150 At the same time, govern-
ment officials emphasized the dependency of the Tibetan Autono-
mous Region (TAR) on central support: State Ethnic Affairs Com-
mission Minister Yang Jing asserted that the central government 
provided in the form of subsidies 90 percent of the funds the TAR 
government spent from 2001 to 2010.151 Statistics are difficult to 
locate on central government revenue derived from natural re-
source extraction in Tibetan autonomous areas—China’s Constitu-
tion appropriates ownership of natural resources throughout China 
to the central government.152 The value of such resources in the 
TAR may be as high as 600 billion yuan (US$93.8 billion), accord-
ing to a December 2010 official media report 153—about double the 
total 2001 to 2010 subsidies the central government provided to the 
TAR.154 
Examples of reported incidents of Tibetan protest against eco-
nomic development initiatives follow. 
November-December 2010: Protest and detentions in 
Rikaze (Shigatse) prefecture, TAR. On December 18, People’s 
Armed Police (PAP) ended a standoff that began on November 22 
when Tibetans began to protest and petition against the start of 
mining activity near Lingka Monastery in Xietongmen 
(Shetongmon) county, Rikaze.155 PAP allegedly beat protesters and 
detained 17 persons, including the Lingka abbot (Kalsang) and four 
monks (Jamyang Rigsang, Jamyang Tsering, Rigzin Pema, and 
Tsewang Dorje).156 
September-October 2010: Protest and detentions in Naqu 
(Nagchu) prefecture, TAR. Tibetans in Biru (Driru) county re-
portedly attempted to block Chinese workers who arrived in Au-
gust 2010 to begin construction of a dam near a mountain Tibetans 
regard as sacred.157 Villagers claimed workers intended to estab-
lish mines in the area, asserted that they had the right to protect 
the local environment, and refused to move.158 On September 26, 
the construction team claimed to have received a mining permit 
agreed to by the TAR Party secretary.159 Security officials report-
edly detained protest leaders Dorje Dragtsal and Palden Choedrag 
and three other Tibetans, Buphel, Tsegon, and Samten, who pre-
sented a petition to Naqu authorities.160 
August 2010: Protest, shooting, detentions in Ganzi 
(Kardze) TAP, Sichuan. On August 18 security officials in the 
seat of Baiyu (Palyul) county, Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefec-
ture (TAP), opened fire on a group of about 100 Tibetans peti-
tioning outside county government offices against a Shanghai- 
based mining company’s expanded gold-mining operations.161 Vil-
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lagers alleged that mining had damaged their farming and grazing 
lands.162 Gunfire reportedly killed ‘‘at least four’’ Tibetans and 
wounded about 30 after a ‘‘scuffle’’ broke out.163 China’s official 
media reported that police fired warning shots after Tibetans at-
tacked them and a ‘‘stray bullet’’ killed one Tibetan; police detained 
35 Tibetans.164 
May-July 2011: Protest and detentions in Changdu 
(Chamdo) prefecture, TAR. After Tibetans learned that Chinese 
laborers had been ‘‘deployed’’ in May 2011 to work at mining loca-
tions in Zuogong (Dzogang) county, Changdu, authorities warned 
residents that protests against mining activity ‘‘would be construed 
as politically motivated,’’ according to a media report’s unidentified 
source.165 During June and July, security officials allegedly de-
tained approximately 50 Tibetans (15 named) linked to protest ac-
tivity.166 Detainees included ‘‘village officials’’ Arsong, Tashi 
Namgyal, and Jamyang Trinle, who traveled to the TAR capital, 
Lhasa, to ‘‘protest’’ the mining and detentions, and alleged protest 
‘‘ringleaders’’ Tenzin and Tashi.167 
SETTLING NOMADS, BUILDING RAILWAYS, REPLACING YUSHU 
Chinese officials continued to implement policies and announce 
projects over this past year that some Tibetans believe threaten the 
Tibetan culture and heritage. Pema Choling (Baima Chilin), Chair-
man of the TAR People’s Government, said on January 10, 2011, 
that the government had settled or resettled ‘‘1.43 million farmers 
and herdsmen of 275,000 households’’ into new housing 168—one of 
the initiatives of a program the Party refers to as ‘‘construction of 
a new socialist countryside’’ 169 and that Party General Secretary 
and President of China Hu Jintao named as a top development pri-
ority at the 2010 Fifth Forum on Work in Tibet.170 Based on a re-
ported total TAR rural population of 2.21 million,171 the govern-
ment has completed the compulsory settlement or resettlement of 
nearly two-thirds of the TAR rural population.172 The Commission 
has not observed statistics during the past year on compulsory set-
tlement or resettlement in other Tibetan autonomous areas. 
The Chinese government provided updates this past year on con-
struction of the railway network that will crisscross the Tibetan 
plateau and has the potential to impact profoundly the Tibetan cul-
ture and environment.173 
• Lhasa-Rikaze (Shigatse) railway. In February 2011, 
state-run media reported that the 253-kilometer westward link 
from Lhasa to Rikaze will be completed by 2015 (the end of the 
period of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social 
Development).174 On September 2, China Daily reported the 
railway will begin operating in 2014 but did not cite the source 
of the information.175 The estimated cost of building the rail-
way as of the September 2010 start of construction was 13.3 
billion yuan 176 (US$2.1 billion)—approximately 20 percent 
greater than the 11 billion yuan (US$1.7 billion) estimate re-
ported in April 2009.177 
• Lhasa-Linzhi (Nyingtri) railway. Construction of the 
eastward link from Lhasa to Linzhi will begin during the pe-
riod of the TAR 12th Five-Year Plan.178 The Commission has 
not observed information about whether the railway will be 
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built along the north or the south side of the Yarlung Tsangpo 
(Yalung Zangbo, Brahmaputra) River.179 
• Sichuan-Tibet railway and Yunnan-Tibet railway. The 
TAR will ‘‘conduct a pre-construction planning and study on 
the Sichuan-Tibet and Yunnan-Tibet railways’’ during the TAR 
12th Five-Year Plan.180 
• Ge’ermu (Golmud, Kermo)-Ku’erle (Korla) railway. 
Construction of the railway linking Golmud city in Haixi 
(Tsonub) Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai 
province, with Ku’erle (Korla) city, the capital of 
Bayingguoleng (Bayingolin) Mongol Autonomous Prefecture in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), will begin in 
2011 and be complete by 2015.181 The railway will reduce the 
journey between Urumqi city, the XUAR capital, and Lhasa 
city by more than 1,000 kilometers.182 
• Chengdu-Ge’ermu railway. Construction of the railway 
linking Chengdu city, the Sichuan capital, and Ge’ermu city 
may start by 2015, the end of the PRC 12th Five-Year Plan on 
National Economic and Social Development.183 The route tra-
verses Ruo’ergai (Dzoege) county in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and 
Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, Yushu (Kyegudo) in Yushu TAP 
(the site of an April 2010 earthquake 184), and Guoluo (Golog) 
TAP, Qinghai.185 Yushu and Guoluo are the most ethnically Ti-
betan areas remaining outside the TAR, based on official 2000 
census data: Yushu TAP (97.1 percent Tibetan), TAR (92.7 per-
cent Tibetan), and Guoluo TAP (91.6 percent Tibetan).186 
Tibetans protested in April 2011 against Chinese government 
plans for rebuilding Yushu (Kyegudo), the capital of Yushu 
(Yushul) TAP, Qinghai, severely damaged by an April 2010 earth-
quake, and demanded that authorities ‘‘fairly and legitimately’’ re-
solve issues involving their residences and use of their land.187 
Media reports between June 2010 and March 2011 revealed gov-
ernment plans to rename Yushu and transform it into an urban 
area traversed by a railway.188 Yushu’s ‘‘temporary’’ name would 
be Sanjiangyuan 189 (‘‘three rivers source’’), after a nearby nature 
reserve.190 The government will redesignate the administrative 
area as a ‘‘city,’’ 191 indicating that it will become the center of a 
substantial population and economy with a well-developed infra-
structure.192 In June 2010, the Qinghai government announced the 
central government would provide most of 32 billion yuan (US$4.68 
billion) budgeted to rebuild the area 193—a sum similar to the 33 
billion yuan (then US$4.7 billion) cost of constructing the Qinghai- 
Tibet railway.194 In March 2011, the Qinghai government an-
nounced that the Chengdu-Ge’ermu railway would pass through 
Yushu’s location.195 
In January 2011, official media reports described Yushu as ‘‘flat-
tened,’’ 196 but a June 2010 unofficial report noted that officials al-
legedly were expropriating Tibetan homes and businesses in sound 
condition so the government could redevelop the area.197 Tibetans 
have objected to government plans to move them from spacious 
homes to smaller apartment- or townhouse-style residences in 
other locations.198 On April 2, 2011, approximately 300 Tibetans 
staged a sit-in protest in Yushu, claiming authorities either sold or 
expropriated their property without providing ‘‘appropriate’’ com-
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pensation.199 People’s Armed Police allegedly ‘‘attacked’’ the pro-
testers, detained about 40 of them, and cleared the area.200 
Summary Information: Tibetan Political Detention and 
Imprisonment 
POST-MARCH 10, 2008: LACK OF INFORMATION, UNCERTAIN STATUS 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Chinese gov-
ernment’s failure to provide details about Tibetans detained, 
charged, or sentenced for peaceful, protest-related activity during 
the period since March 10, 2008, has resulted in prolonged uncer-
tainty about the current status of hundreds of cases. As of Sep-
tember 1, 2011, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database 
(PPD) contained 1,134 records of Tibetan political prisoners de-
tained on or after March 10, 2008—a figure certain to be far from 
complete. No information is available, however, on the outcome of 
more than half (623) of the cases. More than half (348) of the 623 
unresolved cases are presumed to have resulted in release based on 
the substantial period of time since detention—three years or more 
in hundreds of cases. 
Among the 1,134 PPD records of Tibetan political detentions re-
ported since March 2008, post-detention information is available 
for only 307 cases. Included in those 307 cases are 21 Tibetans 
whom officials ordered to serve reeducation through labor (16 are 
believed released upon completing their terms), and 197 Tibetans 
whom courts sentenced to periods of imprisonment ranging from 
six months to life (79 are believed released upon sentence comple-
tion). Of the 197 Tibetan political prisoners sentenced to imprison-
ment since March 2008, sentencing information is available for 186 
prisoners: the average sentence length is five years and three 
months based on PPD data as of September 1, 2011.201 
CURRENT TIBETAN POLITICAL DETENTION AND IMPRISONMENT 
As of September 1, 2011, the PPD contained records of 527 Ti-
betan political prisoners believed or presumed to be currently de-
tained or imprisoned. Of those 527 records, 483 are records of Ti-
betans detained on or after March 10, 2008,202 and 44 are records 
of Tibetans detained prior to March 10, 2008. PPD information for 
the period since March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete. 
Of the 483 Tibetan political prisoners believed or presumed to be 
currently detained or imprisoned and who were detained on or 
after March 10, 2008, according to PPD data as of September 1, 
2011: 
• More than half (264) are believed or presumed to be de-
tained or imprisoned in Sichuan province; the rest are believed 
or presumed to be detained or imprisoned in the Tibet Autono-
mous Region (160), Gansu province (23), Qinghai province (34), 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1), and Beijing (1). 
• 113 are serving sentences ranging in length from one year 
and six months to life imprisonment; the average sentence 
length is seven years and two months.203 Sixty-two (55 per-
cent) of the 113 prisoners with known sentences are monks, 
nuns, or Tibetan Buddhist teachers or trulkus. 
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• 240 (50 percent) are Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, teach-
ers, or trulkus. 
• 425 (88 percent) are male, 51 (11 percent) are female, and 
7 are of unknown gender. 
Sentencing information is available on 27 of the 44 Tibetan polit-
ical prisoners detained prior to March 10, 2008, and believed to re-
main imprisoned. Their sentences range in length from five years 
to life imprisonment; the average sentence length is 14 years and 
3 months.204 








VI. Developments in Hong Kong and Macau 
Introduction 
The United States supports a stable, autonomous Hong Kong 
under the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ formula articulated in the 
Sino-U.K. Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.1 
The United States also supports the high degree of autonomy of 
Macau set forth in the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Macao and the Basic Law of the Macao Special Admin-
istrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.2 Furthermore, 
the United States supports the rights of the people of Hong Kong 
and Macau to enjoy an independent judiciary 3 and an open society 
in which the freedoms of speech, movement, and assembly are 
largely respected.4 
Hong Kong 
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE IN HONG KONG 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council (Legco) passed legislation broadening the elec-
toral base somewhat for the 2012 election of Legco by adding 10 
new members to the current 60 members 5 and increasing the 
membership of the selection committee that chooses the chief exec-
utive from 800 to 1,200 members, changes which fell far short of 
universal suffrage.6 Of the 10 new Legco members, 5 will be elected 
by geographical constituencies, and 5 by a newly formed territory- 
wide District Council constituency.7 The Hong Kong Basic Law pro-
vides, ‘‘The ultimate aim is the selection of the chief executive by 
universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures[;]’’ 
and ‘‘The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the 
Legislative Council by universal suffrage.’’ 8 A December 2007 deci-
sion of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(NPCSC) that prohibited the people of Hong Kong from directly 
electing the chief executive or the Legco in 2012, or making other 
substantive changes to the electoral system, circumscribed the elec-
toral reforms that Legco could pass concerning the 2012 elections.9 
In January 2010, five Legco members resigned, forcing a by-elec-
tion to serve as an informal referendum on the pace of democra-
tization. The by-election was held in May 2010, and the same five 
persons won back their seats.10 The mainland government was 
‘‘hostile’’ to the by-election,11 and in June 2011 the Hong Kong gov-
ernment introduced a bill providing that any Legco vacancy hence-
forth would be filled by the candidate with the next highest num-
ber of votes, thereby eliminating by-elections in cases where there 
are other eligible candidates who received votes in the relevant 
election.12 The Hong Kong Bar Association argued that the pro-
posed bill was not in conformity with the Basic Law,13 and the bill 
was considered one of the reasons that a large number of protesters 
joined the annual rally on the anniversary of Hong Kong’s reunifi-
cation with the mainland.14 In light of controversy surrounding the 
proposed bill, the government withdrew it in July.15 
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Though the electoral base will broaden somewhat for the 2012 
elections, an increased number of political parties may make it un-
likely that any party will present a challenge to mainland China’s 
influence in the affairs of Hong Kong. The number of political par-
ties or organizations has increased considerably, from 3 parties 
shortly after the handover in 1997 to about 14 ‘‘political parties, or-
ganizations or loose coalitions’’ in 2011.16 According to one Demo-
cratic Party lawmaker, James To Kun-sun, from the perspective of 
the Communist Party, this is a positive development, since there 
is no single dominant political party that can pose a threat to 
China. He noted, however, that it does present problems for gov-
ernance.17 At least one independent Hong Kong paper, Ming Pao, 
also conjectured that the mainland government is ‘‘coordinating’’ 
the election strategies of the pro-mainland political parties in Hong 
Kong.18 
‘‘ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS’’ 
During this reporting year, Hong Kong people continued to ex-
press concern over the mainland’s role in Hong Kong. Hong Kong- 
based analyst Frank Ching has expressed concern that Hong 
Kong’s autonomy is under threat.19 One of the examples Ching 
cited was the refusal of Hong Kong immigration officials to grant 
visas to two exiled leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen protests, Wu’er 
Kaixi and Wang Dan, to attend the funeral of political activist 
Szeto Wah. Ching wrote in the Hong Kong Journal, though Hong 
Kong controls its own immigration matters under the Basic Law, 
‘‘The impression, inescapably, is that the Chinese government with-
held its blessings and Hong Kong was left to ‘decide’ that it would 
not permit a visit by Wang Dan.’’ 20 During a visit by Chinese Vice 
Premier Li Keqiang in August, ‘‘heavy-handed security’’ raised con-
cerns in Hong Kong that ‘‘its autonomy is being eroded by a main-
land government that does not value the territory’s more free-
wheeling ways.’’ 21 
In June, Wang Guangya, the director of the Hong Kong and 
Macau Office of the PRC State Council, reportedly told a group of 
Hong Kong students that they should learn the basic elements of 
mainland national education,22 and in July the Hong Kong Edu-
cation Bureau issued a Moral and National Education Curriculum 
Guide Consultation Draft.23 The proposals reportedly were con-
demned in an editorial in the independent Hong Kong newspaper, 
Apple Daily,24 and by the union that represents 90 percent of Hong 
Kong’s teachers.25 
ACTIVE DISSENT IN HONG KONG 
During this reporting year, Hong Kong citizens have continued 
to express their dissent. In some cases, demonstrations have not 
been peaceful, such as one in March 2011 over the Hong Kong 
budget, at which 113 people were arrested, with activists vowing 
to continue to stage ‘‘confrontational’’ rallies.26 After a protester as-
saulted Chief Executive Donald Tsang in March 2011, mainland 
Chinese officials expressed their disapproval, calling for punish-
ment of the protester.27 This raised concerns that mainland China 
was not adhering to the principle of ‘‘one country, two systems.’’ 28 
Supporters of greater democracy in Hong Kong have criticized 
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confrontational protests. Richard Tsoi Yiu-cheong, a veteran democ-
racy advocate, told the South China Morning Post that 
‘‘[i]ncreasingly radical protests may serve the purpose of embar-
rassing government officials, but they also risk diverting public at-
tention from real policy debates.’’ 29 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
For the most part, the people of Hong Kong appear to continue 
to enjoy freedom of expression. Hong Kong rose from 48th to 34th 
over the previous year in the 2010 Press Freedom Index of Report-
ers Without Borders.30 (For comparison, the United States, as in 
the previous year, remained 20th during the same period, and Chi-
na’s ranking dropped from 168 to 171 out of 178 countries.) 31 U.S.- 
based Freedom House in its 2011 Global Press Freedom Rankings 
listed Hong Kong as ‘‘partly free.’’ 32 According to the U.S. State 
Department’s 2010 Human Rights Report, ‘‘reports of media self- 
censorship continued during the year.’’ 33 The report noted claims 
that businesses with interests in China owned most media outlets, 
making them ‘‘vulnerable to self-censorship.’’ 34 This is reflected in 
a 2011 Chinascope report, which divides Hong Kong media into 
those funded by the Communist Party, and those that have just 
‘‘recently grown closer to the [Party].’’ 35 The latter, according to 
the report, are owned by businesses with close ties to mainland 
China.36 
This past year, Hong Kong people expressed support for impris-
oned Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo. Bishop John Tong of the Catholic 
Diocese of Hong Kong praised Liu in a speech on Christmas Eve 
in 2010, for which mainland Chinese-owned newspaper, Ta Kung 
Pao, carried an article criticizing the bishop.37 In November 2010, 
pan-democratic Legco members introduced a motion of support for 
Liu, calling on the mainland government to release him. The mo-
tion was defeated.38 
JUDICIARY 
During the Commission’s 2011 reporting year, there were two 
prominent cases in Hong Kong courts of first instance which ap-
pear to be positive signs of an independent judiciary in Hong Kong. 
In one, the court rejected the Hong Kong government’s environ-
mental impact assessment report on the Hong Kong section of a 
bridge connecting Hong Kong to the mainland.39 The South China 
Morning Post in an editorial called the decision ‘‘a victory for rule 
of law.’’ 40 In the other case, the Hong Kong court refused to enforce 
a mainland arbitration decision as contrary to Hong Kong public 
policy because the same person had acted both as mediator and ar-
bitrator and there was a risk of bias.41 
In a groundbreaking June 2011 provisional judgment, Hong 
Kong’s Court of Final Appeal (CFA) found that the mainland’s 
rules on sovereign immunity should be applied to Hong Kong.42 
The case raised issues as to whether the mainland’s rules on sov-
ereign immunity apply to Hong Kong, and whether the Hong Kong 
judiciary could rule on the issue.43 For the first time, the CFA re-
ferred the case to the National People’s Congress Standing Com-
mittee (NPCSC) for interpretation.44 The NPCSC issued its inter-
pretation in August, affirming the decisions of the CFA.45 The 
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mainland government welcomed the CFA’s decision to seek a judi-
cial interpretation, though the CFA’s move raised some concerns 
over Hong Kong’s judicial independence.46 In addition, one com-
mentator, the director of the Centre for Comparative and Public 
Law at the University of Hong Kong, observed that the decision 
could lead to Hong Kong providing sanctuary to leaders wanted for 
international crimes.47 
Macau 
ABILITY OF MACAU CITIZENS TO INFLUENCE THEIR GOVERNMENT 
The ability of the people of Macau to influence their government 
is restricted by Macau’s constitutional system, under which the 
chief executive is selected by a 300-person committee, and only 12 
of 29 seats in the Legislative Assembly are filled by direct elec-
tion.48 In July 2009, the selection committee chose Fernando Chui 
Sai On as the chief executive in an uncontested election.49 In Sep-
tember 2009, voters selected 12 assembly members by direct elec-
tion, the chief executive appointed 7, and an additional 10 were se-
lected indirectly in uncontested elections, similar to the system of 
functional constituencies in Hong Kong.50 
CORRUPTION 
Corruption is a serious issue in Macau, which ranked 46th in the 
2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 
having dropped from 43rd in 2009. The index measures the per-
ceived level of corruption in 178 countries.51 (By comparison, Hong 
Kong ranked 13th, the United States ranked 22nd, and mainland 
China ranked 78th.) One local Macau scholar argues that corrup-
tion in Macau has not necessarily worsened. Rather, business peo-
ple are simply more aware of the problem.52 
Gambling plays a major role in Macau’s economy, with revenue 
increasing 58 percent in 2010.53 According to a 2011 Reuters re-
port, gambling is tied to widespread corruption, organized crime, 
money laundering, and movement of cash from mainland Chinese 
governments and state-owned companies into Macau.54 The move-
ment of cash from the mainland to the gambling casinos of Macau 
is fueled by a ‘‘junket’’ system, which allows mainland ‘‘high-roll-
ers’’ to bypass Chinese rules that limit how much cash an indi-
vidual can take out of the mainland in a year. An article in the 
Washington Post cites a 2009 study based on official PRC media 
reports, which found that ‘‘57 percent of Chinese high-stakes gam-
blers in Macau are either government officials or senior managers 
in state-run companies, the main beneficiaries of easy credit from 
state-owned banks. On average, these officials and managers each 
lost $3.3 million—nearly all of it public money.’’ 55 
MACAU’S ECONOMY 
The mainland government has called for changes to the Macau 
economy. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for Macau to improve 
regulation and diversify its economy beyond gambling.56 Further, 
the PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic 
and Social Development provides for Macau to develop its tourism 
and leisure industry and diversify its economy.57 
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NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (ARTICLE 23) 
Macau enacted national security legislation in 2009, criminal-
izing treason, secession, subversion, sedition, theft of state secrets, 
and association with foreign political organizations that harm state 
security.58 As of the end of 2010, there had been no arrests under 
the legislation, and thus the impact of the law is not clear at this 
stage.59 
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VII. Endnotes 
†Voted to adopt: Representative Smith; Senators Brown, Baucus, Levin, Feinstein, Merkley, 
Collins, and Risch; Deputy Secretary Harris, Under Secretary Otero, Under Secretary Sa´nchez, 
Assistant Secretary Campbell, and Assistant Administrator Biswal. 
Notes to Section I—Political Prisoner Database 
1 The Commission treats as a political prisoner an individual detained or imprisoned for exer-
cising his or her human rights under international law, such as peaceful assembly, freedom of 
religion, freedom of association, free expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful so-
cial or political change, and to criticize government policy or government officials. (This list is 
illustrative, not exhaustive.) In most cases, prisoners in the PPD were detained or imprisoned 
for attempting to exercise rights guaranteed to them by China’s Constitution and law, or by 
international law, or both. Chinese security, prosecution, and judicial officials sometimes seek 
to distract attention from the political or religious nature of imprisonment by convicting a de 
facto political or religious prisoner under the pretext of having committed a generic crime. In 
such cases defendants typically deny guilt but officials may attempt to coerce confessions using 
torture and other forms of abuse, and standards of evidence are poor. If authorities permit a 
defendant to entrust someone to provide him or her legal counsel and defense, as China’s Crimi-
nal Procedure Law guarantees in Article 32, officials may deny the counsel adequate access to 
the defendant, restrict or deny the counsel’s access to evidence, and not provide the counsel ade-
quate time to prepare a defense. 
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Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11. The Regulations on Religious Affairs condition 
protections on religious groups registering as organizations and registering their venues with 
the government. Regulations on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 November 
04, effective 1 March 05, arts. 6, 12–15. 
11 This section pertains to what official sources refer to as ‘‘Buddhism in the Han tradition,’’ 
an inaccurate umbrella term that encompasses all schools of Buddhism in China, aside from 
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Notes to Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights 
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nian)], 11 August 11. 
7 Ibid., item 2(5). 
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tered Approach and Revel in the Light of Human Rights—Roundup at the Midpoint of the ‘Na-
tional Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010),’ ’’ Xinhua, 4 December 09 (Open Source Center, 
13 December 09); State Council Information Office, ‘‘White Paper on Progress in China’s Human 
Rights in 2009’’ [2009 nian zhongguo renquan shiye de jinzhan], reprinted in Xinhua, 26 Sep-
tember 10, sec. V; State Council Information Office, ‘‘Assessment Report on the National Human 
Rights Action Plan of China (2009–2010),’’ Xinhua, 14 July 11, IV(1); Human Rights Watch, 
‘‘Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan,’’ January 
2011, 47–50. 
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222–24. 
11 See, e.g., ‘‘Published Excerpts of Main Points of ‘Central Committee of the Communist Party 
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Strategy’ ’’ [‘‘Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu shenru shishi xibu da kaifa zhanlue de 
ruogan yijian’’ yaodian zhaideng], Zhongwei Daily, reprinted in Zhongwei People’s Government, 
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‘‘China’s Western Region Development Plan a Dual Strategy,’’ Xinhua, 8 July 10. 
12 National People’s Congress, PRC Outline of the 12th Five-Year Plan on National Economic 
and Social Development [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di shier 
ge wunian guihua gangyao], passed 14 March 11, issued 16 March 11, chap. 18, sec. 5. 
13 For information on grasslands policy in earlier years, see, e.g., CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 
10 October 09, 148–149, 194. See this section for information on the impact of these policies 
on minority groups that practice pastoralism. 
14 ‘‘State Council Researches and Deploys Policies and Measures To Promote Sound and Fast 
Development of Pastoral Areas’’ [Guowuyuan yanjiu bushu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan 
de zhengce cuoshi], Xinhua, 6 April 11. 
15 State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas 
[Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11. 
For additional information, see also ‘‘National Conference on Work Regarding Pastoral Areas Is 
Convened in Hulunbuir’’ [Quanguo muqu gongzuo huiyi zai hulunbei’er zhaokai], Inner Mon-
golia Daily, reprinted in Inner Mongolia News Net, 13 August 11. 
16 State Council Opinions on Promoting Sound and Fast Development of Pastoral Areas 
[Guowuyuan guanyu cujin muqu you hao you kuai fazhan de ruogan yijian], issued 1 June 11, 
items 6, 7, 11, 19, 21. 
17 Gregory Veeck and Charles Emerson, ‘‘Develop the West Assessed: Economic and Environ-
mental Change in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China 2000–2005,’’ 
Asian Geographer, Vol. 25, Nos. 1 and 2 (2006), 61 (based on information on page 13 of pre- 
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It Protect Minority Rights? Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 11 April 05, Testimony of Christopher P. Atwood, Associate Professor, Department of 
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Notes to Section II—Population Planning 
1 The population planning policy was first launched in 1979, canonized as a ‘‘fundamental 
state policy’’ in 1982, and codified as national law in 2002. As of 2007, 19 of China’s 31 provin-
cial-level jurisdictions—accounting for 53.6 percent of China’s population—allow rural dwellers 
to have a second child if their first child is a girl. Gu Baochang et al, ‘‘China’s Local and Na-
tional Fertility Policies at the End of the Twentieth Century,’’ 33 Population and Development 
Review 133, 138 (2007). Other exceptions to the one-child rule vary by provincial-level jurisdic-
tion, and include some exceptions for ethnic minorities. See ‘‘The Origin of China’s Current 
Birth Policy’’ [Zhongguo xianxing shengyu zhengce youlai], China Net, 18 April 08; Chinese 
Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 6. Ac-
cording to Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘In 1984, the Central Committee issued a docu-
ment outlining its ‘current family planning policy,’ which stated that rural residents with one 
daughter could have a second child, while ethnic minorities could have between two and four 
children. Since then, even more exceptions to the original ‘one-child’ rule have been added by 
local governments. These exceptions are numerous, detailed and differ across the country. For 
example, the Shandong Provincial Population and Family Planning Regulations lists 14 cir-
cumstances in which couples are permitted to have more than one child.’’ 
2 This number is based on Commission analysis of population planning measures. These juris-
dictions include Tianjin, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shandong, Fujian, Hebei, Hubei, Chongqing, 
Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guangxi, Anhui, 
Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou. For two specific examples, see ‘‘Revised ‘Guangdong Province 
Population and Family Planning Regulations’ Published’’ [Xiuding hou de ‘‘guangdong sheng 
renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli’’ gongbu], Guangzhou Beiyun District Zhongloutian Public Infor-
mation Net, 29 June 09; ‘‘Jiangxi Province Population and Family Planning Regulations’’ 
[Jiangxi sheng renkou yu jihua shengyu tiaoli], Jiangxi News Net, 11 April 09; Bureau of De-
mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices—2008, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),’’ 25 February 09, 6. The 
Beijing Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission clearly draws the link between 
the term ‘‘remedial measures’’ and abortion: ‘‘early term abortion refers to the use of surgery 
or pharmaceutics to terminate a pregnancy before the 12th week of gestation, it is a remedial 
measure taken after the failure of contraception.’’ See Beijing Municipal Population and Family 
Planning Commission, ‘‘Early Term Abortion’’ [Zaoqi rengong liuchan], 10 April 09. 
3 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), para. 17. The Beijing declaration states, 
‘‘The explicit recognition and reaffirmation of the right of all women to control all aspects of 
their health, in particular their own fertility, is basic to their empowerment.’’ Cairo Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development, para. 7.2. The Cairo International Con-
ference on Population and Development states, ‘‘Reproductive health . . . implies . . . that peo-
ple are able to have . . . the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and 
how often to do so. Implicit in this last condition are the right of men and women to be informed 
and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of 
their choice . . . .’’ On the concept of ‘‘illegal pregnancy’’ and its use in practice, see Elina 
Hemminki et al., ‘‘Illegal Births and Legal Abortions—The Case of China,’’ Reproductive Health, 
Vol. 2, No. 5 (2005). 
4 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua 
shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 18. According to Article 
18, ‘‘The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late marriage and 
childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where the requirements specified by laws and 
regulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be made.’’ Implementing regula-
tions in different provinces vary on the ages at which couples may give birth and the number 
of children they are permitted to have. See Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have 
Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 6–7. 
5 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 
10, 18–19. See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commis-
sion, ‘‘Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection 
Work’’ [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10; Zhu Xiulin, 
Xiushui County Government, ‘‘[Xiushui] County Plans To Deploy 2011 New Year Spring Family 
Planning Service Activities’’ [Wo xian anpai bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian jihua 
shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County Government, ‘‘Fengping 
Town Strengthens Family Planning Work’’ [Fengping xiang jiaqiang jisheng gongzuo lidu], 5 
May 11; Taihe County Open Government Information Platform, ‘‘Chengjiang Township 
Launches Population Planning Concentrated Fortification Campaign’’ [Chengjiang zhen kaizhan 
jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 14 April 11. 
6 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 79, entry into force 2 September 81, China signed 17 July 80, ratified 4 November 
80, arts. 2–3, 16(1)(e). 
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and 
accession by UN General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 Sep-
tember 90, China signed 29 August 90, ratified 2 March 92, arts. 2–4, 6, 26. 
8 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by UN 
General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 3 January 76, 
China signed 27 October 97, ratified 27 March 01, art. 10(3). 
9 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua 
shengyu fa], enacted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 4. 
10 Ibid., art. 39. 
11 See, for example, Maonan District Population and Family Planning Bureau, ‘‘Leaders Pay 
Attention, Responsibilities Fulfilled, Real Action Taken, Maonan District Spring Family Plan-
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ning Concentrated Services Campaign [Achieves] Outstanding Results’’ [Lingdao zhongshi, zeren 
luoshi, zhenzhua shigan, maonanqu chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong chengxiao xianzhu], 
13 May 11; Chenzhou City People’s Government, ‘‘(Shijiao Town) Early Planning, Early Activi-
ties To Soundly Launch Spring Family Planning Centralized Services Campaign’’ [(Shijia xiang) 
zao mouhua, zao xingdong zhashi kaizhan chunji jisheng jizhong fuwu huodong], 21 February 
11; Yangchun City People’s Government, ‘‘Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning 
Services Activities Off to a Good Start’’ [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju 
hao], 4 March 11. 
12 Yangchun City People’s Government, ‘‘Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning 
Services Activities Off to a Good Start’’ [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju 
hao], 4 March 11. 
13 ‘‘Nail households’’ is used in this context to refer to families who resist government popu-
lation planning efforts. 
14 ‘‘Flight households’’ is used in this context to refer to families who have left their homes 
to evade official reprisal for noncompliance with population planning policies. 
15 Yangchun City People’s Government, ‘‘Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Family Planning 
Services Activities Off to a Good Start’’ [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu huodong kaiju 
hao], 4 March 11. 
16 Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, ‘‘Shinan Dis-
trict: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection Work’’ 
[Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10. 
17 Population and Family Planning Commission of Huoqiu County, ‘‘[Huoqiu] County Con-
venes County-wide Second Quarter Family Planning Focused Services Work Meeting’’ [Woxian 
zhaokai quanxian di’er jidu jihua shengyu jizhong fuwu gongzuohui], 25 January 11; Mingguang 
City Open Government Information Net, ‘‘Longshan Community Spares No Efforts in Carrying 
Out Family Planning Special Clean-Up Work’’ [Longshan shequ quanli yifu zuohao jihua 
shengyu zhuanxiang qingli gongzuo], 1 April 11. 
18 Shandan County Population and Family Planning Commission, ‘‘Weiqi Town 2011 Popu-
lation and Family Planning Work Plan’’ [Weiqi zhen 2011 nian renkou he jihua shengyu 
gongzuo anpai], 28 February 11; Population and Family Planning Commission of Gansu, 
‘‘Shenchuan Town Proposes Four Measures and Launches Spring Family Planning Superior 
Services Activity’’ [Shenchuan xiang sicuo bingju kaizhan chunji jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu 
huodong], 28 March 11. 
19 Su Xianchao, Yangchun City People’s Government, ‘‘Chuncheng Neighborhood Spring Fam-
ily Planning Services Activities Off to a Good Start’’ [Chuncheng jiedao chunji jisheng fuwu 
huodong kaiju hao], 4 March 11. 
20 Tang Zhenghai and Gong Ren, ‘‘Luxi Spares No Efforts in Contending To Become the Prov-
ince-wide Model County in Population and Family Planning Work’’ [Luxi quanli yifu zheng 
chuang quansheng renkou jisheng gongzuo mofan xian], Unity Newspaper, reprinted in Xiangxi 
Tujia Autonomous Prefecture Official Web site, 21 March 11. 
21 People’s Government of Tengxian Guangxi, ‘‘Pingfu Town Proposes Many Measures and 
Launches Spring Family Planning Superior Services Activities’’ [Pingfu xiang duo cuo bingju 
kaizhan chunji jihua shengyu youzhi fuwu huodong], 12 April 11. 
22 Population and Family Planning Commission of Gong’an County, ‘‘Maojiagang Town 2011 
Annual First-Half-of-the-Year Population and Family Planning Work Situation’’ [Maojianggang 
zhen 2011 niandu shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang], 25 May 11. 
23 Fengcheng City People’s Government, ‘‘Hutang Town Population and Family Planning Ac-
tion Month-Long Exercise Achieves Three Clear Results’’ [Hutang xiang jihua shengyu xingdong 
yue huodong qude sange mingxian chengxiao], 2 June 11. 
24 For one such example in which the two examinations and four procedures are clearly enu-
merated, see Population and Family Planning Commission of Gong’an County, ‘‘Maojiagang 
Town 2011 Annual First-Half-of-the-Year Population and Family Planning Work Situation’’ 
[Maojianggang zhen 2011 niandu shangbannian renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo qingkuang], 
25 May 11. Some government reports refer to ‘‘three examinations,’’ instead of two. The third 
examination in these references is an examination for the presence of a gynecological disease 
or illness. Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 
December 10, 10. 
25 The original source, Caixin, reported that the abductions happened between 2000 and 2005. 
The New York Times reported that the abductions occurred between 1999 and 2006. Shangguan 
Jiaoming, ‘‘In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder,’’ Caixin Net, 10 May 11; Sharon 
LaFraniere, ‘‘Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say,’’ New York Times, 4 August 
11. 
26 Shangguan Jiaoming, ‘‘In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder,’’ Caixin Net, 10 May 
11; Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say,’’ New York 
Times, 4 August 11; Zhao Hejuan, ‘‘Hunan Officials Launch Inquiry Over Sale of Children,’’ 
Caixin Net, 16 May 11. 
27 Shangguan Jiaoming, ‘‘In Hunan, Family Planning Turns to Plunder,’’ Caixin Net, 10 May 
11; Sharon LaFraniere, ‘‘Chinese Officials Seized and Sold Babies, Parents Say,’’ New York 
Times, 4 August 11. 
28 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 
10, 12. 
29 ‘‘Anhui Young Married Woman Undergoes Forced Sterilization, Lawsuit Rejected by Courts’’ 
[Anhui shaofu bei qiangzhi jueyu, xiang fayuan ti qisu zaoju], Radio Free Asia, 17 November 
10. 
30 ‘‘Zhaotong, Yunnan Villagers Accused of Exceeding Birth Limits, Town Officials Destroy 
New House and Accuse Entire Family’’ [Yunnan zhaotong cunmin bei zhi chaosheng, zao 
xiangguan daohui xinfang zhulian quanjia], Radio Free Asia, 29 October 10. 
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31 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 
10, 12. For another example of violence during family planning implementation in Shandong, 
see Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Another Bloody Family Planning Case Erupts in Chen 
Guangcheng’s Hometown Linyi, 22 Year Old Youth Cruelly Killed’’ [Chen guangcheng laojia 
linyi zai bao jisheng xue’an, 22 sui qingnian canzao shahai], 27 March 11. According to this re-
port, in March 2011, local family planning officials and hired personnel entered the home of Xu 
Shuaishuai in order to take away his sister for an unnamed birth control surgery. In an argu-
ment that ensued between his father and the personnel, Xu came to his father’s defense and 
reportedly was fatally stabbed by one of the personnel. 
32 ‘‘Xiamen Woman Eight Months Pregnant Forced To Abort, Also Kidnapped and Beaten’’ 
[Xiamen huaiyun bageyue funu bei qiangzhi yinchan, bing ceng canzao bangjia ji ouda], Radio 
Free Asia, 13 October 10. See also Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control 
Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 10, 10. 
33 ‘‘Henan Villager Beaten to Death for Exceeding Birth Limit, Thousand People Carry Coffin 
and Protest at Town Government’’ [Henan cunmin yin chaosheng bei dasi, qianren tai guancai 
zhenzhengfu kangyi], Radio Free Asia, 19 November 10. 
34 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Hangzhou Woman Forcibly Subjected to Birth Control 
Surgery in Guizhou Province’’ [Hangzhou nuzi zai guizhou bei qiangxing zuo jieyu shoushu], 22 
May 11. For an additional case of coercive implementation in Guizhou, see Chinese Human 
Rights Defenders, ‘‘Another Violent Family Planning Incident Outside of Guiyang’’ [Guiyang 
chengjiao zaici fasheng baoli jihua shengyu shijian], 30 May 11. 
35 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘Xinyu Village, Jiangxi Woman Undergoes Forced Tubal 
Ligation for Exposing Illegal Land Requisition’’ [Jiangxi xinyu cunfu yin jielu weigui zhengdi 
bei qiangzhi jieza], 19 June 11. 
36 PRC Measures for Collection of Social Compensation Fees [Shehui fuyang fei zhengshou 
guanli banfa], issued 2 August 02, effective 1 September 02, arts. 3, 7. 
37 See, e.g., Pan Lihua, Qingdao Municipal Population and Family Planning Commission, 
‘‘Shinan District: Spare No Efforts in Completing Population Planning, Welcome Inspection 
Work’’ [Shinanqu: quanli yifu zuohao jisheng ying jian gongzuo], 16 November 10; Zhu Xiulin, 
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Family Planning Service Activities’’ [Wo xian anpai bushu 2011 nian yuandan chunjie qijian 
jihua shengyu fuwu huodong], 15 January 11; Wu Yapeng, Songyang County People’s Govern-
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gongzuo lidu], 5 May 11; Taihe County Open Government Information Platform, ‘‘Chengjiang 
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[Chengjiang zhen kaizhan jihua shengyu jizhong gongjian huodong], 24 December 10. 
38 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 
10, 18. 
39 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, ‘‘Country Re-
ports on Human Rights Practices—2010, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),’’ 8 
April 11, 54. For more information on the role of courts in family planning implementation, see 
Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I Don’t Have Control Over My Own Body,’’ 21 December 
10, 27. 
40 PRC Population and Family Planning Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua 
shengyu fa], adopted 29 December 01, effective 1 September 02, art. 39. According to Article 
39, officials are to be punished either criminally or administratively for the following acts: ‘‘(1) 
infringing on a citizen’s personal rights, property rights or other legitimate rights and interests; 
(2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malpractices for personal gain; (3) de-
manding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing, misappropriating or embezzling funds 
for family planning or social maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistic data 
on population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or refusing to provide such 
data.’’ 
41 See, e.g., Pingdu Government Affairs Net, ‘‘Are Village Officials Relieved From Their Post 
if They Violate Population Planning Policies During Their Term of Office? ’’ [Cunguan renqinei 
weifan jihua shengyu falu fagui zhongzhi zhiwu ma?], 16 February 11; ‘‘Hunan Officials Launch 
Inquiry Over Sale of Children,’’ Caixin Net, 16 May 11; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, ‘‘I 
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the Ministry of Public Security and it refuses to issue hukous to children without birth permits, 
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Notes to Section II—Human Trafficking 
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Notes to Section III—Civil Society 
1 Civil society organizations in China include a range of groups, such as national mass organi-
zations that Party authorities create and fund, smaller citizen associations registered under na-
tional regulations, and loose networks of unregistered grassroots organizations. The Chinese or-
ganizational forms that most nearly correspond to the Western concept of a non-governmental 
organization are social organizations (SOs) [shehui tuanti], non-governmental and non-commer-
cial enterprises (NGNCEs) [minban feiqiye danwei], and foundations [jijinhui]. For the purposes 
of this section of the CECC Annual Report, the term ‘‘CSO’’ refers to these three types of organi-
zations. SOs are voluntary organizations; they include academic, professional, or trade organiza-
tions, as well as voluntary associations of individuals with a common interest. NGNCEs are non- 
governmental service providers, including schools, hospitals, sports organizations, or employ-
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Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress on 
10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci huiyi 
shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source Cen-
ter, 25 February 11). Chairman of the TAR Government Pema Choling (Baima Chilin) urged 
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13 China Directory 2010, ed. Radiopress (Kawasaki: RP Printing, 2009), 17. 
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16 ‘‘Zhang Qingli: Overall Situation in Tibet Stable,’’ Xinhua, 7 March 11 (translated in Open 
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passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 6, 7, 12(3), 15, 16, 18–19, 31; 
Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi 
mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 
May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, arts. 8, 9, 13(2), 15, 17(2), 22, 25. 
67 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 7(2); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, 
issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 8(1); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 11(1); Haixi Mongol 
and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu 
zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued 
and effective 3 June 10, art. 8. 
68 The statement is based on information obtained on the Web site of Harry’s World Atlas in 
January 2011 and represented as current in early 2007. 
69 Five of the seven measures for which text was available online as of August 2011 provide 
for a greater role for village committees than the TAR Implementing Measures for the Regula-
tions on Religious Affairs issued in September 2006; two prefectural measures (Diqing and 
Haixi) contain language similar to the TAR measures. See, e.g., Tibet Autonomous Region Im-
plementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’’ (Trial Measures) [Xizang zizhiqu 
shishi ‘‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06, effective 1 January 07, 
art. 7; State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 Novem-
ber 10, arts. 8, 11(2–3), 36; Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs 
Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, 
issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 19, 22–23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 19–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Pre-
fecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 
12, 43–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effec-
tive 30 September 10, arts. 18, 31; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 9; Aba Tibetan 
and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and 
effective 24 July 09, arts. 20, 21(2); Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Man-
agement of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan 
guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, 
art. 5(2). 
70 Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Ti-
betan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing 
banfa], issued and effective 24 July 09, arts. 20, 21(2). 
71 State Administration for Religious Affairs, Management Measures for Tibetan Buddhist 
Monasteries [Zangchuan fojiao simiao guanli banfa], passed 29 September 10, effective 1 Novem-
ber 10, art. 8, 
72 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, arts. 22–23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 
July 09, issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 18–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Ti-
betan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], 
passed 12 January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 11(3), 35, 
42(9), 43–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effec-
tive 30 September 10, arts. 7(5), 17–19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Ti-
betan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu 
tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17. 
73 CECC Staff Analysis. 
74 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 22; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Af-
fairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, 
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issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 19; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 43; Guoluo Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 
18; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 
27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17. 
75 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 23; Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Af-
fairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, 
issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 20–21; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 44–45; Guoluo Ti-
betan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 
17, 19 (do not list specific responsibilities); Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture 
Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao 
shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17 
(does not list specific responsibilities). 
76 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 23(6); Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, 
issued and effective 31 July 09, art. 21(3); Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 
January 10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 44(5); Guoluo Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou 
zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 
19; Haixi Mongol and Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Haixi mengguzu zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 
27 May 10, issued and effective 3 June 10, art. 17 (does not detail reporting requirements). 
77 Commission Staff Analysis. For more detailed information on provisions that provide crimi-
nal or administrative punishment in the prefectural regulatory measures, see ‘‘Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,’’ Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 2 titled Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulatory Meas-
ures: Selected Areas of Requirement, Prohibition, Control. According to the table, ‘‘DMC mem-
bers, teachers, trulkus, monks and nuns may face administrative or criminal punishment for 
activity characterized as . . . .’’ 
78 Commission Staff Analysis. See Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Hainan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 July 09, 
issued and effective 31 July 09, arts. 39–45; Guoluo Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan 
Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 
22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, arts. 45–50; Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autono-
mous Prefecture Temporary Measures on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Affairs [Aba zangzu 
qiangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu guanli zanxing banfa], issued and effective 24 July 
09, arts. 34–41. 
79 Commission Staff Analysis. See Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist 
Affairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 
10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, arts. 46–50; Haixi Mongol and 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Haixi mengguzu zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 8 March 10, approved 27 May 10, issued and 
effective 3 June 10, art. 27 (no chapter on ‘‘legal liability’’ (falu zeren)); Diqing Tibetan Autono-
mous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries [Diqing zangzu 
zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 30 July 09, issued 
and effective 1 September 09, arts. 24–26, 28 (no chapter on ‘‘legal liability’’ (falu zeren)). 
80 Commission Staff Analysis. See Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Bud-
dhist Affairs Regulations [Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 
September 09, issued and effective 24 September 09, arts. 43–47. 
81 The Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) data on Tibetan political detention and 
imprisonment during the period beginning on March 10, 2008, is certain to be far from complete. 
‘‘Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations Taking Effect in Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures,’’ Con-
gressional-Executive Commission on China, 10 March 11, Table 3. Based on PPD information 
as of February 11, 2011, the following numbers of Tibetan Buddhist monks, nuns, and teachers 
were detained on or after March 10, 2008, in prefectures with more extensive descriptions of 
punishable offenses—Hainan TAP (12), Guoluo TAP (18), and Aba T&QAP (57); in a prefecture 
with mid-range extensiveness of descriptions of punishable offenses—Huangnan TAP (3); and 
in prefectures with less extensive descriptions of punishable offenses—Haibei TAP (0), Haixi 
M&TAP (0), and Diqing TAP (0). 
82 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Af-
fairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 
10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autono-
mous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 51; Diqing 
Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Regulation on Management of Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries 
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[Diqing zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao siyuan guanli tiaoli], passed 14 April 09, approved 
30 July 09, issued and effective 1 September 09, art. 27. 
83 PRC Administrative Reconsideration Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingzheng fuyi fa], 
issued 29 April 99, effective 1 October 99. 
84 PRC Administrative Litigation Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingzheng sufa fa], 
issued 4 April 89, effective 1 October 90. 
85 Huangnan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations 
[Huangnan zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 4 September 09, issued and 
effective 24 September 09, art. 48; Haibei Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Af-
fairs Regulations [Haibei zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 12 January 
10, approved 18 March 10, issued and effective 22 March 10, art. 51; Guoluo Tibetan Autono-
mous Prefecture Tibetan Buddhist Affairs Regulations [Guoluo zangzu zizhizhou zangchuan 
fojiao shiwu tiaoli], passed 22 March 10, issued and effective 30 September 10, art. 51. 
86 As of September 1, 2011, the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database (PPD) contained 576 
records of political or religious detention of Tibetans in 2008; 220 records in 2009; 113 records 
in 2010; and 225 records in 2011. PPD information on Tibetan political detentions in and after 
March 2008 is certain to be far from complete. The increase in 2011 is due mainly to the coerced 
removal of monks from Kirti Monastery in April 2011 for de facto detention at undisclosed sites 
for ‘‘legal education.’’ For additional information on the Kirti detentions, see ‘‘After Monk’s Sui-
cide: Coerced Removal and ‘Education’ for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,’’ Congressional-Ex-
ecutive Commission on China, 17 August 11. 
87 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, Author Escapes,’’ Phayul, 
6 March 11. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Hongyuan county is also known by the Tibetan names Kakhog, Khyungchu, and Mewa. 
90 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘4 Tibetans Arrested Over 2 Books in Ngaba, Author Escapes,’’ Phayul, 
6 March 11; Cornelius Lundsgaard and Pema Tso, ‘‘China Arrests Four Tibetans Including Two 
Writers Over 2 Books,’’ Tibet Post, 19 March 11. 
91 ‘‘Police Crack Down on Banned Songs,’’ Radio Free Asia, 25 February 11. 
92 Ibid. The RFA report did not identify the location(s) in the TAR where the detentions took 
place or identify any of the Tibetans detained. 
93 ‘‘Tibetan Writers Sentenced,’’ Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10. 
94 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Three More Tibetan Writers Sentenced to Prison,’’ 21 
January 11; ‘‘Tibetan Writers Sentenced,’’ Radio Free Asia, 31 December 10; International Cam-
paign for Tibet, ‘‘Three Tibetan Writers on Trial Await Verdict,’’ 5 November 10; ‘‘Tibetan Writ-
ers Tried as ‘Splittists,’ ’’ Radio Free Asia, 5 November 10. 
95 ‘‘Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped Conditions,’’ Phayul, 18 October 10 (re-
leased on October 15, 2010, on conditions described in a manner that indicates bail following 
detention on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ‘‘Takmig Ar-
rested Again,’’ 4 February 11 (redetention on December 16, 2010). 
96 Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ‘‘Takmig Arrested Again,’’ 4 February 
11 (redetention on December 16, 2010). 
97 ‘‘Tibetan Author of Banned Video Released, Slapped Conditions,’’ Phayul, 18 October 10 (re-
lease October 15, 2010, on conditions described in a manner that indicate bail following deten-
tion on July 27, 2010); Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, ‘‘One More Tibetan 
Intellectual Arrested’’ 22 August 10 (2,500 VCDs); International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Tibetan 
Monk Makes Video Appeal for Return of Dalai Lama and End to Repression in Tibet,’’ 28 Au-
gust 09 (translation of VCD statement). 
98 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in Lhasa,’’ Phayul, 11 Janu-
ary 11 (refers to events as ‘‘debates’’); Y.C. Dhardhowa, ‘‘China Detains a Tibetan Writer in 
Lhasa, Capital of Tibet,’’ Tibet Post, 11 January 11 (refers to events as ‘‘conferences’’). 
99 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Tibetan Monk Writer From Palbar Arrested in Lhasa,’’ Phayul, 11 Janu-
ary 11. 
100 ‘‘A Lhasa Singer’s Newly Published CD Accused of Political Problems, Arrest Warrant 
Issued’’ [Yi lasa geshou chuban xin guangdie beikong she zheng zao tongji], Boxun, 24 Sep-
tember 10. The Boxun report cites a Voice of Tibet broadcast (likely the same date or one day 
earlier) that describes the police activity, including the issue of the arrest warrant (jubu ling) 




104 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crack-
down,’’ Phayul, 16 March 11. 
105 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Monk Immolates Himself; Major Protests at Tibetan 
Monastery Violently Suppressed,’’ 16 March 11; Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Ngaba Monk Immolates Self 
To Mark 3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown,’’ Phayul, 16 March 11; ‘‘After Monk’s Suicide: Co-
erced Removal and ‘Education’ for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,’’ Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, 17 August 11. 
106 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Chinese Authorities Confirm Death of Monk After Self- 
Immolation; Military Crackdown at Kirti,’’ 17 March 11. 
107 Ibid.; ‘‘Protest Monk Dies,’’ Radio Free Asia, 17 March 11; Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Monk Who 
Set Ablaze Self Dead, 7 Kirti Monks Released, Several Still Held,’’ 17 March 11. 
108 ‘‘Monks Face New Restrictions,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 March 11 (‘‘On [March 21] . . . a pro-
gram of political reeducation called ‘Patriotic Religion’ was launched . . .’’); Kalsang Rinchen, 
‘‘3 Youth Among Arrested as China Goes on Arrest Drive in Ngaba County,’’ Phayul, 24 March 
11 (‘‘the patriotic reeducation campaign at Ngaba Kirti monastery that started on Monday 
[March 21] is underway . . .’’); International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Protests, Tensions Escalate 
in Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown,’’ 11 April 11 
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(‘‘a rigorous ‘patriotic education’ campaign is being enforced’’); ‘‘After Monk’s Suicide: Coerced 
Removal and ‘Education’ for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,’’ Congressional-Executive Com-
mission on China, 17 August 11. 
109 ‘‘Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11 (‘‘Local Tibetans . . . heard 
that the detained monks were then taken to [Wenchuan (Lunggu), Mao (Maowun), and Li 
(Tashiling) counties in Aba (Ngaba) Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture]’’); Kalsang 
Rinchen, ‘‘2 Beaten to Death in Ngaba, 300 Kirti Monks Arrested,’’ Phayul, 22 April 11; Inter-
national Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Two Elderly Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks Detained 
From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens,’’ 22 April 11; ‘‘After Monk’s Suicide: Coerced Removal and 
‘Education’ for Monks; Possible Murder Charges,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 17 August 11. 
110 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Two Elderly Tibetans Killed as Hundreds of Monks De-
tained From Kirti; Crackdown Deepens,’’ 22 April 11 (‘‘[people] had their arms and legs broken’’; 
‘‘The two people who died . . . were Dongko (male) . . . aged 60, and 65-year old Sherkyi (fe-
male).’’); ‘‘Kirti Monks Forcibly Removed,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 April 11 (‘‘Chinese armed police 
then attacked the crowd, beating some and gagging others . . .; A 60-year-old man named 
Donkho . . . and a 65-year-old woman named Sherkyi . . . were killed, and others suffered bro-
ken arms and legs in the attack.’’); International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Ngaba Students Protest 
Crackdown, Authorities Respond; New Information on Deaths of Tibetans Who Tried To Protect 
Monks,’’ 9 May 11; ‘‘After Monk’s Suicide: Coerced Removal and ‘Education’ for Monks; Possible 
Murder Charges,’’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 17 August 11. 
111 ‘‘1st Ld-Writethru: Tibetan Monk Jailed 11 Years For Murder in Self-Immolation Case,’’ 
Xinhua, 29 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. According to the report, on August 29, 2011, 
the Ma’erkang [Barkham] County People’s Court sentenced Kirti monk ‘‘Drongdru’’ to 11 years’ 
imprisonment ‘‘because he hid the injured monk and prevented emergency treatment.’’ ‘‘Two Ti-
betan Monks Sentenced in Murder Case,’’ Xinhua, 31 August 11, reprinted in China Daily. Ac-
cording to the report, on August 30, 2011, the Ma’erkang [Barkham] County People’s Court sen-
tenced Kirti monks ‘‘Tsering Tenzin’’ and ‘‘Tenchum’’ to 13 years’ and 10 years’ imprisonment 
respectively. PRC Criminal Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa], enacted 1 July 79, 
amended 14 March 97, effective 1 October 97, amended 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 De-
cember 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, 28 February 09, art. 232: ‘‘Whoever 
intentionally commits homicide shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment or fixed-term im-
prisonment of not less than 10 years; if the circumstances are relatively minor, he shall be sen-
tenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than 10 years.’’ 
112 ‘‘Tibet Protest March Attacked,’’ Radio Free Asia, 16 March 11. According to an RFA 
source, ‘‘Chinese police and security people present in the area immediately came to the scene 
and kicked and beat him as they extinguished the flames. Local Tibetans and Kirti monks came 
to his rescue and took Phuntsog back to the monastery.’’ ‘‘Ngaba Monk Immolates Self To Mark 
3 Years Since Bloody Crackdown,’’ Phayul, 16 March 11. According to the report, ‘‘As the police 
were trying to take him away in a waiting police van scores of Tibetans rushed to the scene 
and protected Phuntsok.’’ International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Protests, Tensions Escalate in 
Ngaba Following Self-Immolation of Monk: Kirti Monastery Under Lockdown,’’ 11 April 11. Ac-
cording to the ICT report, ‘‘At that point, Kirti monks intervened and sheltered him at the mon-
astery before ensuring he received medical treatment at hospital, . . . .’’ 
113 Free Tibet Campaign, ‘‘Monk Dies After Setting Himself on Fire in Protest in Tibet,’’ 15 
August 11 (‘‘Nyitso Monastery’’); ‘‘Tibetan Monk Sets Himself Ablaze,’’ Radio Free Asia, 15 Au-
gust 11 (‘‘Nyatso Monastery’’); ‘‘Monk Sets Himself on Fire in SW China,’’ Xinhua, 15 August 
11, reprinted in China Internet Information Center. 
114 Accurate, comprehensive, and independently verified information on the views of Tibetans 
living in China is not available. 
115 Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of 
Statistics et al., Tabulation on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Ethnic 
Publishing House, 2003). Based on 2000 census data, 87.2 percent of Tibetans were classified 
as ‘‘rural’’ population: Table 1–2 shows the total Tibetan population in 2000 as 5,416,021; Table 
1–2a shows the ‘‘city’’ population of Tibetans in 2000 as 221,355; Table 1–2b shows the ‘‘town’’ 
population of Tibetans in 2000 as 473,467; Table 1–2c shows the ‘‘rural’’ population of Tibetans 
in 2000 as 4,721,199. Based on information in Table 1–5, the percentage of rural Tibetans could 
be even higher: Of the total 5,416,021 Tibetan population, 5,373,339 Tibetans were classified 
as either ‘‘agricultural’’ (4,792,676) or ‘‘non-agricultural’’ (580,663). Based on those figures, the 
4,792,676 Tibetans classified as ‘‘agricultural’’ made up 88.5 percent of the 5,416,021 total Ti-
betan population. 
116 For previous Commission reporting addressing the issues of Tibetan literacy and the status 
of the Tibetan language, see, e.g., CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 October 07, 202; CECC, 2005 
Annual Report, 11 October 05, 108–9; Teaching and Learning Tibetan: The Role of the Tibetan 
Language in Tibet’s Future, Staff Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 7 April 03, Testimony of Nicolas Tournadre, Associate Professor of Linguistics, Univer-
sity of Paris 8, Paris; Testimony of David Germano, Professor of Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, 
University of Virginia; Testimony of Losang Rabgey, Commonwealth Scholar and Ph.D. Can-
didate, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
117 China’s Constitution and the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law provide nominal protec-
tion for the use of minority languages. See, e.g., PRC Constitution, issued 4 December 82, 
amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 99, 14 March 04, arts. 4, 121; PRC Regional Eth-
nic Autonomy Law (REAL) [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa], issued 31 May 
84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01, arts. 10, 21, 37. The State 
Council Provisions on Implementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law affirm the free-
dom to use and develop minority languages, but also place emphasis on the use of Mandarin 
by promoting ‘‘bilingual’’ education and bilingual teaching staff. State Council Provisions on Im-
plementing the PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Guowuyuan shishi ‘‘zhonghua renmin 
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:53 Oct 12, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00342 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 U:\DOCS\68442.TXT DEIDRE
337 
gongheguo minzu quyu zizhifa’’ ruogan guiding], issued 19 May 05, effective 31 May 05, art. 
22. 
118 ‘‘It Is in the Fundamental Interests of the Tibetan People in Our Province To Strengthen 
and Reform ‘Bilingual’ Education,’’ Qinghai Daily, 29 October 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 3 November 10); ‘‘NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,’’ 
Xinhua, 23 October 10; Xue Jun, ‘‘Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and Video-
conference of Leading Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers Important Speech’’ [Sheng wei 
zhaokai quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], 
Qinghai Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10); Zhi Zhenpu, 
‘‘Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make ‘Bi-lingual’ Education a Livelihood Project’’ 
[Qinghai sheng wei shuji qiang wei: ba ‘‘shuang yu’’ jiaoyu zuowei minsheng gongcheng], Peo-
ple’s Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net. 
119 ‘‘Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the Spirit of the Province-Wide 
Conference on Education’’ [Lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen 
zuotanhui zhaokai], Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 Novem-
ber 10) (ethnic languages are for use in ‘‘one’s home location’’ and in ‘‘courses of study to carry 
ethnic culture forward’’; Chinese language is for use in ‘‘public places’’; non-ethnic languages 
(e.g., Chinese, English) are for ‘‘scientific learning such as mathematics, physics, and chem-
istry’’); ‘‘Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai Province Mid- 
and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’ ’’ [Qinghai sheng 
jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ‘‘qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao 
(2010–2020)’’], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 No-
vember 10) (the role of Chinese language: ‘‘adhere to mainly teaching with the state’s standard 
spoken and written language [Mandarin]’’; role of ethnic language is not identified: ‘‘learn spo-
ken and written ethnic languages’’). 
120 ‘‘Students Protest Language Change,’’ Radio Free Asia, 19 October 10 (October 19 protest 
in Tongren (Rebgong), capital of Huangnan (Malho) TAP, involved students from six secondary- 
and tertiary-level schools; estimates ranged from 1,000 to 7,000 students); ‘‘Tibet Students Pro-
tests Spread,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10 (October 20 protests included ‘‘more than 2,000’’ 
middle school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP, and a total of about 6,000 secondary- 
and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of Hainan (Tsolho) TAP); Barbara 
Demick, ‘‘Tibetan Student Protests Reach Beijing,’’ Los Angeles Times, 23 October 10 (200 to 
300 students protested on October 22 at the Central University for Minorities in Beijing); ‘‘Lan-
guage Protests Spread to Beijing,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (‘‘some 400’’ Tibetan students 
protested on October 22 at the National Minorities University in Beijing); ‘‘20 Tibetan Students 
Detained, Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,’’ Phayul, 25 October 10 (‘‘thousands’’ of 
students reportedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, 
Huangnan TAP; the report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in 
Guide (Trika) county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province). 
121 ‘‘Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Lan-
guage in Qinghai Province’’ [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige 
wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10). 
‘‘The Qinghai Education Department and [Director] Wang Yubo openly restricted the freedom 
of study, use, and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, which totally violates 
the Constitution, the [REAL], . . . the Education Law, and the Law for the State’s Commonly 
Used Language.’’ See also PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo 
minzu quyu zizhi fa], issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 Feb-
ruary 01. 
122 CECC Staff Analysis. Official reports acknowledged the protests but did not allege plan-
ning or organization. Participation of large numbers of students across a wide area in the pro-
tests without planning or organization would depend on widespread student predisposition to 
join protests. Such predisposition would depend on a significant level of dissatisfaction. 
123 CECC Staff Analysis. Based on the relative consistency of government and Party policy on 
Tibetan education as well as on the relative consistency of the Tibetan people’s wish to maintain 
their language and culture, teachers’ and students’ views in Qinghai province are likely to be 
similar to such views in the Tibet Autonomous Region and Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan prov-
inces. 
124 In Qinghai province, Tibetan-language primary and middle schools are located in five Ti-
betan autonomous prefectures (Haibei (Tsojang), Hainan (Tsolho), Huangnan (Malho), Guoluo 
(Golog), and Yushu (Yulshul)), and in one Mongol and Tibetan autonomous prefecture (Haixi 
(Tsonub)). 
125 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Tibetan Teachers Write Petition in Support of Tibetan 
Language; Fears for Students After Detentions,’’ 26 October 10. According to the article, the 
training took place in Tongren (Rebgong), the capital of Huangnan (Malho) Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture. 
126 See Jia Xiaoyun, ‘‘Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai 
Province Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’ ’’ 
[Qinghai sheng jiaoyu ting fuzeren jiedu ‘‘Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan 
guihua gangyao (2010–2020)’’], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 6 November 10). 
127 International Campaign for Tibet, ‘‘Tibetan Teachers Write Petition in Support of Tibetan 
Language; Fears for Students After Detentions,’’ 26 October 10. 
128 Ibid. 
129 ‘‘Students Protest Language Change,’’ Radio Free Asia, 19 October 10 (the six schools in 
Tongren were the First Nationalities Middle School, the Tongren County Yifu Nationalities Mid-
dle School, the Tongren District Residential School, the Tongren Modern Medicine College, the 
Huangnan National Teacher Training Institute, and the Huangnan Nationalities Middle School); 
Free Tibet Campaign, ‘‘Students Protest for Language Rights,’’ 22 October 10. 
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131 Ibid. 
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provided a translation of the apparently Chinese-language text message: ‘‘Yesterday, the Min-
istry of Education decided that, Tibetan language centered education system should be canceled 
[in] all the schools in Tibetan areas. The Tibetan language above primary school is set as an 
optional subject. Tibetan students are protesting for their mother-tongue in the Tibetan areas 
in Qinghai and others. For the sake of saving the Tibetan mother-tongue, please pass the mes-
sage to each other.’’ 
133 Zhi Zhenpu, ‘‘Qinghai Province Party Secretary Qiang Wei: Make ‘Bi-lingual’ Education a 
Livelihood Project’’ [Qinghai sheng wei shuji qiang wei: ba ‘‘shuang yu’’ jiaoyu zuowei minsheng 
gongcheng], People’s Daily, 30 September 10, reprinted in Phoenix Net. 
134 ‘‘Tibet Student Protests Spread,’’ Radio Free Asia, 20 October 10 (October 20 protests in-
cluded ‘‘more than 2,000’’ middle school students in Zeku (Tsekhog), Huangnan TAP; a total of 
about 6,000 secondary- and tertiary-level students in Gonghe (Chabcha), capital of Hainan 
(Tsolho) TAP); Barbara Demick, ‘‘Tibetan Student Protests Reach Beijing,’’ Los Angeles Times, 
23 October 10 (200 to 300 students protested at Beijing’s Central University for Minorities); 
‘‘Language Protests Spread to Beijing,’’ Radio Free Asia, 22 October 10 (‘‘some 400’’ Tibetan stu-
dents protested at the Beijing National Minorities University); ‘‘20 Tibetan Students Detained, 
Protests Over Language Continue in Tibet,’’ Phayul, 25 October 10 (‘‘thousands’’ of students re-
portedly protested on Sunday, October 24, in the seat of Jianza (Chentsa) county, Huangnan 
TAP; the report also mentions student protest in the days prior to the report in Guide (Trika) 
county, Hainan TAP, and in Guoluo (Golog) TAP, Qinghai province); ‘‘Opinions on Mid- and 
Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Language in Qinghai Province’’ 
[Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 
October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10) (‘‘demonstrations staged by the 
primary and secondary schools of the four autonomous prefectures of Huangnan, Hainan, 
Guoluo, and Haibei since 19 October’’). 
135 ‘‘NW China Province Clarifies Purpose of Bilingual Education Reform,’’ Xinhua, 22 October 
10. 
136 ‘‘Qinghai Provincial Department of Education Leader Explains ‘Qinghai Province Mid- and 
Long-Term Plan for Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’ ’’ [Qinghai sheng jiaoyu 
ting fuzeren jiedu ‘‘Qinghai sheng zhong changqi jiaoyu gaige he fazhan guihua gangyao (2010– 
2020)’’], Qinghai News Agency, 22 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 6 November 
10). 
137 PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyu zizhi fa], 
issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01. 
138 ‘‘Opinions on Mid- and Long-Term Reform of the Use of Bilingual Tibetan-Chinese Lan-
guage in Qinghai Province’’ [Guanyu qinghai sheng zang han shuangyu zhong changqi gaige 
wenti de yijian], Sohu blog, 24 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 7 November 10). 
The letter raised issues including: ‘‘[Director Wang Yubo of the Qinghai Province Department 
of Education] bypassed the setting up of the Chinese language course and also altered the mean-
ing of ‘the right to receive education in their own ethnic minority language’ proposed in the Out-
line for National Education Plan’’; ‘‘The Qinghai Education Department and Wang Yubo openly 
restricted the freedom of study, use, and development of ethnic minority languages in schools, 
which totally violates the Constitution, the [REAL], the Education Law, and the Law for the 
State’s Commonly Used Language’’; ‘‘[Furthermore, since the [REAL] is still in effect in the 
PRC, the change in use of language in the schools practicing regional autonomy made by an 
administrative department without authorization constitutes a deliberate challenge and in-
fringement of the state’s basic laws and a serious contempt for the authority of state laws’’; and, 
‘‘Unless the National People’s Congress [NPC] adopts any amendment to the [REAL], an admin-
istrative department, which is actually a provincial level administrative organ, has no right 
whatsoever to go beyond the principles of the basic law and make a decision in violation of the 
law.’’ 
139 Ibid. The letter states that the authors ‘‘submitted’’ it to national-, provincial-, and prefec-
tural-level Communist Party, legislative, government, and consultative entities including the fol-
lowing: Communist Party United Front Work Department (UFWD), National People’s Congress 
Religious Committee, State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Ministry of Education, Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Ethnic Affairs Committee, Qinghai Communist Party 
Standing Committee, Qinghai People’s Congress, Qinghai People’s Government, Qinghai 
CPPCC, Qinghai UFWD, Qinghai Religious Affairs Department, and Party committees, people’s 
governments, people’s congresses, CPPCCs, and education departments in each of Qinghai’s six 
autonomous prefectures. 
140 Ibid. The letter stated, ‘‘Under the current situation and conditions, a government func-
tional department, without approval of a higher level state organ, has gone so far as to make 
a decision and reform in violation of the Constitution and law. We would like to appeal.’’ 
141 PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo minzu quyu zizhi fa], 
issued 31 May 84, effective 1 October 84, amended and effective 28 February 01, art. 20: ‘‘If 
a resolution, decision, order, or instruction of a state agency at a higher level does not suit the 
actual conditions in an ethnic autonomous area, an autonomous agency of the area may report 
for the approval of that higher level state agency to either implement it with certain alterations 
or cease implementing it altogether. That higher level state agency must give its decision within 
sixty days of receiving the report.’’ For information on implementation of the PRC Regional Eth-
nic Autonomy Law, see, e.g., CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 25– 
28; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, Section IV—Tibet: Special Focus for 2007, 10 October 07, 187– 
91; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, Section III—Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights—Spe-
cial Focus for 2005: China’s Minorities and Government Implementation of the Regional Ethnic 
Autonomy Law, 11 October 05, 13–23. 
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ber 10). The article listed Qinghai province institutional participants: ‘‘Education Department, 
Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission, Civil Affairs Department, Agriculture and Animal 
Husbandry Department, Poverty Eradication Bureau, Cultural Federation, Academy of Social 
Sciences, Science Association, Red Cross, and Qinghai University for Nationalities.’’ For infor-
mation on a similar conference on October 23, 2010, see ‘‘The Party and the Government Will 
Never Force Any Student To Abandon Their Mother Tongue’’ [Dang he zhengfu juebu hui 
qiangpo renhe xuesheng fangqi muyu], Qinghai News Agency, 25 October 10 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 6 November 10). 
143 ‘‘Leading Cadres Convene Forum To Study and Implement the Spirit of the Province-Wide 
Conference on Education’’ [Lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche quansheng jiaoyu dahui jingshen 
zuotanhui zhaokai], Qinghai Daily, 27 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 8 Novem-
ber 10). According to Gao, ‘‘The realm of language learning is to be able to speak the common 
language of one’s home location, to be able to speak the national language in public places, and 
to be able to speak an international language on international occasions.’’ 
144 Ibid. 
145 Xue Jun, ‘‘Provincial Party Committee Convenes Telephone and Videoconference of Lead-
ing Cadres Province Wide, Qiang Wei Delivers Important Speech’’ [Sheng wei zhaokai 
quansheng lingdao ganbu dianshi dianhua huiyi qiangwei zuo zhongyao jianghua], Qinghai 
Daily, 28 October 10 (translated in Open Source Center, 1 November 10). 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. The videoconference was convened by the Qinghai Communist Party Committee and 
included ‘‘leading cadres throughout the province.’’ 
148 Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chair-
man Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress 
on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 25 February 11). The report emphasizes adherence to policy as the basis for success: 
‘‘In face of constant disruptions and sabotages by the Dalai clique, all kinds of frequent natural 
disasters, retrenchment of the macroeconomic environment, and other challenges, under the 
leadership of the party Central Committee and the State Council, the people of various ethnic 
groups across the autonomous region have united as strongly as a fortress, overcome difficulties, 
and accumulated valuable experience in expanding demand, promoting growth, creating welfare 
for the masses, and maintaining stability.’’ 
149 Hu Yongqi and Dachiog, ‘‘Tibet’s Achievements Celebrated,’’ China Daily, 28 March 11. Ac-
cording to the report, the Tibet Autonomous Region increased an average of 12.4 percent per 
year from 2005 to 2010. 
150 Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chair-
man Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress 
on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 25 February 11). ‘‘The farmers and herdsmen’[s] per capita net income has remained 
at a two-digit increase for eight consecutive years and topped 4,000 yuan in 2010, to stand at 
4,138.7 yuan, up by 99.2 percent over 2005. The city and town residents’ per capita disposable 
income has reached 14,980 yuan, an increase of 78.1 percent over 2005.’’ 
151 Zhao Yinan, ‘‘Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,’’ China Daily, 18 November 
10. ‘‘From 2001 to 2010, the central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan (US$46.7 
billion) to the Tibet autonomous region, . . . . Of every 100 yuan the Tibet regional government 
spends, 90 yuan comes from the central government.’’ 
152 PRC Constitution, adopted 4 December 82, amended 12 April 88, 29 March 93, 15 March 
99, 14 March 04, art. 9. ‘‘Mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed 
land, beaches and other natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, 
with the exception of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land and beaches that are 
owned by collectives in accordance with the law.’’ 
153 ‘‘Tibet Autonomous Region Reserves Most Chromium and Cuprum in China,’’ China Tibet 
Information Center, reprinted in China Tibet Online, 6 December 10. 
154 Ibid.; Zhao Yinan, ‘‘Minister Prepares To Solve Ethnic Challenges,’’ China Daily, 18 No-
vember 10 (‘‘[from] 2001 to 2010, the central government allocated more than 310 billion yuan 
(US$46.7 billion) to the Tibet autonomous region’’). 
155 Reports did not provide information about the type of mining. ‘‘Tibetans in Tibet Beaten 
and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing Mine’’ [Jingnei zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao 
zhonggong duda he jubu], Voice of Tibet, 11 February 11, reprinted in Boxun, 11 February 11 
(protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on December 18); ‘‘15 
Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests in Shigatse,’’ Phayul, 14 February 11. 
156 ‘‘Tibetans in Tibet Beaten and Arrested by Authorities for Opposing Mine’’ [Jingnei 
zangren yin fandui kaikuang zao zhonggong duda he jubu], Voice of Tibet, reprinted in Boxun, 
11 February 11 (protests and petitioning began on November 22; beatings and detention on De-
cember 18); ‘‘15 Tibetans Put Behind Bars Over Anti-mining Protests in Shigatse,’’ Phayul, 14 
February 11. See the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database for more information on the 
cases. 
157 ‘‘Villagers Block Work on Dam,’’ Radio Free Asia, 30 September 10 (the mountain’s name 
is Lhachen Naglha Dzamba); ‘‘Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,’’ Radio Free Asia, 7 October 
10 (the mountain is ‘‘a traditional site of worship and offerings’’). 
158 ‘‘Villagers Block Work on Dam,’’ Radio Free Asia, 30 September 10. 
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159 Ibid. According to the report, workers claimed ‘‘their permit to mine in the area had been 
approved by the Communist Party secretary of the TAR.’’ The TAR government would issue 
such a permit, but a TAR Party official may have signified agreement. 
160 ‘‘Tibetan Dam Protesters Detained,’’ Radio Free Asia, 7 October 10. See the Commission’s 
Political Prisoner Database for more information on the cases. 
161 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans in Palyul County,’’ Phayul, 24 
August 10 (‘‘100 Tibetans from the village had camped outside the government headquarters 
waiting for a response from the authorities to their plea.’’); ‘‘Police Fire on Mine Protesters,’’ 
Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10. 
162 ‘‘Police Fire on Mine Protesters,’’ Radio Free Asia, 26 August 10 (‘‘gold mining operations 
by the Chinese-owned Kartin Company had led to an overcrowded population, severely degraded 
the fertility of their farmland, and adversely affected the local grassland habitat’’). 
163 Kalsang Rinchen, ‘‘Police Firing Kills 3, Injures 30 Tibetans in Palyul County,’’ Phayul, 24 
August 10 (‘‘[three] Tibetans have been killed and 30 others severely wounded’’); Phurbu 
Thinley, ‘‘China Says Only One Tibetan Shot Dead in Palyul Mine Protest,’’ Phayul, 1 Sep-
tember 10 (‘‘Subsequent reports by overseas Tibetan news services said at least four Tibetans 
were killed, . . .’’). 
164 ‘‘Tibetan Accidentally Shot Dead in Dispute With Police,’’ Xinhua, 30 August 10, reprinted 
in China Internet Information Center. 
165 ‘‘Tibetan Mine Protesters Detained,’’ Radio Free Asia, 5 August 11. 
166 Ibid. The Radio Free Asia report named three persons (the ‘‘village officials’’) detained on 
July 2, nine persons detained on July 6 and 7, one person detained on July 14, and two persons 
(the alleged protest ‘‘ringleaders’’) detained ‘‘around July 20.’’ 
167 Ibid. 
168 Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chair-
man Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress 
on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 25 February 11). ‘‘Around 1.43 million farmers and herdsmen of 275,000 households 
whose housing conditions were comparatively bad have moved into safe and affordable homes.’’ 
169 Laba Cier and Gama Douji, ‘‘Secretary Zhang Qingli of the Tibet Autonomous Regional 
CPC Committee Says That It Is Necessary To Adhere to the Scientific Development Concept 
and Maintain a Leapfrog Development’’ [Xizang zizhiqu dangwei shuji zhang qingli: jianchi 
kexue fazhan guan baochi kuayueshi fazhan], Xinhua, 6 January 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 9 January 11). 
170 ‘‘The CPC Central Committee and the State Council Hold the Fifth Tibet Work Forum; Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao Deliver Important Speeches,’’ Xinhua, 22 January 10 (translated in Open 
Source Center, 25 January 10). 
171 ‘‘Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan Farmers, Herdsmen,’’ Xinhua, 10 Janu-
ary 11. ‘‘[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has a rural population of 2.21 million, of whom more 
than 235,000 are aged 60 or over.’’ (The January 2011 report likely refers to a 2010 statistic.) 
172 Based on official Chinese media reports, the government has settled or resettled into new 
housing 1.43 million ‘‘farmers and herdsmen’’ among the Tibet Autonomous Region’s 2.21 mil-
lion rural population. Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous 
Regional Chairman Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional Peo-
ple’s Congress on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao 
dahui disi ci huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated 
in Open Source Center, 25 February 11) (‘‘Around 1.43 million farmers and herdsmen . . . 
moved into safe and affordable homes.’’); ‘‘Rural Pension System Extended to 2 Mln Tibetan 
Farmers, Herdsmen,’’ Xinhua, 10 January 11 (‘‘[The Tibet Autonomous Region] has a rural pop-
ulation of 2.21 million.’’). For information on the compulsory nature of the program, see Human 
Rights Watch, ‘‘ ‘No One Has the Liberty To Refuse’—Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in 
Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region,’’ 11 June 07. 
173 For more information on the network of railways the Chinese government plans to build 
on the Tibetan plateau, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 46– 
53; CECC, 2009 Annual Report, 10 October 10, 285–86. For information on the completion of 
the Qinghai-Tibet railway in July 2006 and passenger traffic during the first year of operation, 
see CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 166–68; CECC, 2007 Annual Report, 10 Octo-
ber 07, 203–4. 
174 Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chair-
man Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress 
on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 25 February 11); ‘‘Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,’’ Xinhua, 16 Feb-
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175 ‘‘Tibet’s New Railway To Open in 2014,’’ China Daily, 2 September 11. 
176 ‘‘Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,’’ Xinhua, 16 February 11. 
177 ‘‘Tibet Starts Building 5th Civil Airport,’’ Xinhua, 29 April 09. 
178 Dan Zengshe, ‘‘Government Work Report—Delivered by Tibet Autonomous Regional Chair-
man Baima Chilin at the Fourth Session of the Ninth Autonomous Regional People’s Congress 
on 10 January 2011’’ [2011 nian 1 yue 10 ri zai zizhiqu dijiu jie renmin daibiao dahui disi ci 
huiyi shang zizhiqu zhuxi baima chilin], Tibet Daily, 9 February 11 (translated in Open Source 
Center, 25 February 11); ‘‘Lhasa-Xigaze Railway To Be Completed by 2015,’’ Xinhua, 16 Feb-
ruary 11. 
179 CECC Staff Analysis. The decision on whether to route the railway along the northern or 
southern bank of the river has economic and security implications. Most of the forestry and min-
eral resources, as well as most of the population, are on the north side of the river, but a section 
of the China-India border that China disputes is on the south side of the river. 
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city and Lhasa, see CECC, Special Topic Paper: Tibet 2008–2009, 22 October 09, 49–53. 
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to the report, Luo Yulin, Vice Chairman of the Qinghai government, ‘‘hopes that work will start 
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Be Built Through Tibet, Xinjiang’’ [Shier wu qijian jiang jiancheng guantong xizang xinjiang 
zhanlue tielu wang], Xinhua, 6 March 11, reprinted in People’s Daily, 7 March 11. 
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